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Adorno's Critique of Judgment: the recovery of negativity from the 
philosophies of Kant and Hegel - Richard John Stopford 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis has four primary aims.  Firstly, I develop an account of Adorno’s 
critique of Kant and Hegel’s philosophy.  I argue that the role and structure of 
judgement is key to his critical analysis.  Adorno's discussion of their 
metaphysics, epistemology revolves around an immanent critique of judgement.  
This critique reveals, in the dialectical sense, the irreducibility of the 'negative 
moment' within judgement. 
 
This critical exposition grounds the second aim of the thesis.  Analysis of Kant 
and Hegel's philosophies enables us to discern a number of key concepts in 
Adorno's own thought, concepts which will help us to understand his notion of 
negativity.  In particular, his dialectical critique produces a constellation of 
critical - or negative - dialectical concepts: conceptless [begriffslose], non-
identity [Nichtidentität], mediation [Vermittlung].  
 
The generation of these concepts and their elucidation provides the basis for the 
third aim: to give a textually viable and philosophically fruitful explanation of 
key commitments in Adorno’s negative dialectics.  I argue that negative 
dialectics does not amount to a system, a standpoint, or even a set of principles.  
Rather, it is a critical activity.  The commitments, which revolve around the 
constellation of concepts outlined above, indicate a critical sensitivity to the 
limits of epistemology and metaphysics and the problem that these limits pose for 
judgement. 
 
Finally, I develop the resources to answer Michael Rosen’s claim that Adorno’s 
rejection of Hegelian determinate negation leaves his dialectics without any 
dynamic force.  Drawing upon aesthetics, we can better understand the dynamics 
of negative dialectics.  Aesthetic engagement with artworks not only 
demonstrates an appropriate orientation of philosophy to material, it is also an 
appropriate medium through which we can gain a clearer understanding of the 
philosophical commitments elucidated above.  
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Introduction
 
 
In Minima Moralia, Adorno offers the following: "Advice to intellectuals: let no-
one represent you." (MM: 128).  We will see that issues of representation play an 
important role in his thinking — from the consideration of discursive 
representations of objects in judgements through to representation as some form 
of artistic goal.   In all cases, however, he worries that the processes and 
resources required for the various representations we make result in distortions of 
that which they are intended to represent.  Furthermore, he worries that the 
representation is often taken as sufficient to, or a substitute for, the object 
represented.  In this move we run the risk of losing touch with the unique, 
irreducible particularity of that which we were trying to represent.  From worries 
of distortion through to the occlusion of our objects of concern, underpinning 
Adorno's concern with representation is essentially ethical: how do we think 
about objects, about the world and about ourselves in a way which does justice to 
that which we are considering?   
 
It is no surprise that he also considers representation as a meta-philosophical 
concern: that the very representation of one's philosophy by another generates the 
risk of misrepresentation and distortion.  Various forms of discursive 
representation such as précis, distillation, interpretation, etc., all attempt to 
convey a set of ideas in some other form.  Adorno's concern is that the other form 
may not be amenable to the ideas represented.  For Adorno, as we will see, the 
form of presentation must adapt itself to the content of the ideas if the form itself 
is not to distort the content of the idea.  Form and content operate together, they 
mediate each other.  For Adorno, you cannot simply detach one from another and 
'plug' either into a different context without serious distortion.  
 
Adorno's complex, fastidious style is a function of this concern.  The style and 
form of his writing was an attempt to develop a mode of expression amenable to 
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the representation of certain ideas without distorting them.  The implication is 
that if we try to represent the content differently, distortion is inevitable.  Hence 
his concern that he be able to represent himself, with all its legalistic 
connotations. 
 
In this thesis, insofar as I am offering an interpretation of certain aspects of 
Adorno's philosophy, I am attempting to represent him.  I am attempting 
something that Adorno did not wish to happen.  The problem is, as a result of 
Adorno's style, understanding him is extremely difficult.  It is also arguable that 
understanding involves some form of representation.  As a function of 
understanding Adorno, I have to represent his thought in a manner that is 
intelligible to myself.  Therefore, it may be that representation is unavoidable and 
it may also be that Adorno's style lends itself to representative distortion. 
 
Adorno was aware of these points.  He says at the beginning of Negative 
Dialectics that no theory escapes the marketplace: that all theories enter into 
forces of exchange, repackaging, consumption.  He also states that thinking his 
own theory would escape this fate would be no more than 'self-advertising' (ND: 
4).  It is a humble moment.  In immediate response to this concern, he says that 
dialectics is, in its most simplified and reduced expression, the idea that "objects 
do not go into their concepts without remainder" (ND: 5).  What he means by this 
is not yet clear, analysis is required to understand this claim and it will be 
considered in due course.  Indeed, I will argue that this sort of claim should not 
be understood as an axiom in a system or a transcendental principle.  Rather it is 
a generalized commitment derived from and justified by particular dialectical 
analyses of particular objects and concepts.  However, this statement is a clear 
indication that no matter how involved Adorno's philosophy becomes, he himself 
acknowledges that there are commitments which can be picked out and analyzed.  
It is the aim of this thesis to locate these core commitments, analyse and provide 
a coherent account of them. 
 
Adorno's theories have a history of interpretation within social, cultural and 
musicological domains.  However, his explicitly philosophical work has been 
somewhat neglected in Anglophone philosophy until about the last fifteen years: 
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including excellent studies by Jarvis (1998), Zuidervaart (1991), O'Connor 
(2004), Bernstein (2001), Hammer (2006), Foster (2007) and recently Cook 
(2004 & 2011).  In this thesis, I will be considering issues of epistemology and 
metaphysics within Adorno's thinking and so will be primarily concerned with 
the interpretations offered by O'Connor and Foster. 
 
Whilst I think that both of these studies have much to recommend them, I am in 
disagreement with certain claims.  Exactly what those problems are will be 
discussed shortly.  Aside from specific issues, I think there is a general strategic 
problem with their accounts: they, particularly O'Connor, have tried to give a 
'representation' of Adorno's philosophy.  That is, a determinate, systematic 
position which counts as 'Adorno's philosophy'.  Such an ambition, I think, 
misses an important subtlety in Adorno's thinking: philosophy, for him, is a 
critical practice, with commitments certainly, but it is not a reified 'position' 
(ND: 6) — a theme I will return to.  Furthermore, philosophy can be analyzed in 
its own right but the practice of philosophy is an integrated critical activity, 
mediated through other critical enquiries such as sociology, history, musicology, 
economics, etc.  Wresting the philosophy from other modes of critical enquiry 
and discourse will result in its distortion. 
 
In this thesis, I offer another interpretation of Adorno's critical thinking.  I try to 
maintain his own presence in the interpretation through close readings of both 
well-known and slightly less well-known texts — in particular drawing upon 
many of his recently translated and published lectures.  My interpretation will 
also develop from within his own critical analysis of two of his primary 
influences: Kant and Hegel.  Following Adorno's thinking enables us to develop 
key philosophical commitments in his various critiques of epistemological and 
metaphysical positions.   
 
To develop the analysis of these commitments, I will use debates from 
contemporary philosophy: for example, I think the metaphysical debate over 
material constitution is instructive for developing Adorno’s thinking about 
nonidentity. This may appear to stray too far from Adorno’s own idiom.  What I 
believe it indicates is that Adorno’s thinking is neither as esoteric and obtuse as is 
14 
 
often believed and that his dialectical thinking is amenable to analysis – albeit 
analysis which is sensitive to the particular modality of dialectical thought.  
Furthermore, it suggests that Adorno has interesting and relevant points to make 
in contemporary philosophical debate.  The key concern in developing these 
commitments is not to reify his thinking.  Rather than presenting his thought as a 
‘system’, I instead attempt to show how these commitments work within 
particular critical activities — the analysis of an artwork, for example.  In this 
way we maintain what was so important to Adorno: dynamic, fluid, responsive, 
critical thinking. 
 
The Argument and Aims 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to provide an interpretation of Adorno's 
epistemological and metaphysical commitments.  These commitments underpin 
his 'negative dialectics' - the name he gives to his critical mode of thinking.  
Strategically, these commitments will be developed through an analysis of 
Adorno's critique of Kant and Hegel.  When he critiques both thinkers, he 
explicitly engages with them over issues of epistemology and metaphysics.  As 
such, his engagement with these two thinkers provides excellent resources and 
insight into his own views on epistemology and metaphysics.  I argue that the 
motivation for his core commitments revolves around a concern for how we 
judge.  That is, how we represent ourselves and the world to ourselves and to 
each other. It becomes apparent that this concern with judgement and 
representation is intimately related to concerns over the complexity of the objects 
we are attempting to judge. 
 
I argue that Adorno's philosophical commitments are captured by a constellation 
of concepts: the conceptless [der begriffslose], nonidentity [Nichtidentität], 
mediation [Vermittlung].  This constellation emerges from Adorno's critiques of 
Kant and Hegel, their accounts of judgement and their accounts of what it is that 
we judge.  Awareness of the commitments captured by these concepts is 
important if our judgements are to have claim to truth and also if they are to be 
sensitive to the particularity of the entities we are attempting to judge.  We find 
that the purpose of these concepts is to re-orientate our thinking back towards 
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material objects and the import of their irreducible difference to mind.  This 
difference acts as a limit to epistemology and metaphysics.  In turn this limit 
entails that our attempts to achieve a positive, unified, systematic and complete 
knowledge of world is impossible.  The persistence of the limitations of 
knowledge and on our philosophical endeavours is what Adorno's negativity 
consists in.  I will argue that 'negativity', for Adorno, entails both epistemic 
humility and a predominantly critical inflection to our knowledge-making 
activities. 
 
In line with my claim that Adorno's philosophy is more critical practice than a 
determinate position, I apply the theoretical resources I have developed in my 
interpretation to a key concern for Adorno: how do we judge an object to be an 
artwork?  In keeping with Adorno's commitment to particular, bespoke analysis, I 
will examine the case of a specific object, Duchamp’s Fountain, and how we 
might judge it to be an artwork.  This analysis is provided in order to deepen our 
understanding of Adorno's thought. However, inasmuch as it is a compelling 
analysis of an artwork, we have reason to believe that Adorno's approach 'works' 
— Rosen argues, given Adorno's reconfiguration of Hegel's dialectics, that 
Adorno's method lacks essential resources to fulfil its aims.  I suggest Adorno’s 
dialectics do work if we interpret its commitments correctly.  Furthermore, the 
analysis of an artwork goes some way to justifying Adorno's critical approach: 
that if objects are really complex in the way Adorno believes they are and if 
making judgements about them requires the sort of critical approach adopted by 
Adorno, then we have some reason to take Adorno's philosophy seriously on 
issues of judgement.  
 
I bring my analysis to a close by reconsidering Adorno's critiques of Kant and 
Hegel in light of my presentation of Adorno's thinking.  I argue that whilst we 
have seen Adorno critique Kant and Hegel and that his commitments have 
emerged from these critiques, it would be false to understand them as a rejection 
of Kant and Hegel.  Rather, these commitments are best understood as a mutual 
critique of Kant and Hegel.  That is, Adorno's negative dialectics is itself a 
dialectical consequence of Hegel's critique of Kant but also of a Kantian critique 
of Hegel: negative dialectics is the interpenetration of Kantian and Hegelian 
philosophy. 
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The Structure 
 
The thesis is separated into three sections
1
: Sections One and Two deal with 
Adorno’s 'immanent critiques' of Kant and Hegel respectively.  The idea of 
immanent critique is developed by Hegel (PoS: 58 & 9) and is intimately 
associated with dialectical method.  Put simply it is the idea that critique of a 
position operates by making explicit the contradictions, or tensions, within it.  
The contradiction itself provides the grounds for determining what is wrong with 
a position and how the position must be reconsidered in order to dissolve the 
contradiction. Hence the critique is objective in the sense that it does not develop 
according to the opinions of the critic but according to a real contradictions or 
tensions within the position itself.  For thinkers as concerned with dogmatism as 
Hegel and Adorno, such a method is extremely attractive.
2
 
 
Section One 
 
It is clear from Adorno’s lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and in 
scattered analyses on Kant that he thinks there are contradictions – or at least 
aporias or tensions – in Kant’s thinking.  It is not the purpose of this thesis to 
argue for either the validity of his analysis or how it fares against contemporary 
Kantian scholarship.  Whilst I do think that Adorno's criticisms are insightful and 
compelling, the intention is to understand Adorno's critique of Kant insofar as it 
enables him to develop his own thought. 
This section is divided into three chapters.  The first chapter provides an 
orientation of Adorno's critique of Kant.  He argues that the primary tension in 
Kantian philosophy is captured by the theoretical tensions between the 
'constituens' and 'constitutum'.  These are Adorno's own terms and are quite 
                                                 
1
 The thesis is divided into 'sections' comprising of 'chapters' which in turn comprise in 'parts'.  
Clarity over these terms is relevant for reference in cross-referencing. 
2
 Finlayson argues in a footnote that Adorno moves away from a theory of immanent critique. 
(2009: 627).  This is a complicated issue and beyond the scope of this thesis.  It should be noted 
that whilst Adorno does argue that there is an element of self-delusion in immanent-critique - it is 
impossible to conduct an entirely presuppositionless critique - it is still an appropriate method for 
developing a notion of aporias and tensions.  What is also required is a critique of immanence and 
its own tensions.  He does not however, given the problems with aspects of immanent critique, 
opt instead for transcendental critique. See AT: 199, 237, 323 & 380.  
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obscure.  As they are central notions for him, it is necessary to understand what 
exactly they mean and what they refer to.  It will be argued that these terms refer 
to a number of different dualities in Kant's thinking.  In turn, Adorno argues that 
these dualities enable Kant to fix one side of the dualism in order to provide a 
stable basis for the determination of the other side.  Two of the key dualisms 
highlighted by Adorno are: empirical subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity; 
cognizing, discursive subjects and the material objects which they cognize. 
As we will see, Adorno wishes to argue that these dualisms emerge in Kant's 
philosophy due to its epistemic ambitions: to produce an objectively valid basis 
for knowledge from subjectivity itself.  In turn, this particular account of 
objectivity requires a theory of judgement orientated around 'identity-thinking'.  
Adorno's criticism of identity-thinking concerns the presumed sufficiency of our 
conceptual resources for the representation of particular objects: he thinks this 
sufficiency is misguided.  So the analysis of constituens and constitutum leads us 
to an analysis of Kant's theory of judgement. 
In the second chapter, I consider identity-thinking.  I propose two possible 
interpretations each operating with a particular mode of 'sufficiency': the 
qualitative interpretation — that our concepts are not sufficiently fine-grained 
enough to capture the particularity of their referents; and the quantitative 
interpretation — which takes the critique of identity-thinking to be a numerical 
insufficiency of conceptual resources for the representation of a particular 
referent.  I argue against both these interpretations for textual and for theoretical 
reasons.  Instead, I argue that what Adorno has in mind is a metaphysical 
concern: the way objects are is such that our conceptual representations of them 
may well be conceptually valid but they cannot sufficiently represent the object 
as a totality. This insufficiency is, on the one hand, a point concerning the 
difference between the form of concepts and the material form of the world 
which judgements attempt to represent.  On the other, it is an awareness of the 
history of objects: any set of judgements may be correct at a particular time; 
however, there will always be more to be said of an object as it undergoes 
changes as a result of the influence of historical change on it.  Therefore, our 
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conceptual determinations of an object can never be entirely sufficient at any one 
time. 
 
In the third chapter, I develop why Adorno thinks that Kant's philosophy is a 
mode of 'identity-thinking' and why such a way of thinking is problematic. 
Adorno argues that the dualisms analysed in chapter one are structured such that 
one side of the dualism can fix and determine the other side.  In particular, the 
subject is able to fix and conceptually determine the objects of its cognition and 
then represent those determinations in judgement.  The validity of this fixing, of 
the object by the subject is determined transcendentally.  I will analyse Kant's 
theory of judgement, propositions and his associated theory of objects — as 
referents of conceptual determinations — and show how this theory of 
judgement is wedded to the sort of identity-thinking Adorno criticises.   
Adorno worries that when we take our discursive, conceptual representations of 
the world as sufficient to how the world really is, we both substitute and distort 
the rich particularity of experience for a generalised representation of it and we 
also lose the limits to subjectivity.  In turn, the loss of the limits to subjectivity 
has a two-fold problem: without a substantial, objective limit to discursive 
representation which arises from the insufficiency of our general conceptual 
representations to particular material objects, we lose the conditions for genuine 
objectivity; secondly, and relatedly, our subjectivity comes to mistake itself for 
objectivity.  Not only does this latter point indicate an epistemic confusion, 
Adorno argues that there is a deeper psychological worry that the thoroughly 
subjective ego becomes unstable.   
 
Section Two 
 
Having analysed Adorno's key criticisms of Kant, I turn to his critique of Hegel.  
Again, this is an immanent critique whereby Adorno argues that there are 
tensions and contradictions in Hegel's thinking that dialectical critique is required 
to overcome.  Like the first section, the intention here is not to justify Adorno's 
critique of Hegel, interesting as I think it is, but to use this critique in order to 
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understand his own thinking.  At the end of this section, we will be in a position 
to appreciate commitments in Adorno's thinking which emerge from the analysis 
of this and the first sections.  These commitments are captured in the conceptual 
constellation, referred to earlier, of conceptlessness, nonidentity and mediation.   
 
We will also be left with a possible problem.  As Adorno's critique of Hegel 
involves a rethinking of dialectics, we will have to consider Rosen's concern that 
Adorno's dialectics is unable to generate the motoric force essential to dialectics.  
Through analysis of this conceptual constellation and a demonstration with a 
particular case in aesthetics, I show in the third section that Adorno's dialectics 
still 'works'. 
 
In this section I will argue that Adorno is in some ways Hegelian and in some 
ways very anti-Hegelian.  To make sense of the fine-grained distinctions in his 
reception of Hegel, I will present in the first chapter an account of the key aspects 
of Hegel's philosophy which prove to be particularly influential on Adorno.  The 
account will cover Hegel's theory of judgements, propositions, essences and 
modality, the dialectical ontology we find in the Science of Logic, the structure of 
dialectics itself and what may count as truth within Hegel's thought.  The account 
offered here is certainly controversial and I acknowledge that, just as with Kant, 
there are very different interpretations available to us in contemporary 
philosophy.  However, the account offered is intended to capture a conception of 
Hegel's philosophy which Adorno appears to hold.  In turn this will enable us to 
come to an understanding of Adorno's own commitments. 
 
In the second chapter of this section, I consider the ways in which we may see 
Adorno as an Hegelian thinker.  I argue that Adorno is impressed by Hegel's 
dialectical view of judgements — that judgements contain nonidentical elements 
which cannot simply be equated in the form of predication.  Associatedly, I argue 
that he is greatly influenced by Hegel's critique of Kant's dualism of form and 
content; Hegel argues that they are always 'mediated' and Adorno agrees.  That 
is, form and content are inseparable and determine each other through their 
mutual instantiation.  He is also impressed by Hegel's rethinking of modal 
concerns — the way that an object is is not determined according to the 
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transcendental conditions of mind but according to objective ways the world is.  
Most importantly, perhaps, Adorno is also convinced by the dynamic character of 
judgement within Hegel's thinking.  I then conclude with a meta-philosophical 
concern which, I think, motivates Adorno's sympathy with Hegelian dialectics: 
like Hegel, he sees dialectics as a way to think about the world in a way which is 
non-dogmatic. 
 
In the third chapter, I examine the ways in which Adorno rethinks Hegel's 
philosophy.  I consider his concerns with the apriorism and rationalism of Hegel's 
dialectics.  In line with Adorno's materialism, he considers a priori thought as a 
socio-historical construction to be understood according to its context — thought 
can never detach itself from his material conditions in history and in society.  
Indeed, Adorno argues that the unified totality which Hegel's dialectics achieves 
at the end of both the Logic and the Phenomenology are another moment to be 
negated dialectically.  We see that Adorno's immanent critique of Hegel's 
dialectics leads to a transition to 'negative dialectics'.  The attempt of thinking to 
transcend contingency and produce a thoroughly systematic and unified body of 
knowledge, fails for Adorno.  What is left is the persistence of negativity, the 
dialectical moment of nonidentity.  What such a dialectics consists in will be the 
subject of the final section. 
 
I conclude this section with a brief analysis of the concepts which capture the 
philosophical commitments emerging from the critiques of the first two sections.   
Adorno argues that philosophy needs to reorientate itself back towards that which 
is conceptless — i.e., the material world.  Conceptlessness simply indicates the 
categorical difference between material objects and the conceptual entities which 
we use to represent those objects in thought and in language.  Adorno's concern 
with the conceptless is a concern with this categorical — or ontological — 
difference which acts as an immanent limit on our knowledge-making activities. 
 
This difference is then captured by nonidentity.  There are various nonidentities 
in Adorno's philosophy — the nonidentity of mind and world, the nonidentity of 
material objects and the discursive representations of them and also there are 
ways that material objects are nonidentical to themselves.   
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Finally, mediation is an important modal notion which captures the way that 
objects are.  Mediation is a distinctly Hegelian notion and is one that persists in 
Adorno's thinking.  The idea of mediation is that entities are not pure, simple and 
discrete; rather, the way that an object is, and indeed what it is, relies on the way 
that other objects are, i.e., the modality of an object's existence relies on 
heterogeneous elements.  For Adorno, the fundamental mediation of material 
objects is through their socio-historical context. 
 
Section Three 
 
In this section, I analyse the conceptual resources and commitments developed in 
the first two sections.  The intention is to show how Adorno's philosophical 
commitments — to conceptlessness, nonidentity and mediation — underpin his 
understanding of philosophy as a critical practice. 
 
I begin with a chapter on conceptlessness.  In this chapter I consider another 
substantial interpretation of this notion, found in the work of Foster and 
O'Connor, that Adorno is working with a theory of non-conceptual content in 
experience.  I argue that this is both a mistranslation of der begriffslose and when 
formulated, strains intelligibility.  Instead I wish to argue that this term, as 
Adorno uses it, emphasises the ontological difference between concepts and their 
material referents such that material entities are not conceptual.  It is therefore, a 
quite thin notion.  However, it not a trivial point for Adorno. He argues that 
epistemology is tasked to overcome this difference.  That is, mind and world may 
be different but it is our philosophical ambition that this difference be dissolved 
or that we find a way that mind can sufficiently represent the world.  Adorno's 
thought is that this is an impossible ambition and one that has led to a great many 
problems in philosophy. 
 
In the second chapter, I develop Adorno's account of nonidentity and mediation.  
I argue that not only does he see a substantial difference between the conceptual 
identifications we make of objects, but that objects themselves are in some way 
different to themselves - they have moments of nonidentity internally.  I think 
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that this is one of the most obscure aspects of Adorno's philosophy.  However, 
despite its superficial strangeness, I argue that we can make sense of this notion, 
at least in the first instance, through a debate in contemporary metaphysics over 
the issue of material constitution.  I show how a thesis of co-locating objects can 
help us to understand Adorno's theory of nonidentity and mediation. 
 
I then develop this analysis towards a deeper more Adornian conception of 
nonidentity by analysing an actual artwork: Fountain by Duchamp.  Again, the 
primary role of this analysis is to understand Adorno's position rather than 
attempting to provide a definitive analysis of this artwork.  However, that we can 
provide what appears a compelling analysis of Fountain does speak in favour of 
Adorno's dialectics.  Furthermore, and more importantly for the aims of this 
thesis, the analysis shows that Adorno's dialectics still functions without 
determinate negation.  Hence we have a possible solution to the worry raised by 
Rosen that Adorno's dialectics may not work.   
 
Finally, I reconsider Adorno's critiques of Kant and Hegel.  I show that whilst my 
analysis of the critique of Kant highlighted the critical aspects of Adorno's view, 
the development of Adorno's negative dialectics reveals important ways in which 
Adorno appears indebted to Kant.  I argue in this final chapter that the best way 
to understand Adorno's philosophical commitments is as a dialectical sublation of 
Kant and Hegel's thought.  That is, Adorno uses Hegel to criticise Kant and is 
influenced by Hegel in such matters; however, Adorno's counter critique of 
Hegel and some of the motivations for that critique has distinctly Kantian 
elements.  In short, I represent Adorno's negative dialectics as the 
interpenetration of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy to produce a dynamic 
conception of philosophy as a critical practice. 
 
*** 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
Section One 
 
 
  
 
Adorno's Immanent Critique 
of Kant's Philosophy
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Introduction 
 
 
 
In this section I consider Adorno's critique of Kant.  The intention is two-fold: 
firstly it is to develop Adorno's own philosophical commitments and secondly, to 
provide an account of his critical encounter with Kant.  In the first chapter, I 
highlight a conceptual constellation which Adorno takes as indicating a structural 
tension in Kant's philosophy: the constituens and constitutum.  Adorno's usage of 
these terms is, however, fluid and at times obscure.  The reason for this obscurity 
is largely because these terms denote a type of relation that occurs in Kant's 
philosophy but which has many particular forms.  However, the general idea is 
that there is that which constitutes [constituens] and that which is constituted 
[constitutum].  What is important for Adorno is that both the constituter and the 
constituted are fixed and the relation between them is fixed.   
 
Having determined the general idea behind these terms we can develop particular 
important instances of fixity.  I will follow Adorno's own focus on the relation 
between the transcendental subject which constitutes the essential grounds of the 
empirical subject and also on the relation between cognizing subjects and objects 
of cognition.  I argue that Adorno's concern is fundamentally that the epistemic 
and metaphysical fixity which underpins Kant's thinking, systematically distorts 
the rich particularity of experience.  Here we develop the beginnings of Adorno's 
philosophical commitments.  That philosophy, and the modes of thinking it 
underwrites, must be fluid and sensitive to the dynamic richness of experience.  
When philosophy loses this dynamism it lapses into what Adorno refers to as 
identity-thinking. 
 
In the second chapter, I consider the notion of identity-thinking.  Insofar as 
Adorno understands Kant's philosophy as fixed and static, he thinks that Kant is 
an identity-thinker.  I analyse this notion and offer two common interpretations 
of it, both of which I reject.  Instead I suggest that it is a concern that we can read 
ontological commitments off our language - that the world is how it is 
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represented in language.  Adorno is not therefore saying we cannot talk about the 
world successfully nor identify objects.  Rather we need to understand that there 
is a fundamental difference between the way material objects are and how we 
represent those objects in language.  Awareness of this difference is requisite for 
maintaining a sensitivity towards objects as such.  This awareness acts as a 
bulwark against substituting the real world for abstract conceptual models of it. 
 
In the final chapter I consider the import of identity-thinking in Kant's 
philosophy.  Due to the fixity discussed in the first chapter, Kant believes he has 
developed a systematic basis for the development of objectively valid, 
determinative judgements.  Operating with this model of judgement, our 
judgements just are sufficient representations of objects for Kant.  Adorno wishes 
to break down the fixity of Kant's transcendental thinking and with it he critiques 
the model of judgement which it gives rise to.  His critique of Kantian judgement 
sets the scene for the next section where he moves towards a more dialectical 
mode of philosophising which in turn provides the grounds for a dialectical 
model of judgement. 
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1. 'Constituens' and 'Constitutum' 
 
 
In his lectures on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Adorno says that the problem 
of 'the constituens and constitutum' is a central critical concern (KCPR: 138).  In 
order to understand his engagement with Kant, therefore, we will have to make 
sense of this pair of concepts.   
 
We will see that in giving an account of the constituens and constitutum, Adorno 
argues that there are irreducible tensions in Kant's philosophy.  Kant attempts to 
fix the elements of his philosophy yet the very fact that those elements are not 
really amenable to such fixing leads to tension within the system.  The primary 
tension which arises as a result of this fixity grating against the inherent 
dynamism of the elements is that of dynamic character of objects of perception 
on the one hand and the autonomy and priority of our cognitive agency on the 
other.  According to Adorno, Kant tries to fix what objects and subjects are and 
that the former is sufficiently determined in judgement by the latter.  Adorno 
believes that neither subjects nor objects are amenable to this fixity.   
 
Adorno argues that these tensions led Kant to make claims which rely on pre-
critical assumptions which overstep the critical limitations of epistemology and 
metaphysics upon which transcendental idealism is supposedly based.  To 
develop Adorno's analysis, I will draw upon Strawson's seminal work.  This is 
instructive in its similarities to Adorno's position and also in the way in which the 
two thinkers differ.  Adorno's critique is not orientated towards what can be 
'saved' within Kant's thinking; rather it is to develop an understanding, through 
the problems in Kant's philosophy, of what he believes are constitutive problems 
which we face in philosophy. 
 
Piecing together various critical analyses of Kant, the conceptual pair constituens 
and constitutum highlights, for Adorno, reification in Kant's philosophy (in 
particular, reification of the transcendental subject).  He argues that this 
reification is necessary to produce a stable basis for the generation of an 
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objectively valid epistemology.  
 
[S]ubjectification and reification do not merely diverge, they are 
correlates.  The more knowledge is functionalized and made a product 
of cognition, the more perfectly will its moment of motion be credited 
to the subject as its activity, while the object becomes the result of the 
labour that has  congealed in it — a dead thing. (ND: 91) 
 
The reification of subjectivity is concomitant with a reification of the objects of 
experience.  Reification is an important notion in Adorno's thinking and refers to 
the process of turning a dynamic, particular entity into something abstract and 
rigid, divorced from the socio-historical conditions within which the object is 
produced.
3
   
 
It becomes apparent, however, that Adorno does not merely see reification as a 
problem endemic to Kantian philosophy, but indicates a general trend. Therefore, 
analysis of the constituens and constitutum will lay the foundation for orientating 
our attention on a key philosophical concern in Adorno's critical philosophy: 
identity-thinking.  This is a mode of philosophising which Adorno argues is key 
to understanding why we end up reifying both subjects and objects.  So in order 
to develop an understanding of this more general concern, we will move from a 
critical analysis of the tensions in Kant's theory of the subject into a discussion of 
Kant's theory of determinative judgement in the next chapter. 
 
Adorno's hermeneutic analysis is controversial and idiosyncratic compared to 
much Kantian scholarship.  It is not the intention, here, to argue Adorno's 
position against other scholarly interpretations.  I will note, when appropriate, the 
moments when Adorno is either in line with or at odds with contemporary 
debates.  However, the primary concern is to develop a critical account of the key 
issues in his analysis of Kant's philosophy. 
 
1.1 Elucidation of Terms 
 
The terms constituens and constitutum form a conceptual constellation for 
                                                 
3
 See ND: 189 - 91, 370, 374 - 5.  On the background of the concept of reification, see Lukács, 
1971: 83 - 110. Jay ,1984: 109 - 111.  Reification may also refer to 'natural' entities. 
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Adorno.  A constellation is a number of related concepts which are not reducible 
to each other but are required to mutually make sense of each other.
4
  
Furthermore, Adorno holds that constellations of concepts must be fluid in order 
to account for their own history of use and also to account for the historical 
character of their referents.  Consequently, considering concepts as historical 
clusters of related notions is to consider them in a particularly fluid way.  This 
fluidity puts pressure on our ability to understand and define such concepts. 
 
At its most general the constituens and constitutum constellation, unsurprisingly, 
refers to issues of constitution within Kant's thinking: how things are constituted 
and how things constitute and the relationship between the two.   Yet this 
general, thematic notion is too broad to be helpful.  We must consider the 
particular ways and instances of the theme to develop a substantial understanding 
of what is being referred to and what is at stake in the notion.  Adorno considers 
the different ways this theme of constitution appears in Kant's philosophy: in 
particular, he analyses it as it concerns the relationship between empirical, 
individual subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity.  
 
Adorno introduces the terms constituens and constitutum but does not provide 
explicit, definitions.
5
  He says the constituens is 'the pure consciousness through 
which the actual world comes into being' and that the constitutum is 'the world in 
the broadest sense' (KCPR: 147).  The definition of the constituens is unhelpfully 
esoteric and the definition of the constitutum is unhelpfully thin.  Elsewhere 
Adorno defines the constituens as the 'constitutive sphere' (KCPR: 155) and also 
as the realm of the transcendental.
6
  In Negative Dialectics, he uses the same 
terminology of constituens and constitutum which he uses to make a pejorative 
characterisation of the empirical realm within a certain mode of enquiry: 
                                                 
4
 See ND: 53, 104, 127 and esp. 162. 
5
 These terms have a history in the rationalist tradition but as verbs denoting an ontological idea.  
Spinoza (1883) uses it ontologically in the Ethics, for whatever 'constitutes' the essence of an 
entity: see for example, Axiom 4 and Proposition 10.  Leibniz (1909) also uses the French verb, 
constituer, in the Monadology to denote the ontological relation of the soul and bodies of monads 
to living things or animals: See section 63 for example.  It is likely that Adorno has this 
ontological connotation in mind when he uses this constellation. 
6
 See also: "The reductio ad hominem thus becomes the collapse of anthropocentrism.  The fact 
that man as a constituens is in turn man-made disenchants the creationism of mind." (CM: 251) & 
ND: 91. 
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Reflections on the instrument of scientific knowledge have long ceased 
to touch its substance; they only touch upon what may be cognoscible 
[sic] at all, on the validity of scientific judgments. To such reflection, 
any definite knowledge is subaltern, a mere constitutum. (ND: 72) 
 
Adorno's point is that when enquiry only concerns itself with the conditions of 
empirical knowledge, the form and content of knowledge — that which pertains 
to the individual objects of empirical experience — becomes relevant only 
insofar as it can be underwritten by those universally valid conditions.  Particular 
experiences are relevant only insofar as they can be subsumed within the general 
conditions of experience. Already then, a concern with sensitivity to our 
judgements about particulars is emerging from elucidation of these terms. 
 
As presented, the distinction between a constituting judgement and the 
constituted objects of judgement seems commensurable with Kant's 
transcendental philosophy: it is concerned to provide the conditions for empirical 
cognition and knowledge of that which obtains in sensible appearance.  That is, 
we focus on what does the constituting and from there we can make claims about 
what is constituted.  Adorno links his term constituens to Kant's own lexicon in 
the form of konstituieren: 
 
In a Kantian sense the objectification of character could be localized 
only in the realm of the constitutum, not in that of the constituens. 
Otherwise, Kant would be committing the same paralogism of which 
he convicts the rationalists.  
 
The subject is to be free, however, as it posits—"constitutes," 
[konstituiert] in Kant’s language—its own identity, the basis of its 
legality. That the constituens is to be the transcendental subject and the 
constitutum the empirical one does not remove the contradiction, for 
there is no transcendental subject other than one individualized as a 
unit of consciousness—in other words, as a moment of the empirical 
subject. The transcendental subject needs the irreducible nonidentity 
which simultaneously delimits the legality. Without that nonidentical 
element there would be neither identity nor an immanent law of 
subjectivity. (ND: 241) 
 
Here we can see Adorno use this constellation in relation to divisions in Kantian 
subjectivity itself.  There is a 'constituting' transcendental subject which 
determines the 'constituted' empirical subject.  We can see then that Adorno uses 
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the constellation to refer to different issues which will be discussed in detail 
shortly.   
 
However, his attribution of this thematic notion to Kant is perplexing on a 
number of levels.  Kant does not use the term konstituiert — at least in the CPR.  
Furthermore, this term means 'constituted' and is passive rather than active; 
Adorno's linking of it to positing, which is in the active voice, seems strange.  
 
There is a more important worry that Kant appears to reserve the family of terms 
revolving around konstituieren [constitute] to konstitutiv which is the adjective, 
constitutive.  He then uses these terms to talk about the distinction between 
constitutive and regulative principles of understanding and reason.  Constitutive 
principles are any a priori principles which tell us what to think.  For example, 
the dynamic principles of understanding are constitutive.  In contrast, regulative 
principles are the a priori rules for thinking as such.7  Therefore, Adorno's linking 
of his terminology to Kant's in the context seems somewhat inappropriate. 
 
Finally, Kant seems at pains to point out that for transcendental reasons, the 
constitutive import of subjectivity is severely limited; for the most part, the a 
priori principles of understanding are taking a regulative as opposed to 
constitutive role in the determination of phenomenal appearances.  This seems 
directly counter to Adorno's contention. 
 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Adorno does not have a valid point to make 
about Kant's philosophy using these terms.  It is clear from the quotation in 
Negative Dialectics that Adorno is considering the transcendental subject, even in 
its regulative role, as having a constitutive influence on both the contents of 
                                                 
7
 See Kant CPR: 634, A664/B692; 640, A672/B700 on the regulative rather than constitutive use 
of reason.  CPR: 650, A686/B714 & 652, A690/B718 - idea of supreme being as regulative rather 
than constitutive. CPR: 655 A694/B722 on the role of the systematic unity of nature as regulative 
not constitutive.  CPR: 518, 509/537.  Cosmological principle of reason is also regulative not 
constitutive: it does not tell us what to anticipate, only how to anticipate the expansion of 
experience and its 'parts'. CPR: 519, A510/B538 - the cosmological principle is the rule, or 
regulative principle by which we acquire a complete concept of an object [Objekt] but it does not 
tell us what the object is otherwise it would be constitutive.  The regulative principles contained 
in the analogies of experience as opposed to the constitutive principles of the axioms of intuition 
and the anticipation of perception, see CPR: 250 A179/B221.  Reaffirmed in the distinction of 
phenomena and noumena: CPR: 304, B295- 6/A236. 
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experience and the empirical subject engaged in those empirical experiences.  
Even if Kant argues that the a priori, transcendental principles of subjectivity are 
not telling us what there is, they are nevertheless playing a constitutive role in 
setting the parameters of what and how something exists: 
 
What was first to Kant, the synthetic unity of apperception, suffered the 
same fate.  To Kant, every definition of the object is an investment of 
subjectivity in unqualitative diversity—regardless of the fact that the 
defining acts, which he takes for spontaneous achievements of 
transcendental logic, will adjust to a moment which they themselves 
are not; regardless of the fact that we can synthesize only what will 
allow and require synthesis on its own.  (ND: 138) 
 
Kant argues, transcendentally, that the objective sufficiency of subjectivity for 
the valid determination of the objects of experience should not worry us because 
the regulative role of subjectivity is itself determined according to what actually 
obtains experientially.  Hence our transcendental subjectivity does not play any 
constitutive role in determining what there is in the speculative sense; it simply 
determines what is the case.  However, we will see that Adorno's critique is 
aimed at undermining just this very contention as it appears in Kant's theory of 
subjectivity, judgement and method. 
 
It appears that what Adorno has in mind with the constellation of constituens and 
constitution is the following: the constituens is the a priori, transcendental aspect 
of human subjectivity; the constitutum is some 'object of cognition' — both as 
our determined empirical subjectivity — i.e. an individual person — and as the 
determined phenomena of experience. So, Adorno's contention is that the 
constituens both determines and generates the conditions for the empirical 
subject and phenomenal experience (both constitutum) in some manner.  And 
implicitly, he sees problems with this constitutive relation. 
 
As it is not yet clear how the constituens and constitutum map directly onto 
elements of Kant's own system we can consider these terms as referring to a 
concern with what the 'constituting' subject [Subjekt] and the object 
[Objekt/Gegenständ] of that thought are and how they affect and relate to each 
32 
 
other.
8
  From there we can return to Kant. Adorno makes an immediate link 
between constituens and constitutum and some notion of subject and object in his 
essay zu Subjekt und Objekt and in the quotation above with the synthetic unity 
of apperception.  Semantically this seems a reasonable correlation as it focuses 
on general entities where one is constituted by the other and their metaphysical 
and epistemic relations.
9
  Put in this fashion, constituens and constitutum seem to 
fall in line with explicitly Kantian concerns. 
 
Adorno uses the terms constituens and constitutum to structure and develop an 
antinomy in Kant's philosophy.  He argues that on the one hand the subject — the 
thinking agent — and object — the phenomenal 'object' as a determinate, unified 
presentation of the mind — are interdependent (CM: 246 & KCPR: 148). Kant 
certainly acknowledges some form of interdependence because the subject 
determines the phenomenal object as a particular such and such in its judging 
capacity — a claim grounded in the transcendental power of judgement (CPR: 
B172).  Also, the phenomenal object is the condition for the unified 
consciousness of the judging subject — a combination of the theses of the 
transcendental imagination, the analogies of experience and the refutation of 
idealism (Kant, 1996: B137 & 8; B218; and B277 & 8).
10
  Therefore, in Kant's 
transcendental theory of cognition, mind and world require each other and are to 
some degree determined, formally, by each other. 
 
Yet, at the same time, it is a theoretical requirement that the object of empirical 
consciousness is nothing more than a determination of the judging subject in the 
sense of being only subjective.  Furthermore, the transcendental conditions of 
subjectivity must not be constitutively transformed through the flux of 
phenomenal experience.  If they were, they would be unable to provide the 
transcendental grounds for objectively valid cognition.
11
  In other words, 
                                                 
8
 Pluhar translates Objekt and Gegenstand as synonyms of the English term, 'Object', in his 
version of Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Kant, 1996: 5 - 6, Avii, ft. 7). 
9
 See CM: 255 - 6. 
10
 Note Kant's 3rd comment in the refutation of idealism that this phenomenal object is not a 
condition in regards to its putative existence but in regards to the experience of the phenomenal 
object as such (B278 - 80). 
11
 See the transcendental foundation of the analogies of experience in the unity of apperception 
(CPR: B220). 
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phenomenal objects and thinking subjects must enjoy some independence from 
each other despite the determination of the former by the cognizing subject.
12
    
 
If neither the subject nor the object have any autonomy from the other then they 
would be unable to provide the objective epistemic and metaphysical grounds 
from which the other can be theorised.  That is, Kant's transcendental philosophy, 
insofar as it is able to talk about the subject and object intelligibly, requires that 
the subject and object are both dependent on each other and be independent of 
each other.  Adorno see these as competing, even incompatible aims.   
 
Yet Adorno's most acute criticism is not even that there is a tension in Kant's 
philosophical intentions.  After all, there is no reason to think, as it stands, that 
this tension cannot be resolved and Kant thinks that it can.  Indeed, it is the fact 
that this tension can be resolved within Kant's transcendental thinking that 
Adorno takes issue with.  Whatever independence phenomenal appearances have 
from the subject — such as their transcendental grounds in things-in-
themselves
13
 — the subject must be able to thoroughly, objectively and validly 
determine the phenomenal appearance.  It is this epistemic ambition which lies at 
the heart of Adorno's concern with Kant's account of subjectivity.
14
  Indeed, it 
underpins his entire critique of Kant because he believes that it is in virtue of 
these epistemic aims that Kant compromises the independence of phenomenal 
                                                 
12
 See, for example, the First Analogy of Experience (CPR: 253 - 4, B255 - 6). 
13
 Here a two-world metaphysics is being adopted (KCPR: 105) somewhere in line with Ameriks' 
view that the non-ideal has ontological priority over the ideal (1992: 334) and Strawson's 
conclusion that appearances are the result of our being affected by an unknowable thing-in-itself 
(1982: 250).  Such a reading stands against Allison's 'epistemological reading' of transcendental 
idealism (2004: 16).  This reading also differs from Langton's metaphysical, realist distinction of 
phenomena and noumena according to ascribability of predicates delineated according to intrinsic 
rather than relational properties (Langton, 2007: 50).  As we will see, however, he does share a 
sensitivity to Kant's thought as a form of Scientific Realism, see Langton, 2007: Chpt. 9.   
Adorno appears somewhat muddled in his view of things-in-themselves.  He notes the same 
tension as Strawson (1982: 255 - 6), that we can know nothing about them but that they are also 
the cause of our affectations (KCPR: 67); he claims that causality is not naturalistic and only a 
condition of the synthetic unity of subjectivity, yet he contradicts this by saying that things-in-
themselves cause appearances independently of us - contrast, KCPR: 91 & 99.  Charitably he is 
aware of the contradiction as per his earlier claims but he is not clear.  He also makes a number of 
claims that things-in-themselves are beyond knowability - KCPR: 128 - and the product of reason 
in its own self-consciousness (KCPR: 209).  What Adorno means by this is opaque.  Regardless, 
he views appearances and things-in-themselves as distinct and that this, insofar as it constitutes 
Kant's transcendental idealism is both a dubious and unnecessary thesis (KCPR: 228). 
14
 Understanding Kant's transcendental idealism as securing an ambition rather humility is 
antithetical to much Kantian scholarship.  See Bird, 1982: 91 and Langton, 2007: 2. 
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experience and its irreducible particularity.
15
  Adorno argues that Kant settles the 
antinomy of simultaneous independence and mutual determination of subject and 
object by covertly siding with one over the other — the subject over the object.  
Whatever does the constituting — constituens — takes epistemological and 
metaphysical priority over whatever is constituted — constitutum.16  Yet the 
truncation of what is cognized, the constitutum, entails a truncated cognition 
which in turn limits the cognizer to what is required for that cognition. 
 
Kant argues that as long as we determine the object 'correctly' according to the 
coherent, consistent, logical co-ordination of subjective judgement, then we are 
entitled to talk of the objectively valid determination of phenomena (See CPR: 
A333/B390 & KCPR: 143).  And in the same move, we cease to concern 
ourselves with the reality of the phenomenal object beyond this sufficiency.  
Ultimately therefore, the independence of particular, unique 'objects' is dissolved 
in Kant's thinking.  In order to motivate this as a genuine concern, Adorno must 
be able to argue that the accounts of experience and the objects of experience are 
somehow false, or at least truncated, without himself traversing the bounds of 
sense — if he is to take this criterion seriously, which I suggest he does.  Giving 
a richer account of experience will be the subject of the final section of the thesis. 
 
It is a concern with experience, and the dual accounts of subjects and objects, 
which brings us through a critique of Kantian subjectivity into a specific critique 
of Kantian judgement (see chapter three). We will see that Adorno agrees with 
Kant that there is a difference between our mental determinations of objects and 
how those objects 'really are'.  However, he thinks the characterisation found in 
transcendental idealism — through what he takes to be an ontological distinction 
between noumena and phenomena — is an attempt to eliminate the problem; 
furthermore, rather than eliminating it, it merely repositions it as an immanent 
tension within transcendental idealism itself (KCPR: 148 & 165).  Rather, for 
Adorno, this dualism must be worked with not transcended, or bracketed. 
 
                                                 
15
 See KCPR: 177 and Adorno's view that Kant's philosophical ambitions to think beyond the 
limitations of his own system. 
16
 See KCPR: 165 - 7. 
35 
 
Adorno expresses this antinomy as follows: 
 
[The difference between Kant and what is usually taken to be idealism 
is as follows:] … while Kant does situate the unity of existing reality 
and also the concept of Being in the realm of the consciousness, he 
simultaneously refuses to generate everything that exists from that 
realm of consciousness.  The consciousness of what the modern 
expression calls 'ontological difference', that is to say, of the fact that a 
thing is not fully reducible to its concept, that object and subject are not 
to be collapsed into each other — this consciousness is powerfully 
developed in Kant. (KCPR: 18)
17
 
 
So, here Adorno emphasises, favourably, the import of independence of subject 
and object in the form of 'ontological difference.' However, he quickly points out 
that this metaphysical difference comes at a price: 
 
This gives rise to not inconsiderable difficulties, for at the same time 
Kant's aim is to create a system.  As early as the Preface he remarks 
that pure reason cannot be conceived other than as a system, that is to 
say, as a coherent deductive unity.  The idea of such a system actually 
precludes the non-identical, that is, whatever does not fit into it…We 
might even say that in a sense the vital nerve of Kant's philosophy as a 
whole lies in the conflict between these two aspects, the impulse 
towards system, unity and reason, and, on the other hand, 
consciousness of the heterogeneous, the block, the limit.  These two 
elements are in a state of constant friction and he is always being 
brought up short by this block. (KCPR: 18) 
 
In other words, the metaphysical and epistemological demands on Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy require a separation of subject and object.  However, 
we see in the second quotation that the epistemological demands of 
transcendental philosophy, secured by the structure of a coherent, unified system, 
demand that these radically different elements — the subject and the object — 
are brought together in an homogenous unity with the former sufficient to 
knowing the latter.  
 
In order for the subject to be able to determine objects 'correctly', Kant must be 
able to present objects in such a way as they are amenable to cognitive 
determination.  Kant achieves this 'amenability' by positing the ontological 
distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal (Kant, 1996: A249 - 50; 
                                                 
17
 The idea of ontological difference is important for Adorno and I use this phrase in my own 
interpretation of Adorno's concept of Begriffsloslichkeit - see Chapter Eight. 
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A254 - 257/B310 - 12).  The latter is the proper object of epistemological enquiry 
whilst the former — which we can only infer to be the ontological ground of 
phenomenal object — is inaccessible to our cognitive faculties and not a valid 
object of knowledge.  Interestingly, however, the unknowable object — the 
noumenon — is then reintegrated back into the system as well in the form of a 
'known unknown'. Or, as Adorno puts it, a 'noble feature' (KCPR: 128) 
 
Adorno does not see this metaphysical division of being into phenomena and 
noumena and a corresponding epistemic limitation of knowledge to the 
phenomenal as a solution to the problem but rather the beginnings of another 
programmatic issue: 
 
This contradiction [between constituens and constitutum] is one that 
cannot be resolved by philosophy; it must instead be comprehended in 
its truth.  If there is a point at which the transition to a dialectical 
conception of philosophy is compelling, this would seem to me to be 
the place to start. (KCPR: 148) 
 
Instead, Adorno wishes to suggest that the heterogeneity of mind and world and 
the limits that this places on our epistemology and its ambitions, cannot be 
transcended, hypostatized or circumvented — heterogeneity and limitation and 
the tensions they generate must be worked with and, in fact, taken as the dynamic 
condition of knowledge.  What this means exactly will be developed currently.  
However, the tension between metaphysical commitments and epistemological 
ambition underlies two charges.  Adorno argues that Kant traverses the strictures 
of his own limitation thesis in the transcendental subject and the noumenal.  
According to Adorno, Kant also truncates objects and our experience of them. 
 
The transgression of Kant's limitation thesis is key to Adorno's critique of Kant 
and is in fact similar to a criticism offered by Strawson in The Bounds of Sense: 
 
In two ways he draws the bounds of sense, and in a third he traverses 
them.  He argues, on the one hand, that a certain minimum structure is 
essential to any conception of experience which we can make truly 
intelligible to ourselves; on the other, that the attempt to extend beyond 
the limits of experience the use of structural concepts, or of any other 
concepts, leads only to claims empty of meaning.  Dogmatic 
rationalism exceeds the upper bound of senses, as classical empiricism 
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falls short of the lower.  But Kant's arguments for these limiting 
conclusions are developed within a framework of a set of doctrines 
which themselves appear to violate his own critical principles.  He 
seeks to draw the bounds of sense from a point outside them, a point 
which, if they are rightly drawn, cannot exist. (Strawson, 1982: 11 - 2) 
 
Kant argued against making metaphysical claims which superseded what could 
be known either directly or indirectly according to sensible experience.  
However, Adorno argues that due to pre-critical assumptions concerning the 
scope and structure of our epistemology, Kant was drawn to make claims about 
subjects and objects which could not be derived either directly or indirectly from 
sensible experience.  Rather, Kant would have to make speculative assumptions 
about subjects and objects in order to derive the transcendental system upon 
which he could found his critical epistemology. Therefore, his point of 
disagreement with Kant is not the mutual limitation of subject and objects but 
rather that those limitations are circumvented through the rationalist strain in 
transcendental philosophy (KCPR: 64).   
 
Despite similarities with Strawson, the originality of Adorno's critique is already 
apparent.  In the above quotation (KCPR: 18), we see that the conflicting 
elements and demands of Kant's transcendentalism produces new and enigmatic 
concepts: the non-identical, the heterogeneous, the block and the limit (KCPR: 
66). Furthermore, Adorno's conception of this problem leads him to the claim 
that dialectics is required for its negotiation.  Before we explore these key terms, 
it is necessary to analyse how Adorno believes this dualism leads to a traversal of 
the bounds of sense. 
 
1.2 Traversing the Bounds of Sense: the Transcendental Subject and Pure 
Apperception. 
 
Thus far the basis of a tension concerning the relationship between (the knowing) 
subject and (phenomenal) object — and also within the transcendental and 
empirical aspects of subjects themselves — has been outlined.  The results of 
Kant's delineation of the subject and object, Adorno thinks, results in a system 
with competing, incompatible demands: epistemic certainty and objectivity 
which simultaneously requires total, systematic integration of heterogeneous 
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elements as well as their independence.  We are then led to Kant's notoriously 
uncomfortable epistemological and metaphysical conclusions: that there is a 
distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal: we can only know the 
latter and yet the phenomenal is somehow, in an unknowable way, dependent on 
the noumenal realm.
18
  In turn, if we understand this in the two-worlds fashion, 
we have a genuine ontological distinction between appearances and things-in-
themselves.  However, far from allaying empirical scepticism, it appears that 
Kant may have exacerbated it.   
 
Yet, this picture is incomplete.  Kant's transcendental idealism is both a 
recognition of the tensions of dualism and an attempt to provide a system that 
dissolves those tensions.  The limitations of epistemology and metaphysics are 
not a starting point in Kant's thinking but grow out of transcendental thinking 
about experience.  Furthermore, transcendental philosophy is an attempt, not only 
to provide a critique of reason but to provide a model of subjectivity and 
objectivity capable of acknowledging the problems of dualism and of securing a 
positive epistemology and metaphysics — even if this positivity exists within the 
boundaries of limitations.   
 
We find that this positive aspect of Kant's critique, that secures objective 
knowing and the identity conditions for subjects and objects over time is secured 
by the key to Kant's transcendental project: the discovery of the transcendental 
subject.  Like Descartes' cogito, the transcendental subject is the a priori 
necessary basis of subjectivity. Kant's transcendental subject differs in its 
deduction as it is derived transcendentally — according to the conditions for 
phenomenal experience — and cannot therefore be rationally separated as a 
substantial entity from empirical subjectivity. 
 
Adorno argues that the 'transcendental subject' might provide the philosophical 
solution to the tensions implicit within Enlightenment dualisms; however, its 
construction through transcendental argument requires Kant to traverse the very 
                                                 
18
 See Guyer for an alternative characterisation of this relationship: Kant dogmatically claims that 
appearances are spatio-temporally determined and their difference to things-in-themselves 
consists in the fact that the latter do not have spatial or temporal properties (Guyer, 1987: 333 - 
4). 
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limitations of epistemology and rationality which lie at the heart of his critique.  
In other words, the transcendental subject is intended to supply the conditions 
from which we can develop a critical epistemology and metaphysics instead of a 
dialectical philosophy, but the transcendental subject is, in fact a product of 
speculative thinking — the very thinking Kant is attempting to limit. 
 
Adorno characterises this transcendental subject as variously: a product of 
rationalism (KCPR: 30 with 146 & 7); a will to abstraction (KCPR 150 - 3); and 
a vindication of bourgeois subjectivity (KCPR: 10 with 54).
19
  Here the claim 
will be explored that Kant's transcendental philosophy takes him beyond the 
limitations set by his own project.  I will draw upon Strawson to help make 
Adorno's claims explicit and intelligible where they appear to agree.  This will 
also enable us to be clear about what Adorno thinks when it transpires that they 
are in disagreement.  Both Adorno and Strawson share the notion that whatever 
the transcendental subject can be, its abstract nature renders its relationship to the 
empirical subject unintelligible.   In this context we should interpret constituens 
and constitutum as referring to these two selves — transcendental subjectivity 
and empirical subjectivity respectively — and a tension that evolves according to 
competing commitments. 
 
1.2.i The Reification of the Subject 
 
Key motivations in Kantian philosophy revolve around the concerns: how do we 
gain objectively valid, empirical knowledge? What sort of subject is required for 
such knowledge?  Kant's transcendental philosophy, actually answers the former 
questions by the final question: at a fundamental level, what sort of subjects are 
we?  He begins with experience, and develops an account of subjectivity which 
could secure such an experience.   
 
Kant's analysis of subjectivity begins with an immediate logical distinction which 
will be elucidated and justified by transcendental distinctions: "[E]ven though all 
our cognition starts with experience, that does not mean that all of it arises from 
                                                 
19
 See Jay, 1973: 265 on Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of the relation between Kant, 
bourgeois subjectivity and its 'reverse image' in De Sade.  See also Jarvis' claim that Adorno's 
philosophy 'allows the entanglement of fact with value to become visible' (Jarvis, 1998: 48). 
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experience."(CPR: A44).  Adorno acknowledges and works with this distinction 
as central to his own critique of Kant.   Transcendental analysis of empirical 
cognition, along with an analysis of the metaphysical conditions for such 
cognition, amount to an account of a 'transcendental subject' (KCPR: 147).  This 
subject is constituted by the transcendental conditions of sensible experience — 
these include the transcendental faculties and the synthetic unity of apperception.
  
 
This transcendental subject is distinguishable from the empirical subject which is 
any individual subject — a particular token of transcendental subjectivity and is 
the medium through which a set of transcendental faculties is subjected to 
particular empirical experiences.
20
  Adorno emphasises this distinction between 
transcendental and empirical subjects and questions their relation (KCPR: 144). 
The empirical subject is no more than the necessary, a priori condition for 
discursive (conceptual), phenomenal experience.  We need eyes, ears and a brain 
to provide experience for the transcendental subject to process but, in a sense, 
this is all the empirical subject is good for (KCPR: 122).  
 
The problem for Adorno is that the empirical subject, in its transcendental 
function is no more than a vessel for transcendental subjectivity; it is not the 
grounds of a personal identity as such — this is reserved for the 'I' which affirms 
the synthetic persistence of the empirical subject as such.  Yet the basis of this 'I' 
is universal, human cognition.  This knotty problem deepens when we consider 
that the transcendental basis of this subjectivity is this empirical self — despite 
the transcendental subject also being employed to provide the objective basis of 
the empirical self with the transcendental unity of apperception. 
 
Adorno thinks that there are problems of circularity here (KCPR: 145).  He 
argues that the transcendental detachment of the 'I think' — the synthetic unity of 
apperception — stands apart from the particularity of empirical subjectivity.  
                                                 
20
 Contrast Adorno's understanding and analysis of transcendental and empirical subjectivity in 
Kant with Carr.  Carr distinguishes them as the same entity considered differently according to 
content of subjective experience - the former according to intentional content and the latter 
according to ascribable properties (Carr, 1999: 43).  Yet Carr also reaches a paradox of a similar 
vein to Adorno: the empirical self stands in a relation of inclusion and thus a part-whole relation 
to the world; the transcendental self stands in an intentional or subject-object relation to the world 
(Carr, 1999: 45 - 6). 
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Ultimately, the transcendental subject, inasmuch as it is divorced from empirical 
subjectivity, is a speculative piece of philosophy: 
 
Kant says repeatedly that concepts without intuitions are empty; and he 
criticizes the ontological proof of the existence of God by saying that 
the pure concept of a thing, regardless of what properties are ascribed 
to it, does not permit us to infer anything about its existence.  When he 
makes these criticisms, we ought really to apply his arguments to the 
idea of the transcendental subject, that is, to the forms of thought as 
such. (KCPR: 146) 
 
Adorno sees reification at work here.  The concern is that Kant takes what he 
understands to be the structure of experience and provides the conditions for that 
experience which is understood in their unity as transcendental subjectivity.  The 
notion that this subjectivity can have any generality, universality or necessity 
over and above the particular experiences which gave rise to it, entails that it is a 
kind of subjectivity in its own right.  Adorno is concerned that Kant is drawing 
general conclusions about the nature of subjectivity when really, to do so, is to 
overstep the valid scope of our critical reflections.  What is found in particular 
experience is reified, or preserved in the form of a general subjectivity.  This 
subjectivity can then be taken as sufficient to any particular experience and not 
susceptible to the flux of any particular experience. 
 
Implicitly, Adorno is arguing that an 'objective argument' — i.e., in this case a 
non-transcendental argument or an argument which does not begin with the 
subject — is required to the effect that all the content of experience can be 
rendered entirely and sufficiently by the transcendental conditions of sensibility 
— the pure forms of intuition.  It seems impossible for Kant to give such an 
'objective' argument precisely because he thinks that transcendental argument 
properly limits the scope of arguments sufficient to knowledge-making activities.  
Yet, if he is to avoid the charge of arbitrariness, he must be able to prove that 
there are no valid, non-speculative objects of experience which are not 
distinguished and determined according to their appearance in space and time.  
Not only does he not provide such an argument, it seems at least possible that 
there are such objects of experience as will be argued in the final section.  
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Secondly, Adorno requires an 'objective' argument that Kant had the right to go 
from an analysis of individual, particular cognition, to the universal conditions of 
human cognition as such.  Again, such an argument would probably have to be of 
the a priori kind that Kant stipulates against.  Yet the fact that he still arrives at 
this putative moment of objectivity, suggests that his transcendental arguments 
are more rationalist than Kant would admit to. 
 
No doubt these concerns would be baffling to Kant whose modest claims and 
method were an attempt to avoid any major presuppositions.  For example, he did 
not assume rational intuition is sufficient to claims about the self precisely 
because such intuitions do not have an objective basis in sensible experience.  
Rather he takes what obtains in experience and works from there.  Surely the 
onus is on Adorno to say what it is about experience that Kant has made such 
serious assumptions about such that he ought not to have derived his 
transcendental theses about human subjects as such.  I think the burden of proof 
does lie with Adorno as he has to motivate the worry that the particularity of both 
experience and subjectivity is somehow coerced according to pre-critical 
assumptions which result in speculative theories.  Throughout the course of this 
thesis, particularly when artworks are considered in Chapter Nine, I suggest that 
Adorno does meet this challenge. 
 
Adorno follows this distinction between the empirical and transcendental subjects 
to its heart in the analytic unity of apperception (KCPR: 201 - 3).  He points to 
Kant's 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason', where Kant argues against deriving or 
confusing the identity of the person with the transcendental condition for the 
identity of the manifold of a subject's representations.  For Kant the identity of 
the manifold representations of a subject, as a singular subject's representations is 
an analytic proposition: 
 
That the I of apperception, and hence in all thought, is a singular that 
cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects and therefore designates 
a logically simple subject — this lies already in the concept of thought 
and hence is an analytic proposition. (CPR: B407 - 8) 
 
In other words, singular identity is contained in the identity of a manifold 
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representation — it is not a synthetic proposition.  However, this analytic 
proposition does "not mean that I am, as an object, a being subsisting by myself 
or [i.e.] substance." (CPR: B407).  By extension, Kant presses the argument as it 
affects the 'I' of apperception: such an 'I' is not a substantial, particular subject, 
but rather an abstract transcendental condition which guarantees the unity of the 
manifold of consciousness.   
 
Kant is strict about the limits of apperception and the conclusions which can be 
drawn from it: 
 
The I think must be capable of accompanying all my presentations.  
For otherwise something would be presented to me that could not be 
thought at all — which is equivalent to saying that the presentation 
either would be impossible, or at least be nothing to me.  Presentation 
that can be given prior to all thought is called intuition.  Hence 
everything manifold in intuition has a necessary reference to the I think 
in the same subject in whom this manifold is found.  But this 
presentation [i.e., the I think] is an act of spontaneity; i.e., it cannot be 
regarded as belonging to sensibility.  I call it pure apperception, in 
order to distinguish it from empirical apperception. (Kant, 1996: B131 
- 2) 
21
 
 
Here, Kant is distinguishing pure apperception from the sort of fundamental 
identity of the subject we find in his synthetic unity of apperception.  Analytic 
apperception may be the transcendental grounds of empirical apperception, or an 
enduring self which persists.  However, it is not to be taken as anything 
substantial or knowable through pure rational enquiry; rather, it is a function of 
the possibility of empirical subjectivity, the unity of empirical subjectivity 
(empirical apperception), and its experience of the empirical world.   
 
As Strawson suggests, we should not confuse the experience of unity with the 
unity of experience (Strawson 37 - 8) and then try to draw epistemological and 
metaphysical conclusions from that abstract unity.  This limiting is what Kant 
intends when he calls pure apperception an analytic principle rather than a 
synthetic principle: it can be posited through the analysis of the singular unity of 
                                                 
21
 Empirical apperception is a reference to our inner sense whereby empirical intuitions are 
brought into determinate, a priori relations by the synthetic unity of apperception. (Kant, 185: 
B143, §20)  That is, it is distinguished from pure apperception as the latter is the logical condition 
for the possibility of subjective unity and not bound to the condition for a determinate unity. 
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experience but it is not a unity that can be abstracted from that experience as an 
object of knowledge itself. 
 
Nevertheless, Adorno is quite clear that despite the abstract, analytic generality of 
apperception, and the fact that it is not a proper object of knowledge in the 
Kantian sense, it is the foundation of personal identity; it is the essential self to 
which my empirical subjectivity is referenced (KCPR: 201 - 2).
22
  The analytic 
unity of apperception is the grounds of transcendental subjectivity itself.  Adorno 
goes on to point out that insofar as this apperception distinguishes the singularity 
of my identity from all other empirical subjects, my identity as an individual lies 
beyond my own empirical individuality — it even lies beyond something that 'I' 
can experience:  
 
The fact is that all my experiences are defined as mine and not those of 
anyone else.  They tell us nothing about the objective, substantive 
identity of the individual.  It is not the case that this identity is 
permanently present in me in concrete terms.  So what we have here is 
a confusion between the pure conceptual form of identity and a 
material identity, something actually existing. (KCPR: 202) 
 
Not only does this strike Adorno, and Strawson, as strange, it will come to pose 
problems for the tenability of the relationship between transcendental and 
empirical subjectivity. These two selves are dependent on each other but radically 
separated from each other as well.  Adorno is implying that Kant's solution is to 
give priority to transcendental subjectivity and in fact determine empirical 
                                                 
22
 The scholarly reception of apperception is controversial and beyond the scope of this thesis - I 
am attempting to understand Adorno not fully justify his position against other positions in 
Kantian scholarship.  It should be noted that Stephen Priest (1987: 20) and Ameriks (2000: 281 - 
3) claim that Hegel (1991: p.84, §42 Add. 1) reifies Kant's subject as only subject not object and 
that this is a false interpretation. It might be thought that Adorno is doing the same.  This is not 
the case, however, as Adorno's concern reflects a tension in Kant between sensitivity to objects 
and systematic unity and the effect of this tension on subjectivity (KCPR: 184).  He does not take 
the Hegelian route that Kant's a priori analytic claims have epistemic and metaphysical import.  
Furthermore, the inclination to do so - to develop a transcendental subject with ontological import 
- is part of Hegel's program that Adorno critiques: (HTT: 15 - 7) and see Chapter Six. 
Other worries over Kantian subjectivity could include Kant's notion (CPR: B131 - 2) that any 
thought may have reference to an 'I think'.  This is unconvincing: as Ameriks points out this is an 
epistemic reference not an ontological, possessive notion.  Or Guyer's contention that Kant (CPR: 
A117, n. 138) is confused over the status and derivation of apperception as analytic. This is, I 
think, refuted by Allison (2004: 166 - 7). 
On this note Ameriks criticises (1982: 138 & 140) Bennett (1974: 109) and Henrich (1976: 58) 
who do hold rationalist interpretations of Kant's subjectivity with ontological consequences.  
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subjectivity according to his objective epistemological aims, hence reversing the 
polarity of Kant's Copernican Turn. 
 
This account of apperception and its role in grounding a fundamental subjectivity 
is problematic for Strawson as well.  He analyses Kant's arguments for pure 
apperception and, whilst acknowledging that the arguments work, they require far 
more modest epistemological and metaphysical conclusions than Kant himself 
draws (Strawson, 1982: 117).  Furthermore, he implies that Kant's transcendental 
subject — the subject as constituted by the transcendental conditions of 
objectively valid empirical experience which is at root pure apperception as well 
as the categories and the pure forms of intuition — fails to dissolve some of the 
original tensions we have discussed and in fact generates new concerns 
(Strawson, 1982: 247 - 9).  Specifically, Strawson's more modest conclusions 
cast doubt as to whether or not the transcendental subject provides a sufficiently 
accessible object of enquiry for developing a stable reconstruction of the 
objectivity of empirical experience.  Like Adorno, Strawson concludes that 
whatever this subject is, a new tension arises: between this subject — 
transcendent, abstract, hypothetical and necessary — and the empirical subject — 
immanent, concrete, verifiable and contingent.   
 
1.2.ii The Intelligibility of Kantian Subjectivity 
 
To properly understand Adorno's position, I will continue to consider it against 
Strawson's position.  Through this contrast we are able to pin-point both the 
distinctiveness and relevance of Adorno's critique of Kant.  In turn we will be 
able to continue to develop a nuanced account of Adorno's own thought. 
 
Adorno certainly agrees that Kant's account of subjectivity falls short of its 
systematic requirements.  However, Adorno argues, unlike Strawson, that Kant's 
transcendental subject does a great deal more philosophical work than the 
Deduction allows for.  Adorno then agrees with Strawson that there is a radical 
detachment between the empirical and transcendental subjects.  However, as I 
will show, because Adorno thinks that Kant's transcendental subject does more 
work than it is allowed for in the structure of his transcendental philosophy, the 
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discrepancy between the two subjects (transcendental and empirical) has far 
greater negative consequences for Kant's thinking both philosophically — 
epistemologically and metaphysically — and also politically.  I will then show 
how Adorno's criticisms of Kant’s account of subjectivity fit into his 
programmatic concerns of the constituens and constitutum. 
 
In his discussion of pure apperception, Strawson agrees with Kant that despite his 
limitation of the empirical subject to empirical experience, he still requires a 
substantial account of a persisting subject which can properly be an object of 
epistemological and metaphysical enquiry: 
 
What we are in quest of is precisely the fundamental ground of the 
possibility of empirical self-ascription of diverse states of 
consciousness on the part of a consciousness capable of knowledge of 
its own identity throughout its changing (or its constant) 
determinations. (Strawson, 1982: 93 - 4) 
 
It is not sufficient for subjectivity that we are able to locate an empirical subject 
which can be the subject of empirical experience.  We require a transcendental 
subjectivity which is able to ground those experiences as ascribable to a single, 
unified and persisting subject.  
 
'Pure apperception', and the transcendental subjectivity based on the singular 
unity of the claim 'I think', is an analytic notion derived from the conditions 
empirical subjectivity, i.e., that the abstract 'I' of 'I think' is a necessary condition 
of the empirical, or intentional, 'I' in 'I think that…'23 The question is: how 
satisfying is this notion both in terms of its place in Kant's transcendental system 
and as an important aspect of what sort of beings we are?  Certainly, if Kant 
cannot offer an epistemic account of a substantial enduring 'I' which persists 
beyond the flux of one's inner presentations of empirical experience, his 
transcendental philosophy and its Copernican Turn is undermined.   
 
Strawson raises these concerns.  Having agreed with Kant that rationalist 
psychology will not yield an account of the self — i.e., that we cannot confuse 
                                                 
23
 See Kant, 1996: A123 & 4/ B169 - 70. 
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the unity of our experience with an experience of unity itself from which a 
transcendental self may be deduced — Strawson analyses Kant's argument 
concerning the analytic of pure apperception.  Again he agrees with Kant that this 
is a tenable argument and that it does produce a coherent theory of an enduring 
transcendental self.  He considers what he takes to be the primary potential 
criticism of Kant's theory, that this analytic principle is simply insufficient for 
providing the grounds for the self-ascription of unified empirical experiences: 
 
[Kant] speaks of the "abiding self" of transcendental apperception; but 
he certainly does not mean by this the (at least relatively) abiding man, 
an object among others in the world, a point of application for 
empirical criteria of personal identity.  Yet if he rejects this 
interpretation of the "abiding self", does he not evacuate the notion of 
ascription of experiences to a subject of its ordinary meaning, without 
producing anything to fill  the vacuum?  He is really in no better 
position than the theorist of sense-data who maintains that a possible 
experience, the contents of consciousness, could theoretically consist of 
a succession of intrinsically disconnected sensory data somehow linked 
by memory and expectation. (Strawson, 1982: 102 - 3) 
 
Nevertheless, Strawson rejects this charge.  Here he acknowledges the concern 
that the analytic proposition seems quite flimsy considering the metaphysical and 
epistemological importance of the notion of an enduring, fundamental self.  
However, he argues that: 
 
The bark of this objection is worse, it might be answered, than its bite.  
For its main point may be conceded without detriment to the Kantian 
position.  It is not essential for Kant to maintain that his provisions are 
sufficient to explain the actual occurrence of self-ascription of 
experiences.  It is enough if they are necessary to its possibility. (Ibid) 
 
The claim is that it is not necessary for us to 'know about' such subjects, merely 
that they are a necessary requirement for the sort of experience we do have.  
Furthermore, as this pure apperception is not identical with the transcendental 
subject or our fundamental human subjectivity, it does not have to provide a full 
account of such subjectivity.  It needs only to be a viable explanation of a 
necessary requirement not a fully sufficient account. 
 
Yet, despite the seeming viability of Kant's argument, Strawson is critical of the 
transcendental subject as a satisfactory account of subjectivity, i.e., one that 
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provides genuine metaphysical and epistemological insight into the nature of 
human agency.  He points out that Kant's theory of pure apperception — and the 
pure elements of the Transcendental Analytic and Aesthetic — leads to a very 
general and abstract notion of subjectivity: 
 
that any course of experience of which we can form a coherent 
conception must be, potentially, the experience of a self-conscious 
subject and, as such, must have such internal, concept-carried 
connectedness as to constitute it (at least in part) a course of experience 
of an objective world, concerned as determining the course of 
experience itself. (Strawson, 1982: 117) 
 
This seems to be as much as we can claim and it is hardly detailed at that.  
Furthermore, Strawson argues that Kant seems to be at the limits of intelligibility 
in making this distinction between the experience of unity and the unity of 
experience and how we can process this difference both epistemologically and 
phenomenologically:  
 
I really do appear to myself temporally; but I do not really temporally 
appear to myself.  But what does "really do appear" mean?  The 
question is unanswerable; the bounds of intelligibility have been 
traversed, on any standard.  (Strawson, 1982: 39) 
 
He points out that if, as it appears, apperception lays beyond the bounds of a 
critical epistemology then the systematic limitations of Kant's metaphysics and 
epistemology lead us towards an unacceptable position: we place the very object 
of enquiry beyond intelligible enquiry.  The concern regards how satisfactory 
Kant's account is as a theory of human subjectivity; the fact that what we are as 
such remains, in principle, beyond the limits of our own enquiry, thoroughly 
mysterious to ourselves, seems highly problematic. 
 
At this juncture, a comparison of Adorno's theory with Strawson's enables us to 
situate the ideas of the former in a more familiar framework.  Adorno shares 
similar concerns over the abstractness of the transcendental subject and its 
relationship to the empirical subject.  He will agree that this generalised, abstract 
subject is an impoverished account of human subjectivity.  However, he takes a 
very different view of the constitution of the transcendental subject and its 
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metaphysical and epistemological role in Kant's thinking. 
 
The problem for Adorno is that the transcendental conditions of knowing are 
beyond the limits of the very knowing it provides conditions for.  Whilst we can 
offer an analytic account of apperception, if we make any claim to it as a piece of 
knowledge, it becomes speculative and beyond the bounds of sense.  Whilst Kant 
does not make claims about the apperception which go beyond the limits of his 
critical epistemology, the very claim that we can know anything (empirical) is 
radically undermined by the fact that objective condition of knowledge is 
unknowable and is ontologically distinct from ourselves as knowing subjects. As 
it stands, the antinomy of subjectivity threatens to undo the system (KCPR: 150 - 
3). Without being able to reference a substantial transcendental self which 
underpins the transcendental conditions of empirical cognition, our ability to 
know that these transcendental conditions persist is undone.  Indeed, we cease to 
be in a position to properly know ourselves.   
 
Adorno argues that Kant arrives at the transcendental subject, which has been 
painstakingly separated from the empirical subject on both systematic and 
metaphysical grounds, through a stripping away of all that is empirical about the 
self in order to arrive at what is universal about the self.  That is, the transcendent 
subject, insofar as it underwrites the possibility of any individual empirical 
subjectivity, must be purged of the contingency associated with the individual in 
order to provide the grounds for any and all subjects (KCPR: 144 - 5).  Obviously 
this is a very different interpretation to the story provided by Strawson above.  
Indeed, it is very different to Kant's own thinking on the matter.  However, 
Adorno realises this and argues that his interpretation of the derivation and 
construction of the transcendental subject not only properly represents the 
Kantian line, it is in fact more consistently Kantian than Kant is on this issue.  
That is, if we are to think the general from the individual, there will be some way 
that this general is limited by its origins in the individual: 
 
It will at once by objected — Kant too would have joined in the protest 
— that this is a misunderstanding because the transcendental subject is 
what makes possible the multiplicity of individual, empirical human 
subjects.  It is precisely at this point that we encounter the difficulty 
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and that we see that this is one of the problems in which the dialectic is 
grounded in Kant's philosophy.  For how can I feel justified in talking 
about such a universality if my starting-point is simply the individual 
subject? (KCPR: 145) 
 
Adorno's point here is that one cannot, despite the analytic arguments of 
transcendental philosophy, derive pure universality from individuality, even 
analytically.  He presses the point by inverting the argument saying that one 
cannot start from a multiplicity either — i.e., from the point of view of no 
particular subject but of any subject — as this simply assumes the very 
conclusion one is trying to draw (KCPR: 145).   
 
Adorno is thinking along the same lines as Robert Stern.  Making a critical turn 
towards an internalist account of the self, which privileges an abstract self over 
our interaction with the world, other people and even our own empirical 
subjectivity, suggests that the inner world will provide more fruitful and secure 
grounds for theorising the necessary conditions of apperception.  That is, that we 
have more chance of knowing what is necessary about ourselves through 
internalist arguments arrived at through reflection on the self as such.  Stern 
simply asks: why should we think that? 
 
[According to Pippin,] Kant himself made his critical turn to the ‘I’ 
because he believed he had reason to think that here we could establish 
genuinely necessary claims: but why is this so obviously so? Why is 
there any reason to think that the necessary conditions for apperception 
are any easier to establish than the necessary conditions for reality as 
such? (Stern, 2009: 50) 
 
Through Adorno and Strawson's concerns, it appears that the internal world 
remains entirely opaque to us — yet it is the knowledge of the internal world 
which was intended to justify knowledge of the external world.  One may object 
that we do not need to know how the instrument works in all its details, or even 
properly what the instrument is, in order to use it.  However, Adorno has the 
associated worry that this obscurity is indicative of a more serious concern: that 
Kant has transgressed his own critical programme. 
 
The transcendental separation of the inner from the outer, or of transcendental 
subjectivity from empirical subjectivity, seems not only dubious 
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methodologically, it leads to serious concerns.  Transcendental subjectivity may 
provide us with the conditions of empirical subjectivity.  Yet given the fact that 
we can know no more about it than what is required for particular, individual 
subjectivity, how are we to make any genuinely universal claim about it?  This 
concern is exacerbated because we cannot know anything about subjectivity 
other than what can be transcendentally deduced from the conditions of empirical 
subjectivity and what it appears to consist in.  What then are the objective 
standards by which we have a right to talk about transcendental apperception as a 
universal and necessary feature of human subjectivity as such, which stands apart 
from the flux of empirical experience?  Adorno contends that we simply cannot 
answer this question without traversing the bounds of sense. 
 
Adorno argues that the transcendental subject, from pure apperception through to 
the pure categories and intuitions of the Analytic and Aesthetic, is constructed 
through the elimination of the constitutive influence of the richness of individual 
subjectivity on transcendental subjectivity.  This elimination and detachment is 
the only way that Kant can argue for the persistence and objectivity of the 
transcendental conditions of subjectivity. What Kant suppresses, is that the way 
things appear is a function of individual, socio-historically mediated, particular 
subjectivity.  Kant would protest: what is socio-historical about sensible 
appearances being presented in time and space?  Adorno's response is that the 
truncation of individual sensible experience and of objects to what can be 
presented in time and space is already a reification of the richness of experience 
and what objects actually are.  This discussion between Kant and Adorno will be 
on-going because an example must be given of what Kant could be missing in his 
account of sensible experience that does not simply disregard his critical attack 
on speculative metaphysics. 
 
Adorno's claim, as it is emerging, is that Kant has not given the necessary 
transcendental conditions of individual subjectivity, he has hypostatized, or 
reified, empirical subjectivity in the form of universalised claims and assumed 
that these propositions are good for all people, all valid experience and at all 
times; he also assumes its sufficiency to the determination of objects even as they 
appear to us.  
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1.2.iii Transcendental and Empirical subjectivity: Regulation and 
Repression 
 
Adorno's criticisms are not merely methodological — the implication being that 
where Kant deduces the fundamental subject transcendentally, he is in fact 
engaged in an act of dogmatic thinking.  Adorno argues that there are 
consequences of this mysterious, governing subjectivity, at once removed from 
individual subjectivity but law-giving upon it.  He then makes a number of telling 
hermeneutic analyses of Kant's theory of the subject.  Not only does the 
transcendental subject have epistemic and metaphysical priority over the 
empirical subject — in the sense that it is the seat of both objective validity of 
cognition and is also that about us which is necessary and therefore essential to 
us as humans — it takes a governing role over the particular self.  This separation 
bifurcates subjectivity as it proposes an unknowable, mysterious entity as a 
legislator over our phenomenal self.   Of course this is not an argument against 
Kant's position; but it develops the themes of Adorno's analysis and gives a 
clearer indication of what Adorno believes is at stake in this critique.  
 
Adorno's interpretation of the Kantian transcendental subject is that it is an 
abstract entity which is fixed, necessary and mysterious and yet, given its 
primacy over empirical subjectivity, is in fact the substantial object of Kant's 
critical enquiry.  Adorno clearly states his position in the following: 
 
The pure 'I think', the absolute 'I', the secret basis for the establishment 
of these connections or of this process of synthesis, is just as deeply 
concealed as the transcendent, that is, as the transcendent thing-in-
itself.  When it comes down to it, Kant had no right to speak 
undialectically of such things existing in themselves, of such fixed 
forms given to us in reality once and for all. (KCPR: 155)
24
 
 
It is obvious that Adorno shares Strawson's concern that Kant's transcendental 
subject is simply too abstract, too mysterious and evidence of unworkable 
                                                 
24
 Adorno's reservations about the intelligibility, provability and import of the thing-in-itself are 
undeniably Nietzschean: "The 'thing-in-itself [is] nonsensical.  If I remove all the relationships, 
all the 'properties' all the 'activities' of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness 
has been invented by us owing to the requirements of logic, thus with the aim of defining 
communication." (1967: 558, p302) See also Nietzsche, 1998: 6,19. 
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metaphysics.  However, in the second sentence we see how Adorno draws much 
stronger conclusions about the status of Kant's analytic than Strawson.  Whereas 
Strawson accepts the analyticity of the pure apperception, Adorno is arguing that 
the fixed essentialism of Kant's account of the transcendental subject indicates an 
adherence to an 'essential I' despite Kant's own protests to the contrary — that his 
transcendental analytic is different in kind to a metaphysical essentialism that can 
posit a human soul or the like.
25
  However, Adorno's contention that Kant has no 
right to talk about such a fixed subject not only results from his balking at the 
mysteriousness of this transcendental subject but, more importantly for Adorno, 
the fact that the transcendental subject is, as suggested, radically contingent on 
the empirical subject.  As it stands, according to Adorno, the empirical subject is 
determined according to the fixed conditions of transcendental subjectivity.  The 
import of this fixed relation and determination will be discussed in the next 
section when we consider identity-thinking and judgement.   
 
In order to emphasise the appearance of this contingency, he recites, in the 
lecture, the following passage: 
 
That I distinguish my own existence as that of a thinking being, from 
other things outside me — among them my body — is likewise an 
analytic proposition; for other things are such as I think them to be 
distinct from myself.  But I do not thereby learn whether this 
consciousness of myself would be even possible apart from things 
outside me through which representations are given to me, and 
whether, therefore, I could exist merely as a thinking being (i.e. without 
existing in human form) [translation modified].
26
 (Kant, 1996: B409/ 
KCPR: 203) 
 
We can be under no doubt how seriously he takes this passage because he goes 
on to say: 
 
I read this passage out to you with a certain muted exclamation of 
                                                 
25
 See Kant's treatment of absolute subjectivity in terms of a soul (CPR: 387, A348). 
26
 I have used Rodney Livingstone's translation here as the final, bracketed phrase emphasises the 
empirical point being made by Adorno more forcefully than Pluhar's rendering. [(4) Ich 
unterscheide meine eigene Existenz, als eines denkenden Wesens, von anderen Dingen außer mir 
(wozu auch mein Körper gehört), ist eben so wohl ein analytischer Satz; denn andere Dinge sind 
solche, die ich als von mir unterschieden denke. Aber ob dieses Bewußtsein meiner selbst ohne 
Dinge außer mir, dadurch mir Vorstellungen gegeben werden, gar möglich sei, und ich also bloß 
als denkend Wesen (ohne Mensch zu sein) existieren könne, weiß ich dadurch gar nicht.]  
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triumph because it is the passage in the Critique of Pure Reason where 
Kant directly expresses the idea that I have rather laboriously been 
trying to convey to you.  This is the idea that all the talk of an 'I' and all 
the other features that are claimed to be transcendental elements in 
Kant actually presuppose something like an empirical individuality. 
(KCPR: 203) 
 
Taken out of context this could appear a rather strange 'triumph' for Adorno to 
claim.  Firstly, it would surely have to be a concession or admission of a contrary 
position and Kant gives no indication of this.  Furthermore, the passage seems 
entirely consistent with Kant's position.  The analytic of pure apperception is 
merely the proposition, as Strawson points out, that there is necessarily a possible 
'I' which guarantees empirical subjectivity.  By extension, if there is no empirical 
subjectivity there is no necessity for this possible 'I'.  Regardless, the analytic of 
pure apperception explicitly 'presupposes something like an empirical 
individuality'.  This is not a suppressed premise but an explicit part of Kant's 
thinking.  The question is: why does Adorno take this to be admission of the 
validity of his own concerns? 
 
The answer lies in Adorno's comment (KCPR: 155.  See above.) that Kant has no 
right to talk about subjects — transcendental or empirical — undialectically.  
This gives us a specific insight into the sort of relationship Adorno envisages and 
which precludes an analytic postulation of the 'I'.  When Kant deduces, 
transcendentally, the constitutive requirements of an empirical subject capable of 
being the accusative of empirical experience, it is obvious that he thinks of this 'I' 
as a 'thin' notion, i.e., something we can say next to nothing about.  Despite the 
putative thinness of Kant's analyticity, Adorno seems correct to think that insofar 
as the transcendental elements of subjectivity — pure apperception, the 
categories and the pure forms of intuition — are necessary elements such 
elements constitute something like a fixed essence of subjectivity.   
 
Throughout his essay On Subject and Object, Adorno emphasises a problem 
within Kant's transcendental philosophy: the subject becomes detached and self-
sufficient from the object upon which it is in fact predicated: "in fact, subject is 
also object; it merely forgets, as it becomes autonomous form, how and by what 
it itself is constituted." (CM: 254 and also 246, 249). The fact that this essence 
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can only be known analytically and that we can have no direct knowledge — 
through intuitions or through phenomenology — of this subject, does not mean 
that this transcendental subject is not an absolute 'I'.  No matter how abstract and 
general a theory of an absolute 'I' it amounts to, Kant would obviously balk at 
this metaphysical conclusion — and its implication of knowledge of our 
'essential self'.  For Adorno it seems difficult to see how he can avoid it. 
 
Adorno bolsters his argument by pointing out how much in Kant's ethics revolves 
around this 'essential self': it is not that these elements are simply 'inert' 
necessary, analytic conditions inferred from the gaps in our self-knowledge, this 
transcendental subject is put to serious philosophical work in the second 
critique.
27
  That is, the transcendental subject is the basis of Kant's ethics; such a 
move is not possible were the transcendental subject no more than a set of 
conditions.  Adorno argues: 
 
Kant's every concretion of morality bears repressive features.  Its 
abstractness is a matter of substance, eliminating from the subject 
whatever does not conform with its pure concept.  Hence the Kantian 
rigorism.  The hedonistic principle is argued against, not because it is 
evil in itself, but because it is heteronomous to the pure ego: "Insofar as 
the pleasure of the idea of a thing's existence is to be a determining 
cause of desire for the thing, it rests upon the subject's receptivity 
because it depends for a thing, it rests upon the existence of an object; 
it thus belongs to the senses (feelings) and not to the intellect — which 
employs concepts to express how the idea relates to an object, but does 
not employ feelings to express how it relates to the subject.
28
 (ND: 256) 
 
Adorno's point is that the condition of and basis for Kant's rational ethics is a 
pure ego, the transcendental subject, which transcends the contingencies of 
individual subjects and their fleeting desires.  Adorno argues that Kant's moral 
system is determined in character by precisely the pure, abstract, mysterious 
subject discussed.  Such a foundation of Kant's ethics belies the minimal 
analyticity of the transcendental subject in the first critique; indeed, Kant favours 
this 'analytic' subject over the empirical subject. 
 
Adorno elaborates on this ethical critique which continues to shed an interesting 
                                                 
27
 See also CPR: B566 - 87 for Kant's theory of causality and transcendental freedom. 
28
 Quoted from Kant, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft.  See Kant, 2002: §21, p. 33. 
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light on how he understands the transcendental subject and its role in Kant's 
architectonic.  Characteristically he draws on Freudian thinking to dissolve the 
veneer of disinterested analysis within which Kant couches his exegesis.  Adorno 
argues that the elimination of the empirical subject, in not only its contingency, 
but also in its agency and motivations, amounts to a fundamentally repressive 
construction of human agency and the freedom it implies: Kant cannot "visualize 
the concept of freedom otherwise than as repression." (ND: 256).  The 
transcendental subject, the 'pure ego', is for Adorno a super-ego of sorts which 
provides the transcendental possibility of the pure, unwavering moral law of the 
categorical imperative and its applicability to the empirical self.   
 
Interestingly, Adorno presents a psychoanalytic interpretation of Kant's account 
of subjectivity which sheds further light on the discussion.  For Adorno, the 
situation is evidence of an extremely unhealthy ego/super-ego relation. Adorno's 
understanding of Freud's Oedipus Complex indexes it to a particular socio-
historical moment.
29
  As a theory of socialisation and civilisation, the Oedipus 
Complex shows us how particular social models produce particular models of 
socialised individuals. As Adorno takes this model as historically mediated, the 
view of repression is understood as an essential feature of Modern civilisation.   
 
Bourgeois repression finds its apotheosis in Kantian subjectivity where the 
empirical subject, in its dynamic contingency, underpinned by our desires, tastes 
and caprices, is repressed in favour of the pure transcendental subjectivity - the 
basis of rational law.  The problem is the repression does not eliminate our drives 
just as the transcendental subject cannot eliminate the empirical subject and our 
motivations.  Adorno diagnoses in Kantian subjectivity a sublimation of the 
drives of the id in the super-ego which then becomes the seat of violent self-
oppression.  It is then afforded delimited authority over all other (contingent or 
individual) aspects of the ego — the empirical self: 
 
Every bit of knowledge we have of the genesis of character is 
incompatible with the assertion of such an act of original moral 
gestation.  The ego that is supposed to perform it, according to Kant, is 
                                                 
29
 For Freud's analysis of the Oedipus Complex.  See Freud, 2010: 278 - 82; 1976: 313 - 322. 
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not something immediate.  The ego itself is indirect.  It has arisen; to 
speak in psychoanalytical terms: it has branched off from the diffuse 
energy of the libido.  Not only all of the specific substance of the moral 
law refers constitutively to facts of existence, but so does its 
supposedly pure imperative form.  This form presupposes the 
internalization of repression as much as the full development of the ego 
as the solid identically maintained authority which Kant absolutizes as 
the necessary premise of morality. (ND: 271 - 2) 
 
Indeed, the fact that Kant's pseudo super-ego is posited analytically rather than 
developed through social consciousness merely places it beyond the realm of 
further enquiry.  For Adorno, what we discover in Kant's analytic origins of the 
self, is not an account of subjectivity as much as a prior social distortion of our 
psyches which causes us to think about ourselves — and morality — in such 
abstract, reified ways (ND: 275). The fact that this transcendental subject cannot 
be subject to further analysis and enquiry entails that we are forced to accept its 
transcendental necessity; this betrays, for Adorno, an irrational dogmatism which 
lurks beneath the neutral, rational veneer of Kant's analytic (ND: 261).   
 
Obviously these claims are highly contentious and to fully justify them would 
take us away from the primary concern in this part of the thesis: construction of 
Adorno's critique of Kantian epistemology and metaphysics of subjects.  Yet, to 
that end we have learnt a great deal more about Adorno's understanding of Kant's 
account of subjectivity.  Whilst he agrees with Strawson that Kant has developed 
an abstract and very general account of subjectivity, he rejects analytic talk about 
subjects and he perceives this transcendental subject as an active feature in Kant's 
architectonic.   
 
1.3 Conclusion 
 
Adorno holds that the transcendental subject, which at heart is pure apperception, 
is not merely a condition of empirical subjectivity.  He is making two claims: one 
is that the transcendental subject functions as an absolute 'I'; secondly, that this 
absolute 'I' is fixed in such a way as to ground other abstract theses with 
distinctly undesirable import.  We can now see what precisely Adorno is 
referring to when he speaks of the constituens, constitutum and what is at stake in 
these concepts.   
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[What] Kant calls the constitutive sphere, the constituens, should not be 
made into an absolute, any more than should the constitutum … [To do 
so] is to succumb once more to the very pitfall he had unearthed in 
Leibniz and exposed so incisively.  It is to succumb to the amphiboly of 
the concepts of reflection, in other words, the confusion between 
abstract concepts and what they represent, what they refer back to, just 
as truly as these referents point back to those concepts. (KCPR: 155 - 
6) 
 
His charge is that Kant regresses to the sort of pre-critical rationalism which his 
own philosophy set out to eradicate; it is to traverse the bounds of sense — with 
all its ethical as well as epistemological and metaphysical consequences — in 
order to lay down those bounds.
30
  When the constituens becomes fixed and 
detached from the particularity of individual subjects, as is the case with the 
transcendental subject, we not only generate mysterious, abstract entities, not 
only do we make ourselves unknowable to ourselves, we force heterogeneous 
elements — transcendental and empirical elements — together in dangerously 
unworkable unities. 
 
Despite the focus of Adorno's analysis of constituens and constitutum revolving 
around general problems of epistemology and metaphysics of subjects, we will 
see in the next section that these concerns are focussed into a direct critique of 
representations of objects and their determination in Kant's theory of 
judgement.
31
   
                                                 
30
 See also: "But philosophy was in error when it supposed that it could simply cut the umbilical 
cord, thus separating the abstractions from the things from which they were being abstracted." 
(KPCR: 153)  This becomes an issue about the status of transcendental method and argument.  
Inasmuch as transcendental arguments aim at producing fixed conditions which can then be 
considered apart from that which they supply conditions for, Adorno is sceptical of transcendental 
argument.   
This is a vexed issue in Kantian scholarship.  It concerns what level of justification a 
transcendental argument can provide and what the scope and method of transcendental arguing 
must be in order to provide such justification.  For example, Stroud and Cassam attacks the 
warrant of transcendental argument - Stroud, 1968: 255 - 6 & Cassam, 1987: 377 - 8; Pereboom 
argues for a deflationary view of transcendental arguing as not a priori rationalist (Pereboom, 
1990: 41) but genetic and epistemically humble.  See also Stern, 2000: Chpt 2 for discussion of 
these issues.  These issues are also tied to the success of Kant's arguments against scepticism - a 
point duly noted by Adorno later. 
31
 A point emphasised by Allison: "The identification of apperception (as a faculty for producing 
synthetic unity) with the understanding is the pivotal move.  Given this identification, Kant is in a 
position to connect apperception with the representation of objects and through this with 
judgment, which leads, in turn, to its connection with the categories." (Allison, 2004: 173) 
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Whilst Kant has a variety of motivations for his construction of empirical and 
transcendental subjectivities, its primary philosophical import for Adorno is its 
importance for judgement. He is concerned with Kant’s account of the 
transcendental subject because it underpins the objectivity of empirical 
judgements at a technical level and, as such, governs the sort of epistemic 
relations possible for knowing, judging subjects to have with empirical objects.  
These concerns have surfaced if we consider the constitutive and sufficient role 
of the constituens for the conditions of the constitutum as a determination of the 
latter by the former. This avenue of analysis enables us to develop an Adornian 
critique of Kant; it helps us to understand how and why Adorno uses the term 
constitutive when it does not seem to directly correspond to Kant's usage.  The 
transcendental subject is both an indicator of and a lynchpin for a particular 
world-view associated with 'identity-thinking' which, for Adorno, becomes 
deeply problematic for philosophical as well as ethical reasons.  It is to identity-
thinking which I now turn. 
 
 
*** 
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2. Kantian judgements, Representations and Identity-Thinking 
 
 
The analysis of the previous section focussed on the development of Kant's 
reified transcendental subject.  We find that Adorno is concerned that the aim of 
fixing subjectivity is to generate a fixed conception of empirical subjectivity; he 
is also concerned with the objects about which we make judgements.  Kant 
erroneously fixes the subject primarily so that he can fix the conditions of 
knowing.  In turn this provides the fixed conditions through which we can 
generate fixed and sufficient determinations of objects of knowledge.  In other 
words, the transcendental subject is the condition of a form of identity-thinking. 
 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno is quite explicit that his philosophical target is 
identity-thinking (ND: 5). In this section, Adorno's account and critique of 
identity-thinking will be considered and then related to his critique of Kant in the 
next.  What we find is that identity-thinking, which may take many philosophical 
forms, implicates a multitude of Kantian ideas: representations, objects and 
Kant's account of judgement.  Philosophically therefore, motivated by his worries 
regarding identity-thinking, Adorno's critique of Kant revolves around the form, 
content and status of judgement.  Unfortunately, Adorno does not make this 
entirely explicit in his analysis of Kant.  Nevertheless, it can be developed as the 
most appropriate interpretation of his critique of Kantian philosophy. 
 
I will argue that Adorno takes into consideration Kant's socio-historical situation.  
He considers Kant's response to particular philosophical problems of his time — 
primarily to Hume and the Rationalists — but also to particular socio-economic 
developments such as the rise of the bourgeoisie.  In this situation, Kant is faced 
with a set of problems but also commitments, particularly epistemic 
commitments to reason, objectivity and autonomy
32
 which in turn ground his 
metaphysical commitments.  Despite having a great sensitivity to the problems of 
scepticism and the scope of our claims to knowledge, Adorno reads Kant as 
turning these philosophical problems into conditions for objectivity and validity.  
                                                 
32
 See KCPR: 10, 55, 64, 77, 118 and then critically, 81, 110, 115. 
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Adorno understands Kant as configuring the other elements of his transcendental 
system to support, justify and make possible epistemic objectivity and validity.  
Adorno's deepest critique, already hinted at, is that Kant's pre-critical 
commitments to objectivity and validity are not justified within his system of 
thinking.  His view of subjects and objects, their determination in judgement, and 
the very structure of determinate judgement are gerrymandered to fit these pre-
critical commitments.  So, in addition to questioning Kant's pre-critical 
commitments, Adorno is led to criticise Kant's account of subjects, objects and 
judgements. 
 
2.1 Adorno on Identity-Thinking 
 
I have suggested above that Adorno's critique of Kant, of transcendental 
subjectivity and notion of the constitutum, is properly aimed at the epistemic and 
metaphysical relations between the transcendental structure of subjectivity and 
consciousness. The determination of the latter, which we have seen Adorno 
discuss provocatively through Freudian thinking, aims to consider how we come 
to judge and determine ourselves and the empirical world about us.  The fixed 
subject is then used to ground fixed relations with objects: in virtue of having a 
fixed subject we have the conditions by which we can fix our determinations of 
objects.  Since objects of cognition are, properly speaking, mind-dependent 
entities for Kant, the fixing of our mental and cognitive activities provides the 
conditions for the fixing, or reifying, of the world.  This fixing takes place in 
judgement and, as we will see, is characterised by Adorno as a form of identity-
thinking.  
 
We can see that if the constituens is essentially that about the subject which 
judges and makes possible objectively valid determinations — of both ourselves 
and objects — and the constitutum is the object of determination qua material 
object, then these two terms are intimately linked to issues of judgement. 
Identity-thinking and its consequences lies at the heart of Negative Dialectics and 
understanding it provides the key for the extrapolation of all aspects of Adorno's 
philosophical thought. 
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Initially, the name (of dialectics) says nothing more than objects do not 
go into their concept; that they come to contradict the traditional norm 
of adequacy. Contradiction…is the index of the untruth of identity, the 
fact that the object of conception does not go into its concept without 
remainder. (ND: 5 - Trans. Modified)
33
  
 
That is, our conceptual determinations of objects, structured by and represented 
within judgements do not fully represent the object of concern.  This putative 
discrepancy between our representations and the objects of our representations 
may seem exceptionally strange to philosophers who, following Frege, think that 
the reference relation between the name and the object just is sufficient.
34
  Sortal 
identification of the object, expressed via the subject term, is sufficient to identify 
an object just in case the correct sortal is invoked.  Of course there is a great deal 
of philosophical work to be done to construct this identity.  However, what is the 
reason to think that there is a fundamental discrepancy between our predicate and 
subject terms and the objects they identify? 
 
Adorno discusses judgements in greater detail with his examination of Hegel; 
however, we can gather what he is intending to criticise in the quotation above.  
In some way, the predications we make of objects are insufficient for the 
identification of those objects — and for representing the ways that an object is.  
What precisely Adorno means by this, i.e., by insufficiency, is opaque at this 
point and much of the remainder of the present thesis is geared towards making 
sense of this notion.  
 
The target, here, appears to be some notion of analytic identity.  That is, as posed 
in the quotation, he rejects identity insofar as a conceptual determination of an 
entity in cognition is sufficient for the determination of a material referent of the 
cognition in its unique particularity.  This is a difficult issue to discuss because 
Adorno's use of concept [Begriff] is in line with Hegel's usage which denotes the 
                                                 
33
 Ashton translates "Ihr Name sagt zunächst nichts weiter, als daß die Gegenstände in ihrem 
Begriff nicht aufgehen, daß diese in Widerspruch geraten mit der hergebrachten Norm der 
adaequatio. Er ist Index der Unwahrheit von Identität des Aufgehens des Begriffenen im Begriff." 
as "the name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their 
concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of 
inadequacy.  [Contradiction] indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not 
exhaust the thing conceived."  He therefore obscures an important semantic distinction 
concerning the use of names which Adorno evidently intends.   
34
 See Frege, 1948: 210. 
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Notion of a thing which is something like an essence; this understanding of 
concept will be fully discussed in Section Two.  What Adorno has in mind when 
he understands identity-thinking is already a non-Analytic idea.
35
  Nevertheless, 
it is useful to consider identity-thinking analytically to contrast it with Adorno's 
more Hegelian idea at a later point.   
 
Adorno's initial explanation of identity-thinking has a couple of reasonable 
analytic interpretations within which Adorno's worry may appear false.  We can 
successfully identify specific empirical objects, such as tables and chairs, using, 
for example, indexical or demonstrative judgements.  Also, we seem to 
successfully and validly predicate properties of objects all the time.  Furthermore, 
the co-ordination of sortal judgements and property judgements can be logically 
and conceptually co-ordinated and properly refer to objects. 
 
How ought we to interpret Adorno's concern?  As he does not really provide any 
analytic analysis of the concept of identity, it is hard to tell.  I will argue that 
there are at least two interpretations of Adorno's critique of identity-thinking that 
we should reject
36
: 
 
- The Qualitative Interpretation:  
o The weaker claim — our conceptual resources are not fine-grained enough 
 to determine the unique complexity of particulars. 
o The stronger claim — our conceptual resources cannot be fine-grained 
 enough to determine the unique complexity of particulars. 
 
- The Quantitative Interpretation: 
o The weaker claim — we do not have enough conceptual determinations to 
 sufficiently determine the unique complexity of particulars. 
o The stronger claim — we cannot have enough conceptual determinations of 
 objects to determine the unique complexity of particulars. 
                                                 
35
 See Coffa's insightful reworking of Quine's dictum "meanings are what essences 
became…when wedded to the word" to "Meanings are what concepts became when wedded to 
the word." (Coffa, 1991: 8). 
36
 I will argue that our conceptual resources are both qualitatively and quantitatively inadequate 
for the determination of their referents, but these interpretations need reformulating to reflect 
explicitly metaphysical rather than semantic concerns.  See Section Three. 
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Neither of the weaker claims can be seriously considered as grounds for Adorno's 
worry concerning identity-thinking.  If they are true, they are only true trivially 
and do not, by themselves, present any serious philosophical worry.  Therefore, if 
Adorno intends one or both of these positions, he would intend the stronger 
claim.  Furthermore, he would need an argument why, if either of these positions 
were true, that it would be a philosophical worry.  Whilst I suggest that he does 
not adopt either position, the structure of these issues will have to form part of 
my interpretation: namely the interpretation must take some strong form that 
there is a problem in principle with identity-thinking and that this is a bona fide 
worry. 
 
Both interpretations could be considered consistent with Adorno's thought and 
implied by his own formulations of identity-thinking.  However, I will reject 
them because they are unconvincing in themselves — if they did constitute 
Adorno's thinking on the matter, it would be good reason not to take Adorno 
particularly seriously on these issues.  More importantly, we can present a 
stronger argument which is consistent with aspects of Adorno's thought 
elsewhere and which makes for a far more compelling position.   
 
2.1.i The Qualitative Interpretation 
 
This interpretation takes the strong position that our conceptual resources are 
necessarily insufficient to determine their referent insofar as there could always 
be a more fine-grained conceptual identification of the particularity of the 
referent — an argument highlighting an endemic qualitative discrepancy between 
our conceptual resources and objects.   
 
If this were Adorno's claim it would be at least trivial and probably false: the 
problem would not concern the possibility of identification but merely qualitative 
differences in the precision of different judgements.  So, for example, if I were to 
say 'this chair is red' whilst this may be true, one may complain that the predicate 
'is red' does not capture the specificity of this red, and is therefore insufficient to 
the proper identification of the redness of this chair, however we wish to 
understand 'being red' metaphysically.   
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Yet one may always say, more specifically, 'this chair is red; although in fact, 
technically, it's puce." Or, to put even further pressure on this concern about the 
potential precision of a predicate for identification of a property, one could 
appeal to McDowell's rejoinder to Evans over this issue (McDowell, 1996: 57).  
Evans defends a form of non-conceptualism by arguing that our conceptual 
resources do not represent the same level of fine-grained discrimination as our 
colour perception (Evans, 1982: 229 & 270).  Therefore we could see a colour for 
which we have no specific concept — that is not to say that the concept does not 
exist necessarily, just that the person cognizant of such a colour does not have the 
appropriate concept for it.  Does this mean that this person does not experience a 
colour, Evans asks?  McDowell replies that even if they do not have a readily 
available concept to identify the colour, this does not amount to non-conceptual 
experience and — for our purposes — a fundamental paucity in our conceptual 
resources.  
 
McDowell, in line with Sellars
37
, argues that experience is semantically indexical 
such that even those things for which we do not have any concept, we experience 
it semantically as 'this thing (or property)' which is intensionally directed, via 
ostension, to the 'thing' identified (McDowell, 1996: 57 - 8).  'That thing (or 
property)' could be successfully re-identified with the same qualitative sample 
and ostension at any moment.  So, even without the specific concept, the logico-
semantic structure of experience, according to this theory, is sufficient to any 
experience.  What is happening in McDowell's rejoinder is that the referent is 
successfully identified yet our conceptual capacities do no more than indicate the 
referent.
38
 Whilst this is a live debate, it certainly suggests that a principled 
objection to the qualitative sufficiency of concepts for identification seems 
tenuous at best. 
                                                 
37
 See, for example, W. Sellars' 'Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience' where he argues 
that Kantian intuitions are 'broadly conceptual' insofar as they have semantic and indexical 
content (1967: 637). 
38
 One may worry that this still indicates a paucity in our concepts - that the qualitative 
complexity of objects is such that we can only point at objects, in order to continue to identify 
them.  However, this is still not a problem for conceptual capacities vis-à-vis identity.  The 
identification is successful and will continue until the cognizer gains or invents a concept for the 
referent at which point they will presumably substitute bare ostension with a richer, conceptually 
laden judgement - which will be sufficient for the identification of the referent. 
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2.1.ii The Quantitative Interpretation 
 
There is also no reason to think that there is a problem if Adorno's point is that 
our conceptual resources are insufficient to the quantitative complexity of any 
referent.  That is, without more argument, there is no reason to think that we 
could not, in principle at least, list all the propositions which together would 
exhaust all the properties of the referent of any concept.   
 
So, for example, if Adorno's concern is that our concept of a 'Table' is insufficient 
for the sufficient identification in judgement of the particular complexity of one 
particular table, this does not put pressure on the notion of identity, it may simply 
mean that many propositions are needed which would amount a total 
identification of a particular table.
 39
 If the concern were that no concept at any 
one time could be sufficient for determining the quantitative complexity of its 
referent there would again be no worry.  We do not and ought not to expect one 
concept to be sufficient to the quantitative complexity of an object.  Importantly, 
even if this were the objection, it would still not raise concerns about identity per 
se. 
 
So even if we were to grant either interpretation, which I suggest we should not, 
there does not appear to be an evident problem for judgement in either case.  
Insofar as our conceptual resources are in some way impoverished such that they 
are insufficient for rendering sufficient determinations of material objects, this 
impoverishment and insufficiency seems easily negotiable.  Analytic 
philosophers have many ways for fine-tuning their conceptual resources and 
getting their propositions 'correct' qua objective determination of material 
entities.  And where they fall short, this is more a pragmatic concern rather than 
some fundamental flaw in naming, identifying and predicating. 
 
                                                 
39
 Of course there is Quine's suggestion that reference is impossible to substantiate and justify, c.f. 
his 'gavagai' example (Quine, 1968: 118).  Adorno cannot have anything of the sort in mind, 
however: his concern is the semantic, epistemological and metaphysical status of identity, not the 
possibility of reference.  Adorno explicitly takes it that we can and do refer to objects.  I do not 
wish to pursue this issue here.  
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2.2 Textual Evidence 
 
Despite the problems I have raised with each of these interpretations of Adorno’s 
worry, there is good textual evidence to think that he is committed to some such 
critique of identity-thinking.  In particular, there is some textual evidence to 
suggest that the second interpretation outlined above appears to be a fairly 
reasonable interpretation of what Adorno may understand by the problem of 
identity-thinking — that the idea of an object falls short of the object such that 
the idea fails to 'grasp' the object in some fashion.  This seems especially likely 
given his use of the word aufgehen which means 'go into' in a mathematical sense 
— which is undeniably quantitative.  Adorno also uses the term mehr to convey 
the idea that there is 'more' to the particular object than how we conceive of it.  
Again, this appears explicitly quantitative. 
 
If this interpretation was textually correct then Adorno's position would be 
distinctly unpromising for the reasons offered above. Fortunately, there is a much 
more compelling interpretation of Adorno's objection which will be developed 
throughout the rest of this thesis and which properly motivates his philosophical 
critique of judgement.  Following Hegel, he understands predicates as non-
identical determinations of entities according to our ideas of what the objects are; 
where those conceptual determinations, whilst valid, fail to properly disclose the 
ontological structure of the entities they determine.   
 
This does not mean that we cannot successfully identify objects.  I will contend 
that Adorno's point is both more modest and subtle: when we identify objects and 
their properties, we can be misguided if we think that we can read off our 
ontology from our language; we can be led to make assumptions about subjects 
and objects which are false.  Attention to the complex ontology of objects - of 
artworks for example - which Adorno approaches through aesthetics as opposed 
to Ontology, reveals that the way many objects are is more complex than is 
indicated by the surface structure of our judgements.  There is no reason why we 
cannot engage with this complexity and Adorno certainly thinks that we can.  
However, it does require us to realise that our conceptual identifications of 
objects, within the paradigm of identity-thinking, simplify them.  Furthermore, 
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given Adorno's complex account of objects, which will be considered in depth in 
Chapter Eight, there can be change in objects over time without change in 
material properties.  For Adorno our judgements are quantitatively insufficient 
for deep metaphysical reasons.  The idea, therefore, that we can sufficiently 
represent the world, at any one time, is false for Adorno.  We can make sense of 
this claim without commitment to the Quantitative Thesis as expressed above. 
 
Some qualifications are necessary at this point.  It may appear that Adorno is 
arguing that we should 'think differently': if this picture of judging is wrong, we 
should try to work out a new way to reference which somehow avoids identity-
thinking.  Adorno regards this as impossible: he is a conceptualist insofar as our 
experience of the world is conceptually mediated — or constructed by and 
through our conceptual resources — and identification, of some form, is endemic 
to that mediation: "Yet the appearance of identity is inherent in thought itself, in 
its pure form. To think is to identify. Conceptual order is content to screen what 
thinking seeks to comprehend." (ND: 5).  Identity, even as he attacks it, is the 
characteristic function of thought: we identify our perceptions with the entity 
perceived; and, we cognize our perceptions as this entity being this kind of thing 
or this kind of way.  We cannot help but identify objects. 
 
Returning then to Kant, it would appear that Kant's theory of judgement operates 
with the sort of sufficiency that Adorno is attacking.  As Hanna argues, the 
logical and semantic co-ordination of concepts within Kantian judgements 
provides the conditions for logical coherence of our judgements such that the 
mediation of the world through our conceptual schemas is both a sufficient and 
valid determination of the world.  Hanna argues that whilst Kant does not have a 
semantics in a contemporary Analytic sense, and situates objective validity in the 
structure of transcendental cognition, judgement, indexed to the world, is 
sufficient for the representation and determination of the world (Hanna, 2001: 
105).
40
  
                                                 
40
 It is worth noting that for Kant that when we say that an object is a particular way, i.e., when 
we make an objective, determinative judgement, we determine the modality of this claim 
according to the transcendental conditions of cognition.  See Kant: "The modality of judgments is 
a very special function of them.  What distinguishes this function is the fact that it contributes 
nothing to the judgment's content.  Rather, modality concerns only the value that the copula has in 
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Adorno's concern is that we take our conceptual resources to be adequate to the 
determination of the world, what there is in it and how those things are.  Yet he 
also sees that this is a function of thinking and it cannot be bypassed: "I have no 
way but to break immanently, in its own measure, through the appearance of total 
identity." (ND 5).  There is no external position to be taken outside of identity-
thinking such that we can think against it — all thought is involved with and 
implicated by 'identity-thinking'.  Therefore, any attack on identity-thinking must 
operate from within. 
 
What Adorno has in mind when considering identity, in this context, is how we 
identify objects in our conceptual determinations of them.  His concern, however, 
is when we take our conceptual determination of objects as sufficient 
representations — as opposed to the more simplistic and less robust claims of 
qualitative or quantitative sufficiency.   So whilst identity-thinking is unavoidable 
for Adorno, he has a much richer notion of identity (in that it includes 
metaphysical and epistemological concerns of nonidentity) than found in 
identity-thinking — the way that objects are such that they are not sufficiently 
represented in conceptual representations.   
 
Nevertheless, the issues of the sufficiency of our conceptual capabilities and 
resources to the determination of ourselves and to the empirical world pertain to 
Kant inasmuch as Kant is an identity-thinker.
41
 Yet, given the fact that there is no 
external position from which identity-thinking can be attacked and that it is an 
irreducible characteristic of thinking, we may immediately wonder what the 
                                                                                                                                    
reference to thought as such." (Kant 1996: A74/B100, 127).  This is criticised by Hegel, SoL: 129 
- 30 and will be considered in Chapter Four and Five.  That modal claims are settled according to 
the transcendental objectivity of the subject is again telling in light of Adorno's critique of the 
constituens and constitutum.  It also helps us to make sense of Adorno's claim that Kant salvages 
ontology through the subject (KCPR: 31). 
For commentary on Kant's theory of modality see Baldwin (2002), Hanna (2001: 105) and Leech 
(2010).  We will see in Section Three that Adorno, like Hegel, baulks at this subjective 
conception of modality. 
41
 See CPR: 21-2, Bxvii - iii & 67, B30; Hanna: "The representational content is the essential - or 
individuating - part of a cognition in the sense that it determines precisely which object the 
cognition refers to.  That is, it determines the object directedness, aboutness, or intentionality of 
the cognition.  Put this way, and recalling that we have momentarily abstracted away from the 
purely mental or conscious aspects of cognition, then we can clearly see that Kant's fundamental 
philosophical question is effectively equivalent to the question: how are meanings possible?" 
(Hanna, 2001: 3) & (Coffa, 1991: 9). 
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problem is and, if there is a problem, what we could conceivably do about it.  I 
discuss the epistemological and metaphysical concerns in more detail in Section 
Three.  However, Adorno has an immediate social concern for identity-thinking: 
identity mirrors a form of social domination and at the linguistic level, plays an 
important role in this form of social domination: 
 
Identity is the primal form of ideology. We relish it as adequacy to the 
thing it suppresses; adequacy has always been subjection to dominant 
purposes and, in that sense, its own contradiction. After the 
unspeakable effort it must have cost our species to produce the primacy 
of identity even against itself, man rejoices and basks in his conquest 
by turning it into the definition of the conquered thing: what has 
happened to it must be presented, by the thing, as its "in-itself." (ND: 
148) 
 
The concern regarding domination is central to Adorno's thinking and, as we can 
see, motivates his concerns over identity and its role in thinking.  Without 
significant digression, I cannot discuss the political validity of Adorno's theory 
here.
42
  However, we can at least see how this domination works semantically 
and that it has wide philosophical import for Adorno. 
 
What precisely this domination is, however, is difficult to determine.  Given what 
has already been said about identity-thinking, the concern is that the sufficiency 
of our conceptual resources, secured through the determination of the empirical 
in judgements, is in some way false.  Put this way, the claim seems open to an 
obvious objection: the identity of the conceptual determination of a state of 
affairs is only taken as true just in case it does indeed correctly represent that 
state of affairs.  Surely then the state of affairs is not 'dominated' by how we take 
the world to be, unless we are subjective idealists, because if our judgements do 
not correctly represent the state of affairs it purports to then the judgement is 
simply false.  Propositional contents such as concepts are only sufficient insofar 
as they correctly answer to the world; our thoughts about the world are beholden 
to the world, not the other way around.  In short, Adorno simply seems to have 
misunderstood the truth-making relation: even in Kant, the world, as it appears to 
us, still dictates which propositions are true and this truth-making relation is a 
necessary condition of any sufficiency between propositions and the world.  
                                                 
42
 See Hammer, 2006: 46 - 7. 
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Fortunately, I do not think that Adorno makes this mistake because it is not what 
he has in mind.  Again, his point is more subtle.  Our conceptual determinations 
of the world may well be objectively valid; however, in ways which will be 
discussed in Section Three, our conceptual determinations of the world do not 
correspond, in their metaphysical structure, to the way the world is.  Therefore, if 
we take our judgements as valid and also as sufficient to the representation of 
how the world is, and not significantly limited according to metaphysical 
concerns, then we do a disservice to the world — with, in Adorno's view, serious 
consequences.   
 
That is, we are not dealing with issues of truth-making as such.  Rather we are 
concerned with how our conceptual resources, through propositions and their 
propositional contents represent their referents in judgement.  It is at this point 
that Adorno's politically charged terms can be introduced: propositions, in order 
to represent their referents, coerce them into a form that is both different to how 
they really are and which also systematically transforms the particular way that 
referents are into a way that they are not.  The simple gloss for this point is little 
more than there is an ontological difference between propositions and their 
referents — they are different kinds of things.  The representation of one type 
through another requires a fundamental change in articulation of the one within 
the other.  This could appear a trivial truism — language is different to world — 
yet the deeper, more complex way of putting this point, is that the way the world 
is represented in propositions and rendered semantically in judgements, either for 
simple pragmatic reasons or due to more complex logical and semantic 
constraints, results in a distorted view of the world and also of our knowledge-
making activities.  Hence the difference between the world and representations of 
the world are important for Adorno. 
 
Obviously this thesis is highly controversial.  However, I will defer the 
elaboration and consideration of Adorno's position.  At least we now have some 
idea of what motivates him by which we can understand his primary concern 
with Kant's philosophy.  That is, the current import of the above is to give us the 
basic tools by which we can properly understand the heart of Adorno's critique of 
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Kant.  In Negative Dialectics, Adorno argues: 
 
In idealism, the highly formal identity principle had, due to its 
formalization, an affirmative substance. This is innocently brought to 
light by terminology, when simple predicative sentences are called 
"affirmative." The copula says: It is so, not otherwise. The act of 
synthesis, for which the copula stands, indicates that it shall not be 
otherwise—else the act would not be performed. The will to identity 
works in each synthesis. As an a priori task of thought, a task 
immanent in thought, identity seems positive and desirable: the 
substrate of the synthesis is thus held to be reconciled with the I, and 
therefore to be good. Which promptly permits the moral desideratum 
that the subject, understanding how much the cause is its own, should 
bow to what is heterogeneous to it. (ND: 147) 
 
There are a number of claims here: firstly, idealism has a 'highly formal' identity 
principle; identity in idealism is simultaneously modal and existentially 
committed, i.e., it helps determine how and what something is; identity claims are 
synthetic; identity-thinking in idealism not only determines a referent within the 
medium of thought but it 'reconciles' the referent to the subject; and as we saw 
before, there is an ethical dimension to this reconciliation: insofar as the referent, 
determined in terms of the laws of thought — that is, language — rather than 
according to its own terms (whatever those terms would be), is re-articulated as 
something foreign to its own way of being. 
 
In the above quotation, Adorno justifies my claim that we ought to understand his 
critique of transcendental subjectivity in terms of a critique of judgements.  The 
three key claims all relate directly to Kant (although as we will see, also to 
Hegel): identity in judgements affirms what is the case (or that x is thus and so); 
identity in judgements determines what is objectively the case through the 
medium of subjectivity — i.e. the object is represented through a medium which 
is heterogeneous or foreign to it but which is homogenous with the subject — 
that medium being language; and finally, there is the ethical dimension to this 
second point that the unavoidable imposition of the subject onto objects in 
thought constitutes a form of coercion
43
.   
 
This final point might seem somewhat hysterical and inappropriate.  If we are 
                                                 
43
 See Bernstein on idealism and the constitutive subject, 2001: 212 - 3. 
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talking about material, non-sentient objects, the implied ascription of some moral 
patiency to them seems perverse.  Nevertheless, we can make sense of this worry 
and it is directly relevant for understanding Adorno's philosophical motivations.  
Firstly, that we distort objects in language, in some way, is unavoidable for 
Adorno.  It becomes a problem when we don't care to acknowledge or reflect on 
that distortion.  I think he sees this as indicative of a general, and rather worrying 
attitude towards the world, which systematically or methodologically ignores the 
limitations of thinking.  It is also a worry for Adorno because he thinks that 
taking seriously the fact that objects are not how they appear in language is in 
fact a point of critical departure in itself.  If we are simply satisfied with our 
linguistic conceptions of objects we will miss how they contain, through 'non-
identical elements', crucial truths about problems in the world. 
 
For now it is sufficient to see how these three points take the problem of identity, 
as he sees it, as intimately associated with the subject.  In particular, in the 
Kantian sense, if it is the case that the transcendental subject underwrites the 
objective validity of judgements, which we will see in the following analysis is 
the case, and given this worry about how objects are rendered within judgements, 
then we see why Adorno is so deeply concerned with the epistemic and 
metaphysical status of the transcendental subject and its transcendental relation to 
judgements and their propositional contents.  I will now turn to a discussion of 
Kant's account of determinative, objective judgements which is a principal 
concern of the first critique.  We will see just how closely related and 
interdependent judgements and transcendental subjectivity are for Kant.  And we 
will also see how Adorno's worries about identity-thinking underpin his critique 
of Kant's theory of judgement. 
 
*** 
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3. Kant, Determinative Judgements and Semantics 
 
 
Adorno is concerned that the conceptual determinations of the object is the basis 
for developing a sufficient, if limited, metaphysics of objects in Kant's 
philosophy.  These conceptual determinations are framed by the 'constitutive', 
transcendental subject, and underwritten by the transcendental unity of 
apperception.
44
  What is striking is that Adorno sees this as a concern.  As this is 
no more than Kant intends, there is evidently a deep difference in philosophical 
commitments and intuitions between the two thinkers.  In this section, Kant's 
theory of judgement will be examined more fully such that we can pinpoint 
precisely how and why it might be considered a problem for Adorno.   
 
The primary contention is that Kant's theory of judgement has significant analytic 
aspects and is, according to Hanna, propositional.  Again, this cannot be taken as 
a problem in itself without begging the question.  However, analysing the 
structure of Kantian judgement will facilitate a more fine-grained understanding 
of Adorno's critique of identity-thinking.  From there we will be able to develop 
his critique of judgement and why judgements are in some way limited when 
considering valid, conceptual determinations of the material world and ourselves 
as individuals.  From there we will also be in a better position to consider why 
Adorno finds Hegel's dialectical conception of judgements attractive. 
 
3.1 Psychologism or Semantics? 
 
During the last twenty years, inspired by studies such as Coffa's The Semantic 
Tradition from Kant to Carnap, the relationship of Kant to analytic philosophy 
has been re-examined.
45
 Coffa argues that the problem with Kant's philosophy, 
                                                 
44
 See CPR: B137. 
45
 See also Friedman, 1999: 5 - 14.  For discussion of the issues of psychology, justification and 
verification within Kantian terms, see Guyer 1987: 303 - 5 & 374.  He argues that transcendental 
psychology does not account for time-determination.  Rather, his theory of time determination is 
an 'epistemological theory' about the kinds of principles that would have to be appealed to in 
order to justify or confirm claims to knowledge about subjective time-determinations.  Hence he 
does see intuitions qua time, as involved in the logical space of reason and inference.  He does not 
link this with the issue of semantics, however.  Of course Kant does emphasise the importance of 
empirical psychology in the development of transcendental enquiry through its basis in 
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and its inspiration for analytic philosophy, grew out of both 'bad semantics' 
(Coffa, 1991: 19) and where he did have a semantics, they were casual (Coffa, 
1991: 16).  This putative lack and failure is what led Kant to a view of analyticity 
constricted to understanding of concepts — and hence constricting semantics to 
nominal analyticity and excluding an ampliative understanding of analyticity, 
which would be reserved for the synthetic.
46
  The constriction of analyticity to 
the nominal was already to misunderstand analyticity from the later, Analytic 
point of view: misunderstanding the semantic content of analytic and synthetic 
propositions and thereby missing the ampliative possibility of analytic enquiry.   
 
The synthetic required other grounds than semantics and therefore relied on 
empirical intuitions for synthetic a posteriori judgements and pure intuitions for 
synthetic a priori judgements — in both cases a semantic grounding for either 
form of synthetic judgement was already precluded for Kant. In short, Coffa's 
analysis suggests that Kant's semantics, such as there were any, and its derived 
accounts of analyticity and apriority, were psychologistic.  It was the job of 
Analytic philosophy to wrest meaning, analyticity and apriority from psychology 
and resituate it within its appropriate domain of structured meaning, reference 
and inference (Coffa, 1991: 20) enabling an account of objectivity and truth 
which does not resolve in some way to subjectivity. 
 
Nevertheless some Analytic philosophers have begun to return to Kant and Hegel 
in order to deal with a number of epistemological and metaphysical problems 
which have arisen within the Analytic program.
47
  A key aspect in this return has 
revolved around the fact that some form of return to Hegel, and in particular, to 
Kant, is possible whilst retaining a modern, Analytic conception of analyticity 
and semantics because these two categories are not as anathema to these 
philosophers as the early Analytic philosophers may have thought.  Of course it 
has required, in some cases, extremely revisionary accounts of German Idealism 
to make this return possible, but Analytic philosophy and German Idealism are 
                                                                                                                                    
experience. Guyer, 2006: 26.  See also Kitcher on the relationship between transcendental 
psychology and analytic philosophy, 1990: 7 - 8 & 200. 
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 See Coffa, 1991: 16 - 20 & CPR: §§B10 - 7.  
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 See, for example: Sellars (2002), McDowell, 1996: 3 - 24 & 2006: 33 - 45; Brandom, 1994: 91 
- 3; Nuzzo (2006: 86 - 97) and analyses by Redding (2007) & Rockmore (2005) on the 
reconsideration of Hegel within analytic thought,  
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not entirely mutually exclusive.  To some degree this implies that whatever 
semantic underdevelopment we find in Kant, it seems unlikely that he is as 
semantically naïve as was perhaps thought at the beginnings of Analytic 
philosophy.  
 
For example, Sellars argued that Kant's theory of sensible presentations could be 
interpreted as 'broadly conceptual', linguistically representable and therefore 
having the sort of content already amenable to logic and inference.
48
 His point is 
that whatever the original charges of Analytic philosophy against Kant were, and 
whatever their validity, many philosophers are coming to see Kant as having a 
strong semantic element even if it is not in the same form and structure as was 
developed within Analytic philosophy.  Furthermore, the nesting of semantics 
within transcendental idealism, may be problematic for Analytic philosophy; 
however, the reasons why Kant wedded semantics to something of a 
metaphysical program was as a result of a critical response to a number of 
metaphysical and epistemological problems.  As in the case of givenness, these 
problems have not gone away.
49
  We cannot simply say, therefore, that we should 
just drop Kant's transcendental program simply because it is taking up the slack 
of bad semantics: it is an active part of a solution which Kant felt required both 
semantic elements and a metaphysics of subjectivity.  This is not to say, of 
course, that Kant was right to do so or that his solution worked.  It does suggest 
that we ought not to be too quick in dismissing Kant as a relic of pre-Analytic 
enquiry. 
 
These preliminaries are relevant to the discussion of Adorno because there is an 
aspect of his critique of Kant which is sensitive to this proto-Analytic aspect of 
Kant's thought — and he is criticising Kant partly in virtue of it.  Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in Adorno's programmatic concern that Kant's transcendental 
subject amounts to a reification of individual, empirical subjectivity to the extent 
that the subject is the condition of objectivity.  The subject does not attenuate 
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 See Sellars, 1968: 3 - 5; commentary by McDowell (1998) and criticism by Woods (1984).  
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Adorno; however, I disagree with his rendering of non-conceptuality, see Chapter Eight. 
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objectivity; rather, according to Adorno, the transcendental subject determines 
the individual subject.  The transcendental subject, undersigned by the 
transcendental unity of apperception, becomes the condition for systematic and 
logical co-ordination of the conceptual contents of synthetic a posteriori 
judgements.  Our representations of the world are referenced and indexed to 
intuitions and logically co-ordinated to produce a unified and meaningful field of 
experience. 
 
Adorno distinguishes the import of the psychological found in Hume from Kant.  
For Hume laws and regularity are psychological beliefs required to make sense of 
the behaviour and structure of the empirical world (KCPR: 96).  The rules of 
thought based on our observations are therefore contingent.  He points out that 
for Kant causality is in fact a condition of unified thought.  He proceeds with his 
analysis by then pointing out that these transcendental 'laws', as he refers to them, 
underpin the 'complex' of 'transcendental idealism'/'empirical realism'.  
Transcendental idealism says that synthetic a priori judgements are grounded in 
the mind — i.e. ultimately delimited by their relation to pure intuitions.  Adorno 
explains that empirical realism is the interaction of these pure intuitions with 'the 
data of reality' which 'leads to the constitution of the world which surrounds us as 
the world of our experience.' (KCPR: 96)  The constitution here is the 
presentation of the world in phenomenal appearance. 
 
So far this is quite standard and does not suggest any indication of what we may 
consider semantics.  However, Adorno goes on to say: 
 
In order to understand the objectivity claims of subjectivity in Kant it is 
vital to treat this concept of law with extreme rigour.  It must be seen 
as an indispensable precondition without which something like an 
organized consciousness, a consciousness that is logically consistent 
and coherent, and hence an organized, logically consistent world of 
objects, is not conceivable. (KCPR: 96) 
 
In this quotation Adorno emphasises that what we find in Kant is an objective 
structure of law — which I think we can reasonably take, given what he has said 
elsewhere, to be reason and transcendental subjectivity.  This 'law' provides for a 
logically organized consciousness which is indexed and referenced to a logically 
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organized presentation of the empirical world and its contents.  This is not to 
suggest, falsely, that Kant has a modern semantics; however, it does suggest that 
he has elements which are recognizably semantic in the modern sense.  Indeed, 
the conception being proposed by Adorno has strains of Tractarian picture 
theory.
50
  Individual, contingent subjectivity is thoroughly suppressed and 
determined by the logico-semantic structure of unified, indexical experience in 
order to produce a logically, coherent and consistent representation of the 
empirical world which is thoroughly meaningful. 
 
Adorno is quite clear that there is still a strong subjective element.  He says that 
Kant "treats the categories of psychology as empirical categories" and that this 
puts him in the "position of modern psychology" (KCPR: 189) He also properly 
emphasises the fact that it is subjectivity as such which guarantees this logical 
connectivity (KCPR: 98).  Nevertheless, subjectivity is such that we can "make 
connections between sense data, and that it is in this way that objectivity comes 
into being". (KCPR: 97).  Adorno emphasises the fact that objectivity is an issue 
of the determination and co-ordination of sense data through the making of 
connections — i.e., through synthetic a posteriori judgements.  This 
determination relies on a thoroughly objective set rules.  Whilst no-one could 
deny that Kant has a different conception of analyticity to contemporary Analytic 
philosophers, and his use of intuitions and persistent epistemology and 
metaphysics is deeply troubling for them, the logical and inferential structure of 
judgements, grounded in a strong theory of reference, produces a unified system 
of meanings which may not have been explicitly semantic but which does have a 
strong semantic structure. 
 
Interpreting Kant's semantics is controversial and technical.  The discussion here 
is not to provide arguments in that debate.  Rather it is to understand Adorno's 
interpretation such that we can continue to develop Adorno's own thinking. 
Hanna's interpretation of Kant substantiates the ideas Adorno has in mind when 
he talks about objectivity, legality, coherence, consistency and organization.   
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Hanna points out a number of features of Kant's theory of judgement, as 
essentially propositional, and its basis in transcendental subjectivity.  Hanna 
points out that 
 
because (according to Kant's thesis of cognitive or representational 
idealism) all the proper objects of human cognition — the objects of 
experience — are token-identical with the contents of judgements of 
experience, it follows that, for Kant, just as for the Tractarian 
Wittgenstein and Carnap, 'logic fills the world.' (Hanna, 2001: 71) 
 
This seems directly in line with what Adorno says about the structural relation 
between our cognition and their content as represented in judgement.  In both 
cases, they are pointing towards the logical co-ordination of Kantian cognition, 
its contents, and their determination in judgement. 
 
Of course Hanna is well aware that the Kant's contention that logic is the science 
of the rules of thinking (CPR Bviii-ix).  Thus his conception of logic is deeply 
psychologistic.  He is also well aware that Analytic philosophy wished to 
distance itself from such psychologism.  However, like Adorno, when he urges 
us to take seriously the objective, non-subjective basis of transcendental 
'subjectivity', Hanna points out that there is a strong sense that Kant is deeply 
anti-psychologistic.
51
  He argues that Kant is the inventor of anti-psychologism 
and that whilst Kant's theory of logic is thoroughly mentalistic, this does not 
entail a reduction of logic to empirical or experimental psychology (Hanna, 2001: 
73).  The reason being that pure general logic both underpins all particular modes 
of thinking and is irreducible to any particular modes of thinking.  Logic as such 
is, therefore, for Kant, beyond the caprices of psychology, is thoroughly 
normative and is the basis upon which any particular judgement ought to be 
determined semantically.
52
  The very possibility of Kant's being able to talk about 
objectivity, which Adorno consistently emphasises, relies on this anti-
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psychologism.  Adorno could be no clearer about this than in the caustic 
observation:  "The idealists made a heaven of the mind, but woe betide the man 
who had a mind." (ND: 390). 
 
The point of the above analysis is to elucidate Adorno's theses concerning 
Kantian subjectivity, objectivity and how we ought to interpret those theses.  I 
suggest that Adorno is in line with the point of view developed by Hanna, that 
there are strong semantic elements to Kant's thinking and he is, therefore, a 
proto-Analytic philosopher as opposed to just a point of departure for Analytic 
philosophy.  Of course, Adorno's critical aims are radically different to Hanna's.  
Aside from the fact that Adorno does not articulate his criticism in the same way 
as Hanna — unsurprising given their different times of writing and philosophical 
background — but their understanding and value of the consequences of this 
semantics is radically different.  For Hanna, he is trying to re-introduce Kant and 
certain Kantian answers to Analytic philosophy.  Adorno, on the other hand, for 
issues pertaining to representation and identity-thinking, finds this proto-
Analyticity problematic.   
 
Adorno's criticism of Kant, insofar as he makes possible the transition into 
Analytic philosophy, is an attempt to cut off the reduction of philosophy to 
semantics, from the outset.  Furthermore, he does not wish to resolve the 
competing elements of Kantian thought — objectivity and subjectivity/semantics 
vs. psychologism — he wants to suggest that these are irresolvable problems and 
that Kant ought to be applauded for trying to pursue these competing dynamics 
within a unified system.  In other words, Adorno acknowledges the semantic, 
objective elements of Kant's philosophy, but he wants to set these elements back 
in motion against the competing elements of subjectivity, psychology and the 
historical subject.  Whilst Kant may be being taken as proto-Analytic, Adorno's 
target is the transition of philosophy into something primarily semantical.  That is 
not to say that Adorno is in some way anti-logical; rather, it is to emphasise his 
commitment to the complexity of particular experience which in some way 
outstrips the sorts of assumptions that any semantics can be sufficient to the valid 
determination of the empirical world.  Ironically then for Adorno, the transition 
to a supposedly entirely logical, 'objective' semantics is to capitulate to some 
form of subjectivism. 
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3.2 Determinative Judgements and Propositions 
 
Hanna argues that determinative empirical judgements just are the expression of 
propositions for Kant (Hanna, 2001: 16 & 18).
53
  The thesis being developed here 
is controversial.
54
  However, it is certainly tenable and it is a very useful way to 
motivate Adorno's critique of Kant.  Obviously the notion of a proposition is a 
complex issue in itself and can mean many different things — the primary 
bearers of truth-value, shareable objects of belief and other "propositional 
attitudes" (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses, and 
the meanings of sentences (Iacona, 2003: 325 - 7).  The metaphysics of 
propositions is also controversial.  It is not necessary for this discussion to get 
involved with such debates.  We can reasonably understand judgements 
propositionally and, given Kant's theory of modality, as truth-bearing and 
shareable objects of belief.   
 
What is of interest here, is Adorno's view of Kantian subjectivity and his analysis 
of objectivity, logic and unity outlined above such that the subject is able to 
produce judgements which are objectively, valid determinations of objects 
judged.  This entails that judgements are the site where issues of identity-thinking 
can be properly analysed.  We will see that Hanna's analysis of synthetic a 
posteriori judgements, just as with his analysis of Kantian semantics, is helpful 
for understanding Adorno's critique of Kant.  The propositional structure of 
Kantian judgement gives us an insight into Adorno's concern that objects, within 
the Kantian model of cognition, just are what we determine them to be in 
judgement and this is both a valid and sufficient model for the determination of 
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objects.  Insofar as Adorno thinks that propositions are not sufficient or adequate 
for either the total determination or representation of objects, we have reason to 
be sceptical of this Kantian form of judgement. 
 
Whilst any commentator would acknowledge the revolutionary importance of 
judgement in Kant's thinking, Hanna, places the issue of Kantian judgement and 
semantics at the forefront of his interpretation.  He focuses on the construction 
and role of judgements as key in understanding Kant's epistemology and 
metaphysics.  
 
Kant takes a "judgement" [Urteill to be a kind of "cognition" [Erkenntnis] — 
which is itself an objective, conscious mental representation (A320/B376).  What 
is well-known about such cognitions is that they are produced spontaneously as 
an activity of the faculty of judgement.  This faculty brings together sensible 
intuitions to schematized versions of the pure concepts of the understanding.  So, 
our sensible perception of the world provides us with the material for cognizing; 
yet there can be no such cognition without these intuitions being rendered in 
discursive form such that they can be thought by us.  Sensible phenomena must 
be conceptually determined, therefore.  This conceptual determination is a 
judgement.   
 
The constituents of judgements are concepts and intuitions. Concepts have 
various features: (a) general and universal representations (Gesammelte Schriften 
9: 91); (b) discursive representations expressing pure logical forms and falling 
under pure logical laws (A68-70/B92-94, A239/B298); (c) intensional entities 
which can be used in any comprehension of an object which falls under the scope 
of the concept (Gesammelte Schriften 9: 95-96); (d) they are indirect insofar as 
they represents an object via a 'characteristic' shared by a number of such objects 
(A320/B376-377); (e) in virtue of (b), the concept is a sufficient rule for the 
determination of perceptions of objects (A106); and (f) is a reflection of the unity 
of apperception and so is an indirect representation of this higher-order 
transcendental function of subjectivity itself. (B 133) 
 
So, we can see that concepts have a number of key characteristics, all of which 
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will be of import for the forthcoming discussion: they are general, universal; they 
are essentially logical — and hence related to truth-functionality; they are 
sufficient; they are mediate representations of objects; they are rules and they are 
representative of the higher level functionality of apperception.  We can already 
see then that concepts are a mediate point where representations of mind and 
world cohere and that due to their essentially logical nature, this cohesion is 
logical and rule-governed.   
 
Intuitions on the other hand are always object-directed representations; even pure 
intuitions that are apprehended a priori, are, according to Kant, object oriented 
(CPR: A238 - 40/B297 - 99). Intuitions are (1) singular (A320/B377); (2) sense-
related (A19/B33, A51/B75); (3) object-dependent (B72); (4) immediate, or 
directly referential (A90-91/B122-123, B132, B145).
55
 
 
What is of most value here is the notion, which falls out of these four qualities, is 
that empirical intuitions are token-identifiable with the objects which they 
directly represent.  And also that the presence to mind of objects as appearances 
— which just are our empirical intuitions — is as close to the object (in-itself) as 
the mind gets (CPR: B63 - 4).  This is the fulcrum of transcendental thinking — 
that we do not have direct perception of objects but only perceive them through 
the direct but referential form of appearance. That intuitions are directly 
referential also suggests that they are semantic in structure and are also 
immediately implicated in the cognitive processes of the mind. 
 
The judgement is the determination of an intuition, pure or empirical, according 
to concepts, pure or empirical.  It will also, insofar as it determines intuitions and 
concepts, take account of and mediate the cognitive, logical and formal and 
transcendental functions of its constituents.  Judgements will then mediate 
between the general universality of concepts and the singular particularity of its 
intuitions such that judgements are able to both range over a number of empirical 
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representations whilst simultaneously (correctly and sufficiently) determining 
any one representation (CPR: A68/B93).  We can see from the following, and it 
is a point that Kant makes explicitly, that judgements are a function of cognitive 
unity (CPR: A69/B94).  That is, that one judgement can draw together a number 
of possible cognitions.  Thirdly, as indicated, concepts are rules for the 
determination of intuitions and fall within the remit and scope of the 
understanding in general in accordance with the general laws of logic.  
Judgements too, as a cognitive function, are subject to the rules of the 
understanding and to the general laws of logic.  This is an important idea as it 
affirms the role of judgements as entities with truth-functional and modal validity 
(CPR: A130 - 32/B170 - 172). 
 
What should stand out about the characteristics of judgement, given the 
discussion thus far, is that the logical and rule-governed co-ordination and 
coherence of judgements is guaranteed by apperception.  To reiterate, 
apperception is the transcendental condition of the unity of self which is posited 
analytically and a priori.  Whilst it is not an object of knowledge itself — no 
predicates can be ascribed to it and it can't be the subject of any propositions — it 
is according to Kant a necessary, higher level unity of self which can be inferred 
from the synthetic unity of empirical subjectivity.  That is, I can make the 
synthetic a priori judgement that 'I am a judging being' which can be inferred 
from the structure of experience as essentially causal, discursive and unified.  
However, the judgement is properly a reflection about judging and a synthetic 
reflection upon this immediate activity of the mind; it is not directly a claim 
made about the 'I' based on reflection concerning the 'I' itself.  For Kant, as we 
have seen, we have no access to the 'I' as such.  When we speak directly of the 'I', 
we make meaningful and intelligible utterances but they should not be confused 
with inferentially and existentially valid propositions.  I have discussed 
apperception at some length in previous sections; what is relevant here is its role 
in judgement.  The necessary higher-level unity of the 'I', which is a 
transcendental condition of empirical subjectivity, provides the transcendental 
basis for the objective validity of judgements. 
 
Prior to the introduction of apperception, focussing only on the constituent 
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elements of judgements — concepts and intuitions — we would only have the 
possibility of 'well-formed' propositions determined according to the dual 
influence of sensible representations and discursive concepts — and, it should be 
noted, no real possibility of reflective consciousness.  We would not have, 
according to Kant, the conditions for the objective validity of thought because, 
without a position from which multiple cognitions could be considered in logical 
relation to each other, there would be no guarantee of the coherence of thought. 
Yet, Kant's anti-realism at the transcendental level places the onus of objective 
validity on the logical co-ordination of the propositional contents of cognition by 
a single unified self.  A transcendental condition of this coherence is a cognitive 
unity which supervenes on empirical subjectivity; which is irreducible to 
empirical subjectivity; and which behaves as no more than an enduring reference 
point about which the individual products of mental activity — essentially 
rational judgements — are co-ordinated.   
 
Kant makes explicit the role of apperception in objective validity: 
 
A judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to 
the objective unity of apperception. That is the aim of the copula is in 
them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from 
the subjective. (CPR: B141) 
 
In addition to noting the relationship between apperception and judging in this 
quotation, the modal and existential commitments implicit in this relation are 
telling.  Insofar as apperception guarantees the objective validity of a judgement, 
that judgement is not only logically well-formed, rationally coherent and sortally 
correct but the state of affairs it articulates is objectively the case.  The copula in 
judgements, in virtue of the relation between the judgement (in its foundation in 
intuitions) and apperception, is not indicative of a private commitment that a 
particular person 'takes x to be thus and so'.  Rather, it is indicative of an 
objective commitment 'that x is thus and so'. 
 
As Hanna points out, because the range of validity of judgements is not particular 
to any one subject, but any subject which shares the same cognitive structure, the 
intersubjective, rational communicability and validity of judgements is such that 
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judgements are essentially propositions in the sense of being truth-bearers 
(Hanna, 1991: 22).  So whilst Kant is anti-realist — that is, their formulation and 
validity is mind-dependent — about propositions as such, propositions are not 
only objective, they are universally valid. 
 
Finally, to give a full account of the epistemic scope and status of judgements, 
we must give a brief account of truth.  As has been suggested, the universal and 
necessary validity of judgements according to their determination within the 
necessary structure of rational cognition — which amounts to the objectively 
valid representation of empirical states of affairs — entails that judgements are 
propositional in essence.  The question is then, what makes a judgement true?  
 
Given Kant's transcendental account of propositions and modality, it would seem 
likely that Kant would hold some form of coherence theory of truth — that the 
truth values of propositions were determined solely by their meaningfulness 
within a system of meanings.  However, this supposition seems to run directly 
against the grain of what he says.  Firstly, Kant argues states that "truth is the 
agreement of cognition with its object." (CPR: A58/B83).  Truth is therefore 
determined on a case-by-case basis insofar as a semantic representation of an 
object — a judgement — corresponds to how that object is.  In this respect at 
least, Kant seems to hold a correspondence theory of truth: objects are truth 
makers that determine the truth or falsity of judgements in terms of the agreement 
of the proposition with the sort of mental representation which is an object.
56
  
Kant also rejects any essentially rationalist notion of truth, that there can be an 
abstract universal criterion of truth which accounts for truth or falsity irrespective 
of particular contingencies (CPR: A58/B84). 
 
To what extent Kant's theory of truth-making could be considered realist depends 
greatly on Kant's metaphysics of objects.  We do know that Kant argues against a 
material idealism in the Refutation of Idealism.  He argues that enduring, external 
material reality is a necessary condition of the determination of our own enduring 
existence — as we discover in reflection on the unity amongst the synthetic 
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products of judgements: "Hence the determination of my existence in time is 
possible only through the existence of actual things that I perceive outside me." 
(CPR: B275).
57
  This does not entail, as we will see, that objects, as we know 
them, are real — rather they are conceptual entities.  What we should note is that 
in our interest in judgements and propositions we are led to a consideration of the 
metaphysics of objects — this, as we will see, is central to Adorno's critical 
philosophy and is part of why Adorno critiques Kant. 
 
3.3 Kant, Objects and the Recurrence of Identity-Thinking 
 
The problem is that when considering objects, we are, as Allison has pointed out, 
already talking about objects in second-order talk, i.e., we cannot talk directly 
about objects as such but only through their conceptual determination and 
according to the conditions of this conceptual determination (Allison, 2004:173): 
 
1. [An] Object [Objekt] is that in whose concept the manifold of a given 
intuition is united. (Kant, 1996: B137) 
2. What lies in the successive apprehension is regarded as presentation; 
but the appearance that is given to me, despite being nothing more than 
a sum of these presentations, is regarded as their object, with which the 
concept that I obtain from the presentations of apprehension is to agree.  
We soon see that, since agreement of cognition with the object is truth, 
the question can only be inquiring after the formal conditions of 
empirical truth; and we see that appearance as contrasted with the 
presentations of apprehension, can be presented as an object distinct 
from them only if it is subject to a rule that distinguishes it from any 
other apprehension and that makes necessary one kind of combination 
of the manifold.  That [element] in the appearance which contains the 
condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object. (Kant, 
1996: A191/B236) 
 
Hence "whatever is represented through such a synthetic unity counts as an 
object." (Allison, 2004: 173).
58
  If we put these quotations together, Kant seems 
to be saying that objects are appearances under particular rules of the 
understanding such that they provide representations for conceptual 
determination of a particular kind.  
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What Kant seems to have in mind is the idea that a determinate, sensible 
presentation, insofar as it appears as a structurally well-ordered unity, distinct 
from other empirical unities, entails that, given the rules of thinking, it has 
normative force for our cognitive faculties: it says, in virtue of the fact that I 
appear as thus and so means, that you ought to think of me as being thus and so 
given the structure of your cognitive capacities.  Yet, regardless of this notion of 
an object as an objectively valid reference point for our conceptual 
determinations, metaphysically the object is still no more than a representation, 
i.e., a mental entity. The evolving tension between objects as mental entities and 
also being entities capable of objective involvement in shareable beliefs, is 
something Adorno finds very worrying in Kant's philosophy as we will see. 
 
The attempt to maintain not just the objective validity of 'objects' but also their 
objective reality seems strained.  In the following quotation, it is obvious that he 
wishes to maintain a commitment to the objective reality of objects as 
transcendental conditions for the possibility of truth-making and experiential 
coherence; however, his claims are always modified by the limitations of his 
idealist commitments with serious metaphysical and epistemological 
consequences: 
 
If a cognition is to have objective reality, i.e., if it is to refer to an 
object and have in that object its signification and meaning, then the 
object must be capable of being given in some way.  For otherwise the 
concepts are empty; and though we have thought by means of them, we 
have in fact cognized nothing through this thinking, but have merely 
played with presentations.  To be given an object — if this is not again 
to mean to be given it only indirectly, but is to mean, rather, to exhibit 
it directly in intuition — is nothing other than to refer the presentation 
of the object to experience (whether actual, or at least possible, 
experience). (CPR: A155-6/B194 - 5) 
 
At the beginning of the quotation, he speaks confidently of objective reality; the 
qualification at the end — 'presentation of the object' — is practically mumbled.  
Kant begins the passage with a strong sense of externalism and objectivity in 
terms of objects — that they are given to us and that what is given is 'outside us.'  
Yet, by the end of the passage, 'givenness' is in fact the referring of our mental 
presentations of objects to ourselves.  The robust distinction between objective 
and subjective seems strained.
59
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 This is a different issue, of course, to Kant's refutation of problematic idealism in which seeks 
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Elsewhere he cannot help but be more straightforward about the status of objects.  
Insofar as they are presentations only encountered in appearances, objects are 
mind-dependent: 
 
At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the 
expression 'an object of representation'. We have stated above that 
appearances are themselves nothing but sensible representations, 
which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable 
of existing outside our power of representation.  What, then, is to be 
understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and 
consequently also distinct from, our knowledge?  It is easily seen that 
this object must be thought only as something in general=X, since 
outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over 
against this knowledge as corresponding to it. (CPR: A104 - 5) 
 
So, according to Kant it is certainly true that objects can provide a referent for the 
objective determination of appearances. Furthermore, insofar as conceptually 
determined appearances agree with this object which, barring some sort of 
performance error, they most certainly will do, propositions which represent this 
determination will correspond to objects.   
 
Indeed the object, as a mental entity, mediated through the forms of sensibility, is 
a necessary referent for the valid determination of objective experience; hence 
objects are a constitutive feature of the entire validity of Kant's transcendental 
system.  Taken in conjunction with the theory of transcendental subjectivity and 
apperception Kant seems to be able to argue for the thoroughly consistent, 
organized and unified account of empirical knowledge.   
 
However, what Kant has not shown, and cannot show, is that that 'element' which 
is given in the appearance is itself a truthful presentation of the 'object-in-itself'.  
This is the most well-known aspect of Kant's transcendental metaphysics.  All we 
can infer, transcendentally, is that inasmuch as 'objects' appear to us to be thus 
and so — where 'objects' are either elements of or determinations of phenomenal 
appearances — we must think of objects as being thus and so — and that we 
                                                                                                                                    
to prove that, it is transcendentally necessary that a condition of inner experience is that there are 
external objects which I perceive (CPR: B275 - 6).  However, we do not have unmediated access 
to such entities as pointed out in the Transcendental Aesthetic so sceptical doubts may still 
surface.  See Allison for an attempt to construct a Kantian rejoinder (2004: 297 - 298). 
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ought to form beliefs about objects as being thus and so.  What we cannot say is 
that objects in terms of objects-in-themselves are thus and so: we can only 
speculate that the relation between appearances and the real — phenomenal and 
noumenal — is such that what is perceived in appearance is accurately what is 
the case noumenally. 
 
A substantial aspect of Adorno's critique of Kant comes into view at this point.  
Adorno understands Kant as thoroughly committed to some sort of two-world 
ontology (KCPR: 109 - 10).  He argues that objects are mental entities and are 
caused by the noumenal entities (KCPR: 108) — but about which we can say 
nothing.  Adorno goes on to say that this ontology produces serious 
epistemological problems, papered over, as it were, by talk of objectivity and 
validity.  He argues that on the one hand, we are led to an agnosticism: that 
whatever we know we cannot know it with any certainty (KCPR: 109) or that we 
do know a mirror of the real world but that we cannot say properly what the 
relation between the real world and the mirror world is (KCPR: 109). 
 
These are quite standard worries.  Indeed, Hanna argues that Kant's theory of 
judgements — that judgements are grounded in propositions, are logically 
coherent, consistent and co-ordinated, and persist as valid epistemic utterances in 
virtue of their high-order co-ordination according to a persisting, unified 
apperception — can only carry us to the conclusion that our propositions are 
maximally consistent, logical and well-formed.  Inasmuch as judgements 
determine — objectively and validly — phenomenal appearances, then such 
appearances themselves are consistent, logical and well-formed.
60
  Taking into 
consideration Kant's important account of causality offered in the Analogies of 
Experience, where cognition of objects transcendentally require that sensible 
appearances be determinately ordered in a causal succession (CPR: B233), then 
we have a relationship between mind and world which determines the world as 
necessarily being thought of as thus and so and that any human mind must 
necessarily think of the world as being thus and so.  Yet, even if we grant Kant 
has achieved this not inconsiderable goal, as Hanna points out, he is unable to 
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 See also KCPR: 107 where Adorno makes just this point. 
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rule out the possibility that reality is a coherent dream (Hanna: 2009).  That is, 
Kant is unable to meet a measure of scepticism which he explicitly aimed to 
answer with his transcendental epistemology and critical metaphysics.  
 
Nevertheless, Adorno gives these critical concerns a very distinctive turn which 
is programmatic for his own thought.  Taking Kant seriously, we know that he 
attempts to relinquish knowledge of one realm — the noumenal — to secure 
knowledge in another — the phenomenal.  However, even granting this, Adorno 
turns the tables on Kant.  He argues that the critical restructuring of valid 
metaphysics according to the demarcations required to facilitate a set of entities 
which can be thoroughly known to us, bifurcates the world.  There is the world as 
we know it and then the very same world, differently considered, which we 
appear cut off from, unknown and unknowable:   
 
Putting out our nets and catching more and more things in them, there 
is a sense in which nature itself seems to keep receding from us; and 
the more we take possession of nature, the more its real essence 
becomes alien to us. (KCPR: 176) 
 
In short, as Enlightenment thought sought to eradicate the ontological space for 
entities which outstripped our epistemic resources, Kant's philosophy 
inadvertently entrenches this space. 
 
Furthermore, Adorno argues that the Enlightenment coping mechanism, which 
attempted to eradicate the realm of occult entities in the first place, which was 
immanent in pre-scientific times, results in a philosophy which only admits of 
entities which can be fully assimiliable within our cognition.  That is, within a 
judgement which sufficiently represents the world and which counts as sufficient 
for the development of our knowledge.  In other words, the world must become 
ours in knowledge if it is to be at all stripped of its threatening, occult aspect 
(KCPR: 111).
 61
 
 
There are two concerns: the increase in objectivity as mediated through 
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 This is a central theme and argument in the Dialectic of Enlightenment: "Myth becomes 
enlightenment and nature mere objectivity.  Human beings purchase the increase in their power 
with estrangement from that over which it is exerted." (DoE: 6). 
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subjectivity, entrenches uncertainty, it merely co-ordinates it as an export, as it 
were, of the system — it exports uncertainty out of epistemology into speculative 
metaphysics and then attempts to ditch the latter.  Yet it is not even clear that 
Kant has succeeded in avoiding speculative metaphysics himself.  Secondly, only 
that which can be taken as mine, objectively, is a proper object of knowledge.  
The epistemic determination of this latter point is crucial and is a point that 
Adorno makes explicitly: 
 
If we wish to speak of a salvage operation in Kant, as I have done, this 
must refer to the feeling of confidence that a human being, objectively 
forsaken and metaphysically homeless as he has become, can make 
himself at home provided he cuts his suit according to his cloth…That 
is to way, he must confine his activity to what he knows and what lies 
within his competence; he must seek the guarantee of an absolute, the 
warranty of authentic truth, not as an objectivity external and alien to 
himself, but within himself. (KCPR: 113) 
 
Implicitly, what Adorno isolates is a degree of epistemic hubris:
62
 that the world, 
such as it is, ought to be knowable and known by us objectively and validly.  
This aim drives our philosophy.  However, this epistemic ambition, a suppressed 
premise of Kant's entire philosophy, is not argued for transcendentally — and is 
obviously not something that could or should be derived empirically. Rather, it is 
an extra-critical element, imported into Kant's philosophy more as a function of a 
socio-historical condition than as a piece of philosophy.  That it is a socio-
historical element does not, of course, invalidate it; however, its unsubstantiated 
involvement in a system of epistemology and metaphysics that revolves around 
aporias, maybe we should ask questions of this tacit principle.  This is precisely 
what Adorno does. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The delineation of phenomena and noumena, of transcendental subjects and 
empirical subjects, in short any number of the uncomfortable dualistic elements 
which appear in Kant's system, are ultimately a function of an unfettered 
epistemic ambition faced with an insoluble problem — the world, that which we 
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 This issue has surfaced in Kantian scholarship and has drawn antithetical commentaries.  
Normally Kant's epistemology is treated as humble: Langton, 2007: 2; Ameriks, 2000: 24;  
Allison 2004: 18 - 9. 
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want to know about, is external to us.
63
  This externality and difference is, in 
many respects, the perennial problem of philosophy.  Furthermore, it is an 
externality and difference that philosophy has sought to dissolve.  Kant's is one 
solution to this problem but because of its genius and its originality, its putative 
failure, Adorno takes as deeply instructive.  However, his insight is that the drive 
to solve the problem of mind knowing world, the aporias that it generates, 
perhaps indicates something amiss in the original epistemological ambition. 
 
We will see that this is the conclusion that Adorno makes.  The immanent 
critique of both Kant and Hegel suggest that absolute objectivity and knowing 
requires suppressions of subjectivity.  Yet subjectivity is irreducible and the 
attempt to circumvent it, or sublimate it within transcendental systems of 
knowledge, or even experience, will merely return the problem in some distorted 
form.  What Kant gets right, he suppresses in favour of his reimagined notion of 
objectivity.  So whilst it is implicit in Kant's theory of cognition that "[T]he unity 
of consciousness is conceived on the model of the unity of the thing" which 
Adorno thinks is correct, Kant equivocates.  Kant also requires that the unity of 
consciousness is not predicated on the unity of objects because that will make the 
transcendental subject vulnerable to the flux and contingency of empirical 
experience.  (KCPR: 107).   
 
The dependence of the subject on the object must be reversed because if the 
unification of our own consciousness relied on the unity of the object, in an 
ontological sense, then Kant's objectivity would be lost — the problems of 
scepticism would loom again.  Of this polar reversal Adorno says: 
 
The more subjectivization you have, the more reification there is.  
There is a reifying quality in the very attempt to relate all phenomena, 
everything we encounter, to a unified reference point and to subsume it 
under a self-identical, rigid unity, thus removing it from its dynamic 
context. (KCPR: 114) 
 
With that Adorno brings together his critique of Kant.  The epistemic ambition 
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 Here Adorno is directly echoing Strawson's analysis of the conflict between general principles 
detached from the world and the world as the immanent limit of transcendental generality (1982: 
256).  
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drives Kant to situate objectivity in subjectivity.  The value of this move is that 
when the subject and the subject's conceptual resources are made the index of a 
phenomena's being taken as thus and so, we are able to fix the phenomena 
according to our conceptual schemes.  This is the process of reification which 
says that x is y and inasmuch as we take x to be y, x is always necessarily y. The 
phenomena becomes conceptually determined — identified — by how we take it 
to be and is then taken as identical with its conceptual determinations.  Through 
the consideration of subjectivity, then judgements and then their relation to 
Kant's transcendental project, we return to issues of identity-thinking. 
 
The problem with identity-thinking is not therefore a lack of conceptual 
resources, either qualitatively or quantitatively; it is the view that fails to 
appreciate the dynamic quality of phenomena.  The dynamic quality of 
phenomena is such that we cannot foreclose on what entities are and how they 
are — by extension, insofar as our subjectivity is tied to our experience of 
objects, we must also be prepared to see ourselves as essentially dynamic.
64
  This 
is requires epistemological humility insofar as we cannot provide a set of 
propositions which will give a full account of an entity at any one time — to 
settle for this requires that we give up some of our epistemic ambitions.  What 
Kant gets right, for Adorno, is the fact that our experience, consciousness and 
subjectivity is reliant on the flux of intuitions and empirical phenomena.  
Furthermore, subjectivity finds its limits in its encounter with the objective 
world.  The problem comes in Kant's attempt to then objectively and validly fix 
our conceptual determinations as necessarily and always as sufficient to the 
representation of an object. 
 
In the next section we will see how Adorno reconceives the problem of 
judgement through Hegel.  In Hegel he finds resources for critically developing a 
position away from Kant.  However, we see that finally, Adorno returns to some 
of Kant's insights — namely the original difference between mind and world, 
which is strongly felt in Kant's philosophy, is an irreducible problem that neither 
Kant nor Hegel can magic away.  Yet between the two of them, we are given 
critical resources for thinking about objects. 
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Section Two 
 
 
Adorno's Critique of 
Hegel's Dialectics 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
In the previous section, Adorno's critique of Kant was examined.  We began to 
see a number of themes develop which Adorno takes to be philosophically 
important.  He worries about tensions and contradictions in Kant's philosophy, 
generated through reifications of subjects and objects.  He argues that Kant's 
theory of determinative judgement, whilst intended to be sensitive to the way the 
world is, in fact truncates our experience of the world; it distorts the object in the 
sufficiency of discursive representation.  Adorno is concerned with reifications of 
subjects and objects in our theoretical models; that our discursive representations 
of objects in judgements, when taken as sufficient representations of objects, 
actually reduce our sensitivity to the particularity of objective experience; and 
finally, he is concerned with the sorts of assumptions we bring to our 
philosophical enquiries.  Adorno is not so naïve or idealistic as to think that these 
could be circumvented; however, critical reflection on them is essential. 
 
In this section I will pursue a similar process.  The intention is to further develop 
Adorno's thinking through his critical engagement with Hegel.  That is, through 
the reconstruction and critique of Hegel's philosophy, Adorno's own 
philosophical concerns emerge.  They emerge either in the form of dialectical 
criticism, i.e., that Hegel's philosophy contains a tension or contradiction and a 
transformation in dialectical theory is required to overcome that problem; or, 
Adorno's concerns reveal themselves in the way in which Adorno characterises 
Hegel.  On occasion, Adorno projects his own ideas onto Hegel — or he at least 
vacillates between his own conception of dialectics and that of Hegel. 
 
A secondary consideration, which falls out of the primary concern, is whether or 
not we should consider Adorno an 'Hegelian thinker'.  This section can only go so 
far in considering this issue as it is not the primary concern and also, to argue 
conclusively, a thorough scholarly engagement with Hegel would be required.  
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As with the previous section on Kant, I remain very much within Adorno's own 
understanding of Hegel.  Nevertheless, insofar as Adorno criticises certain 
aspects of Hegel's philosophy and insofar as those aspects could reasonably be 
considered valid representations of Hegel's thinking, we have an indication as to 
whether or not it is appropriate to consider Adorno 'Hegelian'.  We have seen him 
critique Kant and we will see that some of those concerns have a distinctly 
Hegelian inflection.  Given Adorno's commitment to dialectics, it would seem 
quite reasonable to consider him an Hegelian.  Nevertheless, we will see Adorno 
level dialectical criticisms at Hegel.  It becomes apparent that in many ways 
Adorno is deeply influenced by Hegel; yet his philosophical commitments 
diverge considerably from what may be considered an Hegelian orthodoxy. 
 
The section is divided into three chapters.  In the first chapter I will consider a 
number of key aspects of Hegelian philosophy.  As mentioned, the presentation 
of Hegel is with a view to Adorno's own criticisms so is not intended as a 
definitive account.  Nevertheless, it is important for us to have a good grasp on 
certain Hegelian ideas if we are to be able to pick through them to consider what 
Adorno agrees with and disagrees with.  From this analysis a fine-grained 
account of Adorno's own philosophical commitments can be developed.  To that 
end, Hegel's theory of judgements and propositions will be considered, paying 
particular attention to Hegel's theory of subject and object.  This analysis will 
then be situated within Hegel's broader metaphysics, considering the dialectic 
itself and its relation to ontology, essences, modality and truth. 
 
In the second chapter we will consider how the theory just developed, directly 
influences Adorno's own thinking — that is, we gain an immediate understanding 
of Adorno's commitments.  We will see that Adorno is deeply impressed with 
Hegel's conception of objects and the difficulties they pose for their cognition 
and conceptualisation in judgement.  We will see that what impresses Adorno the 
most in this regard is how he understands the importance of particularity in 
Hegel's theory of objects and the notion of nonidentity.  Nonidentity marks an 
important, very Hegelian, commitment in Adorno's thinking.  Adorno also adopts 
Hegel's attack on Kant's antinomies, arguing alongside Hegel that whilst Kant 
was brilliant to appreciate the importance of antinomy, his account was truncated 
and ultimately dogmatic. 
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We will then turn to Hegel's own theory of dialectics.  Given the constitutive role 
dialectics plays in Hegel's critique of Kant and that Adorno adopts an Hegelian 
view on much of this critique, it is unsurprising that he should be impressed by 
Hegel's dialectical method.  Like Hegel, Adorno sees dialectics as a method that 
adapts itself to its subject matter; insofar as it adapts, it is sensitive to the 
dynamic structural contradictions of its subject matter normally suppressed 
through the application of pre-established theories and methods.  For Adorno, 
dialectics is a way to think about the world which is non-dogmatic and retains its 
explanatory power.  I suggest that non-dogmatic theorising is a fundamental, 
motivating concern for the way in which Adorno conceives of philosophising. 
 
As much as Adorno adopts a Hegelian position, however, he also conducts a 
dialectical critique of that position.  In the third chapter, I develop Adorno's 
critique and thereby his own idiosyncratic inflection of dialectical philosophy.  
The transformation of Adorno's thinking, through this critique, out of Hegelian 
orthodoxy, places him in deep opposition to much of Hegel's key ideas.  This is a 
fact duly noted by a number of commentators — Rosen, in particular will be 
discussed below.  We will see that whilst Adorno accepts Hegel's critique of 
propositions and predication, he takes the cognitive operations of predication to 
be an ineliminable consequence of thinking.  The duality of the discursive subject 
and the material object — which is primarily an epistemic issue considered by 
Adorno in the form of the limit or block — persists in his thinking.  This is a 
profound difference which entails serious consequences throughout the rest of 
Adorno's assessment of Hegel and also points us towards a key commitment in 
Adorno's thinking: a commitment to the material world as non-conceptual as 
opposed to its conceptuality — qua Begriff — as we find in Hegel. 
 
I will also argue that Adorno continues to hold an Hegelian conception of truth.  
However, given the difference we see between the conceptual realm and the non-
conceptual realm, indicated above, there are also differences in Adorno's theory 
of truth which correspond to a different conception of essences and universals.  
Whilst essences and universals are socio-historically mediated for Hegel, through 
their constitutive role in Geist, their rational becoming drives socio-historical 
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development.  For Adorno it is the other way around and as such the socio-
historical has a constitutive role in the generation of Geist, essences and 
universals become, in a Marxian turn, socio-historical products themselves.  
Truth then, for Adorno, turns out to be socio-historically indexed in a different 
way to that found in Hegel. 
 
In addition to the above differences, it will be shown that given the limits 
discursive subjects reach in conceptualising the objects of their cognition, we will 
see that particularity is irreducible for Adorno.  Whereas for Hegel particularity 
can and is sublated within a deeper dialectical conception of objects, for Adorno, 
the particularity of the object cannot be sublated.
65
  As a result, whilst Adorno 
accepts Hegel's arguments for the suffusion of antinomies in thought, he does not 
think that antinomies can be entirely sublated.  They retain their dialectical, 
Hegelian character insofar as antinomies are still dynamic.  I suggest that this 
indicates one of Adorno's deepest commitments and the requirement of the 
dialectic to account for this particularity is key to the transformation of dialectics 
into negative dialectics. 
 
From the analysis of Adorno's critique of Hegel, I propose three key notions 
which will play a key role in Adorno's own philosophy, to be discussed in the 
final, third section of the thesis.  These notions are conceptless [begriffslos], 
nonidentity [Nichtidentität] and mediation [Vermittlung]. 
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 'Sublation' is the common translation of Aufhebung.  There is no English synonym for the 
German term.  The German term has a number of contradictory connotations: cancelling out or 
annulment, preservation and raising up.  The term sublate is derived from the Latin, sublatus, is 
the perfect passive participle of tollere meaning 'to take away' or 'lift up'.  In its dialectical 
context, English use of the term sublate takes on the dynamic connotation of negation 
transitioning into a positive where the negative is preserved within the positive through the 
determination of the positive by the form of the negative. 
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4.  Hegelian Dialectics, Judgements and Truth 
 
 
In this section, key aspects of Hegel's philosophy will be examined — in 
particular his theory of judgements.  This will then enable us to consider what 
Adorno agrees with in Hegel and what he disagrees with.  Like Kant and other 
Enlightenment philosophers, Hegel was concerned to secure a foundation for the 
objective validity of empirical knowledge.  Like Kant he believed that our 
cognitive resources were capable of providing such knowledge, integrated as they 
are in our autonomous, rational subjectivity.  Given such aims, the problem of 
scepticism was pressing.  Kant's response was to jettison certain modes of 
enquiry and associated knowledge, in order to secure a more conservative terrain 
of knowledge — about which we can make objectively valid judgements.  
Hegel's account of judgement attempted to integrate scepticism as a moment on 
the road to absolutely valid objective knowledge of reality as such — his 
dialectical method presents the possibility of proceeding beyond the strictures on 
thinking and judgement we find in Kant.  We will see that Adorno disagrees 
strongly with Hegel over the scope and content of our judgements; however, he 
agrees with Hegel that the superficial structure of our judgements does not 
represent the ontological structure of the world, and that their objective validity 
must be settled, somehow, in accordance with the way the world is as opposed to 
how we are, i.e., some form of realism as opposed to transcendental idealism. 
 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel gives an account of our everyday 
judgements, and of their certainty and shows how scepticism unavoidably 
evolves from such judgements (PoS: §91 & §109).  Through scepticism and our 
reflections on our judgement we come to develop a higher-level understanding of 
our judgements and their contents which helps to transform our very self-
consciousness.
66
 In the Science of Logic, he considers judgements somewhat 
more abstractly, in terms of their dialectical structure, and shows how we must 
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 See PoS: §§61 - 2, 344, 346, 495, 502, 520, 540 & 780 to follow Hegel's thoughts on the 
development of judgement and its relationship to self-consciousness, reality and eventually 
objective truth.  This will be discussed through its abstract form, as Hegel presents it within the 
Logic.  Also: PoM: §§398, 412, 423, 429, 447, 467. 
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consider the very structure of a judgement differently if we are to properly 
understand how the world really is.
67
  Hegel's idea is that viewing judgement as a 
heterogeneous process to the world — which sorts according to its own structures 
and which are imposed onto the world externally — is a serious mistake.  This 
notion will be important for how Adorno considers our discursive practices. 
 
 
4.1 Determinative Judgements and Modality 
 
It should be noted that Hegel makes an important, if slightly obscure, distinction 
between the proposition and the judgement.  He states that  
 
if what is said of a singular subject is itself only something individual, 
as for instance, "Aristotle died at the age of 73 in the fourth year of the 
115th Olympiad," then this is a mere proposition [Satz], not a judgment 
[Urteil]. There would be in it an element of judgment only if one of the 
circumstances, say, the date of death or the age of the philosopher, 
came into doubt even though the stated ﬁgures were asserted on the 
strength of some ground or other. (SoL: 626) 
 
It appears that what Hegel has in mind, when he says that the proposition states 
something individual, is that a proposition is a mere representation of a singular 
state of affairs and represents this state of affairs in abstraction from other states 
of affairs with which it is intimately linked.  A proposition, whilst syntactically 
predicative, does not, through its predicative structure, assert anything of the 
subject, it is reportage.  A proposition enunciates a state of affairs, whereas for 
Hegel, a judgement asserts the connection it states as it attends to the notion or 
concept [Begriff] of the entity predicated.
68
   
 
We must note at this juncture that the notion or concept of an entity is not a 
mental entity in the Kantian sense but is a constitutive feature of objective reality 
and is related directly to the notion of essence [Wesen] and being [Sein].
69
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 PoL: pp. 550 - 587.   
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 See Pinkard, 1988: 76. 
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 The interpretation of essence and its role in Hegel's philosophy is particularly complex.  
Béatrice Longuenesse interprets Hegel's essences in a highly Kantian fashion arguing that essence 
is the dialectical reconsideration of appearances (Longuenesse, 2007: 6 & 112 - 14). For 
trenchantly post-Kantian, anti-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel's theory of essence see, 
Pippin, 2008: 40; 2011: 75 & 1997: 161 - 163). See also, Brandom's interpretation of essence as 
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Therefore, when Hegel uses the term Begriff he is working with two very strong, 
dialectically related, ideas.  One is that the concept of an entity is like a guiding 
principle which is brought to fruition through the rational development of its 
internal contradictions and determinations.  As well as concept having this 
connotation of 'Notion', it is an emphasis on the fact that objects have a 
conceptual structure and are necessarily amenable to conceptual determination 
and being grasped discursively.  Judgements, insofar as they attempt to correctly 
identify the determinate essence of a particular, are intimately involved with our 
understanding of the real determinations of a particular.
70
 
 
This conception of determinative judgements and their content is already 
radically different to Kant for whom determinative judgements just are 
propositional.  We saw that for Kant, when determining a sensible intuition 
according to a concept which is then expressed in the form of a synthetic 
judgement that x is y, the modality of the judgement is then considered according 
to its relationship to the transcendental faculties.
71
 Any well-formed judgement is 
a candidate for consideration as an item of true knowledge.  Kant refers to the 
modality of such judgements as problematic [Problematische] judgements — 
here problematic is determined according to the categories of 'possibility and 
impossibility' [Möglichkeit/Unmöglichkeit].  Those judgements which are not 
merely well-formed but which are also asserted as true will actually have a truth-
value and any judgement that is well-formed and has a truth value may be 
considered as necessarily true or false in virtue of the transcendental conditions 
                                                                                                                                    
the product of material exclusivity of the world being determinately one way and not another way 
providing the grounds for a conceptual holism itself characterised by the determination and 
exclusion implicit within the material determination  (Brandom, 2002: 49 - 52). 
In this thesis I work with a metaphysical conception of essence along the lines of the following 
commentators.  Stone argues that Hegel's theory of essences has deeper metaphysical 
commitments as opposed to the broadly inferentio-semantic, pragmatic interpretation.  She argues 
that Hegel is wedded to a deeper, rationalist conception of essences - without reverting to 
Aristotelianism (Stone, 2005: 45 - 50). Stern also argues for a metaphysical reading of essences 
as the nature or concept [Begriff] of an entity which can then be mediated with existence to 
generate the category of actuality (Stern, 2009: 66, 78 - 9 & 105 - 6).  Houlgate argues that 
essence is the negation of immediate being as 'positing' - essence is not an essential ground for 
kinds but is an underdetermined moment, alongside being, of the concept.  Reality is concept 
through and through for Houlgate, 2005: 20.  He, therefore, rejects the type of 'essentialist' 
account that I am working with here.  Regardless, this metaphysical account is a useful way to 
orientate ourselves to Adorno's thinking. 
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 See Inwood for a useful analysis of Hegel's terminology concerning Essence and 
Notion/Concept: 58 - 61 & 88 - 91. 
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of cognition.  Obviously this is not suggest that the content of the judgement is 
necessary but that the judgement is true or false given a sensible representation 
and the transcendental conditions of cognition, it is necessary that we think it.  
The transcendental conditions of judgements entail that judgements have their 
modal status built into them without the need for modal terms such as 'probably' 
or 'necessarily'. 
 
In the first section Adorno argues that Kant attempts to ground objectivity in 
subjectivity and that this leads to distortions in the conceptual determinations of 
objects in determinative judgements.  That modal issues of possibility, actuality 
and necessity are settled according to the transcendental conditions of cognition 
as opposed to the object as such serves to underline, for Adorno how much Kant 
'sides with the subject over the object'.  That Hegel takes up this worry as well 
and is influential on Adorno's understanding of the problem of modality helps us 
to understand his commitments. 
 
Hegel is impressed by the implicit progressive element of Kant's stages of 
judgement — that judgements are problematic, then assertoric, then necessary.  
Yet he does not accept that the judgement, at heart, is a proposition — a merely 
predicative entity representing a state of affairs.
72
  This distinction is a function 
of Hegel's realism concerning essences, concepts and universals (SoL: 479 - 89).  
Essential to a judgement is not that it is a well-formed representation of a state of 
affairs, but that it is an objectively valid determination of the concept of an entity.  
In this sense, judgements begin, for Hegel, in the same category as for Kant — 
they are 'problematic'.  However, for Kant, the problematic judgement is 
assertoric — it becomes a valid unit of objective knowledge just in case it 
represents a state of affairs and as such gains the property of truth or falsity.  
Here the assertoric judgement is still propositional because it is simply a 
problematic judgement which is also a determinate representation of a sensible 
appearance.  The assertoric judgement's claim to truth is markedly different for 
Hegel because for him the assertoric judgement is not concerned with mere 
propositional form plus a truth value; rather, it is involved in the metaphysical 
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concern saying something 'essential' about an entity and as we will see, this 
entails a different account of truth-making and the truth-values.   
 
We will see that the rethinking of judgement in this way is important for Adorno 
as it breaks down the 'hegemony of the subject' as it were.  Rather than settling 
our determinations of objects by the transcendental validity of cognition and 
judgement, valid judgements are beholden to the real essence or concept of an 
object for Hegel.  If, as we saw in the first section, Adorno worries that our 
discursive representations of objects have an unwarranted sufficiency within the 
Kantian model, Hegel's deepening of the accountability of our judgements to an 
actual, objectively real state of affairs will be appealing to Adorno. 
 
4.2 Valid Judgements and Essences 
 
The condition of the validity of the judgement for Hegel is that what it asserts of 
the object is essential to the being of the object not merely that it is a valid 
conceptual representation of a sensible appearance: 
 
The name [Name] however stands over against the matter in hand or 
the Notion [Begriff]; this distinction presents itself in the judgement as 
such; now the subject [Subjekt] is in general the determinate, and is 
therefore more that which immediately is, whereas the predicate 
[Prädikat] expresses the universal [Allgemeine], the essential nature 
[Wesen] or the Notion [Begriff]; therefore the subject as such is, in the 
first instance, only a kind of name; for what it is first enunciated by the 
predicate which contains being [Sein] in the sense of the Notion. (SoL: 
624) 
 
Judgements use the name of an entity as a sortal and they predicate something 
universal of that entity.  However, this is the sort of accidental relation that 
obtains between subjects and essences in the primary stages of judging:  I choose 
to predicate the rose is red because that is how it appears to me.  The relation 
between the subject and predicate has a distinctly subjective aspect to it: I make 
the relation between the subject term and the universal and there appears nothing 
necessary or essential to this relation; it is accidental.   
 
Judging moves into the realms of actual objectivity when "The judgement is the 
self-diremption of the notion." (PoL: 625)  That is, when the judgement 
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articulates the concept (of an entity) through a division, it allows us to consider, 
artificially, an identity which was already present within the concept.  This is a 
very difficult idea.  What Hegel appears to have in mind is a strongly 
metaphysical idea that there is an object and there is a way that that object really 
is.  Furthermore, the way that the object is is an expression of its concept or 
notion — what we usually call essence.  The essence of an entity, as conceptual, 
is rational and amenable to conceptual determination by ourselves as also 
rational, conceptualising agents.  However, the concept of an entity is not an 
aggregate of further concepts, i.e., the concept (essence) of being a rose is not an 
aggregate of being red, being a flower, etc.  Rather, being a rose is a unified and 
replete concept, the expression of which results in a particular entity about which 
we can say many things.  Therefore, the different conceptual determinations we 
make about the rose accord with the manifold expression of a unified essence.  
The judgement is not merely something that we can validly say of the appearance 
of an object according to limited resources available to us, as Kant maintains; the 
judgement, inasmuch as it predicates a universal of an entity, it is an objectively 
valid judgement just in case that predicate determines the subject according to its 
'essence'. 
 
The basis of this conception of judgement is strongly realist in two senses: there 
is the epistemological sense that our knowledge-making practices are sufficient 
to understanding how objects really are, mind independently
73
 and, in the sense 
that Hegel is a realist about universals and kinds.
74
  Furthermore, when 
considering the existence of entities which are mind-independently real, the 
scope of entities about which we can be realist is significantly broader than Kant.   
 
Given Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics there is an obvious worry that 
Hegel's attachment to 'essence' is an attachment to such metaphysics: the notion 
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of essences and universals just seems to ignore Kant's critical turn; Hegel simply 
repeats old mistakes.
75
  This is a source of on-going controversy in Kant and 
Hegel scholarship and cannot be adjudicated on here.  For now we will consider 
how Hegel's dialectics, in its attempt to negotiate the constitutive role that 
experience plays in our knowledge-making practices, provides the grounds for 
talk of essences and universals.  That is, how we can either respect or, more 
likely, circumvent, the critical turn and still talk about essences and universals 
without regressing methodologically.
76
 Adorno agrees with Hegel, to some 
extent, that this is possible through dialectical thinking. 
 
The reason why this is possible reaches immediately to the heart of dialectics.  In 
the preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel outlines the developmental, 
transformative structure of sensible experience under dialectical thought which 
enables us to know how and what an object is essentially rather than just 
according to how it appears immediately (PoS: §§61 - 3) — this involves 
understanding judgements correctly and revising the way we judge appropriately. 
 
[R]atiocinative thinking is itself the self into which the content returns, 
in its positive cognition, on the other hand, the self as a Subject to 
which the content is related as Accident and Predicate.  This Subject 
constitutes the basis to which the content is attached, and upon which 
the movement runs back and forth.  Speculative thinking behaves in a 
different way.  Since the Notion is the object's own self, which presents 
itself as the coming-to-be-of the object, it is not a passive Subject 
inertly supporting the Accidents; it is, on the contrary, the self-moving 
Notion which takes its determinations back into itself. (PoS: §60)
77
 
 
Hegel's claim is that speculative thinking, which tries to grasp, literally, that 
which is beyond the immediate in sensible experience, is able to deal with the 
essence of the object because it is sensitive — it shapes itself in method — to the 
manner in which the essence of the object is realised in its determinations.  In so 
doing we are then in a position to adjust our understanding of judgements, their 
form and content in a way where our rational conception of the contents of 
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judgement are understood correctly.  When this is the case, our understanding 
will match or converge with how the world is.   
 
Hegel argues that objects have an essence which is actualized through their own 
inner logic.  Dialectical consciousness and judgement, operating and developing 
according to the same logic is able to follow this development to actualization, 
whilst demonstrating that alternative modes of reflection and conceptualisation of 
objects fall into internal contradictions.  The point being that the essence of the 
object, as fully realised, need not be posited a priori nor jettisoned in favour of 
immediate appearances.  Absolute knowing consists in a speculative 
understanding of appearance where that appearance is thoroughly understood as 
real qua essence (PoS: 110, 365 & 789).  When this is the case, the way in which 
we will understand our judgements and their content will have been transformed 
to meet the concept [Begriff] of the object as it really is. 
 
Implicitly Hegel is criticising Kant here.  Above this quotation he calls the 
Accidental and Predicating Subject as producing picture-thoughts 
[Vorstellungen] of states of affairs which represent objects discursively as being 
thus and so.  In this quotation, Hegel is arguing that the Notion of an object — 
which we can consider as its determinate essence — develops through its own 
inner rationality.  That is a rationality which determines its identity as being a 
‘this’ rather than a ‘that’.  Dialectically judging the object is to understand the 
real determination of the object as it moves through this process of self-
realisation.  The idea is that if we can understand how our judgements can 
rationally change and adapt themselves to the object and the expression of its 
essence, then there is no reason to think that we cannot grasp the essence of an 
object even if we begin with sensible, empirical experience rather than 
conducting a priori metaphysics. 
 
The Phenomenology of Spirit is, at least in part, concerned with how we come to 
a conscious understanding of an object's essence.  Part of the  Logic is dedicated 
to giving an abstract account of the dialectics of judgement through which we can 
understand its dynamic structure and, more importantly, its grounds in the 
metaphysics of objects.  It is in this section where he argues that the concept as 
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expressed in the predicate returns to itself by matching the concept qua essence 
of the object being judged.  These details are important because they will help us 
to assess precisely what Adorno agrees with and what he does not agree with.  He 
will agree with Hegel that dialectics suggests that our conceptual determinations 
of objects according to appearance is far from sufficient to deep conceptual 
engagement with objects.  However, he will not go so far as Hegel as to think that 
our conceptual determinations of objects in judgement can come to match the 
conceptual or essential rational being of an object.  This is predominantly 
because he does not see material objects as conceptual in the way that Hegel 
does. 
 
Hegel argues that objects have an essence.  For example, a rose, has an essence.  
In this sense, we can think in Aristotelian terms that the rose is a natural kind and 
in virtue of being that sort of entity, the ways that this entity is are essential to it 
as a rose-sort entity.  However, this already inflects the essence in a non-Hegelian 
way: the kind needs to develop rationally according to its own inner logic.  Let us 
say that we come across an entity, we name it a 'rose', and we consider ourselves 
to have identified it and its properties and that this identification is taken as 
sufficient to the determination of the object as such.  Hegel shares Kant's worry, 
however, that if we then move to philosophising about essences and natural kinds 
from these immediate impressions of roses and what they are, we will run into 
sceptical problems: properties will appear contingently related to their bearers 
and our foundations for knowing the real world as it is becomes unstable.
78
  Of 
course Kant's answer is the conservative move: if we want secure knowledge, 
essences in this classical sense cannot form part of our knowledge.  Hegel on the 
other hand wants to maintain some theory of essences and thinks we are able to 
do so; what is required is a different approach to judgement to both classical 
forms of judgement and the Kantian form.  Adorno agrees. 
 
Working with an understanding of Hegel which is committed to some form of 
essentialism, he thinks that natural entities, roses for example, have an essence.  
Setting aside Hegel's account of the rational development of nature which is far 
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beyond the scope of this thesis, we are concerned with our judging of an object 
whose essence is already internally articulated.
79
  The epistemic goal of our 
judging activities is to move our conception of an entity in line, as it were, with 
the essence of the entity in question.  This 'moving in line' does not consist in 
altering judgement so that it accommodates what appears to be the case about an 
object.  Rather it is the rational reconsideration of judgement according to the 
way in which judgement has failed to conceptualise an object — i.e. where the 
universal predicate and particular entity do not match.  The rational development 
of the object coupled with the rational development of the judgement according 
to their internal contradictions will result in a judgement where the universal 
predicate and the particular entity judged will match — contradiction will be 
sublated.  If the object is a cultural artefact, then our judging practices will be 
actively involved in the realisation of the notion of that entity.  However, in both 
cases, the aim of judgement is to determine an object according to its essential 
character such that our determination of an object is as the object really is.   
 
That essential character is underpinned by Hegel's theory that the being of an 
object as a particular kind of thing, when fully articulated, will be determined as 
being essentially this thing and not any other thing.  That is, its essence is a 
function of dialectical determination which is not only related to itself but is 
related to all other beings.  Whether or not this is a form of metaphysical holism 
is controversial.
80
 Hegel's dialectical metaphysics is related to holism because the 
individual identity of an object requires, in its dialectical development, 
contradistinction to other beings which it is not.
81
 Yet, the concept of the entity is 
grounded not in contradistinction to other entities but according to its own 
essence.  The apotheosis of natural entities which have a fully determined idea 
and distinct particularity from other entities is the human being.  The human is 
able to reflect upon its own identity as a particular kind, and the essence of other 
kinds and understand the distinction of itself to those other kinds. Nevertheless, 
the individuality of particulars and their determination as distinct things is 
paramount in Hegel's metaphysics. 
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Another way to understand this rather difficult idea — of the relation of essences 
of objects — is through Hegel's criticism of Spinoza.82  In his Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy, he praised Spinoza greatly.  However, where Spinoza 
erred according to Hegel is that Spinoza thought that axiomatically and 
definitionally, if one has substance, and we must, then immediately we must have 
modes — individuals.83  That is, substance is real and therefore its modes — such 
as roses — are real.  Modes are a function of substance and are immediate givens 
— but only as determinations of substance.   
 
[In Spinoza's philosophy] there is absolute Substance, and it is what is 
true.  But it is not yet the whole truth, for substance must also be 
thought of as inwardly active and alive, and in that way must determine 
itself as Spirit.  Spinoza's substance is the universal, and consequently 
the abstract determination…If thinking stops with this substance, there 
is then no development, no life, no spirituality or activity. (LoHP: 155, 
§105)
84 
 
Hegel argues that it is not enough that substance is modally determined: 
individuals must develop their essential distinctions according to their essence.  
Without the realisation of the essential individuation of substance qua entities, 
determination of entities falters and the system collapses back into 
undifferentiated, abstract, substance monism.
85
  Such considerations are of import 
for the determination of Hegel's ontology; it also underlines the importance of 
real individuality and finitude as conditions for the real possibility of universality 
and infinity for Hegel. 
 
We can see from the above that, at least in one interpretation, Hegel has serious 
metaphysical commitments which underpin his dialectics.  This interpretation is 
appropriate for our purposes here because, as we will see, Adorno does not 
accept much of the metaphysical commitments outlined in this part.  We will see 
that although he is certainly impressed by aspects of Hegel's realism — that there 
is a way that objects are and that this determined objectively by their own essence 
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(as opposed to our subjective determinations of them) — he thinks that Hegel's 
realism is too rationalist.  Dialectics can help us to unravel the problems of how 
objects appear to us but it is not a royal road to absolute reality either.  Before we 
enter into this analysis, it is necessary to consider these metaphysical concerns in 
terms of Hegel's theory of judgement. 
 
4.3 The Propositional Model of Judgement 
 
Given Hegel's metaphysical commitments the question is: how does dialectical 
judgement work and how is it a medium through which the essence of an entity 
may be articulated?  This is an issue which is elucidated in Hegel's discussion of 
the dialectics of judgement.  In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel argues that 
our immediate, unreflective judgements about entities turn out to be unstable.  As 
these stand, they have no claim to essential knowledge or objectively valid sortal 
determination.  For example, on Monday, I make judgements about an object 
and, in virtue of those judgements, I identify this object as a rose.  I say of it: This 
plant has a beautiful red flower, it is elegant, tall; it has thorns, deep green leaves, 
etc.  This is a rose.  Here, the rose has appeared to me in a particular way and in 
virtue of this appearance, I have sorted it as a particular entity.  The crucial point 
is that the sortal determination of the object is made according to its appearance; 
the conceptual determination of the 'rose' is merely as a representation of those 
appearances in propositional form; this results in some an ad hoc aggregation, or 
mixture, of properties, which we take to be an entity of a particular kind.  
However, there is nothing within the appearance or even our judgement that 
entitles us to think that we are right in our determination of the 'rose'. 
 
The problem that Hegel highlights is that on Friday after heavy frost, after 
pruning and after the attention of some malicious children, none of the properties 
ascribed to the rose on Monday are now true of it.  If our sole reason for sorting it 
as a rose where that it appears to us in such a way then our ability to call the 
entity a rose on Friday is severely undermined.  Our concept of rose is 
underdetermined and our theory of judgement which seeks merely to add 
properties to entities seems to produce either false or unstable judgements. 
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Let us suppose that we kept a good eye on the rose so we are in no doubt that it is 
the same entity.  How do we deal with these developments?  An obvious solution 
is just to point out that these propositions need to be time indexed and that an 
identity claim is made across the apparently different objects at the two different 
times.  There is no epistemic worry therefore and there is no need invoke 
metaphysical categories to solve a non-existent problem. 
 
In this propositional model, indexed propositions are aggregated and it is then 
stipulated that these propositions are sufficient for the identification of a 
particular object.  As new facts become apparent about the entity, our set of 
indexed propositions grows.  But as long as the conditions for the identification 
of 'different objects' as the same entity obtains, as we find in Kant with his 
transcendental unity of apperception, then we have claim to objectively valid 
knowledge — even if it is not knowledge, qua essence, of that which really exists 
mind-independently: the thing-in-itself. The merit to Kant's distinction of the 
noumenal and the phenomenal is that on the basis of this transcendentally derived 
distinction, he is able to provide a secure foundation for empirical knowledge.  
Wandering into the territory of essences and universals may be unnecessary. 
 
Hegel's concern persists, however.  As we have seen in section one, the limiting 
of empirical knowledge to appearances does not guarantee the objective validity 
of knowledge even when limited to phenomenal knowledge.  As we saw, Kant 
does not and cannot have an argument against the possibility that our phenomenal 
experience is a highly organized, logically co-ordinated, rational dream.  
Furthermore, this problem is a symptom of his transcendental philosophy and its 
move against metaphysics.  As Adorno argued, what Kant did by making the 
noumenal phenomenal distinction is create a situation where the unknown looms 
in all knowledge, constantly threatening to destabilize what we take to be known 
(KCPR: 109 - 11).  Without this epistemic gain, the value of the distinction of the 
noumenal and the phenomenal, and the turn towards transcendental thought, 
becomes suspect. 
 
Furthermore, there is something distinctly arbitrary about this propositional 
model as sketched.  Even granting the fact that the co-ordination of propositions 
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is logical and rational and can be indexed to a single cognizer, as we find in Kant, 
the relation between the name and its referent is determined only according to an 
imported set of standards and which cannot be objectively known to be 
appropriate to the subject matter being considered.
86
 What we have in this model 
is an approach to knowledge-making about the empirical world which may have 
utility for us as cognizers, given a set of standards which we intend our 
knowledge to be sufficient to, but we cannot say that this process has any 
objective validity, qua objects. 
 
4.4 Transition to a Dialectical Model of Judgement 
 
Hegel's dialectical solution to the problems posed by this propositional model of 
judgement is to take the proposition (a representation of a state of affairs) as a 
judgement (the conceptual determination of an entity qua notion).  This is a shift 
to a more reflective approach to considering the world and our epistemic 
practices.  The dialectical conception of judgement introduces a metaphysical 
commitment to saying that the concept or notion of this entity is this way, and 
inasmuch as it is this way, it is a rose: the being of an entity as a rose, according 
to its concept, entails the particularity of this entity.
87
 Therefore, when the rose, 
as it appears on Monday, is destroyed and we find in its place the ravaged rose of 
Friday, we should not simply add a new set of time-indexed propositions and an 
identity claim to account for the rose on Monday being the same rose on Friday.  
Furthermore, our sortal concept, 'rose', should simply be replaced by our new 
expanded version — with a claim identifying our two sortals 'rose' on Monday 
and 'rose' on Friday.   
 
The Hegelian judgement involves the sorts of deep metaphysical commitments to 
essences and conceptual realism as seen in parts 1.1 and 1.2 of this section.  That 
this entity is a rose consists in rational self-actualization according to ontological 
difference, determination and eventual self-identity (PoS: §§55 & 56).  This 
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means that what we must do is revise our concept of the rose from the inside out.  
That is, we have to reconsider what it is for an entity to be a rose.  In so doing we 
must also reconsider what it is to judge an object by its properties because Hegel 
sees such a position as too subjective. 
 
For Hegel, on Friday, we are presented with an epistemological, and implicitly 
metaphysical problem: our concepts, expressed in the universal predicates and 
sortals, do not match the object.  As suggested, there is a deeper problem, qua 
judgement, that this potential lack of matching seems endemic to the structure 
and understanding of judgement.  There is nothing within this mode of judging 
which will safeguard against the next entity always coming to negate, or fail to 
match, our conception of the object.  What Hegel is aiming towards is the 
reconsideration of judgement whereby we cease to see properties as accidents of 
objects but as expressions of essence.
88
  If Adorno is to be impressed by Hegel's 
critique of the judgement consisting in representations of appearances but is 
apprehensive about the idealist claim to have complete, systematic, knowledge of 
an object's essence, then the following analysis will be of particular importance 
for coming to understand Adorno's own philosophical commitments. 
 
When we consider the essence of an entity, we must consider it rationally.  The 
failure of different modes of judging requires us to reconsider essence, universals 
and particulars.  We are brought, through experience, to realise that the way that 
we ought to understand particular entities requires that we resolve the 
fundamental problem of the relationship of particulars and universals.  This is a 
rational problem and requires a solution which is both ontological and logical.  
This is the problem to which he turns in the Logic.  What needs to be understood 
here, in conceiving the general metaphysical issue is that universals are not 
Platonically separated from individuals nor are they qualities in the Aristotelian 
sense.  Rather they are immanent expressions of the essence of an individual qua 
its kind and are not, ontologically, separable from its kind or from their 
instantiations in particulars.  That is, after Hegel has given his ontological 
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account of being, essence and notion, individuals just are individuals insofar as 
they instantiate a particular kind of universal.
89
  And a universal is only a 
universal insofar as there are individuals which instantiate it.
90
   
 
This rational reconsideration of universals, essences and notion requires us to 
revise our theory of judgement.  Before considering this transformed conception 
of judgement and its contents, we must briefly consider the positive motion of 
both thought and dialectics which underpins both the metaphysical commitments 
Hegel has and also by which he will develop his theory of judgement.  In order 
for Hegel to argue for his speculative conception of essence, universals and 
particulars, and of judgement we expect some argument or at least demonstration 
that the rationality by which Hegel reaches his conclusions about metaphysics is 
legitimate.  That is, we need to see how dialectics actually operates and what it is 
about dialectics which licenses Hegel to use the concepts he does.  Here we are 
concerned with the idea of 'determinate negation' as a fulcrum for the production 
of stable speculative knowledge which is necessary, logical, rational and, 
essentially, positive. The issue of determinate negation turns out to be a key issue 
in Adorno's reception of Hegel.  If, as already suggested, Adorno will be 
sceptical of the legitimacy and scope of Hegel's metaphysical commitments, and 
if those commitments are inextricably linked to a particular view of dialectics 
then we have good reason to think that Adorno will be sceptical of aspects of 
Hegel's dialectics.  This turns out to be the case.  To make this case, however, we 
must understand important aspects of Hegel's dialectics. 
 
4.5 Determinate Negation, Positivity and the Dialectics of Being 
 
The problem is that Hegel cannot provide an argument for determinate negation 
outside of his system: the rational transitions that we find in the Logic, are a 
demonstration of their own validity.  Nevertheless, he argues that the positive 
result is a logical entailment of the negative moment in the dialectic.
91
  This is a 
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peculiar aspect of Hegel's thinking and beggars our scientific models of 
thinking.
92
  We are used to providing theories, demonstrating that these theories 
have some degree of epistemic validity, are appropriate in their application to 
their subject matter, and produce quantitatively valuable results.  Stephen 
Houlgate provides the most provocative explication of the Hegelian 'position' by 
arguing that it is not even a position nor a system.  Rather, the Logic merely 
follows the rational determination of the subject matter as it determines itself.  
Not only does it determine itself as this way and not any other way — which 
speaks in favour of its validity — but in following its developmental moments, 
those moments prove themselves to follow an entirely consistent mode of logical 
progression.  Whilst Houlgate's position is controversial, it indicates the problems 
that we face when trying to explain and assess determinate negation, the rational 
necessity of idealist dialectics and from this, Hegel's conception of dialectical 
judgement.
93
 
 
Houlgate argues that the validity of Hegel's logic lies in the fact that what is 
rationally deduced is only what is determined as being the case by the subject 
matter itself — be that subject matter abstract concepts through to material 
reality.  Determinate negation is not introduced to the material as some 
unprovable rational method but is rather a description, as it were, of the transition 
into new forms that takes place within the subject matter itself. Other than 
evaluating the dialectic according to how much sense it makes as we follow its 
transitions, we can consider it also for its explanatory power: does it produce both 
a coherent and compelling metaphysics and epistemology? 
 
Of course, Hegel has not fared well on this point historically.  Even aside from 
Popper's concern, the view in Anglophone philosophy has been that Hegel's 
philosophy is baroque, arguably relies on rational intuitionism of dialectics, and 
                                                                                                                                    
moving soul of scientific progression, and it is the principle through which alone immanent 
coherence and necessity enter into the content of science…" (EL: §81; PoS: §79 & SoL: 83 - 90). 
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 Of course, Adorno and Horkheimer make the claim that scientific rationality is actively 
damaging in at least some of its applications. See DoE: 40, 84, 116, 181, 188, 230, 242 &  HTT: 
73. The dangers of scientism are made no clearer than in their claim: "Juliette's credo is science" 
(DoE: 96). 
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 See also Houlgate's claim of Cartesian pre-suppositionlessness (Houlgate, 2006: 33). 
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is precisely the sort of extravagance we ought to be avoiding.
94
 Nevertheless, if 
we can make sense of the logic which Hegel argues is at work within reality and 
its categories, we go some way to justifying Hegel's thinking as at least coherent 
and the potential basis for a theory of judgement.  Key to this examination will be 
finding a logical structure — determinate negation — and that this structure 
entitles us to consider its products logically necessary and determinate.  From 
here we will then be able to assess Rosen's claim that Adorno's dialectics are not 
Hegelian insofar as he rejects determinate negation (Rosen, 1984: 162). 
 
4.5.i Negation and Being 
 
At the beginning of the Logic, Hegel argues that the 'traditional way', presumably 
Aristotelian, to conceive of logic is that it is a set of principles of thought applied 
to subject matter to yield truths: logic and its subject matter is separate (SoL: 44).  
Hegel's worry is two-fold: developing a method for thinking about the world will 
involve theoretical presuppositions; and also, that the presuppositions, and hence 
the method, in their separation from their content, may result in determinations of 
objects according to subjective presupposition rather than according to objective 
reality.  I will take, as an example, his dialectical analysis of the abstract category 
of pure being to demonstrate how his dialectics operate, what determinate 
negation is, and why we might consider it positive.   
 
He begins the Logic by considering the category of 'being' (SoL: 59).  It is both 
the most fundamental and most abstract ontological category.  Nevertheless, 
despite its abstract, general simplicity, it is in fact the sufficient grounds for its 
own determination — the initial move away from abstraction. 
 
The claim that being is both simple and self-determining is already quite gnomic 
but the idea is not as strange as it may appear.  Remembering that Hegel wants a 
mode of thinking which is presuppositionless and which adapts itself to its 
subject matter, he begins with what he takes to be a concept which is necessarily 
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 See Russell for a relevant and influential rejection of Hegel: "Hegel thought that, if enough was 
known about a thing to distinguish it from all other things, then all its properties could be inferred 
by logic.  This was a mistake, and from this mistake arose the whole imposing edifice of his 
system.  This illustrates an important truth, namely, that the worse your logic, the more 
interesting the consequences to which it gives rise (1945: 746). 
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beyond any particular supposition: being.  Being as such, that is, considered 
separately to any particular determination, is completely abstract.  However, 
insofar as it is entirely general — unsubstantiated and uninstantiated — pure 
being is in fact nothing.  That is, it is nothing in the sense that its total 
indeterminacy entails that 'pure being' is the situation where there is no thing.  
Hegel then observes something paradoxical about the fact that being, which is the 
category through which we construct our positive existential commitments, 
insofar as it is a pure and indeterminate, gives us its equal opposite concept: 
nothing — where nothing is the situation where there is no being. 
 
Here we have the negative dialectical moment.  From 'being', which, in its 
immediacy, appears as a positive existential notion, we find that it is equivalent 
with the negative moment of no existence.  From within the concept of being, the 
concept sufficient for its own negation — nothing — is produced (SoL: 83).  We 
can see the logical inference as produced by a rational a priori enquiry into the 
concept of being — hence Hegel's claim of presuppositionlessness.95  Nothing, 
the negation of being, is given by the concept of being when we properly reflect 
on being as such. 
 
From here Hegel observes that there is a movement in and between these 
concepts.  We begin with the entirely abstract notion of being; consideration of 
its indeterminacy entails that our thought of pure being entails a thought of pure 
nothingness.  He argues from here that our thought of nothingness — which is 
the idea that there is no thing which is, or that has determinate existence — gives 
us the idea of pure being.  In other words, the thought of nothingness returns us 
to the thought of pure being. 
 
In a sense then, we have moved in a circle.  However, our return to the concept 
with which we started, 'being', is now modified: we have two new concepts — 
nothingness and being; and our understanding of being has been expanded upon.  
We no longer take the concept of pure being as a simple concept which merely 
refers us to an abstract idea.  Rather we understand things about the concept of 
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 See Houlgate who argues that the only suppositions required are a philosophical disposition 
and rigour as opposed to methodological presuppositions (2006: 66 - 9).  See also, Burbidge, 
2006: 26 - 27) & LoHP: 138. 
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being, qua notion, and its idea — we have reached a higher level of 
understanding.   
 
Furthermore, the division of our immediate conception of being into being and 
nothing gives us the idea of becoming (SoL: 105 - 6).  Out of abstract being we 
developed a further idea — nothingness — and this helps us to determine the 
abstract concept, being. Hegel's idea is that even the purest abstraction gives way 
to some sort of determination even if that determination is only a quality of 
indeterminateness (SoL: 99).  
 
This is the transition of the negative into the positive in the dialectic — or the 
movement from the dialectical to the speculative moment where more is gained 
from an immediate situation.  Even pure being, it turns out, is not immediate in 
that it is a simple concept with a specific meaning: it is mediated by its counter 
category — nothingness.  Hegel's idea is complex here.  Pure being, insofar as it 
yields nothingness as a product of its own inner-mediation [Vermittlung], actually 
moves from being into nothing.  This is the ceasing to be of being.  Conversely, 
nothing, as pure abstract nothingness, contains within itself the idea of there 
being something that is not nothing.  That is, being as such is a condition of there 
being nothing.  Hence nothing yields the movement back to being as a 
consequence of its own mediation.  Both being and nothing yield movement and 
the dynamic transition from one state into another state, Hegel refers to as 
becoming. 
 
Hegel is then able to complete the final moment in this speculative ontology.  
Becoming is the sublation of being and nothing and a unity of them both (SoL: 
105 - 8).  It is reducible to neither one of its categories — which are in effect 
categorical under-determinations of the unitary concept becoming — but each 
category will produce its contrary other and hence will produce becoming.  
Whether or not one is convinced by this as a rigorous piece of a prioristic logic 
— as Houlgate is — or if one sees it as dubious thinking — as Russell did — we 
can at least consider the claims made on behalf of determinate negation.   
 
We begin with something that is given — an ontological category or a concept — 
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and in reflection upon the subject matter, its negation becomes apparent as 
mediated within it.  There is a sufficient relationship between the two aspects of 
the dialectic in that one category produces another.  There is no aspect of the 
original category which is not negated by the new category and there is no part of 
the new category which refers to anything other than the original category.  
Rather than producing a sceptical stalemate between these two categories, 
Hegel's guiding idea is that reflection on the relation between the positive and 
negative poles of the dialectic provides the conditions for a positive solution.  
Again, the positive solution is parsimonious insofar as it is the immediate 
incremental step to resolve the tension generated between the two opposing 
categories. 
 
Of course this is extremely controversial and we will see that Adorno 
fundamentally disagrees with Hegel on aspects of his theory of determinate 
negation: the negative moment, the nonidentity of terms or entities cannot be 
entirely sublated.  Why this is the case will be considered in depth below and in 
the final section.  Nevertheless, aspects of this dialectic will prove to be hugely 
influential on Adorno: in particular the idea that that which appears immediately 
given is mediated by some other element; that given, immediate entities are not 
self-identical in the way that they may immediately appear. 
 
4.5.ii Determinate Negation, Process and History 
 
Not only is determinate negation an integral facet of the ontological structure of 
reality itself, as developed within the Logic, it is an integral process within the 
development of the very way in which go about judging.  Particular failures in 
one mode of judging, in its ability to provide a stable basis through which we can 
express how reality actually is, results in a transition into a new mode of judging 
which is then able to match our developed understanding of reality.  Therefore, 
dialectics and the process of determinate negation works at a number of levels: at 
the level of reality as such; at the development of objective reality and its 
particular parts; at the level of judgement as such and in the development of our 
particular judgements.  In the cases of the development of particular objects and 
in the development of particular judgements, this development is actually 
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temporal — it happens within a socio-historical framework.  The charting of the 
rational development of objective reality and of our judgements just is the 
dialectical and philosophical study of history.  The point for now is that dialectics 
and determinate negation makes a strong link between reality as such, judgement 
and history.  The link between ontology, judgements and history, we will see, is 
an important concern for Adorno.  Just as we will see that he is critical of Hegel's 
metaphysical commitments, his theory of dialectics, he is critical of the relation 
of dialectics to history. 
 
We have already seen how Hegel has argued that propositional modes of 
judgement result in unstable modes of determining a subject by a predicate.  This 
instability arises out of the tension between particulars and universals where the 
particular negates the sufficiency of the universal attached to it in the judgement.  
However, Hegel argues that there is not merely a negation of this judgement but 
the mode of judgement upon which this problem is based.  That is, we must 
rethink judging itself and the forms of knowing associated with those modes — 
not merely rethinking individual judgements.   
 
The rest of the Phenomenology is devoted to giving an account of this rethinking.  
Eventually, Hegel develops the argument that out of the failures of individuals 
and their individual judgements is the realisation that part of this failure, lies in 
the partitioning off of knowledge and judging to the practices of isolated 
individuals.  Moreover, this individuality cannot be recuperated by an objective 
set of principles which can 'work' for any individual.  Rather, the failure of 
individual judgements requires the resituation of judgement within a broader 
socio-historical and cultural context.  The validity and status of any individual's 
particular judgement results in their assimilation within the grand human project 
of knowing.  We realise that our individual failures and revisions are a reflection 
of the larger processes and history of human enquiries into the world.  Sublating 
the difference between the inquiries of the finite individual into the history of 
human inquiry and development generally is what brings us towards the situation 
of 'Absolute Knowing'.  Absolute knowing is not 'knowing everything about the 
world': it is a situation of knowing that what we know is objectively true.  This 
objectivity, for Hegel, was realised through the sublation of religious 
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representation which in turn is the ultimate expression of Geist.
96
  
 
As we judge objects, therefore, we enter into a process of realising the essence of 
a kind of object in the world which turns out to be intimately related to history of 
human knowing as such.  When our understanding of knowledge has transitioned 
beyond the finitude of particular judgements of particular individuals into an 
appreciation of their integration within infinite spirit itself, we will understand 
that the content of our judgements will be radically different to what we thought 
they were in the situation of immediate sensory experience.  Our judgements will 
then match the essence of an object; our concepts will be sufficient for the 
identification of objects. We will know that what we take roses to be is how roses 
really are.   
 
The condition of this truth is the achieved understanding that the particular 
determination of a particular rose, is not partitioned off from other particular 
roses or other particular judgements about them.  Rather, every rose, indeed 
every entity, is in some sense systematically inter-related with all other beings 
and all individuals are instances of the universal kinds.  Our individual 
judgements are likewise, an integrated aspect of the human project of knowing 
the world and are bolstered by the irreducibly progressive nature of human 
knowing.  Knowing as such and the articulation of reality are isomorphically 
related.  All of these processes, which are fundamentally and irreducibly 
progressive revolve around the objective, productive and positive qualities of 
determinate negation. 
 
The historical development of judgement, in accordance with the dialectical 
actualisation of reality, propelled by the progressive transformations of 
determinate negation, entitles us to think that reality and judgement are both 
rationally progressive.  We will see that whilst Adorno certainly thinks that 
history is vital to our knowledge making practices he thinks that history is not 
simply a medium through which reality unfolds into absolute realisation.  Rather, 
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359; 406 - 18 & 784 - 7 culminating the section on Absolute Knowing. 
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metaphysical and epistemological systems, and the view of reality and the world 
which they underpin are in fact products of particular socio-historical moments.  
This is an important departure from Hegelian thought and will be discussed in 
depth in the next two chapters. 
 
4.6 The Dialectical Logic of Judgement 
 
The socio-cultural experience of the transitions of finite, unstable judgements, 
into absolute knowing is a key subject of the Phenomenology.  As suggested, the 
reconsideration of knowledge that Hegel wishes to achieve is primarily a 
reconsideration of knowing as such — as opposed to the evaluation of any 
specific judgements.  Having explored the dialectical progressions of judgement 
through socio-historically situated experience, and suggesting that these 
transitions are an inflection of the dialectics of being as such, it is natural that 
Hegel should consider the logic of being as such; this will inevitably bring him to 
consider the logic of judging as such.
97
  In considering determinate negation, we 
have already considered the logic of being.  We can, therefore, turn to the 
dialectical logic of judgement.  Following Hegel's thought in this way, not only 
helps us to be clear on key aspects of Hegel's thinking for when we return to 
Adorno, but in reaching an analysis of judgement as such, we are at the heart of 
Adorno's own concern with Hegel. 
 
The ontological and speculative logic of immediacy, determinate negativity and 
the transition into necessary positivity — as we saw in the dialectics of the 
category of being — bears an isomorphic relation to Hegel's unusual analysis of 
names and predicates and their role in judgements.
98
  Hegel's concern with the 
proposition is not merely epistemological but also metaphysical.  In the analysis 
of the first section, we considered the propositional structure of Kantian 
judgements. This representation is both the condition of discursive knowledge 
and the smallest unit of knowledge.  However, for Kant the proposition is seen as 
a sufficient representation of states of affairs and a valid bearer of truth; it is also 
a valid object of beliefs about the world.   
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Hegel disputes this metaphysical and epistemological picture of judgements.  The 
predicative determinations of entities as accidents is unstable for Hegel  He 
replaces this metaphysical picture with his dialectical conception of reality 
whereby predicating a property of an entity is a true conceptual attendance to one 
aspect of the entity's real, unified essence.  Particular entities and universals are 
real but are mutually mediated through each other.  The metaphysical 
reconfiguration of entities, essences and universals requires a reconfiguration of 
our understanding of semantics and syntax to cope with this metaphysical state of 
affairs. 
 
Hegel thinks that the predicative proposition represents the semantic and 
syntactical limits of finite human thinking.  It is also an irreducible feature of 
human cognition: two functions of conceptual articulation as such are partiality 
and, therefore, finitude.  That is, it is an unavoidable feature of articulation that 
conceptual attendance to something is implicitly the non-attendance to another. 
For example, when we are saying 'the rose is red', we are, by extension, not 
saying, or at least attending in that moment to 'The rose is beautiful'. One may 
think that this is an absurd worry because we have only said that the rose is this 
way but we are not neglecting nor precluding any other determination of the rose.  
Yet this would be to miss the point of Hegel's worry.  In our common 
understanding, the judgement — and its content — is thoroughly 
underdetermined and hence unstable — what does the judgement, taken by itself, 
mean and what exactly is its content?  Taken by itself we have nothing in 
contradistinction to which, we can determine the subject such that we gain a 
determinate understanding of what it is. 
 
Furthermore, the predicate is also underdetermined.  The rose is red but what is it 
to be determined simply by being 'red'?  We need to know what it is to not be red 
in order to know what it is, determinately, to be red.  Again, the accretion of 
propositions will leave our conceptual resources underdetermined.  Nor is there 
simply a fact of the matter to which the universal correctly corresponds.  Being 
red is a general term and as such ranges over many instances. It is this issue of 
the scope and determinacy of terms and their relative position within the 
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proposition that particularly interests Hegel. 
 
This partiality of the proposition is not merely between propositions but is also 
present within the proposition: sententially, 'The rose is red', determines the 
subject, the rose, as equivalent with the property of redness.  Hegel thinks that, at 
least in its immediate form, there is a serious ontological discrepancy being 
masked here between particulars and universals.  Of course, the relation of 
particular and universal is an old metaphysical problem. Kant sought to settle the 
problem by limiting the metaphysics and offering his own account of judgement 
and understanding which, as I have suggested above, is, in certain respects, proto-
typically Analytic.  As we have seen, for a variety of reasons, Hegel does not 
think we need to take Kant's route in order to understand the potential and limits 
of reason — indeed, in the judgement, the limits of reason become the conditions 
for genuine speculative knowledge.   
 
Hegel elaborates on the problem of the range of the terms and the subsequent 
scope of the proposition.  Taking the copula as indicating existential 
commitment, we say that x is in the way of being y in the assertoric proposition 
this rose is red.  Hegel points out that it is not the case that the rose is the way of 
being red as such: 'red' is the way that many other things are that are not the same 
way, colour-wise as this particular rose.  Also, if we invert the proposition that y 
is in the way of being x, this also cannot be correct because it is not the case that 
red is only a the way it is in this particular rose. Hegel argues then that the 
previously positive assertoric propositions yield negative judgements (SoL: 631 - 
6). 
 
One might think that Hegel is confused over the status of the copula and has 
failed to understand the analytics of meaning and reference which were in no 
small part due to the limitations of the logic he was critiquing.
99
  Hence he sees 
the proposition as being false when a proper semantics would reveal nothing of 
the sort.  
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Yet we should not be too quick to dismiss Hegel's argument as simply confused.  
For a period at least, the linguistic turn eventually led to the jettisoning of 
metaphysics. Historically, this is precisely the sort of philosophical compromise 
Hegel is attempting to avoid.  Hegel's understanding of the proposition is 
trenchantly metaphysical.  When we make property ascriptions we need to be 
able to think metaphysically: beyond the formal limits of linguistic ascription to 
the point where we understand property qua essence.  Reality is the means by 
which we co-ordinate our propositions and their meanings not according to 
linguistic form — about which we already have many metaphysical assumptions.  
 
The representational proposition, as discussed here, is attached to a particular 
metaphysics; one which treats objects as primary substances and properties as 
universal attachments of these substances.  The relations of the objects and their 
properties run the risk of contingency and arbitrariness in this metaphysical 
picture.  This contingency is revealed through the awkward and unresolved scope 
differences between the particular terms and the kind and amount of entities they 
reference.  Rather than dealing with this discrepancy, the assertoric proposition 
suppresses it and attempts to glue the two terms together with a copula.
100
  
Hegel's linguistic analysis suggests that all this does is entrench the negative 
proposition into the positive one (SoL: 636). 
 
Hegel offers an extremely complicated and difficult analysis of the proposition as 
he tries to show how the tensions within the initial proposition, which is abstract 
and unstable, led towards its own determination.  A compressed dialectics of 
assertoric propositions runs as follows:  
 
- The rose is red (immediate positive judgement);  
- The rose is not red (negative — due to discrepancy between particular and 
universal terms); 
- The rose is not-red (positive articulation of the negative leading to a new 
meaning i.e. it is some colour);  
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- Further negation: the rose is not not-red (because it is not any colour other 
than red, it is the colour that it is, i.e. red!)   
- The rose is red.  (Speculative/infinite judgement.) 
 
What Hegel is aiming at is a new metaphysical understanding of the final 
proposition which he thoroughly admits is linguistically the same as the first 
proposition. Indeed, if we do not think metaphysically then it would be difficult 
to even motivate a worry here.  The problem with the first judgement is, 
according to Hegel, the particular subject term and the predicate term are 
mutually underdetermined as a result of a category error of sorts.  Until we 
reconfigure our categories properly, the proposition only carries the semblance of 
sense and is not a suitable bearer of truth-values. 
 
Underlying the linguistic analysis is the real metaphysical claim: particulars are 
always mediated by universals and universals are always mediated by particulars 
(SoL: 642).
101
  In short it is an argument concerning the metaphysics of how 
predicates refer to properties, what ontological entities we can be realist about 
and how we ought to be realist about those entities.
102
  The claim, in its shortest 
form, is that formal structure of propositions does not map onto the ontological 
structure of the world — whilst they may well be valid.103  The associated 
ontology, which takes there to be particulars and universals as separate, discrete 
self-subsistent kinds of entity, is also false.  For propositions to become 
metaphysically sound units of knowledge we must understand how and why, 
even within their own structure, they map onto the world.  In so doing, we learn 
about how the world really is; we come to reconsider our knowledge of the world 
as knowledge of how the world really is. 
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4.7 Material, Correspondence and Coherence Theories of Truth in Hegel's 
Philosophy 
 
We now have some conception of how the world is for Hegel and the judgements 
that we make about it; why judgements are not evaluated merely according to 
correctness but as capturing deeper metaphysical states of affairs. From this 
position we have the basis for formulating some theory of truth.  The problem is, 
given Hegel's dialectics, his dynamic ontology and his processual theory of 
reality and knowledge, this a vexed issue with some commentators arguing that 
he does not have a theory of truth, others arguing that he does.
104
  Rather than 
trying to provide a definitive interpretation, certain relevant notions will be 
briefly developed such that we can consider Adorno's own position in relation to 
Hegel — accepting the fact that the view of Hegelian truth presented is itself 
controversial. 
 
Stern makes an important point when arguing that Hegel does not hold a 
'propositional theory of truth' but rather a 'material' theory of truth. He says that: 
 
Truth is propositional when it is attributed to statements, judgements, or 
propositions on the basis of their accordance with the way things are. Truth is 
material when it is attributed to something on the basis of the accordance of 
the thing with its essence. Thus, whereas propositional truth applies to our 
judgements or statements, material truth applies to things and their natures. 
(Stern, 2009: 77 - 8) 
 
To some extent this is certainly correct and accords with the essentialist 
metaphysics developed above.  There are two points being made here.  Firstly, 
because reality develops according to an objective and necessary dynamic force 
and that these forces include some form of essence, entities move from a state of 
internal antagonism into internal unity and self-integration.  This is an entirely 
objective process for Hegel.  The relationship between the essence of an entity 
and its current instantiation determines the 'Truth-value' of the entity.  Here, 
truth-value is not a mere bivalent property of a representational truth-bearer such 
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as a proposition, a belief or a sentence, for example, but is a nuanced and fine-
grained evaluative notion based on metaphysical commitments. 
 
Secondly, correctness and truth are not synonyms for Hegel.  When considering 
our linguistic utterances, their being correct, is not the principal concern of his 
theory of truth.  It is whether the state of affairs is truly articulated that is at issue.  
This seems affirmed by the account of judgement given above.  A rose may well 
be red and our linguistic articulation that the rose is red would therefore be 
'correct'.  But as we have seen, the deep relationship between metaphysics and 
epistemology for Hegel means that being correct is not tantamount to knowledge 
of truth.  Rather, we must reconsider our judgements dialectically so that they are 
sublated in order to accord with the deeper metaphysical truth. 
 
Nevertheless, it would appear wrong of Stern to argue that Hegel has no account 
of truth besides material truth.  Furthermore, just because metaphysical states of 
affairs are the principal truth makers and bearers, this does not mean that Hegel's 
theory of truth cannot be understood as having some elements associated with 
correspondence.  Taking Russell's classic formulation: 
 
(b)[b is true(B)(x)(y)(R)(b = <B, x, R, y> & xRy)] 
 
This says: there is a true belief iff there is a believer (B), an x and a y and a 
relation (R), and that the belief consists in the believer believing that x and y have 
a particular relation to each other and that this relation of entities really exists.
105
 
 
It is clear that Hegel conceives of the structure of linguistic truth differently.  
Crucially, if the judgement is a property ascription, it is metaphysically flawed to 
see x and y as separate entities, i.e., Hegel contests the extensionality, or the 
referents of the proposition.  Of course, this effects the relations which obtain 
such that the structure of the 'fact', is false according to Hegel.   
 
Hegel also highlights a deeper problem concerning the relation in his theory of 
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judgement.  Built into Russell's correspondence theory is a directionality of both 
the structure of the proposition and the structure of the fact to which it 
corresponds: Russell sees capturing this direction as crucial to the validity of the 
correspondence (Russell, 1951: 128).  However, we have seen that Hegel sees the 
proposition as unstable precisely because it mistakes the linguistic direction, a 
function of language, with ontological structure.  The rose is red takes the subject 
as the 'starting point' and says that the being of rose determines what predicates 
are valid.  The predicate is somewhat of a passive end point.  We have seen 
Hegel argue that this gluing together of subject and predicate, beginning with the 
subject leads to epistemic instability which equates to unstable metaphysical 
assumptions.  In short, although Russell is trying to capture a correspondence of a 
complex unity in a belief, Hegel would regard his metaphysics as wrong and his 
understanding of the complexity of a state of affairs as not complex enough. 
 
So Russell's intensional analysis, according to the Hegelian conception, is also 
wrong.  What the judgement, 'the rose is red' means is not that there is a rose 
entity and a red(-ness) entity which are attached according to the being of the 
rose.  Rather there is an entity, a rose, and the way that this entity is is such that it 
licences the ascription of being red.  And the judgement means — taking the 
propositional content to run in the opposite direction as well — that there is a 
way of being, i.e. red, such that that way licences the ascription of being rose-like 
to red.   
 
Hegel's point is not esoteric, however. One cannot glue particulars and universals 
together without concerning oneself with the metaphysics.  The second direction 
is an attempt by Hegel to capture the mediation of the universal in the particular.  
Hegel's point is that they are never not instantiated in objects and this must be 
reflected in our metaphysics and in our judgements.  Yet, in so doing, it also 
transforms the Aristotelian understanding of universals as ascribed properties.  
Mediation entails that extensional entities of the proposition this rose is red — 
'rose' and 'red' — are in fact the same, singular and unified, truth maker: the fully 
articulated and true essence of the entity, 'Rose'. 
 
It seems reasonable then to say Hegel does have a correspondence theory of truth, 
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qua judgements and that Stern is a too quick to dismiss Baldwin's claim to that 
effect (Stern, 2009: 77 - 9).  Yet this is not the whole story.  Truth, even of 
judgements, cannot be reached just through articulation of a state of affairs.  The 
meaning of the judgement, as the idea it expresses, is essential to epistemic — as 
opposed to material — truth.  We must have a dialectical understanding of what 
is expressed and referred to in the judgement, in order for it to be true.  
Therefore, justification is a necessary condition of epistemic truth for Hegel.  
Hence some form of coherence plays a role in Hegel's theory of truth.   
 
The justification is that we understand the dialectics of being such that we both 
understand the structure of the being of entities, qua essence, and that we are 
cognizant of the objective validity of that understanding.
106
  The justification of a 
judgement, in terms of truth, is therefore not an issue of coherence within a 
system of linguistic use for example.  Rather it is coherence according to a 
metaphysical system and structure of reality and our understanding of that 
structure.
107
  
 
Truth is not dealt with by first-order talk about judgements and semantic content, 
even though we have suggested a role for correspondence.  The justification for 
truth is the a priori knowledge of essential being which enables us to truly 
determine the meaning and reference of the propositional content of judgements 
qua true reality.  When reality is materially true, and our conception of reality is 
true, our judgements will truly correspond, in 'infinite judgement', to reality. 
 
The above analysis suggests that Stern is correct to regard material truth as 
central to Hegel's conception of truth.  However, correspondence and coherence 
also play a role in his theory of knowledge and epistemic truth.  It is an Hegelian 
thought, however, that a 'true human', a material truth, will have a true conception 
and articulation of material truth.   
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 See also Hofstadter, 1975: 682 - 4. 
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 Adorno acknowledges this directly and repeatedly: "Speculative idealism does not recklessly 
disregard the limits of the possibility of knowledge; rather, it searches for words to express the 
idea that a reference to truth as such is in fact inherent in all knowledge that is knowledge; that if 
it is to be knowledge at all and not a mere duplication of the subject, knowledge is more than 
merely subjective; it is objectivity like the objective reason in Plato" (HTT: 6) & HTT: 11 - 2; 36; 
40. 
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We have seen how metaphysics and epistemology are intimately related in 
Hegel's philosophy.  This relationship is underpinned by dialectics.  I have 
indicated throughout the discussion that there are ways in which Adorno will be 
indebted to Hegel and ways in which he diverges from Hegelian orthodoxy; a full 
analysis of Adorno's critique will be the focus of the next two chapters.  Hegel's 
theory of truth will prove to be both influential on Adorno and a point of 
disagreement.  The agreements and disagreements will be divided according to 
the particular metaphysical and epistemological commitments which supporting a 
particular aspect of Hegel's notion of truth.  We will see that Adorno agrees with 
Hegel that the truthfulness of a judgement is determined according to how objects 
are.  However, the way that objects are to be determined historically rather than 
according to a dialectical rationality working through history.  Furthermore, our 
understanding of those objects is not a matter of coming to a view of an object as 
it is integrated within absolute knowing; rather, it is known through analysis of 
mediation within history.  Elaborating on how Adorno understands these ideas 
will be discussed throughout the rest of the thesis.  However, we can see that the 
way in which Adorno deviates from Hegel's position will entail changes in his 
theory of truth.  Truth is historically indexed. 
 
*** 
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5. Adorno as an Hegelian Thinker 
 
 
The previous section focussed on certain areas in Hegel's philosophy: primarily 
dialectics, judgement and truth.  I presented Hegel's critique of the notion of 
judgement as merely propositional.  This brought the discussion into 
consideration of metaphysical issues and a consideration of essences.  Having 
considered Hegel's ability to talk about essences in a non-regressive, post-critical 
way, we considered the structure of Hegel's metaphysics and dialectics, 
determinate negation as the motor of its positive transitions, and the fact that such 
considerations underpinned his understanding of universals.  I was then able to 
analyse the very structure of the judgement so as to take proper note of Hegel's 
metaphysical commitments.  Finally, a sketch of Hegel's theory of truth was 
proposed. 
 
Inasmuch as these concerns are critical in Hegel's thinking, we will use these 
analyses to consider to what extent Adorno is an Hegelian thinker.  The resulting 
analysis then splits between Adorno's assimilation of Hegel and in the third 
chapter of this section, the deep differences in philosophical commitments 
between the two thinkers are explored.  It is in light of these differences that 
Adorno was led to conduct an immanent critique on Hegel's own system and 
dialectics.  Furthermore, we again find that analysis of Adorno’s critique of 
Hegel is revealing for an understanding of his own commitments.  For now, we 
will see that Adorno's criticisms of Kant, developed out of his immanent critique, 
are in line with the profound influence that Hegel exerted over Adorno's thinking. 
 
5.1 The Influence of Hegel's Criticism of Kant on Adorno 
 
Adorno agrees with much of Hegel's conception of judgement and truth.  Section 
One showed that he is highly critical of the propositional structure of Kantian 
determinative judgements, their truth values, the subjective basis for their 
objective validity and that their modal status is settled according to the structure 
of the cognizing subject not the object.  Where Hegel holds similar criticisms of 
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Kant, Adorno is in line with Hegelian thinking on judgements. The transition to a 
dialectical theory, whereby the judgement is not taken to be a mere representation 
of a sensible state of affairs but is concerned with the essence of an object, is a 
direct influence on Adorno.  He makes this explicit in his book on Hegel:  
 
Kant's delimitation of consciousness as a scientific consciousness that 
makes straightforward judgments returns in Hegel as the negativity of 
consciousness, as something that needs to be criticized. (HTT: 72) 
 
Kant's propositional, representational form of determinative judgement takes 
predication as something imposed and guaranteed by the subject; Hegel's 
dialectics is a direct criticism of this structure. Whatever Kant's epistemological 
advances, it is obvious that Adorno takes Kant's transcendental move as a form of 
nominalism and naturalism.  That is, a theory of knowledge-making concerned 
with providing a theoretical basis for the objective validity of what is given in 
empirical experience from given data. 
 
Hegel's dialectical judgement reconsiders Kant's propositional model which 
directly influences Adorno. 
 
The first formula to express this [indifference to knowledge] was 
Kant’s famous line that the "transcendental idealist" is an "empirical 
realist." Admirers of the Critic of Pure Reason, and of his attempt to 
find reasons for experience, were deaf to this admission of bankruptcy: 
that the immeasurable strain of that critique was adiaphorou 
[indifferent] with respect to the content of experience. (ND: 72) 
 
The propositional form of judging, which underpins Kant's transcendental 
idealism and secures empirical realism, is 'bankrupt' for Adorno because, for 
reasons developed above, it is indifferent to the content of experience.
108
  This 
may be a staggering claim for the Kantian.  However, considered within the 
structure of Hegelian judgement, it makes sense.  Kant was concerned with the 
content of experience but only in content which could be parsed within his 
conception of judgements.  He was concerned to secure a terrain of valid 
epistemic enquiry and was prepared to jettison anything about experience or 
objects which would jeopardise this epistemic security.  According to Hegel and 
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Adorno, what Kant jettisoned is a deeper conception of objects and what they 
really are.  As we have seen, within Kantian judgements, what is secured is the 
validity of judgement qua subject not the objective validity of the content qua 
object. 
 
Maintaining his concern about propositions, Adorno argues that dialectics is a 
move against the sufficient determination of entities according to generalised 
concepts which range over many modally different entities: 
 
For what we mean in the judgment is always the entity due to be 
judged beyond the particular that is included in the judgment—
otherwise, according to its own intention, the judgment would be 
superfluous. And this intention is precisely what it does not satisfy. The 
negative motive of identitarian philosophy has remained in force: 
nothing particular is true; no particular is itself, as its particularity 
requires. Dialectical contradiction is neither the mere projection on the 
thing of a concept formation that miscarried nor a metaphysics running 
amuck. (ND: 152) 
 
This complaint was at the heart of Adorno's critique of Kant. Our discursive 
identifications of objects come to be sufficient representational determinations of 
the particular. The particular object is then co-ordinated within a ratio-logical 
framework according to its conceptual determination.  The unique self-identity of 
the particular is metaphysically and pragmatically inefficient and must be leveled 
within the fluid exchange of concepts.  Dialectics is the awareness that the 
judgements we make of objects, at least immediately, require the repression of 
key metaphysical concerns: primarily the ontological difference between 
ontological structure and distinctions of the mind and the unique particularity of 
the thing judged — effectively the difference between the conceptual realm and 
the non-conceptual realm.
109
 
 
For Adorno, the problem is that the identity judgement — or proposition — is 
concerned only with identifying the particular with the general.  Of course the 
identity judgement tries to say something true.  However, as early as the 
Transcendental Aesthetic we are given the clear basis of some correspondence 
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 Here ontological difference indicates a different concern to the phrase as Heidegger uses it - 
"The difference between beings and being": Heidegger, 1988: 17.  Adorno's understanding will 
be discussed in depth in Section Three. 
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theory that the conceptual determination of the object within the judgement is 
true just in case it corresponds with the object — where the object in this sense is 
its immediate sensible presentation.
110
  The sensible presentation is a mental 
entity, albeit one which is objective according to Kant; the modality of the 
judgement is determined by the relation of the judgement to the transcendental 
structure of the mind.  So what in the judgement is genuinely beholden to the 
self-identical particularity of the object?  Arguably: nothing.  Because that self-
identical particularity, unmediated by conceptualisation, sounds very much like 
the noumenal.  Whilst Kant may give the necessary conditions of what appears to 
us to be the case and then partitions off any aspect of reality which may prove 
problematic — the noumenal — we are given pause to consider what exactly his 
epistemology can salvage. 
 
Adorno holds that, in dialectics, the copula states the mediation of the particular 
by the general — and vice versa; the difference between the particular and the 
general is maintained.  That is, the conceptual distinction identified by the 
universal predicate, insofar as the predicate can be stated as a particular way to 
consider the particular, is different to how the object is in its individual self-
identity.  Obviously, if the subject and predicate were synonyms, which would be 
the strongest identity and truth, then the judgement would be a redundant 
tautology. Difference between the subject and predicate is necessary for the 
epistemic and metaphysical import of the judgement.  The question is: how do we 
understand this difference?  Adorno, and Hegel's point, is that the identity 
judgement simply ignores this difference in favour of epistemic co-ordination of 
the given in appearance.   
 
Importantly, for Hegel, the way the particular is and the way the universal is 
become identical through their sublation in judgement.  However, Adorno argues 
that the difference between the subject and the predicate is the condition by 
which the particularity of the subject in question can be maintained. It is also the 
condition by which our epistemic activities are properly beholden to how the 
world, qua particular material entities, really is.   
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Intentionally or not, every judgment—even an analytical one, as shown 
by Hegel—carries with it the claim to predicate something that is not 
simply identical with the mere concept of the subject. If it ignores this 
requirement, the judgment breaks the contract it has previously signed 
by its form. (ND: 71) 
 
Hegel notes the difference between subject and predicate; Adorno is directly 
influenced by Hegel's thoughts on this matter.  However, we will see that what 
Adorno understands by this difference is somewhat at odds with Hegel's view.  It 
is sufficient to note at this juncture, that Adorno's critique of identity-thinking 
involves a siding with Hegelian judgement over Kantian judgements in certain 
respects. 
 
5.2 The Separation of Form and Content 
 
Another way that Adorno sides with Hegel against Kant, in line with the previous 
criticisms, is that Kant separated form and content: the world supplies content; 
the mind supplies form.  Due to this strict separation, the mind can know that 
about the content which can be formalized.  Speaking dialectically, separating 
form and content in the way that Kant does enables him to collapse the difference 
— or at least its import — by taking one side or other as sufficient to knowledge: 
he sides with cognitive formality. Like Hegel, Adorno takes the propositional 
function of predication to be an external, heterogeneous process.  However, that 
difference should not be used to isolate form from content — this leads to a 
reification of knowledge as facts and of the subject as a processor of facts.  
 
[S]ynthesis by the copula would happen as a mere external occurrence; 
this was precisely what the concept of Being was thought up against. 
Once again, as in an obsolete logic, subject, copula, and predicate 
would be conclusive, completed details after the model of things. (ND: 
101) 
 
In the dialectical conception of judgement, the difference between form and 
content is maintained as a dynamic, interactive relationship. Essential to this 
dynamism is the transformation of thought away from the determination of what 
appears immediately.  This enables us to reconsider the immediate form of the 
judgement as insufficient to its subject matter.  Predicative judgements are 
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unavoidable.  Yet the rejection of the essence of judgement as propositional and 
as a true, formal representation of the object is a move against reifying 
judgements. 
  
Acknowledging the formal distortion of the subject and its properties in 
judgement is a way to maintain an awareness of the particular way an object and 
its properties are.  It is also essential for deciding matters of truth: the rose and 
redness are ontologically mediated; a judgement which means this is true. The 
fastidious discrimination of the extensional and intensional aspects of the 
proposition is the dialectical attempt to maintain a clear sense of the judgement as 
only valid insofar as it is sensitive to and determined by the particular object.   
 
Any aspect of the judgement which is not sensitive in this way must itself be 
negated.  It turns out that the very form of predication is to be negated.  Through 
the negation of predication as the appropriate structure for representing the form 
of real entities, we attain a higher level of understanding of what objects are and 
how they are. We also ensure that our epistemic practices operate from within 
their subject matter rather than determining it according to an externally imposed 
form which in fact, unavoidably, distorts the entity in question. 
 
5.3 Dialectical as Opposed to Transcendental Modality 
 
As an extension of his propositional account of judgement as a representation of 
a state of affairs, Kant argued that the judgement relied on the transcendental 
conditions of cognition to determine its modal status.  This is unsurprising within 
Kant's system because the judgement is not the determination of things-in-
themselves and so the objectively real cannot be the basis upon which we settle 
our modal claims.  Kant has no choice but to refer the modal status of the 
judgement back to the subject.  We saw that Adorno's critique of the constituens 
and constitutum amounts to an attack on the idea that the structure of our 
cognition can be taken as sufficient to both the form and content of the world. 
Likewise, Hegel baulked at this and directly criticizes Kant for it saying that his 
dialectics will put modality in its 'proper place' (SoL: 80) 
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Hegel argues that individuals are the determinate, particular ways that universals 
are instantiated.  To reflect his idea that the individual has a dialectical essence 
and is not immediately and 'abstractly' given as it is in Spinoza's ontology, Hegel 
calls the mode the measure.  Measure is the 'concrete truth of being' and is 
antithetical to the modality we find in Kant (SoL: 329). If we follow Hegel's 
ontological logic, the modal character of judgements is determined according to 
the very distinction of an individual as such, not according to the relation to the 
faculties.  Measure, or modality, is therefore the basis of essence (SoL: 330).   
 
Adorno notes this point when he discusses the copula in Hegel's dialectics.  Not 
only does he say that the copula is not the copula of identity, he argues that the 
copula is the determination of the way the subject is qua its essence.  Therefore, 
unlike Kant, Adorno explicitly argues that the judgement is existentially 
committed: 
 
mediation of the copula as per Hegel and which leads onto dynamism 
"Is"establishes a context of existential judgment between the 
grammatical subject and the predicate, thus suggesting something 
ontical. Taken purely by itself, however, as a copula, it means at the 
same time the general, categorical fact of a synthesis, without 
representing anything ontical. (ND: 100) 
 
Adorno's concern that our judgements are determined according to how objects 
are suggests that he follows Hegel by resituating our modal commitments in 
terms of objects not subjects. 
 
Consequently, in judgement, the qualification of the subject by the predicate is 
insufficient for the essential modal concern outlined above.  In an effort 
distinguish the sort of existential judgement, with its ontical import, from the 
more familiar, existential proposition, Adorno refers us to the epistemic activities 
of a child trying to reflect on the relationship between language and the world.   
 
[The child] wants to find out what the words mean, and the occupation 
with them — as well as an impish, nagging, psychoanalytically 
explicable stubbornness, perhaps — leads him to the relation of words 
and things.  He may get on his mother's nerves with the awkward 
problem why a bench is called a bench.  His naïveté is un-naïve. (ND: 
111) 
140 
 
 
The idea is that when a child is told the meanings and referents of words and 
develops the logical foundation through which to co-ordinate her utterances, 
these utterances are in principle sufficient for her ability to successfully reference 
the world and talk meaningfully.
111
  The child can use language. The thought 
Adorno is addressing with this example of the child is that the attempt to co-
ordinate one's discursive utterances successfully and use the correct names and 
predicates in the correct way fails to properly capture the problem of judgement.   
 
Indeed, that there is already 'a correct way' indicates that the sort of existential 
concern Adorno is trying to grapple with is moot.  He is concerned with the idea 
lying beneath the childish question: "why is a bench, a 'bench'".  The child has an 
intuitive grasp of a complex issue concerning how we reference and what it 
means to reference.  Children are naively considering a deep metaphysical issue: 
what is a 'bench' really and how does this word I use, 'bench', capture the being 
of this entity.  Children learn the word and they know they can pick out benches.  
However, the seeming inadequacy, the strange difference between this sound and 
this concrete object, makes the reference seem improbable to the child.  Bernstein 
takes up this idea when he suggests that Adorno is asking us, as adults, to be like 
the child: a 'conceptual neophyte' actively trying to build the reference relations 
between names and predicates and the world they putatively reference (Bernstein, 
2001: 266 - 275). 
 
However, if we follow Hegel as Adorno does, the material particular is an 
irreducible, requisite for the possibility of judging.
112
  The judgement, and the 
judging subject, must therefore, always return to the object in question in order to 
determine the truth of the judgement: 
 
Literally, the preponderance of the object might be traced back to the 
point where a thought believes it has won its own absolute objectivity 
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sees that there is something arbitrary about this process. 
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by rejecting any objectivity that is not thought—in other words, to 
formal logic. The "something" to which all logical propositions refer 
even when they are free to ignore it entirely is a copy of that which a 
thought means, and without which it could not be. The noncognitative 
is a logically immanent condition of the cogitative. In fact, the copula 
"is" always conveys some objectivity already, after the model of 
existential judgments. This disposes of all the hopes kindled by our 
craving for security: that in formal logic we might possess something 
downright unconditional as the sure foundation of philosophy. (ND: 
184n.) 
 
Objects — the material (as opposed to mental) entities named by the subject 
particle of judgements — are particulars upon which the possibility of judging is 
based.  The modal determination of judgements relies on our ability to engage 
with objects of judgements as they themselves are.  Furthermore, given that 
objects are not merely what they are given in appearance for Adorno and that 
judgements are not merely representations of those appearances which gain truth 
values according to the validity of their representational function, the validity of 
any judgement must constantly return to the particular it determines, paying 
attention to the object in its particularity. 
 
5.4 Dialectics and the Dynamism of Judgement 
 
Adorno agrees with Hegel that under the dialectical conditions described above, 
judgements have a dynamic, transformative role in both knowledge-making and 
in determining the reality of objects in the way discussed above.  The structure of 
dialectical judgement and the attendant conception of predication entitle the 
Hegelian to consider judgement as inherently dynamic: 
 
Hegel attacks the Kantian doctrine of the limits of knowledge and yet 
respects it. From it he develops the theory of a difference between 
subject and object that manifests itself in every particular. This 
difference, which acts as its own corrective, moves out beyond itself to 
become more adequate knowledge. Accordingly, the justification of the 
primacy of negation in Hegel's philosophy is that the limits of 
knowledge to which its critical self-reflection leads are not something 
external to knowledge, not something to which it is merely condemned 
from the outside; rather, they are inherent in all moments of 
knowledge. All knowledge, and not merely knowledge that ventures 
out into the infinite, aims, through the mere form of the copula, at the 
whole truth, and none achieves it. Hence in Hegel the Kantian limits of 
knowledge become the principle of epistemological advance. (HTT: 76 
- 7) 
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Taking together Hegel's understanding of the relationship between form and 
content, of how we settle the modality of judgements and the importance of the 
particular in the judgement lead to Adorno praising the dynamism of dialectical 
judgements.  Whereas Kant reified the difference and limitations of judgement in 
order to produce a critical, yet positive knowledge, the difference that Hegel 
maintains enables the judgement to maintain motion.  In short, the dialectical 
judgement is a medium through which conceptual determinations and the 
instances they determine can interact and maintain their transformative 
relationship. 
 
So, for Adorno, Hegel respects the Kantian limits of epistemology and provides a 
dynamic self-correcting account of knowledge.  We could argue the former claim 
through the fact that Hegel does not need to make conceptual assumptions in 
order to generate his dialectical transitions.  Hence his speculative metaphysics 
does not operate according to a dialectical use of the concepts of reason as Kant 
understands it.  We could argue for the second claim because dialectical thought 
does provide the conditions for its own development out of various limits it finds 
both within and without.   
 
However, Adorno's claim at the end is strange.  He applauds Hegel's dialectics 
because it provides an account of knowledge which demonstrates how it reaches 
out to infinity but fails.  This is precisely false: it wilfully suppresses Hegel's 
claims for the Absolute Idea at the end of the Logic and Absolute Knowing at the 
end of the Phenomenology.  In other places, Adorno acknowledges that Hegel's 
dialectics over-reaches, as he considers its limitations and, indeed, his critique of 
Hegel is based on this idea.  What we have in this passage is Adorno's own 
thought breaking through into his account of Hegel.  The negative moment, the 
failure of the judgement is, for reasons which we will consider shortly, 
ineliminable.  We cannot, for Adorno, overcome the difference between the 
subject and the predicate because we cannot overcome the ontological difference 
between mind and world.  The transition into the infinite judgement is already 
compromised by its conceptual formulation.  Nevertheless, the dynamism of 
judgement, discussed above, is a major positive influence on Adorno's thought 
and is a commitment which he is keen to maintain in his own thinking. 
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5.5 Dialectics Against Dogmatism 
 
Although not a part of the structure of dialectical thinking, it is arguable that what 
Adorno finds most attractive about dialectics is that it is as a move against 
philosophical dogmatism.  Hegel talks of dogmatism repeatedly and argues that 
dialectics is a move against such thinking.  He is unusually candid about what he 
considers dogmatism and he links it directly to propositional views of judgement: 
 
Dogmatism as a way of thinking, whether in ordinary knowing or in 
the study of philosophy, is nothing else but the opinion that the True 
consists in a proposition which is a fixed result, or which is 
immediately known.  To such questions as, When was Caesar born?, or 
How many feet were there in a stadium?, etc. a clear-cut answer ought 
to be given, just as it is definitely true that the square on the 
hypoteneuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides of 
a right-angled triangle.  But the nature of a so-called truth of that kind 
is different from the nature of philosophical truths. (PoS: §40)
113
 
 
The preceding discussion shows what Hegel has in mind.  Dogmatism is thinking 
where the truth of the assertion is either determined by considerations 
heteronomous to the subject in question, or where the claim to truth is premature.   
The former case is dogmatic because it imposes on its subject matter what the 
subject is rather than the material subject dictating the character of its own 
individual existence.  The latter is dogmatic because, due to some imported 
epistemic element, inquiry has been brought to a halt before the truth of the 
subject has been realised in the manner discussed. 
 
In Section One, Adorno repeatedly echoes Hegel's criticism of Kant that he 
lapses into dogmatism.  In particular, he argues that Kant's thought is dogmatic in 
the resolution of the antinomies (this is an explicitly Hegelian claim, SoL: 190 - 
9) and that he is dogmatic in his determination of the transcendental conditions of 
objects in terms of their sensible conditions in the transcendental aesthetic 
(KCPR: 232).  By contrast, he praises dialectics for not succumbing to 
dogmatism: 
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Dialectics can break the spell of identification without dogmatically, 
from without, contrasting it with an allegedly realistic thesis. The circle 
of identification—which in the end always identifies itself alone—was 
drawn by a thinking that tolerates nothing outside it; its imprisonment 
is its own handiwork. (ND: 172)  
 
The above, constitutes Adorno's deepest philosophical commitment — avoiding 
the putative dogmatism of identity-thinking.  It is also that in Hegel's thinking 
which guards against dogmatism of uncritical identifications which is most 
influential on him.  Hegel is committed to claim that the propositional form of the 
predicative judgement must be understood as a false representation of the relation 
of an object to its properties or essence.  It is vital to Adorno's thinking that 
predicative judgements cannot simply be taken as identical, through 
representation, to objects; nor are predicative judgements sufficient to the 
identification of objects.  Indeed, it is a total commitment to non-dogmatic 
judgement which eventually leads Adorno away from Hegel.  He argues that the 
irreducible mediation of dialectics in concepts and language means that dialectics 
as the road to absolute, objective truth is compromised.
114
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In this section I have considered Hegel's theory of dialectics and judgement.  
Dialectical judgements, according to Hegel, are valid ways for us to engage with 
the world.  Furthermore, their predicative form is an unavoidable structure for the 
conceptual determination of entities.  However, despite the necessity and validity 
of predicative judgements, Hegel's particular understanding of predication, the 
semantic particles of a judgement and the relationship between the judgement 
and the material particulars they determine, is radically different to the 
conception found within a propositional model.  The deep metaphysical 
commitments implied within the dialectical account entails a different conception 
of truth, judgement and modality. Nevertheless, in the next section, I will 
examine Adorno's disagreements with Hegel.  Numerically they are few; 
however, the consequences of these disagreements are, in fact, substantial. 
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6. Adorno's Immanent Critique of Hegelian Dialectics 
 
 
Adorno practices a form of immanent dialectical critique on Hegel — the method 
of revealing internal tensions within the system which leads to a new, improved 
position (in Hegelian form) or transformation (in Adornian form).  Adorno's 
immanent critique of Hegel results in the negation of Hegel's totalizing 
epistemology and metaphysics (HTT: 14).  In this sense, Adorno sees himself as 
continuing the dialectic of Hegel's program: when the Hegelian system reaches 
unitary totality, this totality becomes a one-sided posit ready for negation (HTT: 
13). Adorno accepts Hegel's critique of predication on the following points: that 
it critically reconsiders the metaphysical status of the universal and particular; 
that the subjective moment, predication, is considered in its heterogeneity to the 
referent of the subject; and, that the positivity of the immediate proposition is 
negated as a result of these unreconciled nonidentities (between particular and 
universal and between subjective conceptual determination and objective material 
reality).   
 
Nevertheless, he argues that the transition of the positive judgement, through its 
negations into the infinite judgement, whilst dialectically consistent, misses its 
own dialectical moment: that objective transformation of the judgement is 
mediated by the subject who makes the judgement — the process cannot be 
entirely objective for dialectical reasons.  The transition of the subjective 
judgement into an infinite judgement is a labour; something worked by the 
subject and therefore, for Adorno, mediated by the subject.
115
  As a result, the 
positive, infinite judgements of dialectics are indexed to the particular labours of 
particular subjects at particular historical moments.  The immanent critique of the 
claim to objective universality reveals within itself an element of its opposite: 
these objective claims have a nonidentical, irreducibly subjective element that is 
particular to a socio-historical moment.  The infinite judgement, rather than a part 
of truth, qua Absolute Idea, returns in Adorno's thinking as a negated moment of 
socio-historical truth.   
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Valid predication, which amounts to the subjective moment in the determination 
of the objective, always reproduces the difference between subject and predicate 
(HTT: 24) as a result of the irreducible ontological difference between mind and 
world.  The mind cannot sublate this difference without conceptualising it as 
something amenable to sublation, i.e. as a conceptual difference.  Hegel is able to 
argue for the assimilation of ontological difference as a result of his idealist 
commitment to the conceptual structure of the world qua Begriff.  Adorno's 
materialist inflection of ontological difference, emphasised by the 
conceptlessness of the world, entails that the difference is irreducible. 
 
The sublation of the subjective and objective moments in Hegelian dialectical 
judgements is not, therefore, possible for Adorno — experience, as subjective, 
particular and partial, inevitably mediates its claim to objectivity with its 
irreducibly subjective moment.  To put it metaphorically, the objective is always 
filtered through the subjective such that the latter cannot help but inflect the 
former — there is no 'pure' route to objectivity. The consequence is that Adorno's 
negative dialectics do not revolve around determinate negation which produces a 
determinate positive out of the negation of a negative.  Rather, negation of the 
immediate proposition determines socio-historical truths, not grounds for further 
negation into a sublative positive.  As Michael Rosen has pointed out, this is a 
radical departure from Hegelian dialectics and it is appropriate to ask to what 
extent 'negative dialectics' is Hegelian (Rosen, 1984: 159 - 60).  More 
importantly for our purposes, are the commitments of Adorno's dialectics such 
that they are underdetermined to the extent that they do not 'work'? 
 
We will consider various stages in which Adorno attacks the sublation of the 
negative into a moment of the positive.  Considering Hegel's dialectics and its 
basis in a priori rationalism and associated commitment to speculative ontology, 
Adorno's commitment to the irreducibility of the subjective is at odds with such 
an idea — so much so that we will see Adorno almost misrepresent Hegel in 
order to maintain his praise for Hegel's dialectics.  In light of Adorno's inevitable 
critique of apriority and ontology in Hegel's dialectics, what survives of Hegel's 
dialectics is the moment of negativity.  The irreducibility of the negative — a 
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function of the ontological difference between subject and material object — 
marks Adorno's decisive break from Hegel's dialectics.  Unavoidably, Adorno is 
committed to a very different view of the subject than Hegel — in this light we 
will reconsider the categories of the constituens and constitutum, analysed in the 
first section, as a constellation for critically engaging with Hegel's thinking.  
Having set out Adorno's general concerns we return to the specifics of judgement 
itself.  We see how the recovery of negativity in the dialectics results in a 
definitive transition in Adorno's understanding of judgement.  In short, we will be 
in a better position to develop and understand Adorno’s own philosophical 
commitments. 
 
6.1 Hegel's Dialectics, A Priorism and Rationalism 
 
Rosen argues that Adorno misunderstands Hegel in at least one crucial way: that 
Adorno understands Hegel's philosophy to be a philosophy of experience like 
Goethe's.
116
 If Adorno argues this it would seem to be a mistake: Rosen says that 
contrary to Adorno's interpretation: "against Goethe, Hegel explicitly describes 
his own philosophy as not being a doctrine of experience." (Rosen, 1984: 160).  
By experience, Rosen is here referring to our experience of social and material 
phenomena.  This seems absolutely correct.  As Rosen also says, despite being a 
dubious claim about Hegel, it indicates something interesting about Adorno's 
thinking: he is projecting onto Hegel something of his own view of dialectics.  
That is, Adorno's dialectics is inextricably wedded to socio-historical experience.  
Where Hegel's dialectics proceeds aprioristically and rationally, Adorno is in 
deep disagreement with him.  In fairness to Adorno, I wish to show that he is at 
least conflicted and equivocates about the importance of experience in Hegel's 
philosophy.  This conflict probably grows out of the great respect that Adorno 
has for Hegel.  However, in charting this conflict, we are able to gain a much 
clearer understanding of Adorno's departure from Hegelian orthodoxy and what 
Adorno’s own commitments consist in. 
 
In the Three Theses, there is support for Rosen's interpretation.  At the end of the 
essay on the experiential content of Hegel's philosophy Adorno makes the 
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following remarks: "[Hegel] did an injustice to the experience on which he drew" 
(HTT: 86), explicitly attaching this use of experience to 'concrete and grounded' 
social experience, as opposed to rational experience.  He says that "Even where 
Hegel flies in the face of experience, including the experience that motivates his 
philosophy, experience speaks from him." (HTT: 87).  This is the conclusion of a 
complex argument: Adorno takes Hegel to be saying that reality is rational, 
systematic, unified and good in virtue of these achievements.  On the one hand he 
argues that Hegel seems wrong as history testifies otherwise: social life did 
become systematic and rationalised, although in the form of coercion and 
violence.  Nevertheless, the fact that Hegel understood history's progression 
towards this systematic and violent rationalisation of social reality, this is the 
deeper truth of Hegel's philosophy.  
 
It is obvious that Adorno talking about experience of social phenomena in this 
quotation; he is suggesting that Hegel's philosophy is motivated by this 
experience.  It does seem as though Adorno is situating dialectics within the flux 
of socio-historical experience which gets the priority of Hegel's thought 
incorrectly.  Socio-historical phenomena are the product of the rational, 
dialectical force which structures reality.  Such phenomena can be studied and 
understood through appropriate dialectical analysis, but they are not the condition 
of dialectics nor is dialectics ontologically dependent on such phenomena. 
 
These worries about Adorno's interpretation persist when he says that: 
"[Dialectics] arises from the experience of an antagonistic society; it does not 
originate in some mere conceptual schema." (HTT: 82).  This is still ambiguous.  
Certainly Adorno is right to not reduce dialectics to a conceptual schema and, as 
suggested, motivation could come from social experience without that experience 
determining the ontological dialectic.  Yet the emphasis seems incorrect.  In the 
Logic, the process of dialectics shows that the determinations of concepts such as 
being, nothing and becoming are all derived a priori — Hegel says as much (SoL: 
96).  Without doubt Hegel took socio-historical and natural phenomena seriously 
but it was with a view to show how the dynamics of dialectics determined the 
concrete and conceptual manifestations of material reality. 
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Most worrying is Adorno's claim that "contradictions, which are its true and only 
ontology, are at the same time the formal law of a history that advances only 
through contradiction and with unspeakable suffering." (HTT: 82)  He is 
referring here to the "history of an unreconciled epoch" and making the claim 
that what is real are contradictions; in this instance the contradiction between the 
imposed claim of harmony which suppresses the violence and antagonism upon 
which that harmony is predicated.  However, the structure of Adorno's point 
reveals a sliding of reference.  He says that Hegel is motivated by the experience 
of social history and that this is its positive import for dialectics.  He then says 
that the only ontological reality of this socio-historical import is contradiction.   
 
This does not seem to capture what Hegel thinks.  First of all, the Logic makes 
clear that dialectical determination of underdetermined ontological categories 
results in the final determination and fulfilment of the concept in the Absolute 
Idea (SoL: 843 - 4).  This is real for Hegel, not contradictions as such.  Hegel's 
thought then, in terms of history, is that history is the real and genuine resolution 
of contradiction.  As Adorno says, Hegel acknowledges history as a 
'slaughterbench' (HTT: 82).  Nevertheless, for Hegel, these are passages in the 
determination of the Absolute Idea mediated within socio-historical reality.  It is 
not the case that the true and only ontology is contradiction.  This is Adorno's 
thought not Hegel's. 
 
I think we do have reason to suspect Adorno's interpretation at times.  However, 
it would be wrong to suggest that he was unaware of these points.  He 
acknowledges these disagreements and also undoubtedly understands Hegel.  He 
begins the book by acknowledging Hegel's rationalist ontology: "Hegelian reason 
tried to set the burden of existence in motion through the reason that obtains even 
in what exists." (HTT: 1). He argues that speculative thought enabled Hegel to 
say something, not merely about the instruments of knowledge but also about its 
'essential objects'.  In light of this, Adorno acknowledges Hegel's realism (HTT: 
5); dialectics is not trapped within problems of subjectivity and is able to thereby 
engage in genuine metaphysics.  
 
He also argues that for Hegel, nothing can be known 'that is not in experience' — 
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quoting the Phenomenology.  If we look at the context, however, Adorno is 
referring to Hegel's claim that experience can also be expressed as: "inwardly 
revealed eternal verity." (PoS: 487) Neither Hegel nor Adorno are referring to 
socio-historical experience — but a rational experience of the intelligibility of 
reality.  It seems too quick for Rosen to suggest that Adorno misunderstands 
Hegel. 
 
The situation is more complicated though.  These conflicting moments emerge 
from a dual respect and criticism of Hegel which in turn relates to what Adorno 
wishes to develop in his own thinking and the elements of idealist dialectics he 
wishes to critique.  On the one hand, Adorno thinks that Hegel errs by imposing 
historical resolutions and harmony where it is not a reality: "in the Philosophy of 
Right Hegel broke off such thoughts by abruptly absolutizing one category — the 
state […] He could not resolve the contradiction between his dialectic and his 
experience: it was this alone that forced Hegel the critic to maintain the 
affirmative." (HTT: 80).  Yet even as Hegel does so, succumbing to an 'untruth', 
there is truth here, as I have suggested: the rational coercion of the contradiction 
and antagonism into state-administered harmony is the grim truth of reality.  
What Adorno probably has in mind here is the rise of fascism.  Adorno's respect 
then is that even as Hegel errs, he is, in some respect, correct (HTT: 81).  In this 
sense, experience does speak through Hegel, even if Hegel is not a philosopher of 
experience. 
 
That Adorno is prepared to make such a move is telling.  If truth is indexed to 
particular socio-historical moments, it is possible that a claim is false — for 
example, Hegel’s claim that history culminates in Absolute Knowing — but 
making that claim at a particular moment might tell us something true about that 
socio-historical moment.  In other words, that Hegel said p indicates something 
true about the world even if the claim itself is not true.  Hence, Adorno’s 
complex critique of Hegel in these matters is deeply instructive of how we ought 
to understand his own thinking. 
 
Furthermore, Adorno sees Hegel as a philosopher who was prepared to think 
beyond the given — either in its most parochial immediate form, sense 
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perception, through to the greater, social structures such as the nation state.  He 
was a thinker able to see the limits of both philosophy and reality and turn them 
into the conditions of change.  For a thinker as restless as Adorno with the status 
quo, Hegel is a great thinker (HTT: 80 - 1).  We are about to consider the 
consequence of this differing view of experience which will result in a radical 
departure from Hegel.   
 
Yet, in fidelity to Adorno's complex admiration for Hegel we should remember 
that what he sees in Hegel is the closest philosophy could ever come to fulfilling 
its promise — i.e., the promise which Adorno declares is over at the beginning of 
Negative Dialectics (ND: 1).  If philosophy is the discipline of inquiring into the 
very structure of reality and in our ability to know that reality, then Hegel's 
absolute idealism — which, as Westphal points out, is simultaneously an attempt 
at epistemological realism — was our best attempt.  For Adorno the 
disintegration of the possibility of Hegel's dialectics just is the disintegration of 
the possibility of a total, unified, systematic philosophy.  
 
Just as with Beethoven, whose middle period was the apotheosis of the musical 
dream of the rational integration of musical material into a thoroughly satisfying 
musical whole, so is Hegel's philosophy an attempt to rationally integrate all its 
content with a structured, formal whole.  Even as the musical utopia of 
Beethoven's music disintegrated according to the contradiction of its own totality, 
Hegel's philosophy did the same.  This does not change the fact that if music and 
philosophy were still possible as rationally integrated totalities, Beethoven and 
Hegel are, for Adorno, the greatest there could ever be.
117
  That such possibilities 
have disintegrated is deeply telling about Adorno’s philosophy: totalizing, 
systematic philosophy is no longer a tenable activity.  Whatever Adorno’s 
philosophical commitments are, they will not amount to a system as he believes 
the time for systems is over. 
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6.2 The Transition to Negativity 
 
We have seen Adorno's ambiguous reception of the import of experience in 
Hegel's philosophy.  It appears that this ambiguity is in part due to Adorno's own 
conception of dialectics: it is not a process which determines reality; nor is it a 
mode of a priori, rational inquiry.  Submerging and mediating dialectics in socio-
historical reality entails that the positive moment cannot be guaranteed rationally.  
Rather, dialectical tensions are diffused through contradictory elements which 
cannot be brought together into determinate, unified wholes.  Unavoidably and 
intentionally, Adorno reverses the positive polarity and trajectory of Hegel's 
dialectics towards the 'negative moment'. 
 
Adorno refers to Hegel's claim "What is rational is real; And what is real is 
rational" (PoR: xix) as "one of Hegel's most dubious theses" (HTT: 82).  He 
knows that Hegel's philosophy does not amount to sets of theses, detachable from 
others and that this idea is, arguably, a summation of Hegel's deepest 
philosophical commitment.  However one interprets this well-known and 
controversial thesis, it seems hard to reject and remain an Hegelian.
118
   
 
Nevertheless, Adorno rejects this idea.  He says: 
 
More than any other of his teachings, that of the rationality of the real 
seems to contradict the experience of reality, including that of its so-
called overall tendency.  But that idea is identical with Hegelian 
idealism.  A philosophy for which all that exists dissolves into spirit 
[Geist] as a result of its movement and as the totality of that movement, 
and which therefore proclaims the identity of subject and object in the 
whole when it is their nonidentity in the particular that inspires it — 
such a philosophy will apologetically take the side of what exists, 
which is supposed to be identical with spirit. (HTT: 85)
119 
 
Adorno is clear in this passage that the rationality of the real is central to 
Hegelian idealism and results in the false and implicitly coercive identification of 
the subject and object within the dialectics of Geist.  This passage is as clear an 
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indication of Adorno's turn away from Hegel and towards his own conception of 
dialectics which has little to do with the Hegelian commitments. 
 
I do not think that Adorno does misinterpret Hegel; he deeply disagrees with him.  
Yet despite that disagreement he can see the importance, the brilliance and even 
the truth in the place where he disagrees with him the most.
120
  Due to the 
complete systematic nature of Hegel's philosophy and the fact that it is not co-
ordinated by a set of first principles that one can choose from, one cannot readily 
pick and choose what one likes from Hegel: arguably one is Hegelian or not.  
Hegel's thought in both content and form is one idea differently considered.  
Adorno notes this in the fact that his deviation from Hegel is articulated in its 
total inversion: "The whole is the false" (MM: 50), reiterated in the Three Studies 
as the "whole is the untrue" (HTT: 87).  It is for such reasons that Joel Whitebook 
claims that "Adorno was vehemently anti-Hegelian.  He was also one of the most 
thoroughly Hegelian thinkers of the century." (Whitebook, 2004: 51). 
 
Adorno’s divergence from the totalizing, systemic unity of philosophy is due to a 
disagreement with Hegel over two related issues: firstly that the dialectic is able 
to overcome the nonidentity of the subject and object and secondly that the 
dialectic culminates in an objectively valid, rational and moral, social 
arrangement.  Adorno responds to these claims in the negative: the nonidentity of 
subject and object persists; reality, at least in its present state, is not valid, 
rational or moral.  Furthermore, the negativity of these claims is present within 
the dialectic itself: the immediate is realized as false (the moment of negativity); 
the positive and the negative are sublated as moments in both reality and in our 
understanding of reality.  If the mind cannot sublate the positive and negative 
moments — indeed if the negative moment is true — then the dialectics is 
negatively inflected.  The critical import of negativity is that the negative 
moment is indicative of a second-order truth.  We do not find the truth in the 
positive sublated moment: we find truth in the negative moment. 
 
The question for now is how does he use his own philosophical resources to 
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argue against Hegel? This is an important question when considering my over-
arching aim – to understand Adorno’s philosophical commitments: what about 
dialectics is left such that it can criticise Hegelian dialectics even after so doing it 
has rid itself of essential resources (determinate negation) from Hegel’s 
dialectics?  This is especially pertinent considering he claims that due to the 
'closed' nature of Hegel's dialectical system it is able to sublate and turn to its 
own advantage, any criticism (HTT: 2). The answer is that just when all 
negativity is eradicated in Hegelian dialectics, as it sublates all contradictions, 
Adorno thinks, dialectically, that it becomes another position, an immediacy 
within which its negation is already present.  
 
Adorno's uses Hegel's thought against himself.  Adorno acknowledges that 
Hegel's philosophy uses the limits of subjectivity as the fulcrum by which he is 
able to speculate beyond the subject in order to achieve an objective 
epistemology (HTT: 10).  Whenever a position is attained, its situation as a 
position is used against it.  The negation of the position is demonstrated to be 
implicit within the position and the consideration of the position and its negation 
is used to provide the means to develop a fuller, higher-level understanding of the 
position.  Adorno argues that it is unavoidable that at every stage of dialectics, 
the subject posits both sides of the dialectic. Through this positing, the subject 
attempts to use the structure of the negation to overcome its own finite 
subjectivity, evident in the fact that it posits both sides of the dialectic, and 
propels itself past its own limitation into a position of total objectivity (HTT: 13). 
 
Adorno argues: 
 
When the contemplating spirit [betrachtende Geist] presumes to show 
that everything that exists is commensurable with spirit itself, with 
Logos, and the determinations of thought, spirit sets itself up as an 
ontological ultimate, even if at the same time it grasps the untruth in 
this, that of the abstract a priori, and attempts to do away with its own 
fundamental thesis.  In the objectivity of the Hegelian dialectic, which 
quashes all mere subjectivism, there is something like a will on the part 
of the subject to jump over its own shadow.  The Hegelian subject-
object is subject. (HTT: 13) 
 
'Contemplating spirit' is not an explicit category of Geist in Hegel's 
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Phenomenology making the reference point of Adorno's claim obscure.  Given 
the context, it seems that what he has in mind is the situation where subjective 
consciousness has fully realised itself.  At this moment the rational self-
movement of the Idea has developed into its own complete and unified fruition in 
reality (PoS: §§805 - 8).  Adorno's point is that because the thought 
determinations of the subject become objective — through their development 
according to the sublation of deficiencies in finite determination — the subject 
becomes an ontological ur-principle.  The subject, through a priori dialectical 
thought, becomes fully objective and unsusceptible to the vicissitudes of the 
finite reality.  Indeed, those vicissitudes are reconsidered as dialectically 
necessary.   
 
Adorno acknowledges that this seemingly abstract position is mediated within 
itself as also a position of concrete reality and hence denying its one-sidedness as 
pure abstraction.   However, Adorno refuses Hegel his final move: that the 
individual, empirical subject is able to dissolve its own finitude within the 
unconditioned, self-movement of the dialectic.  Dialectics are always a product of 
the subject.  The subject as distinct from the object — as dialectics itself — is 
irreducible for Adorno: 
 
An "I" that was no longer "I" in any sense at all, an "I," that is, without 
any relation to individuated consciousness and thereby to the 
spatiotemporal person, would be nonsense.  It would not only be as 
free-floating and indeterminable as Hegel accused being, its 
counterconcept, of being; in addition, it could no longer be grasped as 
an "I," as something mediated by consciousness.  Analysis of the 
absolute subject has to acknowledge the indissoluability of an 
empirical, nonidentical moment in it, a moment that doctrines of the 
absolute subject, idealist systems of identity, are not permitted to 
acknowledge as indissoluable.  In this sense Hegel's philosophy is 
untrue when measured against its own concept. (HTT: 17) 
 
In other words, the subject is finite and cannot think its way out of its finitude 
and is always nonidentical to spirit.  For Adorno the transition into an absolute 
subject — a subject which has overstepped the limitations of particularity as 
such, is just another position.  Its negation is found immanently within it.  Just 
when reality has become truly integrated and rational — the age of 
Enlightenment — is in fact the moment when the transition into the rise of 
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modern fascism begins.  The sublation of the absolute spirit according to its 
negation in reality is certainly a moment of truth; however, it is not a supra-
historical truth.  Rather it is an historically mediated truth: the untruth of the truth 
of Enlightenment as enlightenment.  The dialectical claim to the positive 
disintegrates back into the negative; reality's claim to a positive moral goodness 
disintegrates back into the antithesis. 
 
This verdict is undoubtedly controversial.  Houlgate would argue that despite 
Adorno's evident sympathy with Hegel and sensitivity to Hegel's thought, he 
fundamentally mistakes the dialectic.  The point is that dialectics is never 
subjective.  Its subjectivisation in consciousness is really only a moment in 
consciousness' coming to realise its own movement towards objectivity.
121
  I 
cannot adjudicate between interpretations of Hegel as the intention is to delineate 
Adorno's thought.  Insofar as Adorno thinks there is a subjective element to the 
dialectic and insofar as the dialectic has aims towards an ontology not limited to 
transcendental claims
122
, Adorno seems to be arguing that Hegel is making pre-
critical mistakes.  The Logic, insofar as it is a speculative rather than 
transcendental ontology, repeats the mistakes of the ontological argument and the 
epistemology of the Phenomenology becomes accordingly compromised.  This is 
precisely what Adorno does argue: 
 
The linguistic expression "existence," which is necessarily conceptual, 
is confused with what it designates, which is nonconceptual, something 
that cannot be melted down into identity. (HTT: 19) 
 
Just as Kant argues in the Transcendental Dialectic that the logical use of 
concepts, divested from their material roots, leads to reason spinning without 
friction on the world, Adorno is repeating these charges against Hegel.  For 
Adorno, as for Kant, concepts do not have any reality other than in their material 
designation.  Furthermore, the categories of the linguistic designator as 
conceptual and the material designated as nonconceptual, or as I prefer, 
conceptless, are not identical.  Their difference cannot be overcome nor sublated 
— the negative moment persists. 
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The persistence of negativity is a deeply anti-Hegelian thought.  For Hegel, a 
priori enquiry tells us that the conceptual under-determination of being in 
nothingness, demonstrates a structure of determination that entails determinate 
plurality.  Adorno seems to be taking Hegel's Logic as a deep ontological 
argument concerning why there is something rather than nothing — as opposed 
to, say, a transcendental argument demonstrating the necessary conditions, qua 
categories and relations of categories, for the possibility of conceptual 
determination.  He then argues that you cannot pull that which is not conceptual 
out of that which is conceptual. 
 
If we pursue this ontological programme, it seems unlikely that Hegel could have 
made such an obvious category mistake.  Although it does beg the question how 
we can analyse concepts and develop ontological arguments about nonconceptual 
reality.  Hegel's answer shows, again, deep disagreements with Adorno: reality is 
conceptual.  Adorno, the materialist, thinks the opposite.  With this view of 
reality, Hegel's rationalist dialectics can proceed ontologically.  We could say 
that the dialectical transitions of being, for example, are developed not only 
according to the intensional content of the concept 'being' but according to the 
very possibility of delineation and determination.  The intention is not to produce 
an argument for the possibility of conceptual determination; rather it is an 
ontological argument concerning the dialectical nature of determination as such.  
This is valid because the nature of real determination is conceptual and can be 
explored conceptually. 
 
So, it is not merely according to the meaning of the concept of being (and 
nothingness) that we move towards the absolute idea.  Rather, if we dialectically 
consider the formal structure of 'no-thingness', immanent within its ontological 
under-determination, is the proto-notion of a singularity (the notion of there being 
a being).  Yet the underdetermination of singularity as such reveals the immanent 
posit of another posit by which we are able to determine the first posit as a posit 
at all; this is essence.  The underdetermination of essence is such that immanently 
within its notion is the determination of separate identities where we move from 
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two identical posits to two posits with different identities (concept).
123
  A 
condition of separable identities between two identical posits is a third position 
from which one posit can be determined as a 'this' and not 'that'.  This abstract 
determination marks the beginnings of the dialectic.  However, it is deeply 
ontological, deeply realist and does not appear to resolve to an analysis of socio-
historical concepts in terms of their meaning.  Reality is necessarily self-
actualizing. 
 
Adorno argues that this pure a priori argument still needs to be 'worked'.  Like 
Gadamer, the tools for its workings are concepts and concepts are socio-cultural 
and historical artefacts.  Not only can such entities not produce entities but the 
idea of them ever being presuppositionless is simply false for Adorno.
124
  Even if 
Houlgate is right and Hegel's ontology is not linked to the German language and 
therefore to a particular conception of language, it is still a cultural phenomenon 
that concepts as such can be worked to produce ontological results.  That said, if 
Hegel is providing an ontological argument concerning why there is something 
rather than nothing, and if this entitles Hegel to proceed rationally developing the 
structure of reality, it is not clear to me that Adorno's concern does enough to 
question Hegel on this point.  Whilst such a priori arguments are undoubtedly 
arm-chair philosophy, they are of course work.  However, just because the 
argument is subjectively made, it does not entail that the content of the argument 
is subjective fabrication.  Whether Adorno's criticism works or not, it 
nevertheless gives us a deep insight into his own thinking: the categorical 
difference between concepts and nonconceptual entities is paramount and 
irreducible. 
 
That is not to say that Adorno wishes to turn Hegel into a non-metaphysical 
thinker as Pippin does.  Rather, in Hegel, just as we find in his critique of Kant, 
Adorno treats him as an articulation of a real problem: a skandalon as he puts it.  
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Interestingly, despite the fact that Adorno appears to roundly criticise Kant and 
move to Hegel, he recapitulates a novel form of Kant's critical-turn against 
Hegel.   
 
The debate between Kant and Hegel, in which Hegel's devastating 
argument had the last word, is not over; perhaps because what was 
decisive, the superior power of logical stringency, is untrue in the face 
of the Kantian discontinuities. Through his critique of Kant, Hegel 
achieved a magnificent extension of the practice of critical philosophy 
beyond the formal sphere; at the same time, in doing so he evaded the 
supreme critical moment, the critique of totality, of something infinite 
and conclusively given.  Then he highhandedly did away with the 
barrier after all, with the experience of something that cannot be 
dissolved in consciousness, which was the innermost experience of 
Kant's transcendental philosophy, and he stipulated a unanimity of 
knowledge that becomes seamless through its discontinuities and that 
has something of a mythical illusory quality to it.  Hegel thought away 
the difference between the conditioned and the absolute and endowed 
the conditioned with the semblance of the unconditioned. (HTT: 86) 
 
In this passage, Adorno lauds Kant and decisively criticises Hegel on Kantian 
grounds.  If we take the critical turn to be canonical in Kantianism, and an 
absolute dialectics of metaphysics and knowing to be canonical Hegelianism, 
then Adorno sides with the former over the latter.  In the above passage Adorno 
agrees with Hegel insofar as he furthers and radicalizes Kant's critical turn but 
departs from Hegel as soon as he considers Hegel to have departed from the 
critical turn.   
 
In this important quotation, Adorno makes explicit his critique of Hegel and 
situates it next to Kant in the form of a mutual critique of the two thinkers.  
Whilst Adorno agrees that Hegel's attack on Kantian formalism devastates the 
latter's philosophy, Kant's critical turn persists against Hegel insofar as the limits 
of epistemology return in Adorno, albeit reformulated through dialectics. 
Negative dialectics is the critical turn reconsidered through dialectical thinking in 
order to disturb any transcendental philosophy.  Yet it also uses the limits of 
reason and subjectivity, implicit within the critical turn, to disturb any claims to 
absolute knowledge or purely a priori metaphysics.  Its positive contribution to 
knowledge consists solely in the negative moments of critical and dialectical 
philosophy.  Elucidating and exploring what this means is the subject of the final 
section of the thesis. 
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6.3 Constituens and Constitutum Revisited 
 
Implicit within Adorno's critique of Hegel are his categories of constituens and 
constitutum.  These critical categories were used to critique problems in Kant's 
theory of the subjective and objective aspects of both individuals (the 
transcendental vs. empirical subject) and in the relations of our epistemic 
practices (knowing subjects and known objects).  Adorno only draws on these 
categories once in the Three Theses and to little effect (HTT: 19).  Nevertheless, 
for the sake of understanding the consistency of Adorno's thought we can see 
how they are applicable to Hegel.   
 
Adorno's worry in Kant was that the constituens became detached from the 
constitutum and that in this move the former was in a position to dominate the 
latter.  Hegel wishes to sublate these categories, albeit in his own terms through 
material reality broadly construed (constitutum) and concept 
(Begriff/constituens).  This sublation marks a transition from duality of subject 
and object to the rational actualisation of the constituens as what there is 
objectively: the constitutum is conceptual and ultimately as we conceptualise it as 
being.  The Hegelian point is not that this is a process of conceptual domination 
by subjects but an objective, rational process, within the world.   
 
As shown in the previous section, for Adorno, this constituens is not objective in 
the way that Hegel intends it.  Rather it is the reification of the socio-historical 
labour of the individual subjects — that is, as subjectively, economically and 
politically mediated — as an absolute constituens.  It is in this sense that he sees 
Hegel's philosophy siding with 'the big guns' as he puts it (HTT: 83): 
 
The metaphysics of labor and the appropriation of the labor of others 
are complementary.  This social relationship dictates the untruth in 
Hegel, the masking of the subject as subject-object, the denial of the 
nonidentical in the totality, no matter how much the nonidentical 
receives its due in the reflection of any particular judgement. (HTT: 24) 
 
Again, Adorno's departure from Hegelian thought is apparent.  He takes Hegel's 
metaphysics as a product of labour which is denied in its own presentation as an 
161 
 
objective, unified and rational, absolute dialectics.  Adorno's point is that the 
subjective labour cannot be made objective in this way and that the nonidentity of 
the subjective and objective moments, either in production, cognition or 
conceptual determination, cannot be worked, thought or judged away. 
 
Furthermore, in this quotation, Adorno picks up on the issue of judgement and 
how the nonidentical maintains 'its due'.  In the previous chapter, Adorno lauds 
Hegel for understanding the categorical difference between objects and 
conceptualisation and the nonidentity between distinctions of reason and 
ontological structure.  However, we also saw that Hegel thought he could 
overcome nonidentity in his dialectics of judgement.  If Adorno is committed to 
the persistence of nonidentity between subject and object as such, he is 
committed to it down to its structure in judgement.  If he upholds the nonidentity 
of subject term and predicate and between propositions and their extensive 
referents and between the intensional content of propositions and their referents, 
and if Hegel tries to show how dialectics can overcome these problems, to what 
degree is Adorno even Hegelian about judgements? 
 
6.4 Negativity in Dialectical Judgements  
 
We have seen Adorno highlight what he takes to be the moment of untruth in 
Hegelian thought.  The Adornian and Hegelian conceptions of dialectics and the 
possibility of philosophy are diverging significantly as a result – a picture of 
Adorno’s thinking is also emerging.  Adorno is clear about these distinctions 
himself and that he is not inheriting Hegel's dialectical method as Hegel intended.  
Adorno argues that Hegel requires rescuing not reviving (HTT: 83).  What then 
does Adorno wish to revive?  It appears as though it is the moment of nonidentity 
— that is, the negative difference between subject and object which cannot be 
sublated.   
 
We can infer this just from the fact that the essence of Adorno's criticism of 
Hegel is that he falsely sublates the difference between subjective conceptual 
determinations and the objective referents of those determinations – material 
reality – to generate a theoretical unity between the conceptual determinations of 
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mind and the manifestations of world: eventually reality is how we conceive it to 
be.  What is rescued is a dialectics of negativity.  The persistence of negativity is 
such that even as Hegel's dialectics reaches a point of unity, for Adorno, it 
becomes another moment of false positivity to be negated.  These abstract 
notions will be considered in the final section where we gain a more concrete 
understanding of what nonidentity is and what Adorno is referring to with this 
notion. 
 
In the previous sections, Adorno argues for this persistence of the negative as it 
impacts on the a priori rationalism of the Logic and the transitions of the 
Phenomenology into absolute knowing.
125
  As argued above, Hegel's theory of 
judgement is isomorphically engaged with his ontological commitments.  
Inasmuch as his conception of judgements is shaped by ontological commitments 
which Adorno rejects, he will also differ in his conception of judgement.
126
  This 
is the case. 
 
6.4.i Negativity, Judgements and Metaphysics 
 
We have seen that Hegel argues that the dialectical transitions of judgement 
move towards an ‘infinite conception’ of the object — that is, one which moves 
beyond the contingency and inherent instability of the immediate proposition — 
towards a stable, true and real conception of the essence of the object at hand.  
On this interpretation of Hegel, held by Adorno, the judgement is deeply 
metaphysically committed.  The immanent critique of the propositional form of 
judgement enables us to conceive of the subject and predicate as unified and 
mediated.  The nonidentity of subject and predicate, a function of the categorical 
difference between their respective domains is seen, not as an expression of a 
metaphysical difference, but as an epistemic problem with the structure of our 
immediate claims to knowledge.  This epistemic problem needs to be overcome 
— the correct metaphysics and dialectical critique of the proposition itself will 
achieve that. 
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The truth of the judgement, as a product of the immanent critique of propositions, 
invokes metaphysics for Hegel.  Getting our metaphysics right is essential for 
proper epistemology and our eventually coming to know reality as it actually is.  
If, however, the metaphysics is rejected, as we have seen Adorno do, there is a 
proportional effect on judgement — in terms of both the structure and content of 
meaning and the referents of that meaning.   
 
If, for Hegel:  
 
1. infinite judgements are truthful determinations of the essence of a 
particular according to its essence  &, 
2. the dialectical realisation of essences is a result of the dynamic, 
rational, forward motion of dialectics &, 
3. ontologically, the particular is mediated by the universal and the 
universal by the particular, 
4. such that a true judgement articulates such states of affairs, 
 
then, Adorno cannot hold the same view of judgements because in some 
way or other he rejects all three of these ideas.  His analysis of dialectics 
and its metaphysical commitments, suggest that he would be sceptical of 
essences developing through history rather than being developed out of 
socio-historical moments.
127
  Furthermore, the irreducibility of the 
particular entity being judged is such that it cannot be mediated, without 
remainder, by the universal in the judgement and vice versa.  Subject term 
and predicate are irreducibly nonidentical. 
 
That there are no real 'essences', for Adorno, which lie entirely outside of our 
socio-historical labour, means that insofar as we are talking about real, material 
entities, we cannot think that the distinctions of reason, articulated in judgement 
through the predicate, represent real ontological structures.  There is a difference 
between the referent of the subject term and how that object is and how it is 
conceived in the judgement according to a conceptual entity, a predicate.   
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This does not commit us to radical subjectivism.
128
  Nor does it suggest that we 
cannot validly or truly talk about the world. Rather it suggests that conceptual 
attendance and determination — necessary qualities of a judgement — require 
distinctions and discriminations which may have objectively valid reference but 
the distinctions themselves may not accord with a fundamental ontological 
structure of an object.
129
 Insofar as epistemology relies on judgements, our 
epistemic projects find their limits in the ontological difference between 
conceptual entities and material entities which they reference.  It is to say no 
more than we cannot read off our ontology from our language nor should we 
confuse the two.  It does not follow from this that we are hermetically sealed in 
language or that our judgements do not validly refer to the world.  Nor does this 
make Adorno's dialectics an anodyne recognition of epistemic limits.  Here he is 
concerned with objects, social artefacts like artworks, which are such a way as to 
put tremendous pressure on our epistemic resources.  I suggest that this is the 
metaphysical commitment that underpins Adorno's theory of nonidentity, qua 
judgement, and motivates it.  This is far from the hysterical attack on reason that 
it is often considered to be.  
 
Given Adorno's commitment to the nonidentity of subject and predicate in 
judgement because the difference of the two cannot be overcome in metaphysics 
— and certainly not within epistemology — we can infer Adorno's negative 
dialectics as breaking away from Hegel's exactly at the point of the negation of 
the positive judgement.  That is, after the very first moment of the dialectical 
critique of the proposition.  Recall that Hegel critiques the immediate, 'positive' 
proposition: this rose is red.  He argues that due to categorical differences 
between the domains of the two entities as presented, this proposition, in its 
immediacy, is false: a particular, as such, is not a universal, as such, and vice 
versa.  We saw that Hegel's solution was to argue that particulars are able to be 
particulars insofar as they instantiate a universal and universals are such only 
insofar as they are particularly instantiated.   
                                                 
128
 See Adorno on relativism, ND: 35 - 7. 
129
 To this extent, there seems to be some shared ground between Adorno and Nagel, 1986: 99 - 
105. 
165 
 
 
Adorno agrees with Hegel that it is a mistake to conceive of the immediate 
proposition as a true representation of a state of affairs.  He also thinks, as would 
Hegel, that the issues of articulating true representations of the world are also  
issues of metaphysics rather than semantics alone.  However, he disagrees with 
Hegel, that the untruth of the proposition is only a moment to be sublated.  
Hegel's initial diagnosis of the problem of the nonidentity of our conceptual 
determination of entities and the entity itself, is the truth of dialectics.  Despite 
his initial agreement with Hegel, and the fact that he believes Hegel was brilliant 
to critically identify the dialectical problems of propositions, Hegel's 
metaphysical solution was false precisely because it is a solution.  There is 
nothing to solve, the distinctions of mind and the way the world is, are different.  
 
6.4.ii Immanent Critique of Judgement 
 
The sublation of nonidentity presents another moment in the untruth of Hegel's 
dialectics for Adorno.  As he seeks to overcome immediacy of static, contingent 
judgements, the ultimate movement towards the identity of form, content and 
terms in Hegel's theory of judgement cannot help but reproduce the immediacy 
which it was the intention to overcome.  That is, whilst dialectics was intended to 
be a presuppositionless actualization of both truth and reality, its very possibility 
as such, relies on the very immediacy and presuppositions it set out to overcome.   
 
But like every aspect of the whole in Hegel, [the standstill of the 
system achieved in its actualization in Idea] is simultaneously an aspect 
of every individual part, and its ubiquity may have prevented Hegel 
from acknowledging it.  He was too close to it; it concealed itself from 
him, a piece of unreflected immediacy. (HTT: 134) 
 
Adorno argues that the complex micro-movements of Hegel's thought obscures 
from him the persistence of immediacy which remains in the overall arc of his 
dialectics. 
 
This would be a puzzling criticism to Hegel and again reveals the difference 
between Adorno and Hegel.  Hegel's point was never that we are wrong in our 
immediate judgements, rather they are open to scepticism.  Adorno quotes the 
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Phenomenology where Hegel makes this point: immediate appearances are the 
richest experience of the truth that we have; however, the problem is epistemic, 
we do not understand the truth of appearances and so appearance does not appear 
as truth.
130
  A better understanding of the truth of appearance will correspond to 
social progression.  However, the immediate was never false as such.  Therefore, 
why would Hegel worry that the immediacy of experience is preserved?  
Arguably, preserving immediacy through its sublation as metaphysical insight 
was precisely what he was trying to do: preserve and justify realism against 
sceptical doubts. 
 
Adorno knows this.  The problem is he cannot accept this dialectical insight for 
his own commitments.  Again, what we have is Adorno's own thinking breaking 
through into his critique of Hegel.  Empirical experience as conceptually 
mediated, presents its content with the partiality that comes from conceptual 
distinctions and attendances.  All of those attendances and distinctions may be 
valid and, for some objects, even sufficient to the identification of that object; 
however, the difference between conceptual distinctions and ontological 
distinctions will mean that there will always be a nonidentity between the two 
modes of determination.  Furthermore, in the case of many objects, the ontology 
of objects will be such that valid conceptual distinctions and determinations will 
indicate both a history of the object and ontological issues which do negate the 
sufficiency of appearance. 
 
In short, Adorno does not misunderstand Hegel as much as thoroughly disagree 
with him over metaphysical issues.  If we accept Adorno's critique of Hegel's 
metaphysics then we can see how and why he criticizes Hegel's theory of 
judgement. 
 
In the dialectic of identity, then, not only is the identity of the 
nonidentical, as its higher form, the A = B, the synthetic judgment, 
attained; in addition, the content of the synthetic judgment is 
recognized as already a necessary moment of the analytic judgment A 
= A. Conversely, the simple formal identity of A = A is retained in the 
equivalence of the nonidentical. Often, accordingly, the presentation 
makes a backward leap. What would be new according to the simple 
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schema of triplicity reveals itself to be the concept that formed the 
starting point for the particular dialectical movement under discussion, 
modified and under different illumination. (HTS: 135) 
 
In the above quotation, Adorno presents the dialectics of immediacy in identity 
statements.  We know that according to Hegel the judgement is a determination 
of one particular entity according to some general term.  Insofar as the predicate 
can be asserted as something about a subject, it is necessary that the predicate is 
not identical with the subject.  This says no more than a predicative judgement, 
that has any claim to knowledge, is not mere tautology.  Nonidentity in this 
instance is no more than the idea that the subject and predicate terms are not the 
same linguistic particle and are not extensional synonyms.  As discussed, the 
subject and predicate are taken as different in order that one can be meaningfully 
asserted of the other.  This is what Adorno means when he says that the 
nonidentical is presented at its higher form A = B.  This is the form of the 
synthetic predicative judgement. 
 
The key issue is what linguistic particles — subject terms and predicates — 
reference.  One move would be to say that any predicate about which we have 
realist convictions will pick out a real property of an object.  As such there will 
be some correspondence or identity relation between proposition and object.  
Importantly, it also commits us to the idea that predicates represent real 
ontological divisions and reference properties which are in some way distinct 
from their property-bearers as discussed above. Hegel wishes to negate this 
understanding of predication where the predicate references a distinct property, 
without any idea of the mutual mediation of particular and universal qua essence. 
Interestingly then, Hegel seems to hold that the proposition, as characterized, 
does not properly respect the metaphysics of identity.  Objects and their 
properties are mutually mediated according to the object's essence which is self-
identical (but which, of course, needs to realise itself through its determination in 
the particular).  
 
The negation of difference in unitary mediation according to essential identity is 
key in Adorno's analysis of Hegel.  In the quotation Adorno makes the point that 
the truth of A = B relies, materially, on the self-identity of A: (A = A).  For 
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Hegel, the nonidentical predicate, B, is a way of considering A which is true iff 
what B says of A is essentially true of A.  B, then, is a way to attend to A 
conceptually, but is true iff, modally, A is 'B way' and B is 'A way' where A being 
B way is tantamount to A being A, qua essence.  Therefore, the predicative 
judgement is only true if A (particular A) = A (concept A).  The difference 
between A and B needs to be sublated to reach a fuller understanding of what is 
meant by A = B and its truth value.  Adorno's point then is that A = A persists 
throughout Hegelian dialectics.  It is the basis upon which something 
nonidentical can be asserted, it is the basis upon which the predicative judgement 
can be considered true, and it is the basis upon which the predicative judgement, 
as mere proposition, can then be sublated.  It is also, therefore, the end result of 
cognition.  In other words, the identity of non-identical elements is the formula of 
Hegel's idenititarian dialectics.    
 
This is not yet an argument against Hegel: this merely elucidates his position.  
Furthermore, the point of Hegel's dialectics is to assert that the claim A = A as it 
presents itself immediately, returns as (A = A)' at a deeper level of understanding.  
The concretion and realisation of (A = A) means that there is at least an 
epistemological difference between these semantically identical claims.  
Nevertheless, Adorno notes that the epistemological difference inevitably leads to 
a reconsideration of the first position — the dialectic has retroactive force, as he 
puts it (HTT: 134).  It shows that what turned out to be (A = A)' as an 
epistemological insight, was actually expressed in (A = A) — we simply did not 
realise it at that moment.  So the difference between (A = A) & (A = A)' is also 
sublated and maintains the unity of the moments of the system. 
 
To generate the critical moment Adorno uses the dialectical notion of negation 
against Hegel. As all entities are assimilated to the concept — either in their 
historical development or as a metaphysical insight with retroactive force — 
Adorno questions the possibility of the absolute concept: as something 
unmediated by its negative other.   
 
In Hegel’s case, despite the extreme enhancement of his claim to derive 
the nonidentical from identity, the thought structure of the great Logic 
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implies the solutions in the way the problems are put, instead of 
presenting results after striking a balance. While Hegel’s critique of 
analytical judgments is exacerbated to the thesis of their "falseness," 
everything is to him an analytical judgment, a turning to and fro of the 
thought without citation of anything extraneous to it. It is a moment of 
dialectics that the new is the old, and otherness is familiarity. (ND: 
64)
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As mediation is one of Hegel's key insights, Adorno tries to be more Hegelian 
than Hegel.  Absolute Idea finds its negation in material reality which is not itself 
conceptual – it is material.  That is, in what is extraneous to it.  In Adorno's 
understanding of dialectics, as soon as a position is reached it begins the 
dialectical process again.  For Adorno this is the first-order truth of dialectics.  
That Hegel worked within the abstract medium of pure thought — never properly 
grounding his dialectics — is a function of his own epistemological 
commitments.  Just like Kant, then, Adorno criticises Hegel for importing a pre-
critical element into his philosophy, the commitment to absolute objectively valid 
knowledge, and arranging dialectics around this commitment.  It is implied in 
Adorno's thought that such a commitment is itself an appropriate object of 
dialectical critique.  The result being that such objectively valid knowledge, 
cleaved off from the vicissitudes of the socio-historical world becomes false 
precisely because it is removed from its historical context.  Conversely the very 
idea of a complete and objectively valid system of knowledge tells us something 
true about the epoch within which such an idea was generated. 
 
Hegel's philosophy revolves around the recognition of the difference between 
concepts and the objects to which they refer — in terms of the particular and the 
universal.  However, determinate negation requires that this difference be 
rendered in a manner that can be conceptually sublated.  We have seen that for 
Hegel the concept is rational and its inner rationality is the self-condition for its 
own transformation.  This insight can be achieved through a priori metaphysics.  
As we have seen, Adorno will not grant Hegel the belief that such inquiry 
escapes the ambit of the socio-historical for what he considers are dialectical 
reasons.  Furthermore, and in the same fashion, he will not grant Hegel a 
conception of the concept as such, or any individual concept, ontological reality 
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or priority over and above the socio-historical realm.  The judgement then, is not 
a moment in the objective narrative of our individual conceptions coming to 
match the objective conception of reality — in virtue of which the difference 
between the subject and predicate can be sublated — the judgement is always a 
socio-historical moment where heterogeneous elements are brought together.  As 
we will see, this does not preclude truth, but it does require that truth is indexed 
to particular socio-historical moments.  This is precisely what Adorno does 
say.
132
 
 
If one grants Adorno his criticism of a priori metaphysics then we can see why 
Hegel's realism is transformed back into an absolute idealism ready for negation.  
Rather than representing reality as such, it represents one conception of it, 
indexed to a particular socio-historical moment, and that socio-historical moment 
can be brought to bear on the claims of the system for the concept.  Adorno 
judges history to have spoken against Hegel insofar as Hegel thought that it was 
the nature of reality to be rationally unified. Adorno is arguing that it was the 
nature of the Enlightenment that reality is unified in the way that we conceive it. 
Furthermore, Adorno argues, particularly in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, that 
the increase in the rationalization of society has led to its fragmentation and 
increasing irrationality. 
 
The irreducible heterogeneity of the elements of a judgement emerges, therefore 
as a key idea in Adorno's thought.  Once the concept and its articulation in 
predicates is ontologically separated from its subject matter, and given that 
material objects are socio-historically mediated, then it is necessary for the 
concept to change accordingly.  The dialectical transitions of the concept cease to 
maintain ontological priority over the contingencies of the socio-historical world 
but become part of the flux of that world.  Appropriately he makes this 
commitment explicit in his critique of Hegel: 
 
Hence the concept that remains true to its own meaning must change; if 
it is to follow its own conception, a philosophy that holds the concept 
to be something more than a mere instrument of the intellect must 
abandon definition, which might hinder it in doing so.  The movement 
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of the concept is not a sophistical manipulation that would insert 
changing meanings into it from the outside but rather the ever-present 
consciousness of both the identity of and the inevitable difference 
between the concept and what it is supposed to express, a 
consciousness that animates all genuine knowledge.  Because 
philosophy will not relinquish that identity, it must accept this 
difference. (HTT: 71) 
 
Adorno's point is that our conceptions of objects are our means of identifying 
objects and also, in their ontological difference to objects, are heterogeneous to 
objects.  As a result, inasmuch as a concept is to be referred, via the predicate, to 
the object, via the subject term, the concept cannot be reified in the form of a 
definition.  It must change as objects change socio-historically.  Understanding 
what this dialectics consists in and what about objects facilitates such a dialectic 
will be the subject of the final section. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Adorno's immanent critique of Hegel is undoubtedly controversial.  Considering 
the many interpretative possibilities open to us, and given that Adorno's 
immanent critique rests on just one, his own, his critique is not a 'knock-down' of 
Hegel's dialectics.  That said, Adorno's critique is at least tenable, and given a 
specific interpretation of the dialectic, not without serious force. 
 
Aside from scholarly issues, much of the force of Adorno's argument will rest on 
meta-philosophical considerations concerning the possibility and scope of 
metaphysical thinking.  I have argued that Adorno evidently takes Hegel 
seriously as a metaphysical thinker and even where he believes that this leads 
Hegel into 'untruths', there is a second-order truth to be gained from the untruth: 
even as Hegel's thought carries over into dogmatism, for Adorno, that dogmatism 
is indicative of a real social dogmatism.  He does not, therefore, wish to revive 
Hegel's dialectic, nor rescue it through defusing it as a non-metaphysical 
program.   
 
Nevertheless, philosophically, Adorno does not accept a purely a priori, 
metaphysical mode of thinking.  Inasmuch as Hegel is committed to such 
thinking and inasmuch as such thinking plays a constitutive role in his dialectics, 
172 
 
Adorno seeks to use a particular mode of dialectics in order to destabilize the 
metaphysical results.  What in Hegel impresses Adorno the most is that it 
provides the resources for thinking historically, and for thinking in terms of 
mediation: that however an object is presented, either discursively within the 
medium of a judgement, or even empirically in perception, it is Adorno's 
philosophical experience that the positivity of the judgement or the givenness of 
the appearance turns out to belie a complexity which requires dialectical thinking 
to negotiate. 
 
Even if Adorno is right about Hegel, which is controversial, Rosen points out a 
serious problem for Adorno.  If Adorno wishes to be a dialectical thinker, but he 
refuses to acknowledge the possibility of the subject and predicate sublating each 
other according to their heterogeneity — indicating a genuine heterogeneity 
between the determinations of mind and the ontological determinations of reality 
— how does he suggest that the dialectic advances itself?  This is particularly 
critical, if, as I have just suggested, Adorno still considers dialectics as an 
appropriate critical orientation to the philosophical problems we face.  The final 
section is concerned with making sense of Adorno's dialectics, how it works and, 
as a result, providing a tenable response to Rosen. 
 
 
*** 
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7. Negative Dialectics and Concepts 
 
 
The previous two sections have reconstructed key aspects of Adorno's immanent 
critiques of Kant's and Hegel's philosophies.  We have seen how, given Adorno's 
understanding of these philosophies, he thinks that they generate internal 
contradictions and inconsistencies — for example, the requirement of 
dependence and independence of transcendental and empirical subjectivity in 
Kant; the aporia of absolutes in Hegel's dialectics.  The question is then, how are 
these critiques helping us to understand Adorno's philosophy as opposed to 
simply being localised critiques of two other thinkers?   
 
The answer to this is to highlight a function of immanent critique and dialectical 
thought.  Whilst Adorno does not think that the generation of negativity within 
any position can be sublated into an outright positive, as we have seen, he does 
still think that the understanding of the relation of the negative and positive itself 
leads us to a higher level of critical understanding.  That is, if we can at least see 
what the contradictions are and how they are generated then we gain conceptual, 
critical resources for reflecting on thinking itself and upon the complex character 
of phenomena which we think about. 
 
Throughout these two sections a constellation of three ideas has emerged.  They 
each capture some idea which Adorno believes seems important to be aware of 
when we think philosophically, criticise other philosophies and also, as much as 
possible, in our daily interactions with our environment broadly construed.  They 
are: the conceptless [Begriffslose], nonidentity [nichtidentität], and mediation 
[Vermittlung].  Each of these ideas has emerged as a critical concern from 
Adorno's interaction with Kant and Hegel and it will be the concern of the final 
section of this thesis to make sense of these notions and show how they operate 
within Adorno's thinking. 
 
7.1 The Conceptless 
 
The central concern in Adorno's critique of determinate negation is the way that 
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objects are identified in judgements.  Adorno's criticism, as we have seen, is that 
Hegel's rendering of the particular fails to maintain the difference between the 
conceptual and the irreducible, unique particularity of that which is not-
conceptual – the material object. The particularity is conceptually determined in 
such a way that its particularity can be conceptually negated without remainder.  
This rather odd notion — 'without remainder' — will be considered fully in the 
next section; however, the idea is that there is no way that the particular is, which 
cannot be rendered conceptually through universals according to essence such 
that the particular is thoroughly conceptually transparent in judgement.  Indeed, 
as we saw, Hegel thinks it is mistake to think of particularity as such — the way 
that the particular is, is universal. 
 
In regards to Kant, despite the importance of epistemic and metaphysical 
restraint, Adorno diagnoses an epistemic immodesty: the aim is still to give an 
account of the systematic sufficiency of our conceptual determinations of 
objective phenomena.  Again the ontological difference between concepts and 
their nonconceptual referents — literally objects in their materiality, their 
conceptlessness — is circumvented. 
 
In Adorno's critiques of both Kant and Hegel, he thinks that the attempts to 
overcome the conceptlessness of the world, in their different ways, fall into 
contradictions.  Whilst very few doubt that there is some ontological or 
categorical difference between mind and world, Adorno is observing a 
philosophical compulsion based on an epistemic ambition that we should be able 
to overcome this difference. Furthermore, the attempt to overcome this difference 
results in a loss of contact with and interest in the world.  Not only does Adorno 
worry about this epistemic goal, he argues that philosophy, in order to lay claim 
to substantial insight, it must engage with that which is conceptless whilst 
respecting its categorical difference.  In the following section, this notion will be 
explored through the interpretations of other commentators on Adorno, and my 
own position will be developed. 
 
 
 
175 
 
7.2 Nonidentity 
 
Nonidentity is already implicit in the philosophical issues highlighted in the 
notion of conceptless.  It is in this sense that these concepts are a part of a 
constellation – they overlap and aid in the mutual understanding of each other.  
Insofar as Adorno is emphasising that which is conceptless as the appropriate 
object of philosophy, he is emphasising a category of objects which is different, 
not identical, with the mind.  Attention on that which is different, as long as this 
difference is maintained and respected, offers us an objective aim of enquiry and 
an immanent limit on our enquiries.  It is in this way that Adorno thinks that we 
can maintain the notion of objectively valid knowledge, a basis for critical self-
reflection, and a sense of epistemic humility.   
 
In Adorno’s interpretation of Kant, the latter could be considered a thinker of 
nonidentity.  Although we have seen this interpretation as largely critical, insofar 
as Kant’s philosophy has an element of nonidentity, it has much to recommend it.  
Adorno praises Kant for what he notes is a ‘highly developed sense of 
ontological difference’: that mind and world are different and belong to different 
ontological categories.  As such, there is a limit or block in Kant’s account of 
cognition and knowledge which results from this nonidentity.  Where Kant erred 
is in reifying the non-identical elements in transcendental idealism such that 
knowledge consists in a sufficient account of discursively mediated reality.  
Furthermore, the reification of the conceptless, which is effectively the noumena 
in Kant, does not lead to greater control over the world – an Enlightenment aim 
which Adorno’s isolates.  Rather, it solidifies reality as an alien otherness entirely 
beyond our control – hence Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument in the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment that the Enlightenment used conceptual control over the world 
to lift itself out of myth and uncertainty and in so doing entrenched the conditions 
for a new mythological relationship to the world, albeit suppressed under the 
narrative of science and rationality.  Adorno’s overarching criticism is that the 
non-identical elements need to be set back in motion such that mind and world 
may be genuinely responsive to each other. 
 
For Hegel, nonidentity is an explicit notion and undoubtedly grounds Adorno’s 
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use of it.  Like Kant, Hegel considered experience and showed in the 
Phenomenology that the difference between mind and world, if not properly 
reflected upon, produces unstable epistemology and metaphysics.  Hence Hegel 
also notes the nonidentity of mind and world is a key issue which has to be 
negotiated. 
 
One important way that this issue of nonidentity is considered is through 
judgement. We saw that in Hegel's theory, subject and predicate particles are 
considered as non-identical elements.  Obviously the predicate, as a linguistic 
particle, is not going to be materially identical to that about the object which it 
refers.  The more interesting point is that due to the extensional difference 
between the particular and the general, Hegel believed that the identity stated in 
an immediate proposition does not obtain.  Nonidentity becomes a constitutive 
issue in our thinking about the world. 
 
We also saw how Adorno argues that, in virtue of the conceptlessness of material 
particulars, Hegel is wrong to think that nonidentity can be sublated.  This is a 
radical departure from Hegelian metaphysics and entails a serious undermining of 
Hegel's epistemology.  A direct consequence of Adorno's critique on identity in 
Hegel's judgements is that nonidentity persists rather than being sublated.  
However, due to the conceptlessness of particulars and the limits it presents to 
conceptual determination, nonidentity cannot simply obtain between linguistic 
particles as they refer to objects.  Nonidentity persists within judgements and 
between judgements and the material world they are intended to represent. 
 
Nonidentity is, therefore, subtlely different from its form in Hegelian dialectics.  
There it denotes the problems of difference pertaining to the abstract and the 
concrete in Hegel's thinking.  Adorno argues that nonidentity persists in 
judgement for two reasons: firstly, because in order for the particularity of 
objects to be thoroughly sublated in dialectical judgement, the particular must be 
considered conceptually.  The problem is that this eradicates that about the 
particular which is non-identical.  As a result, the sublation is properly speaking, 
only an idealist, identity-thinking operation — it does not properly orientate itself 
towards the objective particularity of the thing judged.  Secondly, and this will be 
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explored fully in the final section, the object is such that there are ways that it is 
non-identical with itself.  In virtue of the irreducible nonidentity of the object to 
itself, this nonidentity must be preserved in the way we judge and determine 
objects 
 
7.3 Mediation 
 
Mediation is the third concept in the constellation, which informs Adorno’s 
thinking.  Furthermore, it is concept developed directly out of Hegelian 
dialectics.  Mediation is best understood in dialectical philosophy as a modal 
notion.  The idea is that the very instantiation of an object, or even a category or 
concept, entails that the entity in question is transformed – it is mediated as a 
result of its instantiation.  We have already seen this idea at work in Hegel’s 
theory of judgements.  Universals are mediated by their instantiation in 
particulars; particulars are mediated through their instantiating universals.  
Mediation points us to the idea that the way things are is neither pure, discrete 
nor simple: dialectical ontology suggests that entities interpenetrate each other as 
a consequence of their very instantiation.   
 
I argued that Adorno's deepest critique of Hegel and his development of the 
categories in the Logic, is that the complex microstructure of the Logic and its 
dynamic movement belies a fundamental stasis.  That is, Hegel believes that he 
can begin from a position which is pure and presuppositionless; in other words, 
Hegel believes that he can begin from a point that is not mediated.  This very first 
move then results in a structure which is at once deeply dynamic, dialectical, and 
also, in the final reckoning analytic for Adorno.  It is a philosophy that 
suppresses its socio-historical mediation.   
 
Adorno is deeply impressed by Hegel's dialectics as found in the Logic and the 
Phenomenlogy.  However, he applies Hegel's own logic of mediation to the 
starting point as such.  He agrees with Hegel that being is always mediated 
through the particular.  However, he also uses the notion to criticise Hegel  
arguing that even starting points are mediated.  Being as such, even prior to its 
dialectical negation by nothingness is already a mediated conceptual notion.  
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Undermining the 'start' of Hegel's Logic is indicative of Adorno’s rejection of an 
Enlightenment dialectics.  He can accept dialectical change but the structure of 
progressive Geist as Hegel understood it, is at least beyond our knowing. 
 
7.4 Negative Dialectics 
 
The dialectical and critical transformation of Kant and Hegel's categories into the 
forms elucidated above play a constitutive role in the Adorno's negative 
dialectics.  Indeed, they form a constellation of critical ideas which do not 
aggregate to form a new position or method but rather help to orientate our 
philosophical activity.  Giving a proper account then of these categories and 
understanding their critical import for epistemology and metaphysics amounts to 
understanding Adorno's dialectics and what negativity consists in for him and 
how he understands judgement.  Giving such an account will be the subject of the 
next section. 
 
The aim of Adorno's philosophy is not philosophy as such.  This may sound 
strange but it is to emphasise that what is important is not philosophy itself, it is 
not to be a good philosopher, or to have the 'right' system.  Rather, our 
philosophy is as good as it helps us to be the sort of people who would never 
commit the atrocities of Auschwitz again.  Philosophy is valuable and valid 
insofar as it helps us to understand the world and our relationship to it better; 
such that when we engage with it, discursively, we can do so in an ethical 
manner.   
 
To reflect this critical priority, my account of Adorno's philosophy is not 
orientated towards giving a philosophical system or position.  To do so would 
require distorting Adorno's thinking and would require us to deviate from the 
motivation for philosophy.  My account is to elucidate what his commitments 
are.  The difference between these two enterprises can be understood through a 
consideration of Brian O'Connor's thesis that Adorno was a transcendental 
philosopher.  That is, that Adorno's philosophy gives us a philosophy by which 
we can gain the necessary conditions for genuine experience and demonstrates 
other models of experience to result in incoherency (O'Connor, 15).  As 
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O'Connor puts it: 
 
Adorno sees it as his task to establish a form of philosophy that through 
a metacritique of epistemology will be capable of rescuing the idea of 
experience from a range of basic philosophical assumptions to be 
found throughout a range of positions within modern philosophy. 
(O'Connor, 2004: 3) 
 
In so doing, Adorno will form "a synthetic philosophical position": "a negative 
dialectic" (O'Connor, 2004: 43).   
 
There is much in O’Connor’s account of Adorno that is persuasive and we are in 
agreement over the basics of nonidentity and identity-thinking, for example.  
Furthermore, his theory that Adorno is a transcendental philosopher, whilst 
surprising, is not implausible.  Nevertheless, it should be noted, that this 
contention is at odds with Adorno’s own view of his philosophy and seems 
incompatible with aspects of his thinking. 
  
Adorno argues, explicitly, that this is not what negative dialectics is: 
 
Once dialectics has become inescapable, however, it cannot stick to its 
principle like ontology and transcendental philosophy.  It cannot be 
maintained as a structure that will stay basic no matter how it is 
modified.  In criticizing ontology we do not aim at another ontology, 
not even at one of being nonontological. (ND: 136) 
 
This is a point of mediation: negative dialectics is also mediated.  We cannot 
separate off negative dialectics from its subject matter.  Adorno’s claim for the 
mediation of dialectics seems hard to align with O'Connor's claim for two 
reasons: firstly, O'Connor commits Adorno, via negative dialectic (singular), to a 
determinate philosophical position; Adorno argues that negative dialectics is not 
reducible to a philosophical position and explicitly argues against any form of 
'prima philosophia'.
133
  Secondly, Adorno explicitly takes transcendental 
philosophy to be involved in producing such a determinate position.  By contrast 
Adorno's negative dialectics (plural) is a critical activity which is reformed 
                                                 
133
 "The metacritical turn against the prima philosophia is at the same time a turn against the 
finiteness of a philosophy that prates about infinity without respecting it." (ND: 14)  It seems hard 
to think that a philosopher has no theoretical principles and if this is O'Connor's claim it is 
minimal, possibly to the point of triviality.  
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according to its material.  Whatever dialectical findings we make at one time may 
not be valid for another; therefore the shape or structure of dialectics may also 
change.
134
  Dialectics does not adopt a standpoint (ND: 6) even towards itself.
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Despite Adorno's own claims for dialectics, we may interpret claims such as 
"Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity" (ND: 5) transcendentally.  
However, treating this claim in that way runs against the grain of what has been 
developing in Adorno's analyses: that we begin with the objects and critically 
examine them in an almost experimental fashion.  We assume as little as 
possible.  We proceed with an awareness of nonidentity but no ready-made 
theory of nonidentity.  It may be that this is all O'Connor has in mind; then it 
seems more appropriate, given Adorno's own concerns about epistemic humility 
and theoretical openness, to consider his analysis in their commitments rather 
than as a position.  In that way we are less likely to reify Adorno's dynamic, 
materialist mode of enquiry into an abstract, ahistorical set of principles or 
conditions. 
 
In the next section, I develop this constellation.  Through the discussion of 
textual evidence and also through the provision of an extended example, I intend 
to highlight many of the complex metaphysical commitments which underpin 
Adorno’s thinking.  Again, this does not commit him to a system of thought or to 
a system of a priori ontology.  It does, however, suggest that he is engaged with 
the fundamentals of traditional philosophy and has interesting, compelling and 
relevant insights to offer. 
 
*** 
 
                                                 
134
 See Menke, 1998: 209. 
135
 See Jarvis' excellent analysis of Adorno's materialism as a move against transcendental 
argument and method, chpt. 6. 
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Section Three 
 
 
 
The Recovery of Negativity
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Introduction 
 
 
 
The culmination of Adorno's critique of Kant and Hegel resulted in the 
production of a constellation of concepts.  These concepts evolved out of the 
immanent critique of Kant and Hegel's epistemological and metaphysical 
positions.  They indicate key ideas and commitments which inform Adorno's own 
negative dialectics.  This final section will explore these concepts. 
 
The first chapter will consider the notion of the conceptless.  This notion is 
particularly important because Adorno highlights it repeatedly throughout his 
writings as the proper object of philosophy.  Furthermore, the interpretation of 
this concept offered here is different to the understanding of much of Adorno 
scholarship.  I argue that Adorno is concerned with an ontological or categorical 
difference between that which are concepts and that which are not concepts, i.e., 
the world.  This concept is usually rendered in Adorno scholarship as 
nonconceptual where it designates some form of nonconceptual content in 
experience.  Whilst the nonconceptual interpretation is certainly tenable, I will 
argue that my interpretation has textual support and is able to offer a greater 
fidelity to Adorno's deepest philosophical commitments. 
 
Adorno's theory of nonidentity will then be considered and will be shown to be 
intimately linked to the issue of conceptlessness.  The conceptless indicates the 
central philosophical issue — put in other familiar terms it is a difference 
between mind and world — and indicates a priority for Adorno.  Whilst mind is 
undeniably the medium of our experience and cannot help but have subjective 
priority, this should not suppress the fact that the mind is dependent on the world 
and we should be mindful of that priority.  That is, we become aware of the 
particular discrepancies between the determinations mind makes of the world and 
the way the world actually is — these particular discrepancies are the concerns of 
nonidentity.  Nonidentity emphasises the awareness of the conceptless in its 
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categorical difference to mind; but specifically, it is a critical awareness of the 
particular ways in which conceptual determinations of the conceptless contain 
aporias and tensions.  Analysis of these tensions helps us to orientate our thinking 
back towards objects rather than being merely satisfied by their nonidentical 
determinations in mind. 
 
Nonidentity is best analysed through a particular example as the specifics of any 
nonidentity are determined by the different objects in question.  I will consider an 
aesthetic case of nonidentity.  This is especially appropriate as aesthetic 
nonidentity is an issue which motivated Adorno's thinking and because issues of 
nonidentity are endemic to artworks.  That is, Adorno argues that issues of 
nonidentity have a constitutive role in the ontology of artworks. 
 
Through the analysis of artworks, I will develop Adorno's theory of mediation.  It 
becomes apparent when we consider artworks that nonidentity obtains not merely 
between the world and our determinations of it but that nonidentity actually 
occurs within objects themselves.  That is, there are ways that objects are such 
that they are not-identical with themselves.  Adorno's understanding is that 
identity is fluid, dynamic and involves heterogeneous elements.  Mediation is a 
modal notion which, in the case of artworks, says that the way these objects are, 
their identity as artworks, is mediated through heterogeneous socio-historical 
phenomena.  Critical analysis of nonidentity leads us to understand the modality 
of artworks through their mediations.  We find that this analysis provides us with 
the material for the persistence of dialectics without determinate negation.  
Hence, we answer Rosen's worry that Adorno's dialectics lacks 'motor force' 
without reaching towards a notion of the nonconceptual in experience. 
 
Finally, I will draw these notions together to show how they constitute a negative 
dialectics.  In the first two sections, I have analysed Adorno's critique of Kant 
and Hegel.  However, to equate critique with rejection would be to mistake 
Adorno's intention.  Adorno does reject both thinkers — in one sense — and yet 
in another sense his thought is a sublation of their philosophies: the critiques he 
performs on Kant and Hegel are dialectical and result in the familiar mode of 
both cancelling their thought whilst preserving them.  I will argue that this 
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cancelling and preserving is actually achieved through the mutual critique of both 
thinkers.  Adorno uses resources in each thinker — as he thinks that both thinkers 
have achieved genuine insight into our thinking about the world — to counter-
critique the other and through that mutual critique Adorno is able to generate his 
negative dialectics.  In so doing, Adorno recovers 'the negative' from each 
thinker.  Consequently, Adorno's critique of the judgements is a critique of the 
imposition of positive determinations onto the world; for him, dialectical judging 
involves a deep epistemic commitment to open-ended, fluid, sensitive and 
receptive thinking. 
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8. Conceptlessness and Non-conceptual 
 
 
Adorno argues that the conceptless is the proper focus of philosophical analysis.  
According to him, Kant and Hegel acknowledge the concern of conceptlessness 
but, for different reasons, fail to do justice to these concerns.  Rather, they 
attempt to overcome the problem.  Here the concept of the conceptless will be 
analysed. Two possible interpretations — both derived from Foster — will then 
be considered which highlight the importance of this notion.  These two 
interpretations will be called 'the unsayability thesis' and the 'ineffability' thesis.  
However, neither provides a satisfactory account of conceptlessness.  Instead a 
theory of conceptlessness will be proposed which emphasises the metaphysical 
commitments of the notion.  Conceptlessness is primarily a way of emphasising 
the ontological difference between language and the objects language represents.  
Through this emphasis we are brought to consider the metaphysics of objects — 
referents of language — on the one hand, and the status of our linguistic 
determinations, as they represent the world, on the other.  
 
8.1 Conceptlessness and its problems 
There appears to be two facets to this notion: 'conceptless' [Begriffslose] refers to 
what might appear to be a trivial difference between concepts as such and their 
material referents which are conceptless, i.e., not conceptual.
136
 As we will see, 
Adorno's point is that this difference is neither trivial nor can it be overcome.  In 
the second instance, and more controversially, the conceptlessness of the world 
indicates that the world is, in its difference to linguistic entities, in some way, 
beyond semantic representation.  As we will see, in its specifics this will become 
an issue of nonidentity.   
 
Unless one is committed to strong idealism or a reductive physicalism on the 
other pole, the first claim seems trivially true.  The problem is the second claim 
                                                 
136
 I use the term material here to emphasise Adorno's materialism.  In this context, materialism is 
not a reductive metaphysical position but simply serves to indicate the difference between the 
world and concepts.  See ND: 196 - 7, 365. 
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which raises issues.  On first glance there is no reason to think that because of an 
ontological difference between language and the world it represents, concepts 
cannot sufficiently represent the world: if the idea is that the second claim is 
entailed by the first, this is already a weak sounding thesis.  Second, making any 
claim about the conceptless, if the conceptless is that which is 'unsayable', talking 
about it seems to involve a performative contradiction. 
 
Nevertheless, Adorno states that philosophy should be orientated towards the 
conceptless: 
   
The distinction I would make is to say that the interest of philosophy 
can be found to lie at the precise point where [Hegel] and the entire 
philosophical tradition have no interest, namely, in the non-conceptual 
[italics in original]. (LoND: 68) 
 
Given initial concerns about the notion of conceptlessness, Adorno must give an 
account of the conceptless which allays the concerns of triviality, non sequitur or 
unintelligibility.  The most obvious way is to understand the conceptless as 
involving some sort of commitment to non-conceptual content.
137
  That is, there 
is some form or 'part' of experience which is either not rendered conceptually or 
is prior to conceptual rendering.  However, neither of these claims regarding non-
conceptual content is available to Adorno because he is a conceptualist in his 
theory of perception:  "Because entity is not immediate, because it is only 
through the concept, we should begin with the concept, not with the mere 
datum." (ND: 153).
138
  In line with his understanding of Hegel, Adorno therefore 
                                                 
137
 See O'Connor, 2004a: 37.  O'Connor argues in favour of non-conceptual content in experience 
rather than a metaphysical claim about non-conceptual entities as such.  He takes the latter thesis 
to equate to a commitment to a thing-in-itself.  As we will see, ontological difference does not 
commit us to a Kantian position of the thing-in-itself which he rightly points out Adorno 
criticises. 
138
 O'Connor (2004b: 61 & 172) equates conceptualism with idealism and says that if you are 
committed to the former then this precludes the nonidentity of the material entity.  I do not think 
that this follows.  Concepts may be the medium of experience but this does not mean that 
conceptual experience is incapable of critically engaging with the non-conceptual, material 
objects of experience to show that our conceptual determinations of those objects fall short in 
some way.  This can all be achieved conceptually and this is what Adorno argues.  This is a point 
made by Nagel also, 1986: 103.  See also Hammer, 2008: 69. 
As Adorno himself states, the problem of concepts is not that they are concepts and that material 
world is conceptless, it is that the concept denies change in what it determines.  This will be 
developed in the next chapter on nonidentity.  However, it is important to note it here.  Awareness 
of the former helps orientate us towards a critical sensitivity to the latter.  As the conceptless 
changes it produces the critical difference with its concept to be analysed as a moment of 
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seems opposed to either notion of non-conceptual content.  Yet a commentator 
such as O'Connor would worry that this precludes the possibility of a 
'conceptlessness' — or at least one which is knowable or intelligible. 
 
The problem is further exacerbated because, despite the importance of the 
'conceptless', he gives very little analysis of the concept.  Indeed, he explicitly 
argues that reifying the conceptless into the 'non-conceptual' misses what is 
essential to the notion: "The ontological difference is removed by virtue of the 
conceptualization of what is non-conceptual into non-conceptuality." (ND: 
123)
139
  Hence, I suggest a more literal translation of begriffslos than non-
conceptual — with its analytic connotations of non-conceptual content in 
experience — and use the term 'conceptless'.140  Furthermore, instead of 
conceptual analysis, and in keeping with his constellatory technique, he explores 
the concept through its relations with other concepts — in particular, nonidentity 
and mediation. 
 
I now turn to Roger Foster's interpretation of Adorno.  What is interesting is that 
he deals with conceptlessness indirectly: he examines the notion of unsayability 
[unsagbare], which amounts to a possible interpretation of conceptlessness. 
However, we will see that Foster's interpretation does not properly allay initial 
concerns and in fact introduces new problems. 
 
 
8.2 Conceptlessness, Unsayability and Identity 
 
One interpretation of Adorno's theory of conceptlessness can be derived through 
analysis of another notion, the unsayable [das Unsagbare].
141
 Whilst Foster 
focuses on this concept, I suggest that this concept does the same philosophical 
work as conceptlessness.
142
  In this section, I will develop two related 
                                                                                                                                    
nonidentity.  "The concept's immanent claim is its order-creating invariance as against the change 
in what it covers.  The form of the concept - "false" in this respect also - would deny that change." 
(ND: 153)  Nonconceptual experience, as such, is not required for this critical engagement nor 
does it block the slide from materialism into idealism as there is no such slide. 
139
 See also, AE: 111 & 140. 
140
 I alter translated quotations accordingly from 'non-conceptual' to 'conceptlessness'. 
141
 Here I use Foster's translation; others have used 'unutterable' and 'unnamable'. 
142
 It is worth noting that begriffslos is employed with far greater frequency than the relatively 
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interpretations from Foster's work — the 'unsayability thesis' and the 'ineffability 
thesis' — which I take to be consistent with other interpretative work conducted 
on Adorno.  I argue that Foster's analysis is valuable but that he makes a critical 
mistake: he argues, erroneously, that Adorno is committed to the idea that talking 
about the conceptless or the unsayable leads to a failure of language and 
ultimately to some form of linguistic scepticism: that our linguistic articulations 
about the world fail not only to accurately represent the world but fail to refer to 
the world. 
 
Foster criticises the view, propagated even by thinkers within the Frankfurt 
School such as Habermas and Wellmer that Adorno's negative dialectics amounts 
to a collapsing of a particular conception of rationality which it itself utilizes — 
that Adorno holds antiquated views of language and logic which led him to an 
hysterical, self-defeating philosophy.
143
  Foster, along with other writers such as 
Coles, Cook and Bernstein, point out that Habermas misunderstands Adorno's 
critique of rationality and the limits of language.
144
  Far from being naïve, 
Adorno's critique of rationality is so constructed because he perceived problems 
within the Analytic programme — not because he didn't understand it. 
 
What Adorno is concerned with, Foster rightly argues, is critical reflection on the 
articulation of experience in language and the implications of this reflection for 
our understanding of the world and our relationship to it (Foster, 2007: 33).  
Adorno's target is the role of identity-thinking in experience and our thinking 
about it — this was discussed at length in the critique of Kant, see Chapter Two 
and Three.  He is concerned with the role of identification in language as it 
obtains between our propositions and our concepts and the material entities in the 
world which such judgements putatively identify.  As we have already seen: 
 
Identity is the primal form of ideology. We relish it as adequacy to the 
thing it suppresses … After the unspeakable effort it must have cost 
our species to produce the primacy of identity even against itself, man 
rejoices and basks in his conquest by turning it into the definition of the 
                                                                                                                                    
scarce term, Unsagbare. 
143
 See Habermas, 1984: 144 - 5, 384 - 7 & 2003: 283.  Wellmer, 1991: 71 - 4. 
144
 See Coles, 1995: 28 - 31 - with whom I agree in his interpretation of conceptlessness and 
nonidentity; Cook, 2004: §3 & Bernstein, 2001: §2. 
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conquered thing: what has happened to it must be presented, by the 
thing, as its "in-itself." (ND: 148) 
 
Adorno's position revolves around the following key ideas: identity not only 
constitutes a relation between utterances and referents, it comes to constitute the 
referent.  This constitution is represented in the form of the definition where 
definition seems to be propositional such that the definition becomes the 'thing 
in-itself'.  We have seen this worry, in different forms in Adorno's critique of 
Kant and Hegel. 
 
Foster's gloss on Adorno's move away from identity-thinking is useful: 
 
[W]orking against [the] abstraction [involved in general cognition 
which ignores the uniqueness of particulars, theory] must take the form 
of re-creating, reweaving the webs of significance that link elements to 
one another as they figure in subjectively saturated experience. Adorno 
describes this interpretive practice in terms of a "force field." Rather 
than constituting the experiential item as a discrete and repeatable 
exemplar, the subject makes interpretive connections between the 
experiential item and all the elements surrounding it in its historical 
context, "attracting" those elements toward it by demonstrating how the 
positioning of those elements illuminates the intrinsic features of this 
experiential item. (Foster, 2007: 17 - 8) 
 
So, what Adorno objects to is the truncation of experience within identity-
thinking. Negative dialectics, rather than legislating against reason or logic — or 
even identity — simply allows us to reflect on the world and our relationship to it 
in a more fruitful manner.  This seems in line with my contention Chapter Two 
that the quantitative and qualitative interpretations of identity-thinking are not our 
only options. 
 
Adorno's idea is that the subject term, a name of an object, and whatever 
predications are true of it, may well be valid ways to talk about an object.  Our 
predicates may articulate valid conceptual distinctions about an object.  However, 
we should not, from there, think that our predicates articulate the way an object is 
from an ontological point of view.  We will see that Adorno's immanent critiques 
of objects, whilst not ontology as such, suggest that the ontology of objects are 
complex in a way which is often overlooked in identity-thinking modes of 
reference.  It is on this basis that I suggest that Adorno has important 
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metaphysical commitments.  For the identity thinker, the object just is how we 
validly talk about it and it is on this basis that our talk about and identifications of 
objects are adequate to them.  It is in this sense that, for Adorno, our articulations 
about objects are inadequate to objects.  Moreover, if we take it that all our 
definite descriptions, articulated in predicates, are adequate to picking out the 
object in its particularity, we misunderstand objects and we falsely equate the 
particular object with our linguistic representations of it.  
 
Yet Adorno's position simply appears false: we successfully identify, using 
indexical, demonstrative judgements — which employ naming or identifying 
concepts — specific empirical objects such as tables, chairs and the like all the 
time.  Furthermore, Adorno's position seems to suggest that objects have 
properties which lie beyond the possibility of linguistic articulation.  Even if this 
is the case, how is this a knowable fact about objects?   
 
We may also wonder whether Adorno is guilty of an error which Frege was 
attempting to eradicate.  Is Adorno running together the idea of an object (which 
is the subjective representation of the object) with its objective determination in a 
proposition? Propositions are not intended to capture our subjective ideas of 
objects, as we represent them to ourselves; propositions are intended to render 
objective states of affairs which are linguistically transparent.
145
  This worry is 
not as strong as it might appear.  Whilst Adorno does not have as clear a 
distinction between the proposition and the idea of an object as Frege does, 
Adorno's argument does not rest on this distinction.  What he is bringing into 
question is our ability to articulate supposedly objective states of affairs in 
judgements.  In effect he is therefore drawing into question the notion that 
propositions can make objectively valid claims in the way that Frege thought they 
could. 
 
As much as Foster correctly builds a case for the importance of identity-thinking, 
his analysis of conceptlessness exacerbates the preliminary concerns one may 
have about how we fail to identify objects.  Foster interprets Adorno's critique of 
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identity-thinking as leading to a radical and substantial 'unsayability thesis'.  I 
suggest we understand this unsayability thesis as amounting to Foster's 
understanding of conceptlessness in Adorno's philosophy.  In turn the 
unsayability thesis opens up a second possible interpretation, the 'ineffability 
thesis'.  Here I simply state my own interpretation so that we can contrast it with 
Foster's — I shall not discuss it in detail until later on: 
 
(1) The Unsayability Thesis — the metaphysical doctrine that there are 
parts of the world — properties or, more generally, entities — that lie 
beyond linguistic articulation. 
 
(2) The Ineffability Thesis — Foster does not propose this thesis but I 
propose it as the strong claim, which may have to be faced if one follows 
Foster as far as Unsayability.  The world 'appears to us' as unrepresentable 
in language.  Experience of the world is founded in pre-conceptual 
experience; we approximate (unsuccessfully) this experience in language. 
 
(3) The Ontological Difference Thesis — My thesis, which opposes the 
direction of (1) and (2), takes conceptlessness to consist only in the 
awareness of ontological, or categorical, difference between our concepts 
and that which is conceptless — i.e., literally that which is not itself 
conceptual, the material world.  I shall avoid the initial concern of triviality 
by showing, through nonidentity, that appreciation of the ontological 
difference between the world and its linguistic representations leads us to a 
non-trivial rethinking of our theory of objects. 
 
The first two theses will be considered and, through their rejection, my own 
interpretation will be offered alongside a development of Adorno's theory of 
nonidentity and mediation.  Textual evidence for Unsayability will be considered 
which will demonstrate problems with Foster's interpretation.  I will then show 
how my interpretation better explains such evidence and other textual evidence 
brought to bear. 
 
The 'unsayability' thesis is captured in the following quotation: 
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The "more" that Adorno refers to … is the excess of what calls for 
expression over what is sayable.  To become aware of that "more" in 
using a concept, Adorno wants to say, is to be aware of the distance 
that separates our experience from the experience prefigured in the 
longing that animates thinking.  By experiencing the failure of our 
concepts in this way, we can measure the distance between current 
experience and a nonreduced experience. And the process of measuring 
that distance would be equivalent to raising suffering into the concept. 
(Foster 2007: 30) 
 
Foster is arguing that experience of the physical world, as it is constructed 
through our propositional judgements, truncates the richness of experience: there 
is both 'more' to the objects of our experience and to our experience than is 
presented in our propositional articulations.   
 
The problem is that Foster does not give an explicit account of how concepts and 
the world fail to match up. Rather, he moves straight to the idea that Adorno is 
committed to some sort unsayability and tries to give an account of that.  
Unfortunately his account of unsayability appears to undercut the resources 
required to give an account of the 'more' which instigated the problem.  He argues 
that whilst the unsayable cannot be grasped conceptually, the failure of our 
conceptual articulation of the world will act as a guide for what is missing in this 
conceptual articulation.  So we can somehow 'measure' the distance between 
inarticulable experience and articulated experience through that which can be 
said but which fails to say what it attempts to say.  I am not sure that this makes 
any sense.  
 
This worry appears in other commentators such as O'Connor's borrowing of 
Strawson's phrase that objects are 'weighty' (O'Connor, 2004: 57) and that  
 
to recognize the nonconceptual dimension of objects as we experience 
them is to recognize their inﬂuence on our epistemic activities. The 
relational quality of experience is the attempt of conceptuality to map 
out the nonconceptual, an attempt that involves the assumption that our 
conceptuality is limited by the experience of the nonconceptual. 
(O'Connor, 2004: 56) 
 
O'Connor does not develop his account of the nonconceptual here.  Objects are 
'weighty' and have a non-conceptual dimension in experience which limits the 
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conceptual within experience; we can recognize and 'map' their nonconceptual 
influence on our epistemic activities.  Again, the claim seems improbable, is 
difficult to grasp and seems to undermine our critical purchase on the world, not 
enhance it.   
 
In addition to worries about the sense and utility of the Unsayability thesis and its 
associates, there is the worry of the derivative, ineffability thesis.  Neither Foster 
nor O'Connor proposes this.  Yet it is worth including here as there is logical 
space for such a notion.  The thesis of nonconceptual experience may lead to 
such a possibility.  This slide would be problematic insofar as Adorno explicitly 
argues against such ineffability.
146
 
 
Foster's unsayability thesis proposes that there is a 'more' to the material world 
which is experienced but inarticulable.  'More' suggests a part or aspect of the 
world.  The problem is, how much does this 'more' account for?  Conversely, 
what part or portion of the world do we properly render in our judgements — and 
how 'much' of the world does this account for?  Foster does not seem to offer a 
thorough analysis of this 'more' and seems, without further argument, in danger 
of succumbing to the response to the quantitative and qualitative interpretations 
of identity-thinking — that there are always more propositions which could be 
true of objects and/or there are always more fine-grained distinctions to be made 
about objects.  In Chapter Two neither of these positions appeared particularly 
promising. 
 
Furthermore, it appears that if we follow Foster as far as an Unsayability Thesis, 
he loses the resources to argue against the notion that the world is entirely 
ineffable — completely beyond linguistic representation and articulation.  What 
we are left with is a world given to us in pre-linguistic experience, thoroughly 
non-conceptual, leaving language to spin without friction or purchase on the 
world.  A model of experience and cognition which takes experience to be 
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immediate and cognition as thoroughly inadequate to that experience is 
consistently rejected by Adorno.  As I have mentioned, Adorno is a conceptualist 
and rejects 'immediate', non-conceptual experience (ND: 153) and flatly criticizes 
any view which divorces our cognitive capabilities from their subject matter as 
lapsing into another form of abstraction — 'that which cannot be cognized' (ND: 
110). 
 
That Foster does not give a satisfactory account of conceptlessness may be 
considered reasonable because conceptlessness cannot be given a conceptual 
account.  Yet, given Adorno's philosophical commitment to critical praxis, there 
is a worry here that dogmatism creeps back into our epistemic practices, albeit in 
a negative form: there is a way the world is but we cannot talk, or even think — 
discursively — about it; however, we must in some way adjust our philosophical 
commitments according to how it is.   
 
Before accepting a thesis of unsayability, which admittedly is not an 
unreasonable way to interpret Adorno, we should first of all ask what Adorno 
means by an insufficiency of our conceptual resources to the world.  I think that 
his claim is tenable but not in such a way that it leads to the notion that there is 
something about the world which is beyond linguistic articulation.  Rather, we 
can make the ontological difference claim much more interesting by arguing that 
critical reflection on the ontological difference between objects and concepts 
provides the conditions for a limit on the scope of modes of articulation.
147
  We 
do not need the further claim that there are esoteric qualities of objects occupying 
an occult region of experience.  The question to which I now turn, is how do we 
understand objects such that the emphasis on the sheer conceptlessness of objects 
indicates something theoretically substantial?  I will argue in the next section that 
the import of conceptlessness and our critical ability to navigate this problem is 
grounded in two of Adorno's most important concepts: nonidentity and 
mediation. 
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9. Nonidentity, Mediation and Dialectical Aesthetics 
 
 
How ought we to interpret Adorno's concern with the relationship between our 
conceptual determinations of objects in language, and the referents of those 
determinations — the objects themselves — which are conceptless?  We have 
already seen Adorno critique identity-thinking in both its Kantian and its 
Hegelian forms.  The attempt to do justice to the conceptless is immediately an 
issue of identity-thinking.  Adorno admits that identity-thinking is in some way 
unavoidable, yet he thinks that we can still think about objects in such a way as to 
do justice to their conceptlessness.  Critically reflecting on our determinations of 
objects is sufficient, as we will see, for highlighting differences between objects 
and our conceptual determinations of them.  Critical reflection on particular 
instances reveals particular moments of 'nonidentity'.  Nonidentity is therefore 
intimately linked to a concern with the conceptless.   
 
Nonidentity was introduced and developed through Adorno's critique of Hegel in 
Section Two. We saw that whilst Adorno praised Hegel for noting the moment of 
the non-identical which instigates the dialectical motion, he criticised him for 
sublating nonidentity into a revised conception of identity.   
 
In this section, Adorno's theory of nonidentity will be analyzed.  We will see how 
nonidentity is a key notion in Adorno's constellation of dialectical concepts 
alongside conceptlessness and the notion of mediation.  I argue that nonidentity 
obtains in two forms: one, between objects and their discursive representations in 
language; secondly, within objects themselves.  Both will be discussed in this 
section.  We will also see that in Adorno's theory of nonidentity he has 
metaphysical commitments: that the way that objects are, in that they have 'non-
identical elements', is such that they present distinct problems for our 
epistemological activities and ambitions.  According to Adorno's dialectical 
aesthetics, an aspect of an artwork's nonidentity is its mediation through the 
socio-historical.  That is, that both the way that society is and the history of both 
society and the object itself have constitutive roles in the determination of the 
object as an artwork.  Therefore, mediation is important in our consideration of 
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issues of nonidentity: it is a key metaphysical concern in understanding what an 
object is and how it comes to be that sort of object.  It also points to an extremely 
challenging and complex theoretical situation for understanding and identifying 
certain kinds of objects whilst paying attention to their nonidentity.  Attention to 
nonidentity, and the fact that objects are mediated by heterogeneous influences, is 
what enables us to do justice to the conceptless particular and, contra Rosen, 
provide the resources for dialectical thought, without requiring a theory of non-
conceptual content or unsayability.    
 
9.1 Identity, Nonidentity and Artworks 
 
The thesis of 'ontological difference', appeals to some problem of identity.  Is the 
medium through which we identify objects amenable to identification of those 
objects or is the difference between the object and the medium of representation 
unavoidably going to lead to distortion of the former?  Adorno argues that 
language is certainly able to identify and represent objects; however, he also 
argues that language can come to distort the objects of experience if we take 
language to be sufficient to the representation of that object as it really is.  I have 
suggested that the problem can be dissolved, in some sense, by developing a 
critical awareness of the way that language masks the nuanced and complex ways 
that objects are.  This enigmatic notion concerning the nuances and complex 
ways objects are and the way that we must approach such objects in language 
will be developed through an extended example in the second part of this chapter.  
However, to develop our understanding of conceptlessness, it is necessary to 
develop our theoretical resources in regards to nonidentity
148
 and mediation. 
 
As we saw, Adorno critiques Hegel's eventual sublation of nonidentity back into 
identity.  For Adorno, nonidentity is irreducible and this is because objects 
themselves are complex locations of nonidentity.  To reiterate, Adorno rejects 
Hegel's dialectical sublation of nonidentity as a moment in identity. 
 
The fundament and result of Hegel's substantive philosophizing was 
the primacy of the subject, or — in the famous phrase from the 
introduction to his Logic — the "identity of identity and nonidentity." 
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He held the definite particular to be definable by the mind because its 
immanent definition was to be nothing but the mind.  Without this 
supposition, according to Hegel, philosophy would be incapable of 
knowing anything substantial or essential. (ND: 7) 
 
He praises Hegel just before this quotation for reorientating philosophy towards 
substantive concerns — i.e., concerns of nonidentity.  However, in this quotation 
he reiterates his concern that idealist dialectics results in a primacy of the subject 
which is predicated on the identity of identity and nonidentity.  It is on this basis 
which philosophy could know the substantive in its essence.  Yet in the next 
section, Adorno goes on to argue that this move draws Hegel's attention away 
from his original insight, away from the conceptless, in its individuality and 
particularity (ND: 8).  His eventual lack of interest in the particular, according to 
Adorno, coupled with the elimination of the non-identical as such, are indices of 
the reification of Hegelian dialectics. 
 
I have analyzed Adorno's critique of Hegel on this point.  But we see the 
rejection, again, in the use of the term 'supposition'.  Adorno does not think that 
the difference between our linguistic identifications of objects, through abstract, 
general universals and sortals, can be brought together with our perception of the 
particular, contingent object, into a totalized, essential understanding of the 
entity.  The reason for this we will discuss below.  The guiding idea, however, is 
that objects are not amenable, because of the character of their own nonidentity, 
with the sort of sublated identity Hegel is arguing for.
149
  To understand Adorno, 
it is most helpful to consider identity within the aesthetic context of artworks 
because it is artworks and analysis of them which motivates Adorno and because 
nonidentity reveals itself clearly in artworks. 
 
The philosophical import of Adorno's aesthetics is found in an analysis of the 
failure of identity-thinking: it fails to account for the particular way in which 
artworks exist. The complexity of Adorno's aesthetics is in part due to the dual 
awareness that there is some sort of truth, albeit historically indexed, about 
whether an object is an artwork but that that 'truth' is based on a thoroughly 
complex social state of affairs and a thoroughly complex internal state of affairs 
                                                 
149
 This point is noted by Stone, 2008: 60. 
198 
 
within the artwork: "The task of aesthetics is not to comprehend artworks as 
hermeneutical objects; in the contemporary situation, it is their 
incomprehensibility [Unbegreiflichkeit] that needs to be comprehended." (AT: 
157)  In this section and the next I will consider this complexity.  In terms of the 
argument, this complexity will mean that objects are not amenable to conceptual 
identification as understood within the identity-thinking paradigm.  This entails 
that the very fact of an object's conceptlessness is significant in our 
understanding of them.  In other words, ontological difference between language 
and its referents is nontrivial.  
 
Artworks are 'enigmatic' or 'riddles' [Rätsel] and make for highly 'unruly' objects. 
 
The progressive spiritualization of art in the name of maturity only 
accentuates the ridiculous all the more glaringly; the more the artwork's 
own organization assimilates itself to a logical order by virtue of its 
own inner exactitude, the more obviously the difference between the 
artwork's logicity and the logicity that governs empirically becomes the 
parody of the latter; the more reasonable the work becomes in terms of 
its formal constitution [Formkonstitution], the more ridiculous it 
becomes according to the standard of empirical reason. (AT: 158) 
 
The self-identity of certain objects, mediated through the integration of its form 
and content, is such that the rules and logic of identity-thinking are unable to 
adapt themselves to the representation of the object.  Art-works result in the 
parodying of identity-thinking.  The organization of an artwork is such that that 
about it which validates its sorting as an artwork disrupts the sufficiency of our 
representations of the object as an 'artwork'.   
 
This is obviously a metaphysical issue and superficially makes for an unusual 
theory of identity:   
 
Artworks synthesize ununifiable [unvereinbar], nonidentical elements 
that grind away at each other; they truly seek the identity of the 
identical and the nonidentical processually because even their unity is 
only a moment, and not the magical formula of the whole. (AT: 233, 
trans. modified) 
 
Adorno's argument, which I will analyse below, is that artworks are in some 
sense not the unified wholes that identity-thinking — sortal determination of the 
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entity by the concept 'artwork' — takes them to be.  The self-identity of an 
artwork is complex and the identifications of artworks in aesthetic propositions 
are proportionally complex.  This complexity is captured by nonidentity. 
 
9.2 Artworks, Nonidentity and Enigma 
 
Adorno's aesthetics is concerned with the ontology of 'the enigma'.  The mode, or 
way art-objects are, is enigmatic or riddle-like. Adorno's aesthetics is concerned 
with what an artwork is; and if the way an artwork is 'is enigmatic' then 
explaining the metaphysics of the enigma would be to explain the core of 
Adorno's aesthetics.  The enigmatic nature of artworks is in some sense a 
problem of self-identity: their elements do not 'fit together' to form a static, 
integrated whole.  Adorno highlights this strange metaphysical quality in the 
following fragments: 
 
Artworks are self-likeness freed from the compulsion of identity. (AT: 
166) 
 
Artworks share with enigmas the duality of being determinate and 
indeterminate. (AT: 165) 
 
The objectivation of art through its immanent execution requires the 
historical subject. (AT: 222) 
 
In the artwork the subject is neither the observer nor the creator nor 
absolute spirit, but rather spirit bound up with, preformed and mediated 
by the object. (AT: 218) 
 
According to Adorno, metaphysically, artworks have the following 
characteristics: they are in some way determinate, in some way indeterminate, in 
some way self-identical and in some way not self-identical. Furthermore, their 
reality, as objects, requires their mediation through the subject where that subject 
is not an individual, collection of individuals nor Hegel's absolute spirit, but 
rather historically mediated 'spirit'.  
 
What Adorno has in mind is the following: the determinacy of an artwork is both 
its material manifestation (which depending on the medium of the artwork may 
or may not persist unchanged through time) and also what can be determinately 
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said of it, qua art, at a particular moment in time.  Insofar as its material 
substance constitutes an artwork, it is self-identical.  This is no more than the 
application of the 'indiscernibility of identicals' to the material manifestation of 
an artwork.
150
  That is, whatever propositions are true of the material, are true of 
the artwork.  Insofar as both the matter and the artwork share the same properties 
they are the same object. 
 
However, as much as Adorno acknowledges the self-identity of the artwork in 
one respect, he thinks that it also has moments of nonidentity because it is 
historically mediated — hence the intimate relationship between mediation and 
nonidentity in Adorno's constellation of concepts in negative dialectics.  
Artworks are special objects insofar as their material manifestation bears a modal 
relationship to that which is external to it — contingent social arrangements 
impact on the material art-object which means that there is a way that the art-
object is, qua art, which is indeterminate and dynamic.  
 
This modal relationship introduces dynamic indeterminacy in two ways: firstly, 
the socio-historical conditions for the sortal determination of the artwork change, 
opening up the possibility of contradictory sortal determinations indexed to 
different times; secondly, at certain socio-historical moments, the Modernist 
epoch of art-making, for example, there may be socio-historical conditions 
whereby the art-object instantiates contradictory propositions under different 
respects.
151
 For example, an object considered from one perspective will be an 
artwork and considered from another perspective it will not be considered an 
artwork. This specific form of nonidentity will be examined through a case study 
in the following section.  For now, I will consider them theoretically.  The 
different socio-historical mediations of the ways the art-object is, amounts to its 
nonidentity. 
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9.3 Material Constitution 
 
To help make sense of Adorno's argument, I wish to show that there is an 
analytic precedent for the sorts of concerns Adorno is wrestling with.  The 
metaphysics of material constitution, as argued by David Wiggins and John Heil, 
is a recognition of this problem: one object, differently considered, seems to 
make true claims about further objects which do not appear to be the same.  
Appropriately the form of the debate they consider is the relationship between a 
statue and a lump.  Are we confused that single objects can generate 
ontologically distinct objects or are we confused that there is really any 
difference between statues and lumps?   
 
The solution of Wiggins and Heil, as opposed to that of Gibbard and Lewis, is 
amenable to the Adornian position.  Rehearsing Heil's analysis of the 
metaphysical problems of the material constitution of artworks will help us to 
understand the sorts of metaphysical commitments which underpin Adorno's 
theory of nonidentity and how socio-historical properties can provide the 
metaphysical basis for the claims being made by Adorno.  I am not suggesting 
that we can or should supplant Heil's thesis for Adorno's or that the material 
constitution debate, is equivalent to Adorno's debate.  Adorno approaches the 
problem from within the problematic of aesthetics not metaphysics.  As a result, 
where Wiggins and Heil end their metaphysical analysis, Adorno begins his 
analysis.  Nevertheless, I will argue that Heil's analysis complements Adorno's in 
at least this instance. 
 
The material constitution debate concerning artworks is a version of an ancient 
metaphysical debate.  As formulated by Allan Gibbard, the issue concerns the 
identity relationship between the material, qua matter, of a statue and the statue, 
qua artwork.
152
  The problem concerns the following: in some ways the statue is 
dependent on the matter from which it is constructed, hence there seems to be 
some identity. However, the statue does not appear reducible in identity to the 
lump of matter — hence the statue and the matter are not identical.  The problem 
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is two-fold then: if the statue is putatively 'more' than the matter but there is 
nothing 'more' present materially, what 'more' is the statue?  Furthermore, if there 
is only one thing present, the lump of matter, how do we make sense of the 
notion that the statue is not identical to the material?  Here we can see a classical 
philosophical paradox which seems to revolve around there being a 'more' about 
an entity as we saw with Foster's unsayability thesis.  If we can find a solution to 
this problem then maybe we can make sense of Foster's use of the term 'more' 
without pursuing his theory into that of 'unsayability'.  Furthermore, if it turns out 
that this 'more' concerns socio-historical modal properties of lumps qua artwork, 
which Heil argues it does, then we have a way to motivate the metaphysical 
validity of nonidentity as concerned with socio-historical mediation.   
 
Rea formulates the puzzle of the statue and the lump in the following 
propositions: 
 
(1) The parts of a statue compose a statue. 
(2) Every statue is necessarily such that its parts are arranged statuewise. 
(3) The parts of a statue compose a lump. 
(4) Every lump is such that its parts might fail to be arranged statuewise. 
(Rea, 1997: xxv) 
 
He then argues that (1) and (2) provide us with an 'essentialist assumption' where 
the parts of the statue compose something that necessarily bears a particular 
relation to its parts; whereas (3) and (4) provide us with what he calls a 'Principle 
of Alternative Compositional Possibilities' assumption where the statue does not 
bear that particular relation to its parts. 
 
Both Wiggins
153
 and Heil, in their slightly different ways, solve this paradox by 
arguing in favour of coincident entities.  Coincident entities enable us to consider 
the metaphysics of 'artworks' as a complex of entities with different persistence 
conditions which enter dynamic relations with each other.  Furthermore, it 
provides the metaphysical basis for a theory of nonidentity which properly 
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locates the mediatedness of an object's socio-historical properties.  Whilst this is 
very much a live metaphysical debate, I suggest that Heil's solution gives us a 
way to understand metaphysical foundations for the complex dynamics which 
underpin Adorno's aesthetics of nonidentity. 
 
Heil contends that objects are simply bearers of properties (2003: 172).  
Whatever bears properties is an object; objects, insofar as they are objects, bear 
properties.  He then approaches the problem of the statue and the lump from the 
point of view of the persistence conditions for each.  He notes that they have 
different persistence conditions: that about the statue which enables it to persist 
through time is not the same as that about the lump which enables it to persist 
through time. That about these entities which engenders the difference in 
persistence conditions turn out to be modal properties; statues and lumps have 
different modal properties which are integral to their constitution.  This analysis 
allows Heil, given his theory of objects, to draw three conclusions: statues and 
lumps are distinguishable objects with differing sets of properties; modal 
properties play a constitutive role in the constitution of certain types of objects at 
least; certain types of objects can 'overlap' or 'co-locate':   
 
We have seen already that, owing to differences in persistence 
conditions, [a] statue and [a] lump of bronze differ in their modal 
properties. A statue could undergo certain changes that a lump of 
bronze could not undergo; and a lump of bronze could undergo 
changes that would result in the statue’s ceasing to exist. (Heil, 2003: 
183) 
 
So, for example, a lump of bronze could undergo a change in shape which would 
be destructive of the statue — the property of the shape of the statue is a 
necessary persistence condition for it but not to the lump of bronze.  Conversely, 
we could scoop out the inside of the statue, qua lump, leaving the skin of the 
lump to instantiate the statue.  In this case, there is a 'pre-scoop' lump which is 
destroyed and a 'post-scoop' lump' which is created. 
 
Heil takes such modal considerations as important identity conditions across 
objects: 
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Suppose, however, modal properties of the statue and the lump of 
bronze are included in the mix; suppose we extend the idea that a and b 
are the selfsame object only if every property of a is a property of b 
and vice versa to include modal properties.  Then, if a and b differ in 
their modal properties, a and b must be distinct (see diagram). (Heil, 
2003: 182)  
 
Fig. 1 
 
 
 
 
Heil's conclusion is: 
 
Applying the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, and 
including modal and historical properties in the inventory of objects’ 
properties, we can see that the statue and the lump of bronze must be 
distinct individuals. If the statue and the lump of bronze differ in which 
of their properties are essential, which accidental, all the more reason 
to distinguish them. These individuals coincide spatially for a period of 
time—the period of time during which, as we might put it, the statue is 
made up of the lump of bronze. (Heil, 2003: 183) 
 
Heil's argument is that the principle of identity itself actually forces us to 
recognise a multiplicity of objects (we may have more objects than the material 
object and the art-object: we may have a functional object, a sentimental object, 
etc.), co-locating but not co-varying.  
 
Heil does not use the term nonidentity and does not need to: he is interested in 
the numerical identity here.  However, his theory provides a metaphysical 
background against which we can understand the sort of complexity Adorno 
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works with in his theory of nonidentity.  Adorno uses the term nonidentity 
because his analysis of this complexity, from an aesthetic as opposed to an 
ontological point of view, is to note tensions which exist across co-locating 
objects.  Furthermore, when Heil notes the metaphysical complexity of what 
appears as a unified simple object, he underlines Adorno's contention that the 
metaphysical simplicity assumed in identity-thinking is false.  Pursuing Heil's 
theory that we incorporate historical and modal properties in the inventory of 
properties which distinguishes a statue, we have the metaphysical resources to 
argue for the mediation of statues.  The constitutive role of the socio-historical in 
instantiating objects which are in some ways identical to and distinct from their 
material objects speaks in favour of a theory of mediation — the mediation of the 
statue by the socio-historical. 
 
If we use the term 'statue' as a sortal for identifying similar entities, and if Heil is 
correct that a statue is a distinct object with different properties and persistence 
conditions from that entity which determines its material basis, we make a 
serious metaphysical and logical mistake if we believe there is some equivalence 
relation which obtains between the statue and the lump, i.e., that about the lump 
which can be considered statue-like and then determined as a particular statue, is 
that about the particular statue which can be considered lump-like and 
determined as a particular lump.  Adorno worries that just such equivalence is 
made.  Furthermore, it is captured by the fact that we have a singular term 
'artwork' which treats extensionally distinct objects as a unity. Insofar as Heil is 
right, we have a case for nonidentity, as Adorno understands the problem, in its 
most simple form: that which we take to be a self-identical unity — an 'art-object' 
— is in fact not self-identical in the manner assumed.154  Aesthetically, 
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 Of course I have not justified Heil's position and there are counter-positions such as Gibbard's.  
Nevertheless, if Adorno is right about the aesthetics, and if it is aesthetics is in line with the co-
locating objects thesis, then he adds force to this position over Gibbard's.  Gibbard accepts that 
statues and lumps can coincide and exist at different times.  However he does not accept the 
thesis that this commits us to overlapping objects.  Furthermore, he believes that we should be 
able to provide a 'physical', systematic account of statues and lumps to 'track' the relationship 
between any one particular statue and its material which we can achieve by naming (Gibbard, 
1997: 97).  He argues, modally, that in any world, a particular statue is always equivalent to its 
particular material - changes in either the lump or the statue designate different worlds without 
transworld identity of the entities in question.  Gibbard's argument is exceptionally complex and 
well beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, Adorno would certain question Gibbard's lack of 
analysis concerning the conditions by which a lump of clay is statue-like.  Gibbard takes statues 
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nonidentity is far more complex than this but metaphysically I suggest that it is 
no more controversial than Heil's thesis. 
 
The 'Art-object' then is not a simple object with uniform modal properties.  It is 
already a tremendously complex 'object': this is the metaphysical basis for how 
we ought to understand nonidentity insofar as it characterises the issue of the 
self-identity of artworks: objects, as we normally identify them, are chimera of 
(many) dynamic objects with different persistence conditions, responsive to 
different types of changes in different kinds of states of affairs. 
 
Adorno is unequivocal that ignoring the complexity of identity, reducing it to a 
'self-same' unified simplicity, seals us off from substantial knowledge of the 
object: 
 
(1) By the formula of "self-sameness," of pure identity, the knowledge 
of the object is shown up as hocus-pocus, because this knowledge is no 
longer one of the object at all: it is the tautology of an absolutized 
   [thinking of thinking]. (ND: 160) 
 
and 
 
(2) What is, is more than it is. This "more" is not imposed upon it but 
remains immanent to it, as that which has been pushed out of it. In that 
sense, the nonidentical would be the thing’s own identity against its 
identifications. The innermost core of the object proves to be 
simultaneously extraneous to it, the phenomenon of its seclusion, the 
reflex of an identifying, stabilizing procedure. (ND: 161) 
 
The context of (1) is Adorno's critique of Hegel and his 'negation of negation' 
leading to another delusion of identity which is a 'projection of consequential 
logic' (ND: 160).  It is relevant for our purposes because the truth in Hegel's 
initial move is to say that identity of the object with our determinations of it is 
false.  The particularity of the object is such that it defies this sort of identity with 
our conceptual determinations.  Adorno contends that if we conceive of art-
                                                                                                                                    
as a rigid kind which enables a co-variant relationship between changes in particular statues and 
changes in particular lumps.  Adorno would argue that statues are constituted such that you can 
have changes in the existence of a statue without any change in the lump.  This conclusion is 
anathema to the aesthetic assumptions of Gibbard's argument qua statues.  Arguably Gibbard's 
position relies on the epistemic assumption that we ought to be able to track all real entities 
systematically.   
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objects as simple, self-same entities, then in an important way we have 
misunderstood what an artwork is.  Of course, materially it is a single entity but 
the art-object, qua art, is more complex than this material self-identity suggests.  
Our knowledge of the object becomes distorted according to the conceptual 
requirements of identity.  In short, Adorno is urging us not read our ontological 
commitments off the way in which we are inclined to think about the world 
conceptually. In (2), Adorno articulates, in his own idiom, the 'material 
constitution' argument presented above. The "more" that we find in an object, 
which is truncated by identity-thinking, is not some set of supra-linguistic 
qualities set in an occult region of space, but the complexities of objects as 
discussed. 
 
Returning then to Heil's statue, there are properties of the object qua artwork, e.g. 
that the statue is a particular shape, that is not essential properties of the lump of 
bronze from which the statue is made, e.g. that it is a particular mass.  If it is the 
case, however, that the statue and the lump of bronze spatio-temporally coincide 
then the 'art-object' — both statue and lump of bronze — is the location of 
distinct yet overlapping objects (Heil, 2003: 183).  In some ways the art-object is 
self-identical, in some ways non-identical; however, the artwork is not non-
identical in a way in which it violates the law of non-contradiction or even the 
law of numerical identity.   
 
Crucially then, what are the historical and modal properties which account for the 
immanent difference located within artworks?  Heil suggests that a modal 
property is simply a property in virtue of which, were the object to lose that 
property, it could no longer license or warrant a particular judgement: 
 
A statue cannot change shape in the sense that, where the bronze that 
makes up the statue to undergo a sufficiently dramatic change of shape, 
it would no longer count as a statue. (Heil, 2003: 185) 
 
Aesthetically this is a thin account; I consider this in greater detail in the next 
section.  However, metaphysically, it does the job.  A modal property is that way 
that an object is such that it warrants particular judgements; an historical property 
is a time indexed property an object possesses.  I will argue that Adorno makes 
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extensive use of modal and historical properties in his account of artworks. 
 
We could be easily deceived — by the immediacy of identity-thinking — as to 
Heil's position.  Even granting historical and modal properties, it may appear that 
their salience is salience according to our conceptual schemes.  This is the 
position being argued against.  It is not the case that the sortal, 'statue', applies 
just in case that object has x, y and z properties where those properties are 
equivalent to the properties of the lump and that given our conception of statues, 
the lump has been moulded to invoke this statue concept.  A statue bears modal 
and historical properties in virtue of the qualities of the material object with 
which it co-locates and in virtue of many states of affairs beyond the two co-
locating objects, and their sortal concepts; therefore, the salience of modal and 
historical properties is not reducible to facts about lumps, nor conceptual 
stipulations for the applicability of sortals.
155
   
 
Indeed, that an object has these modal properties at all is in virtue of the fact the 
world is such and such a way, not simply that the lump is such and such a way 
and that that way corresponds to our conceptual stipulations regarding statues.  
Historical and modal properties are not only part of the inventory of artworks' 
properties, their salience for sortal determination takes account of many states of 
affairs about the world.  This is the deepest point of rejection of identity-thinking.  
We should not look to our concepts to find out about how the world is — the 
world is already the way it is and the proper analysis of the world and objects 
will engage with it appropriately.  Immanent critique is to engage with an object 
such that its illusory unity opens up to reveal complex, irreducible, co-locating 
objects, at least one of which, the art-object qua art, only exists because of the 
formal qualities of the material object and because the socio-historical world is 
precisely the way it is.  This latter point concerning the social world does not 
detract from the point that the way the world is for Adorno is an historical issue 
of how it is has become; we should consider how the world is, as an issue of how 
it has become, i.e., its history, in our aesthetic analysis.  
                                                 
155
 This is not quite holism either - where the being of a statue involves a totality of social states 
of affairs at a given time.  The reason being that Adorno thinks that social reality is equally 
fractured.  As we will see, an artwork may exist as direct result of a fracture in society as opposed 
to its unity (AT: 167 - 9). 
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To push the division between the sufficiency of language to world in identity-
thinking to its maximum, it is metaphysically possible that there are artworks in 
virtue of a world being the way it is but that in this world there are no correct 
identifications of artworks. It is highly unlikely: a world where there are artworks 
is likely a world where there are agents with correct judgements of them.  What 
is likely impossible is that there is a world with artworks but agents with no 
concepts of them: for there to be artworks, there must be agents with that sort of 
concept.  But, to reiterate, it will not be the case, necessarily, that there are 
artworks in virtue of the fact that there are agents that identify, or even designate, 
certain objects as artworks.  Identifying artworks correctly obtains only when our 
judgements are warranted by the way the world is.  This captures the objectivity 
of Adorno's position.   
 
However, this claim is too static to capture Adorno's thought because how the 
world is, is also dynamic and a result of historical becoming — hence true 
judgements are also in dynamic flux.  This is the culmination of the Adornian 
move against the 'saturation of the subject' in the world — nonidentity reasserts 
objective reality.  The point is, if you want to know what an object is, you 
examine the object not the term and if you do so with certain objects you will 
find something far more complex than is often assumed by the sufficiency of 
sortal determination.   
 
To put these points another way, an artwork is so in virtue of a highly complex 
state of affairs regarding the object itself and according to how the socio-
historical world is.  By extension, if the world changes in significant ways, lumps 
of bronze may persist but statues may not, despite the material entity not 
changing at all.  Heil provides for the metaphysical viability of this idea once we 
have made the realisation that modal and historical properties play a constitutive 
role in the metaphysics of art-objects. 
 
What is the truth here? What do we require in order to say that statues 
(or lumps) exist? What is it to be a realist about such things? Suppose 
we ask what is required for God to create a universe like ours 
incorporating statues. God will need to create the atoms and the void 
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(the elementary particles, or the fields, or what have you), and arrange 
them appropriately. If we are to have statues, and statues require 
distinctively intelligent intervention, then, in creating a universe 
featuring statues, God will need to create dynamic, possibly widely 
dispersed systems of particles. Once this is accomplished, God will 
have created a world containing statues: it will be true there are statues. 
The truth makers for our statue talk will be staggeringly complex and, 
from the point of view of physics, hideously unruly. Nevertheless, it 
will be true, literally true, that there are statues (and, for that matter, 
that there are lumps of bronze). (Heil, 2003: 189) 
 
With this, I think Heil does give the deep ontological story about statues and 
artworks as such.  If you want to make a statue, you cannot just make the 'statue'.  
A 'statue' is made possible by a complex state of affairs which Heil suggests in 
materialist terms of systems and particles.  However, he explicates this in non-
eliminativist terms that statues as modal objects rely upon concepts, agents and 
societies and are irreducible to lumps of matter (Heil, 2003: 186). 
 
A key point that fig. 1 cannot catch, which I have indicated above, is the relation 
of those modal properties to those socio-historical states of affairs which 
determine the properties of the lump as modal properties of the artwork.  What is 
it about the world which effects change in the modal properties of objects is far 
from scientifically analysable: they are changes in the society in all its 
strangeness, its extreme complexity, the unconscious endeavours of individuals 
and its bursts of irrationality.  Furthermore, a broadly scientific mode of 
investigation into the existence of artworks, operating by predictive hypothesis 
within some sort of nomological framework, based on examples is structurally 
inappropriate for analysis of the types of entities artworks appear to be.  This is 
why Heil is right to say that the artwork may exist but its existence is wildly 
complex and hideously unruly in terms of physics.  Constellation is an 
appropriate term to describe the interaction of these overlapping objects.  The 
seemingly singular entity, the 'art-object', Mona Lisa, is a complex constellation 
of overlapping objects which interact with each other, which are in some ways 
identical and in some ways not identical, in some ways hermetically sealed from 
the influence of the world by their singular material manifestation, in some ways 
completely subject to the vicissitudes of history and human social life. 
 
Obviously as this analysis stands, there is one rather important omission: is 
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Adorno right over his analysis of artworks?  To justify Adorno's aesthetics is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  In the next section I will offer an example 
through which we can understand some of these metaphysical commitments in a 
more developed aesthetic context and situate the discussion in Adorno's own 
aesthetic theory.  I hope that the example gives reasons to take Adorno's theory 
seriously and gives us reasons to favour it.  What I am urging is that if Adorno 
can provide an analysis of an artwork, this is the metaphysical basis for how the 
art-object displays issues of nonidentity. 
 
9.4 Nonidentity and Conceptlessness 
 
The above analysis helps us to understand the importance of conceptlessness 
according to my 'ontological difference' thesis.  I rejected Foster's 'unsayability 
thesis'.  His thesis revolves around the notion that there is some part or entity in 
the world which we cannot identify in language; there are enough of these parts 
or entities to suggest that our ability to linguistically represent the world 
inevitably involves more or less failure — depending on how much more there is 
in the world that we cannot identify.  This is a radical thesis but I have suggested 
that it misconstrues Adorno's intention and runs into problems of intelligibility 
itself.  My thesis is that conceptlessness merely indicates awareness that there is a 
categorical difference between concepts and many of the entities, such as 
material objects, to which our concepts refer.  In emphasising this categorical 
difference, Adorno is trying to re-orientate our epistemic and metaphysical 
enquiries.   
 
The worry is that this difference is little more than an analytic truism and that if 
this is all that Adorno is saying then he is stating something blatantly obvious.  
Furthermore, it would appear to make a mockery of Adorno's contention that 
philosophy has taken no interest in the conceptless: a significant part of 
philosophical investigation is, and always has been, the consideration of the 
material world about us which is conceptless in the way I have been suggesting.  
The point of this section is to show that, whilst it may be true that 
conceptlessness is hardly the exotic term it at first appears, its import for 
philosophy is not trivial.   
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Adorno makes this quite clear when he points out that the first mistake of dealing 
with the conceptless is to dissolve this important metaphysical point, 
conceptually, as no more than analytic truism.  Philosophy has often attempted to 
overcome the problem of the conceptlessness of much of its subject matter by 
assimilating it within a conceptual framework.  It may attempt to do so through a 
priori inquiry — this is not promising for Adorno.  It may attempt to negotiate 
the difference between mind and world by beginning with experience of the 
subject matter in question as both Kant and Hegel, in their different ways, did.  
This is promising for Adorno.  However, Adorno's contention is that in all cases, 
almost because of the nature of philosophy insofar as philosophy just is the 
attempt to overcome the fact of conceptlessness through conceptual enquiry, 
philosophy dissolves this important metaphysical fact, that the material world is 
categorically different to the concepts we employ to represent it.  This difference 
is to be maintained, however, as an irreducible limit to our epistemic ambitions.  
Furthermore, in attending to this difference, we find that our conceptual 
representations do not sufficiently represent the world. 
 
 
In this section, I have begun to show what is at stake in this difference.  The way 
in which we attempt to represent the world, the ontological commitments which 
seem integral to language use — that the world is the sort of thing which is 
amenable to representation according the reference structure of linguistic 
determination — is mistaken.  Whilst we cannot avoid identifying entities — 
sorting and predicating them — we must be aware that certain entities, artworks 
for example, are not amenable to the representation according to the assumptions 
made of them within identity-thinking.  The nonidentity between certain 
complex, multiple objects, masked by language within identity-thinking, is one 
such way for thinking about the import of conceptlessness.  Furthermore, the 
ontological structures of conceptless objects are such that those structures do not 
correspond to the structures implied by identity-thinking.  Attention to the 
conceptless is, critically, an attention to the problems of identity-thinking and 
issues of nonidentity.  I will explore a concrete example of an artwork, 
employing the ideas of conceptlessness and nonidentity, in the next section where 
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we see the complexity of these issues within an aesthetic, rather than a 
metaphysical, context. 
 
A Dialectical Analysis of Fountain 
9.5.i A Constellation of Concepts: conceptlessness, nonidentity and 
mediation 
 
In this chapter, a study of Duchamp's Fountain will be used to elucidate and 
develop my account of conceptlessness and nonidentity and develop Adorno's 
notion of mediation.  As has been said, these three concepts form a constellation 
of critical tools which work together to produce the mode of critical orientation 
called 'negative dialectics'.
156
  This mode of critique is not a position nor a system 
and these concepts are not amenable to discrete definitions; what is required is to 
see their role in critique of particular phenomena.  Negative dialectics, I contend, 
is a critical activity developed through our enquiries into particular phenomena.  
Therefore, the form of negative dialectics will be shaped according to the 
phenomena in question.  The determination of the constellations will be similarly 
particular.   
 
Through analysis of particular objects we can see how Adorno's theories of 
conceptlessness, nonidentity and mediation give us resources to re-engage with 
the problems of gaining knowledge about the material world and what it consists 
in.  His approach to this problem, as explored here through the question of an 
artwork, enables us to see why aesthetics has constitutive importance for 
philosophy in Adorno's thinking.  The subject matter of aesthetics, insofar as it 
deals with artworks, reveals concrete examples as to why identity-thinking is 
problematic. 
 
In the previous section the deeper metaphysical issue was developed: that the 
nonidentity which we find between our judgements (and their conceptual terms) 
and, on the other hand, their referents, had a deeper foundation in objects 
themselves.  The problems of 'material constitution' were considered in an 
attempt to make sense of the basic metaphysical problems and commitments of 
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 See KCPR: 80 for analysis of a constellation as a force-field. 
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identity and nonidentity as it relates to objects themselves.  It was argued that 
analytic identity statements across statues and lumps of matter are false.  This has 
been taken as a starting point for understanding the dynamics of nonidentity in 
terms of objects.   
 
We will see in the following analysis the sort of complexity involved in Adorno's 
conception of nonidentity.  This far exceeds the scope of the material constitution 
debate and introduces the dialectics of nonidentity — where the identity 
conditions across objects enter into relations with each other and with elements 
outside of the objects through which the identity of objects is transformed.  It is 
in this extremely complex dialectical account of nonidentity that we consider 
Adorno's theory of mediation.  The being and modality of certain objects is 
determined by the existence of other objects and other socio-historical 
phenomena.  The determination of the mode of one object by another is captured 
by Adorno's use of the term mediation.  Furthermore, considering historical and 
modal properties of certain objects gives us the resources to understand the basics 
of Adorno's theory of truth. 
 
9.5.ii Aesthetics and Negative Dialectics 
 
Duchamp's Fountain (1917) presents well-known metaphysical and 
epistemological issues within the aesthetic context.  I will argue that Adorno's 
dialectical aesthetics handles these problems extremely well.  Furthermore, in 
considering the propositional descriptions and predications we make of Fountain 
in an historical and dialectical analysis, we see that if we do not pay attention to 
historical and modal properties, if we do not consider the dynamic relations of 
identity and nonidentity of certain types of objects, then we fail to make sense of 
artworks on an aesthetic level.  Inasmuch as identity-thinking fails to take such 
issues into consideration, we may think that identity-thinking tends to 
misunderstand artworks.   
 
Of more general philosophical importance: if identity-thinking carries the same 
assumptions at work in the aesthetics analysis of other phenomena, then we have 
reason to believe that identity-thinking may similarly misunderstand other social 
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phenomena.  By extension we may hold that insofar as Adorno's dialectical 
analysis has successfully engaged with artworks, that Adorno's critical analysis 
may be more successful with other kinds of phenomena.  In short, aesthetics 
presents problems for identity-thinking which deepens the questions raised about 
identity-thinking as such. 
 
There are three important caveats required at this juncture.  The following 
aesthetic analysis is developed for the purposes of elucidation.  It is not intended 
as a complete or sufficient aesthetic analysis of Fountain which is in fact an 
extremely complex piece.
157
  Instead the analysis intends to demonstrate the 
operation of the aforementioned constellation of concepts, how they work and 
how they are adept at orientating analysis to the complexity of artworks such as 
Fountain.  It should also be noted that Fountain is not chosen as an example to 
be used as justification for a general theory which then ranges over many, or even 
all, artworks.  For Adorno, aesthetic analysis is particular to the demands of any 
particular artwork — as has been said, the intention is to demonstrate the use of 
Adorno's critical concepts in relation to a particular example.   
 
Finally, Adorno did not write critically on Duchamp or on Fountain: not only 
was the readymade outside of Adorno's interest, inasmuch as it instantiates 
somewhat anti-artistic impulses, it was an attack on the high-modernism which 
Adorno championed.  In response, my intention is to show that Adorno's critical 
thinking has general philosophical import.  Whilst this sort of analysis may not 
deal with the sort of artworks Adorno was directly concerned with, if Adorno's 
critical analysis is only relevant to certain sorts of artworks and those artworks 
are consigned to history then so might Adorno's theorising.  I do not think it is 
and in order to show that, Adorno's critical thinking must be separated from his 
aesthetic tastes.  Relatedly, Adorno himself realised that he let his tastes impede 
his critical awareness.  This is most apparent in his reconsideration of Stravinsky.  
Having thoroughly criticised Stravinsky's apparently regressive neo-classicism, 
as opposed to Schönberg's progressive, critical atonalism,
158
 Adorno came to 
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 There are many analyses of ready-mades and of Fountain in particular.  Roberts' in depth post-
Marxian analysis was helpful in developing the analysis presented here (2007). 
158
 Compare, PoMM: 37 - 41 & 135 - 8 with AT: 45. 
216 
 
realise that there was validity to Stravinsky's work.  Arguably the same is true of 
Fountain — it is an anti-artwork as art, made possible by a world in which the 
socio-historical conditions for 'Art' were disintegrating.  We will see that, in this 
sense, Fountain may have 'truth content' even by Adorno's own standards.  
Furthermore, his dialectical thought allowed him to see that art could not be 
separated from that which parodied it, kitsch.  Whereas a critic such as Greenberg 
held art and kitsch as thoroughly separate and opposed categories,
159
 Adorno 
understood their dialectical relation, their mediation.
160
 
 
Fountain is chosen, other than supporting the general relevance of Adorno's 
critical thinking, because it appears immanently engaged in problems of 
semantics.  Given Adorno's concern with semantics in judgement and the 
problem of nonidentity therein, an artwork which instantiates problems of 
semantics of nonidentity is simply a good way to develop an understanding of 
these constellations.  
 
Hopefully the following is a not unreasonable aesthetic analysis of Fountain, in 
Adorno's terms, but the intention is not to attribute this analysis to Adorno or to 
suggest that it is a sufficient aesthetic analysis of Fountain.  Rather, the intention 
is to show how issues of nonidentity become particularly complex and dynamic 
with concrete aesthetic particulars — individual artworks.  Therefore, the 
interpretation of Adorno's philosophy being developed here does not rest on the 
validity of the following aesthetic analysis.  What is of issue is whether or not we 
continue to make sense of Adorno's epistemological and metaphysical critiques 
within aesthetics and how aesthetics supports these critiques.  If we are to be 
convinced that Adorno is right, not just that his theory is tenable, successful 
aesthetic analyses are required.
161
  However, it is a function of Adorno's 
aesthetics that such analyses require genuine critical expertise in their own right. 
 
9.6 Lumps of Porcelain and Urinals 
 
Fountain was one of the first 'artworks' to bring into question its relationship with 
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 Greenberg, 1971: 9 - 10. 
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 See AT: 196, 310, 312, 397 & CI: 168. 
161 For thorough, technical Adornian analyses of artworks see Paddison, 1997: 279 - 84. 
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its sortal, artwork.  It is relevant for my purposes because equivocation over its 
identity has a role in its being as an artwork. For the purposes of this analysis, 
certain details are relevant and worth emphasising.  The Society of Independent 
Artists in New York made an open invitation to artists to supply work and that all 
artworks submitted would be exhibited (Balken, 2003: 61).  Duchamp supplied a 
factory edition, Bedfordshire model urinal.  He turned the urinal 90
o
 so that the 
part normally attached to the wall became the base of the artwork. Despite the 
criterion of exhibition stating that all works would be exhibited, Fountain was 
not.  The implication is clear that, for the society, Fountain was not an artwork; 
not everyone shared their opinion.   
 
Duchamp complained.  In a letter to the art magazine, The Blind Man, 1917, he 
suggested that the two grounds given for the rejection of Fountain — that it was 
immoral and that it is a plagiarised work — were specious.  The process of art 
production in this instance revolved around Mutt's (the pseudonym under which 
he produced Fountain) 'choosing' the object to be considered from another point 
of view, such that its functional import disappeared and some sort of artistic 
appreciation was now possible.  Fellow artist, Alfred Stieglitz, photographed 
Fountain in 1917.  The photograph treated Fountain as an artwork and was 
arguably an artwork in its own right. 
 
The question in this chapter is two-fold: what propositions are true of Fountain 
and what, if anything, makes these propositions true? And, what is Fountain? 
Following the structure of the material constitution debate and working with the 
notion of 'co-locating objects', the suggestion is that we have multiple objects 
which are not analytically identical.  The following entities are proposed in virtue 
of potentially different persistence conditions: there is a material object, the 
porcelain entity; there is an artwork, Fountain.  A third object could also be 
identified: a 'urinal' — which is a functional object identified by its own 
persistence conditions.
162
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 By committing to a urinal object, one is not committed to a metaphysical functionalism 
whereby objects can be identified by the same sortal in virtue of a shared dispositional property 
instantiated through objects with different qualities.  In this discussion, the sortal, urinal, is 
applicable in virtue of the intrinsic, empirical properties of the material object and various social 
facts about the world, including the concept, urinal. 
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Even once we have established these three entities, their identity conditions still 
present live metaphysical problems and therefore the truth makers for 
propositions concerning these objects are also under debate.  As the primary 
interest here is the ontology of Fountain, the metaphysical and epistemic 
problems associated with the porcelain and the urinal will be largely set aside for 
the purposes of discussion.  The thought is that whatever the porcelain entity and 
the urinal turn out to be, what their relationship to each other is and what 
properties they 'really' instantiate, analysis of Fountain reveals a set of identity 
problems often ignored in debates of material constitution and which point 
towards the dialectical analysis adopted by Adorno.  
 
Of the many propositions which seem true of the porcelain, we will consider the 
following insofar as they seem candidates for its possible identity conditions: the 
lump of porcelain has some mass and volume; it is white and hard; it has a flat 
base; it is a 'urinal shape'; and is made of porcelain. Many other propositions 
would be true of the porcelain lump — these are a selection.   
 
It seems that propositions identifying the mass and volume of the lump of 
porcelain refer to candidates for identity conditions.  A lump of porcelain, insofar 
as it is a particular lump which has a determinate spatio-temporal extension, will 
instantiate a particular mass and weight, and must continue to instantiate that 
particular mass and weight if it is to persist as that particular lump of porcelain.  
Propositions concerning whiteness and hardness refer to notoriously 
controversial properties.  Such properties can be bracketed for now as they 
concern our metaphysical commitments concerning empirical properties which 
are not currently at issue. As for the porcelain, it could undergo changes in shape 
and still be the particular lump of porcelain - the shape does not appear to isolate 
persistence conditions of the lump.  Conversely, the proposition that the lump of 
porcelain is made up of porcelain obviously isolates a persistence condition.  
What the truth makers are for these propositions depends on one's opinion over 
the metaphysical status of these properties and the epistemic conditions of 
knowing these properties.  These propositions have been chosen to show the sorts 
of considerations involved in identifying an entity and will also play an important 
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role in discussing other objects which co-locate with the porcelain. 
 
All of these propositions are true of the urinal entity which shares the same 
material constitution.  Deciding which are the persistence conditions of the urinal 
is more fraught.  Whilst such analysis is relevant and would be required for a 
sufficient analysis of Fountain, it is not necessary to consider these issues here as 
they take us well-beyond the metaphysical scope of this thesis and also because it 
is not necessary for developing the theoretical import of Adorno's dialectics. For 
the purposes of this discussion, however, some form of functionalism will be 
assumed — that the urinal can be identified as a distinct object according to its 
function as a urinal.  One could assert a higher level dispositional property which, 
regardless of qualitative change, acts as the truth maker for taking the lump as a 
urinal.  Or one could argue that there is no such dispositional property (no 'higher 
level' or supervenient properties) opting instead for a bare nominalism about 
dispositional properties.  Regardless, as long as in both cases the object is a 
urinal, insofar as it is an entity taken as a urinal according to function, a co-
locating entities argument stands
163
 — there is a difference in persistence 
conditions between the lump of porcelain and the urinal.  The differences 
between these two functionalist positions are metaphysically important due to 
differing commitments; however, it is not relevant to the aesthetic considerations 
to be analysed here.   
 
Therefore, assuming some functionalism about the urinal, mass and volume are 
not persistence conditions for the urinal, as in order for it to be a urinal it must 
instantiate properties which make possible its being used as a urinal — the 
particular mass and volume of this urinal are not essential to being a urinal.  It is 
not necessary that a urinal is white or even hard (to an extent).  It is necessary, let 
us say, that it has a urinal shape.  The key idea is that we have different 
persistence conditions for two types of entity which allows for the argument that 
we have two objects even though, materially, there is only one entity — the lump 
of porcelain.  
                                                 
163
 In the strong functionalist case, a change in p will not necessarily bring about any change in u 
as long as certain conditions obtain.  In the second case, due to extreme nominalism about 
particulars and properties, any change in p will entail a new urinal entity, u'.  In both cases the 
persistence conditions are same qua the sortal, urinal even if there is a nominal change in entities 
in the second case. 
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If Wiggins and Heil are right — it seems we can speak of (at least) two distinct 
objects — then it appears that the lump of porcelain is not a urinal and vice versa.  
They share the same material but that does not seem to make them exactly the 
same thing as they have different historical and modal properties.  Furthermore, 
as it stands, neither of them seem to be, as either a lump of porcelain or as a 
urinal, an artwork — this still needs to be argued for, however. 
 
9.7 Fountain 
 
Turning now to the identity of Fountain, its persistence conditions and what 
'makes true' the judgements we make about it, we move towards the aesthetic 
issues at hand.  The claim is that when we consider the persistence conditions and 
the truths concerning Fountain, a dialectical account argues in favour of 
including many facts about the world.  One also finds, that if the socio-historical 
dialectics of Adorno's thought are correct then we are committed to an extremely 
complex account of nonidentity which in turn helps to explain the 'riddle 
character' of artworks.  Not only can we make sense of this riddle character as a 
notion, if it is right aesthetically, insofar as this character is not entirely specific 
to aesthetic objects, it suggests that we may have to make serious revisions to our 
metaphysics and epistemology concerning objects and our theory of identity.   
 
As with the lump of porcelain and the urinal, all the propositions made of them 
appear true of Fountain — that it is white; it is a particular shape, etc.  Fountain 
co-locates with the lump and the urinal and shares the same material constitution.  
Furthermore, if Fountain has different persistence conditions to these other two 
objects then, following Wiggins and Heil, it seems reasonable to say that 
Fountain is not a lump of porcelain nor is it a urinal in the sense that it just is 
those things.  Fountain is a particular entity, intimately related to other entities.  
But they are not identical and should not be metaphysically 'run together'.  The 
reason for this becomes most apparent when we re-consider this analytic 
nonidentity in more complex and dynamic dialectical terms.  Co-locating objects 
is an heuristic device to orientate the complexities of dialectical nonidentity. The 
question for now is: what about Fountain must persist in order for it, inasmuch as 
221 
 
it is an artwork, to count as both an independent entity from the lump and the 
urinal and also as an artwork? 
 
9.7.i Competing Explanations of the Ontology of Fountain  
 
There are many aesthetic theories which we could employ for the consideration 
of a material object to be taken as an artwork.  For example, a broadly Kantian, 
formalist argument, would consider the material properties of the porcelain, in 
concert with their effects on our cognitive faculties.  In light of such 
considerations we may consider the form of the porcelain to be of aesthetic value.  
They may argue then that the porcelain is beautiful, or at least is aesthetically 
compelling, and, depending on their view of production, take it as an artwork. 
Taking the porcelain as an artwork is captured through it being given the name, 
Fountain. 
 
Let us assume that this sketched formalist judgement made reference to material 
propositions such as those already considered — it is (a lustrous) white, it is 
urinal shaped (and elegant in virtue of that shape), etc. They may argue that the 
formal properties identified in such propositions are essential to the aesthetic 
value of the porcelain such that any change in the material properties of the 
porcelain entails the eradication of Fountain.
 
 The point is that in this instance, 
the empirical properties of the lump, insofar as they instigate a particular 
cognitive response in us, are sufficient for the ascription, or not, of formal beauty.  
In turn, this validates us in judging the porcelain as an artwork — or not.  The 
viewer, under the transcendental conditions of cognition, is a constant in this 
relationship and whilst the viewer is a necessary condition of there being an 
artwork, the artwork as such co-varies with the properties of the lump of 
porcelain and its properties.  Therefore, whilst the persistence conditions of 
Fountain are different to those of the porcelain and the urinal, due to the 
requirement of the subject, changes in the porcelain will entail changes in 
Fountain. Of course it may be argued for aesthetic reasons that porcelain is not 
beautiful but this is beside the point for the purposes of this discussion.   
 
An alternative way to determine the persistence conditions of Fountain would be 
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according to a broadly institutional account.
164
  Indeed, this has been the most 
common way to negotiate the metaphysical problems presented by Fountain.  In 
this instance, the material properties of this particular porcelain and urinal, and to 
an extent, their particular persistence conditions are incidental to the taking of 
them as an artwork.  What is relevant — and it is something that Duchamp 
himself said — was that the very act of taking the object as an artwork, 
resituating it in a context in order for it to be considered differently — 
aesthetically rather than functionally — was the sufficient condition of the lump 
of porcelain/urinal being taken as Fountain.  In such a case the proposition that 
'Fountain is an artwork' is true.  Pushing this theory further, it is often said that 
the re-situation of the urinal in the gallery was making an anti-aesthetic 
statement.  No quality of the urinal/porcelain is relevant to its being taken as an 
artwork.
165
 
 
In this instance, in theory at least, any material object could be taken as an 
artwork. As long as the person saying that the object is an artwork is a person 
'qualified' to say so, and the claim 'warranted', then the judgement is true.  To 
some extent it is due to the metaphysical problems Fountain poses, qua art, that 
people have adopted some form of the institutional view which is based on this 
sort of move.  The thought being that if we do not make this move then we may 
be forced to a potentially unattractive position.  For example, we may have to say 
that Fountain is not an artwork and its placing in a gallery involves some sort of 
category mistake; or that if Fountain is a valid object of 'aesthetic' concern, that 
the conditions which we previously valued artworks are either no longer 
applicable to 'art' or that we were wrong about art or that there is no such thing as 
art (any more).
166
   
 
Whilst it is true that the material object is incidental to its being taken as an 
artwork, once the designation of the material object as an artwork has occurred, 
assuming we accept this account of art-making and naming, the material object 
                                                 
164
 Davies, in his division of functional and procedural positions, has explored fundamental 
structural differences between attitudes to denoting an object as an artwork (1990). 
165
 See, for example, Zangwill's second-order appropriation theory (2007:  69 – 73). 
166
 For analysis of institutional theory see Danto, "The Artworld" (1964) and Dickie, "Art and the 
Aesthetic: an Institutional Analysis" (1974). 
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now just is the particular artwork as named.  
 
Kraut argues that this stipulative view is not as impoverished as it first might 
appear as it still admits of aesthetic criticism and the giving and taking of reasons 
for whatever objects we wish to take as artworks.  It also allows for the 
separation of metaphysical questions — what is an artwork — from evaluative 
questions — is this a good artwork.  Having a thin notion of what validates an 
object's being taken as an artwork does not entail a thin evaluative account.  
Regardless, institutional arguments will rely on the citing features of the objects 
in question even when those features are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
taking the object as an artwork.  Together these conditions determine the warrant 
of the claim.  Nevertheless, in a point which will be returned to, this still entails 
that the 'taking as' in this instance resolves to social fiat and still does not take 
any facts about putative artworks or any other states of affairs as necessary or 
sufficient for sorting an object as an artwork (Kraut, 2007: 41- 3). 
 
Both of these examples are greatly simplified in order to reveal the import of 
different aesthetic positions for the metaphysical question of material 
constitution.  When considering the persistence conditions of Fountain, we can 
see how they could both argue, but for different reasons, that the relationship 
between Fountain and the porcelain, at least, is rigid.  Gibbard's argument for the 
identity of the statue and the lump is potentially compatible with both the 
formalist and the institutional view because in both those views, for different 
aesthetic reasons, there is a possible argument for a rigid relation between the 
material entity and its being taken as an artwork: in the formalist view the rigidity 
is determined by the fact that in all worlds where there is an entity with such and 
such properties and a cognizer with such and such faculties then the rigidity of 
entity to name is set by the putative universality and necessity of the sortal 
judgement.
167
 Institutionally, the relationship between the material object and the 
sortal is potentially rigid because in every world where there is the appropriate 
designation, then the statue and the lump co-vary accordingly.
168
   
                                                 
167
 Of course this position revolves around the quantitative and modal qualities of aesthetic 
judgements of beauty for Kant. 
168
 This argument is not affected by the aesthetic consideration that the artwork as such may be an 
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9.8 Material Constitution Revisited 
 
In both cases we are able to determine the relationship between the lump and the 
particular artwork as co-variant even if in one case this determination depends on 
properties of the object and in the other it may not. The nominalism of both 
positions is captured by Gibbard's metaphysical analysis of the statue/lump 
debate, in the following: 
 
What is special about proper names like 'Goliath' and 'Lumpl' [sic] is 
not that they are rigid designators.  It is rather that each is rigid with 
respect to the sortal it invokes.  'Goliath' refers to its bearer as a statue 
and is statue-rigid; 'Lumpl' refers to its bearer as a lump and is lump-
rigid' (Gibbard, 1997: 100) 
 
Given Gibbard's identity claim that the statue is the lump, and that statues are the 
sorts of thing that can be rigid, both entities have a rigid co-varying relationship 
with their material properties; I have suggested that we can couch this rigidity in 
aesthetic terms either in virtue of those properties or by some form of fiat which 
determines those properties as salient for designation. Gibbard's position is 
consistent with two different aesthetic accounts of art making.   
 
Gibbard himself does not give an account of statues or of the aesthetic 
considerations involved in statue making.  Making a statue consists in fashioning 
an entity which evokes the sortal, 'statue' (Gibbard, 2007: 100).  That is, making 
a statue involves making a statue.  Even if it is thought that this is unfair on 
Gibbard, that he is talking about a statue and not necessarily an artwork — he 
gives the example of fashioning a sculpture of an elephant — it is not clear that 
he can cut out all aesthetic considerations as the relationship between ornaments, 
statues and statues/sculptures qua artworks, is a complex aesthetic issue.  Implicit 
within the thesis being developed here is that if metaphysicians discuss problems 
of material constitution and invoke aesthetic entities, they cannot do the 
metaphysics without doing any aesthetics. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
idea or concept within the institutional view.   
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9.9 Adorno's Dialectical Aesthetics 
 
The reason why this is the case brings us back to the discussion of Fountain and 
a dialectical analysis of the object qua artwork, functional entity and material 
entity. I will argue that Adorno's account of Fountain is incompatible with 
Gibbard's analysis and requires the sort of complexity we find in the co-location 
thesis at the very least.  Indeed, we will see that the identity and nonidentity of 
artworks is dynamic in a way which cannot be captured by, what is in effect, and 
identity-thinking account of identity.  The reason for this is that Adorno's 
analysis of artworks, based on his dialectics of nonidentity, suggests that you can 
have no change in the porcelain but a constitutive change in Fountain — where 
that change is not stipulated by fiat, nor resolves solely to concerns about the 
artworld.   
 
Indeed, as we will see, Adorno's analysis suggests the possibility that the proper 
name 'Fountain', which names a particular entity, could continue to be used — ie. 
people continue to use the proper name as a referring subject term — but that 
Fountain no longer exists.  For those who claim that Fountain just is the 
urinal/lump of porcelain such a possibility is ruled out.  This situation arises 
when the socio-historical conditions, which have a constitutive role in there being 
an artwork, change such that there is no longer an artwork even though the 
material entity is unchanged.  The rest of this chapter is concerned with making 
sense of this claim — showing how it is a function of Adorno's theory of an 
artwork.  This analysis will in turn broaden our conception of nonidentity, 
mediation and negative dialectics upon which this analysis rests. 
 
It has been suggested that Gibbard's conception of objects, inasmuch as his thesis 
invokes aesthetic entities, has potential problems.  If Adorno is correct in his 
understanding of artworks, this position provides serious issues for our aesthetics 
but also for our epistemology and metaphysics.  To understand why, we must 
consider Adorno's theory of an artwork.  I quote a long passage from Aesthetic 
Theory because it argues, in Adorno's words, the points I have sketched above 
and which allows us to develop Adorno’s own, dialectical conception of 
nonidentity: 
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If the artwork is nothing fixed and definitive in itself, but something in 
motion, then its immanent temporality [Zeitlichkeit] is communicated 
to its parts and whole in such a fashion that their relation unfolds 
[enfaltet] in time and that they are capable of canceling [kündigen] this 
relation. If artworks are alive in history by virtue of their own 
processual character [Prozeßcharakters], they are also able to perish 
[vergehen] in it. The indefeasibility of what is sketched on paper, 
painted on canvas, or carved in stone is no guarantee of the 
indefeasibility of what is essential [wesenlich] to the artwork, its spirit 
[Geist], which is dynamic in itself. Artworks are on no account 
transformed [wandeln sich] exclusively by what reified consciousness 
takes to be the changing attitude of individuals toward works, which 
shifts according to the historical situation. Such change is external with 
regard to what transpires in the works themselves: the dissolution of 
their layers, one after the other, which was unforeseeable in the 
moment of the work's appearance; the determination of this 
transformation by their emerging and increasingly distinct law of form; 
the petrification of works that have become transparent, their 
decrepitude, and their falling silent. Ultimately their development is the 
same as their process of collapse [Zerfall]. 
 
The concept of an artifact [Artefakt], from which "artwork" is 
etymologically derived, does not quite match [nicht ganz heran] what 
an artwork is. Knowing that an artwork is something made does not 
amount to knowing that it is an artwork. The exaggerated accent on its 
fabrication, whether to besmirch art as human deception or to denounce 
its artificiality or preciousness in opposition to the delusion of art as 
unmediated nature [unmittelbare Natur], stands in sympathetic accord 
with philistinism. The idea of providing a simple definition of art was 
dared only by those all-disposing philosophical systems that reserved a 
niche for every phenomenon. (AT: 235 - 6 - Trans. modified) 
 
In the above passage, Adorno makes metaphysical distinctions between the 
artwork qua material and artworks qua essence [Wesen].  These metaphysical 
distinctions correspond to the distinctions made above in terms of determinate 
objects with different persistence conditions.  In terms of Fountain, the porcelain 
and the artwork are different entities and the latter is not reducible to the former 
and the former is not the sufficient — and perhaps even necessary — condition 
of the latter. Adorno makes precisely this point.   
 
Furthermore, the material entity, considered in terms of its properties, or its 
selection by fiat, is not sufficient for its determination as an artwork.  Adorno 
explicitly states that 'making as' or 'taking as' art does not guarantee that the 
material entity is an artwork — that 'making as' or taking as' instantiates another 
object with its own persistence conditions.  In light of this position, Adorno 
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emphasises change as something 'essential' to the nature of artworks.  Given the 
difference between the artwork and its material instantiation and that according to 
Adorno changes in artworks qua art can occur separately to changes in material 
entities, it is valid to emphasize the difference in persistence conditions across 
different, co-locating entities. 
 
Furthermore, given this complexity, it is not surprising that there is enormous 
pressure on our sortal concepts and their reference relations when attempting to 
determine an object as an artwork.  Adorno affirms my interpretation by 
emphasizing another aspect of nonidentity: just because the term 'artwork' cannot 
help but pick out the material entity, the porcelain, we should not be confused 
into thinking that the concept which refers to the artwork refers to the porcelain 
such that Fountain just is the porcelain.  Furthermore, as implied above, because 
the persistence conditions for Fountain vary separately from the porcelain and 
simple social fiat, we cannot assume that our conceptual identification of 
Fountain is rigid in virtue of its matter or by what we take to be the case about 
porcelain qua art. 
 
9.9.i History, Judgements and Dialectics 
 
Adorno emphasises that the essence of the object as art, in his terms, is different 
from the object as a material entity: what makes one what it is, is not the same as 
what makes another what it is.  In light of this claim, we should consider why this 
is the case and what it is about these different objects which makes them what 
they are for Adorno.  He says at the beginning of quotation ("If the artwork…") 
that the relation between the parts of the artwork and the 'whole' unfolds and is, 
therefore, temporal in character.  That the being of an artwork takes place over 
time, this unfolding is historical in character.  I will argue that this historical 
element has three aspects all of which are constitutive concerns for an entity 
being an artwork:  
 
a) the history of the object itself;  
b) the historical relationship of the 'artwork' and its material to other 
entities of a similar kind and their material;  
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c) the historical relationship between the artwork and the socio-historical 
conditions.
169
   
 
The temporal aspect of the artwork, (a), through which we can track its dynamic 
qualities, affords it precisely the opposite status to that assumed by Gibbard — 
that putative entities are rigid, self-identical and can be tracked in time 
accordingly.  Historical change, for Gibbard, inasmuch as it occurs, is partitioned 
off through possible-world semantics.  Conversely, for Adorno, it is this dynamic 
quality which he argues is essential to artworks, and which needs to be critically 
engaged with if we are to identify artworks.  
 
Understanding the nature of the dynamism of artworks, their processual character 
[Prozeßcharakters], is key to Adorno's aesthetics and important for 
understanding the particular pressure that artworks present to our epistemic 
activities.  The first claim is that the artwork unfolds over time and entails that it 
has a history.  Adorno explains this unfolding as a process which results from the 
'grinding away' of the parts of an artwork (AT: 233).  In order to understand this, 
it is useful to return to the claims made about Fountain above (9.5 & 6).  If it is 
the case that propositions assert what is true of the world then it seems reasonable 
that we can identify what these parts are and develop further propositions which 
track the relations of those parts. 
 
We should first note that the character of the unfolding will be different across 
different types of artworks.  The structure of unfolding for temporal artworks 
such as music and literature will be different than that of an artwork like 
Fountain which is in some sense, materially static.  These differences are to be 
expected and respected as aesthetics, done properly, requires bespoke analysis on 
an individual, particular basis.  Nevertheless we can consider the temporal import 
of Fountain and this will help us to understand the core commitments in the 
notion – even if these commitments will themselves take on a particular mode, 
depending on the object in question. 
                                                 
169
 I include within this condition the concerns of aesthetic attitude and the history of our 
consumption of art.  For Adorno these are important aspects of the socio-historical mediation of 
artworks. 
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There is a time when the urinal, which came to be selected by Duchamp, made 
true the propositions mentioned above.  It would also be true of both the 
porcelain and the urinal that they are lumps of porcelain, made to be a urinal and 
not made to be an artwork —  in this case, being lumps of porcelain is necessary 
only for a porcelain lump; being made to be a urinal is only necessary for being a 
urinal; given what both the urinal and the porcelain are, not being an artwork is 
necessary for both entities. Inasmuch as the urinal and porcelain entity are what 
they are respectively — and not artworks — they are mass-produced, tokens of 
types and they are made for use in public spaces.  Art works, within the prevalent 
tradition of autonomous art during which Fountain was ‘made’, are art, at least in 
part, because they do not have these utilitarian properties. 
 
As is well-known and quite obvious, Duchamp chose this porcelain/urinal 
complex precisely because what it is is everything that an artwork at the time was 
not. Here we start to see the processual, antagonistic 'parts' of an artwork and a 
deep structural issue of nonidentity qua art. The claims that a urinal is an artwork 
and that a mass-produced lump porcelain is an artwork are false.  This falsity is 
vital because it is in virtue of it, amongst other reasons, that Duchamp chose the 
urinal to be considered as an artwork.  Therefore, you have the somewhat 
aporetic metaphysical situation that Fountain, which is materially identical to the 
porcelain and the urinal, is an artwork because what it itself is, materially and 
functionally, is not an artwork. 
 
The question is, then, why is Duchamp not simply wrong to take the 
porcelain/urinal as an artwork?  At another later time, having been chosen as an 
artwork — or at least chosen for aesthetic appreciation, as Duchamp put it — if 
we take Fountain to be only one sort of entity, we have the strange situation that 
it is an artwork because it is not an artwork.  This is flatly contradictory and not a 
move that Adorno makes.  Precisely because of a more complex conception of 
identity and its aporetic, transformative character, characterized by nonidentity, 
at least in certain objects, he is able to assign scope and temporal index to 
otherwise contradictory propositions, such that co-locating objects enter into 
antagonistic relations with each other.  Indeed, it seems part of the dialectics of 
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Fountain’s identity that its being identified as an artwork — by Duchamp's 
associates, for example — is in part due to the fact that at the moment of 
choosing it, it is not an artwork.  As will be discussed, this strange sorting is 
predicated on a meta-aesthetic consideration of the relationship between the 
aesthetic and the non-aesthetic.  However, its becoming an artwork, inasmuch as 
that consists in some substantial sense of it not being an artwork, eradicates the 
very conditions for its persistence as art — its not being an artwork.   
 
The buffeting of truth-values between contradictory propositions, characterizes 
dialectical analysis.  One sees what is true of the identity of an object at one 
moment – considering its relationship to other entities with which it co-locates 
and ‘shares propositions’ as it were, and the fact of the truth-values of those 
propositions entails a metaphysical shift in the constitution of the entities present 
entailing corresponding contrary shifts in truth-values. 
 
Adorno speaks in dramatic terms of the ‘life of art’.  This is not mere figure of 
speech: it is an attempt to capture the dynamic quality of artworks which we have 
glimpsed above. Fountain is perhaps the aesthetic apotheosis of the difference 
between an entity qua artwork and an entity qua material constitution.   
 
Artworks are something made that has become more [Mehr] than 
something simply made. This was not contested until art began to 
experience itself as transient [seitdem Kunst sich als vergänglich 
erfährt].  Confusing artworks with their genesis, as if genesis provided 
the universal code for what has become [gewerden], is the source of the  
alienness of art scholarship to art: for artworks follow their law of form 
by consuming their genesis [denn kunstwerke folgen ihrem Formgesetz, 
indem sie ihre Genesis verzehren]. (AT: 236 trans. modified) 
 
Regardless of the persistence of the manufactured material of Fountain, arguably 
its 'life' as an artwork was over in a flash: in the very moment it became art it 
eradicated the conditions for its own consideration as an artwork.
170
  This is 
reflected in the seismic shift that Fountain precipitated in the artworld, aesthetics 
and the application of the concept, 'art', in the moment it was chosen as an 
                                                 
170
 It should be noted that Fountain was not the first readymade, see Bicyle Wheel (1913).  
However, Fountain was the 'game-changer' and this is arguably due to the particular way the 
conceptual tensions are articulated in Fountain, i.e., semiotically, the use of a urinal as opposed to 
a bike wheel, sets the aporias of art-making in sharpest relief. 
231 
 
artwork.  Inasmuch as Fountain could be taken as art, no future readymade, even 
an iteration of Fountain, could be taken as an artwork of the same type as 
Fountain.  Speaking dramatically, Fountain died in birth; what persisted is the 
memory of Fountain in the urinal and porcelain (which were also changed by the 
encounter with Fountain as they are no longer just any urinal).   
 
I take it that this, rather difficult notion, is what Adorno is referring to when he 
says: 
 
It is conceivable, and perhaps nowadays it is requisite of works, that 
they immolate [verbrennen] themselves through their temporal nucleus 
[Zeitkern], [that they] give their own life to the moment of the 
appearance of truth, and tracelessly vanish without thereby diminishing 
themselves in the slightest. (AT: 234 - trans. modified) 
 
Adorno is emphasizing the temporal contingency of artworks here and that their 
being an artwork cannot be confused with the material permanence of the entity 
with which the artwork co-locates.  In the case of certain artworks, Fountain for 
example, this temporal contingency translates into a very short existence qua art.  
This does not preclude future ready-mades from being artworks but they can 
never be an artwork in the same way as Fountain was. 
 
The above analysis also indicates a further way in which we can consider the 
'more' that Foster speaks of.  Recall that Foster wanted to couch this 'more' as 
some supra-linguistic, non-conceptual fact about objects.  Adorno seems to 
indicate a conceptual 'more' in line with my interpretation.  The more prosaic, yet 
more accurate connotation of mehr, is 'more' in terms of ‘remainder’.  The above 
analysis enables us to gather a particular type of propositional and historically 
mediated complexity which I think Adorno is aiming at.  It suggests that if we 
fail to index and set the domain of propositions to the correct entity(/ies) we will 
get contradictory propositions.  For example, if we take there to be an identity 
between Fountain, its matter and functional entity, and we don't historically 
index these claims, we get propositions such as Fountain is something that is and 
is not an artwork with no further qualifications.   Awareness of the socio-
historical mediations of Fountain and its internal nonidentity in terms of the 
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porcelain, urinal and artwork enables us to negotiate this complex metaphysical 
situation. 
 
Attendance to Fountain as an artwork requires attendance to more than what is 
asserted about Fountain in any one proposition. As we saw above, to get a 
dialectical account of the identity of artworks, we had to consider multiple 
propositions and consider how they impacted on each other’s truth-values at 
different times.  This ‘more’ is just that there remains more to be considered.  
However, it suggests another possibility for the quantitative insufficiency of 
propositions in terms of sets of propositions.  If it is the case that what is true of 
the artwork, the urinal and the porcelain can change over time then the historical 
indexing of propositions entails that we cannot foreclose, at any particular time, 
on a determinate, sufficient set of propositions that are true of these objects for 
any time.   
 
This is a substantial thesis.  The claim is not that there are more propositions 
required to account for Cambridge properties — Fountain was made 10 years 
ago and then a year later, Fountain was made 11 years ago.    Rather, the position 
says something about what exists and what that existence consists in.  Maybe, 
Fountain could cease to be an artwork, and then for some future situation it could 
become an artwork again.  There will always be 'more' to say as regards the 
propositions licensed by the historical and modal properties of the objects 
inasmuch as they persist historically.  This 'more', however, is not a mystical 
region, entity or property, it is part of Adorno's critique of the sufficiency of 
identity-thinking considered temporally.   
 
He even argues that we can revise our aesthetic notions with serious 
metaphysical consequences.  What was previously taken to be an artwork, or not, 
or what was previously taken to be a quality artwork, or not, can be revised.  He 
contests it is possible that such and such is an artwork at a particular time and that 
such and such is not an artwork at the same time.   
 
The superiority of the great impressionists over Gauguin became 
evident only after his innovations had paled in the face of later 
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developments. For quality to unfold historically, however, depends not 
just on it but on what came afterward, and it sets in relief what 
preceded it; perhaps there is a relation between quality and the process 
of perishing. (AT: 256, trans. modified) 
 
This is a possibility if we properly index the propositions temporally because the 
scopes of the two propositions are different.  The first proposition is qualified 
according to its consideration at the time in question and the second is qualified 
by the clause when considered from another, later time. Of course it is 
epistemically impossible to know the two propositions will be true at the first 
moment but Adorno is not suggesting this.  Following Hegel, the owl of Minerva 
flies at dusk for Adorno – substantial knowledge is gained after the fact through 
dialectical, historical analysis.  And for Adorno it is vital that our knowledge of 
the past is revisable at any given future moment.  Furthermore, given the 
dynamism of artworks, we should not assume that because we have identified an 
entity at one moment, it will therefore be instantiated at another, later moment. 
 
However, at this juncture, the account still has a strong institutional theory 
element even if the persistence conditions of certain artworks escape the ambit of 
social fiat and despite having established a more substantial account of 
nonidentity which suggests against institutional theory.  It may appear that the 
sufficient condition of being an artwork, no matter how briefly, is that it is taken 
as such.  Also, as yet, we do not have a good reason why a urinal could be taken 
as an artwork, to some degree, in virtue of it not being, materially, an artwork.  
From previous quotations we know that Adorno argues against ‘taking as’ an 
artwork as sufficient to being an artwork; he also argues that the existence of 
artworks is an objective state of affairs in the socio-historical world.  Therefore, 
some good reason must be provided for the objective validity of a urinal being an 
artwork which is not reducible to an act of 'taking as'.  Having expanded on 
issues of nonidentity as they relate to the co-locating objects, this account needs 
to be expanded to show the constitutive role of the socio-historical on the identity 
of an artwork and also how the socio-historical is important for the identification 
of artworks. 
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9.10 Nonidentity, History and Truth Content 
 
Adorno says that it is in virtue of the temporal nucleus of the artwork, discussed 
above, that artworks partake in truth: the moment that the work is an artwork, 
inasmuch as it is an artwork it has 'truth content'.
171
  Explaining what truth 
consists in here identifies the crucial difference between Adorno's dialectics and 
institutional accounts: it entails that an artwork’s being an artwork is an objective 
state of affairs.
172
  It will also help us to understand, given a thesis of different 
co-locating objects, how we can name an object, 'Fountain' for example, which 
has certain antithetical properties to another entity with which it co-locates.  We 
will see that this objective state of affairs is not reducible to facts about properties 
of objects, properties of subjects nor is it reducible to social facts.  Rather it 
invokes all of these elements and their relations as they stand at the particular 
moment of analysis.  From here we will be in a position to understand the import 
of the socio-historical on the existence and identity of artworks and upon what 
basis we can identify artworks as artworks. 
 
9.10.i The Socio-Historical Dimension 
 
A number of propositions were considered above, through which one could show 
the sorts of tensions between propositions as they are true of artworks.  The 
tensions, as they were considered, concerned issues of identity.  This account 
does not tell us why these identity shifts take place; it just states it according to 
some assumed fact about artworks.  To understand why our judgement that a 
lump of porcelain/urinal can be taken as an artwork is valid beyond social fiat, 
we need to understand what it is about the object, our concepts and the world 
which entails this complex, shifting situation. 
 
It was suggested above that there are three ways to consider the history of the 
object.  Artificially, the history of the object, (a), was considered discretely, 
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 See AT: 45, 51, 116 & esp, 168. See Zuidervaart, 1991: 116. 
172
 See Zuidervaart's excellent analysis of objectivity in Adorno's thinking, 1991: 109 - 18, esp. 
"The notion of reflective expression points to a crucial connection between art and social history.  
It points to the artist's socio-historical experiences, unconscious and unintentional, that enter 
artworks and become objective.  Adorno's version of aesthetic realism calls for unswerving 
faithfulness to such experiences." (1991: 114).  See AT: 217, for a bold commitment to aesthetic 
realism.  What I am adding to Zuidevaart's theory is the associated importance of the socio-
historical conditions which provide the historical index for this realism. 
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separately from other ‘histories’, (b) and (c).  To grasp Adorno's theory of truth 
we need to understand how the history of the object is involved in other historical 
issues.   Analysis of the historical relationship of an artwork to other artworks 
and the relationship of the artwork to its general socio-historical conditions is 
required. 
 
The material involved in choosing a urinal to be taken as Fountain, this particular 
mass-produced lump of porcelain, is itself part of a social history.  That is, its 
individual, particular being is mediated by a wealth of socio-historical factors — 
facts about the social world and therefore also about us as social beings.  It is a 
token product of a particular form of industry; it is made possible according to 
certain technological processes; it indicates a particular form and structure of 
labour; its design tells us about functional aesthetics, etc.  On behalf of the 
subject, Duchamp, who chooses the artwork, his material — his ideas and 
concepts — themselves have a history: what has he previously considered 
artworks?  What has he made as art previously?
173
  His previous artworks 
involved particular techniques, technologies through which they partook in a 
particular conception of art-production.  Society, of which Duchamp is also a 
part, takes a view of the difference between what Duchamp as an artist does and 
what a manufacturer is doing when they make a urinal.   
 
The basis for such normative considerations, following this Hegelian, historical 
perspective, is then related to a general history of society, its economic, its 
political and its cultural structures.  When we track these large-scale socio-
cultural phenomena, we track Geist, the history of world as it instantiates in a 
movement through these phenomena.
174
  Whilst Adorno did not agree with 
Hegel’s metaphysics of Geist (see Chapter Six), as we considered, Hegel’s theory 
was enormously influential on Adorno.  Geist is an indispensable concept for him 
as it provides an important notion for following the dynamics of dialectical 
critique. 
 
                                                 
173
 It is not that he made art of such a type which is important: it is the relation that Fountain takes 
to other works of art which have a common source.   
174
 Adorno speaks in just this way in Negative Dialectics when he refers to capitalism (ND: 199). 
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What needs to be understood is how these various elements — the socio-
historical, the material and the conceptual — interact to guarantee the substantial 
metaphysical commitments being posed above: that we can be committed to the 
existence of artworks as real, in the sense of being objective, and that the 
objectivity of artworks’ existence, as such, provides the grounds for substantial 
truths about the world.  From here we will then be able to determine what is 
being identified and on what basis our identifications are valid.  The problem is 
that the dialectical analysis involved becomes so complex and the number of 
dynamic and transformative relations, so vast, that it is very difficult to distil the 
philosophical commitments.  The following is an attempt to understand the sorts 
of dialectical inferences I believe are involved in engaging with an artwork such 
as Fountain; I cannot justify the soundness of this argument.  An analysis worthy 
of a thesis would be required to argue for the soundness. 
 
Fountain, it was suggested, points, as it were, to facts about the world which lie 
beyond itself: forms of production, norms of aesthetic utility, etc.  Insofar as 
certain propositions are true of the urinal and the porcelain, this is due to other 
facts about the social world.  For example, the token-type identity of the urinal is 
possible only within a certain mode of production.  Using Adorno's 
understanding of the constitutive role of social history on artworks we can note 
the importance of the mode of production upon which the urinal is predicated.  
This mode of production is itself a function of particular social arrangements: a 
dialectical analysis of modes of production reveals states of affairs about the 
development and state of class, about capital, about labour form, etc.  Certain 
propositions, true of the urinal, reference, indirectly, through its identity, 
existence and form, many other phenomena and the particular way in which they 
are. 
 
An Adornian analysis would also consider Fountain: what do the identity, form 
and existence of Fountain indicate about the world?  Bearing in mind the 
particular socio-economic arrangement upon which the urinal is predicated, the 
conception of art-making, producing, consuming and identifying as a 
commensurable function of the socio-economic structures within which the urinal 
was made. So, for Adorno, a particular mode of functional production is wedded 
to a particular mode of non-functional (artistic) production.  The economic mode 
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of manufacture which produces urinal is dialectically involved with a mode of 
art-making as autonomous.  Therefore, for Adorno artistic autonomy is not 
detachable from its socio-economic environment.   
 
Just as a particular socio-economic structure makes autonomy possible, it 
inflects, or mediates, autonomy in a particular mode – the nature and possibility 
of autonomy becomes implicated in the socio-economic structure upon which it 
is predicated.
175
  This is highly speculative as presented here.  However, the issue 
here is not whether Adorno is right but how his thinking works.  Thus far, the 
socio-economic, cultural and political state of affairs upon which the urinal is 
predicated is the same state of affairs upon which a notion of art-making is 
predicated.  Furthermore, this socio-historical state of affairs, within which 
Fountain was developed, i.e., the Modernist period, says precisely that those 
objects which are to be identified as artworks are autonomous of the interests and 
utility of the states of affairs within which the artwork is produced. 
 
Adorno’s analysis of this autonomy, as it is determined, or mediated, according 
to this economic structure, argues that the artwork is also a commodity fetish.  
This somewhat aporetic idea says that an artwork's complete lack of utility, its 
autonomous separation from the material and the practical concerns of society, 
means that in economic terms its value is determined entirely by the surplus 
value it can generate as a medium for the flow of capital.  So, differently 
considered, the socio-economic conditions within which autonomous artworks 
are produced means that simultaneously the artwork is totally separate from the 
interests of society from one point of view and yet considered from the 
perspective of the economic, it is only valued according to the monetary interest 
we take in it.  The economic development towards the conditions whereby the 
artwork can be a pure commodity makes it possible for an artist to state this 
commodification within the realm of the aesthetic: by presenting a functional 
commodity as an artwork.  One way of interpreting the ‘arthood’ of Fountain, 
which could show the constitutive import of a particular moment in the socio-
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 There is a great deal of work analysing these ideas both in Adorno and in many commentators.  
See for example, Zuidervaart, 1991: 91; Jarvis, 1998: 114 - 7; Hammer, 2006; 80 - 1; Paddison, 
1997: 98.  Hohendahl, 2010: §13. 
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historical milieu in which it is made, is that it makes explicit the aporia of 
autonomous artworks that they are pure commodities.
176
  Inasmuch as the sortal, 
artworks, only picks out autonomous artworks, it is ‘out of phase’, as it were, 
with the art-making possibilities generated by the very conditions which make 
autonomous artworks possible. 
 
The point is that Fountain is a product of this complex situation where that 
situation, from different perspectives, seems to make very different claims: x is 
potentially an artwork (from an economic point view) and x is not an artwork 
from an aesthetic point of view.  One can take a commodity as an art-object 
because, from the perspective of economics and production, what is substantially 
true of an artwork is that it is a commodity.  It therefore follows, that any 
commodity, inasmuch as it is a commodity, can be taken as an artwork as long as 
there is nothing about that commodity which stops it from entering into relations 
of pure commodity fetishism.  Fountain is the making explicit of the meta-
aesthetic state of affairs such that a urinal, qua commodity, can be fetishised as a 
pure commodity and as such fulfills a valid condition of autonomous art.  What is 
interesting about this move is that as it makes explicit the relationship between 
the bourgeois autonomous artwork and its status as commodity, Fountain helped 
to explode the myth of autonomous art.  Hence, in other terms, it destroyed the 
conditions for its own possibility. 
 
The above analysis is a sketch of the aesthetic issues.  However, it is enough to 
see how the socio-historical could have a constitutive role in the objective 
existence of art entities.  Whether or not Adorno would even make this argument 
is moot.  Nevertheless, the kind of dialectical, aesthetic arguments Adorno makes 
include such socio-historical notions and that they have substantial metaphysical 
consequences for the entities to which we are committed.  Furthermore, Adorno’s 
dialectics seems to be able to make sense of a particularly intractable problem for 
identity-thinking in the form of Fountain, whilst retaining objectivity, sensitivity 
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 Again there is a great deal of other aesthetic issues which have not been mentioned for the 
purposes of this argument.  In particular, one could argue that Fountain also points towards the 
breakdown of in the idea that there are 'natural' forms of art-making such as melodies, pictorial 
representation, etc.  It is a complex and well-known aspect of producing autonomous artworks 
that they came to reflect upon their own formal processes.   Although one would certainly need to 
consider such notions for a proper aesthetic analysis, they are not essential to the task at hand. 
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to the particularity of artworks, a fine-grained account of sortal identification and 
a complex metaphysics of objects at least in line with the accounts of some 
contemporary metaphysicians.  Arguably formalism has floundered somewhat 
before an account of Fountain; institutional theories flounder in maintaining a 
substantial and objective sense of 'art'.  In light of such problems, Adorno’s 
theory has much to recommend it.   
 
9.10.ii History and Truth Content 
 
The idea at work is that analysis of history vis-à-vis culture, economics, and 
politics reveals ‘facts’ indexed to the moment in time at which that analysis was 
conducted.  Let us say that one such fact is that the socio-economic mode of 
production is such that it licenses a particular form of art: art as commodity.  Yet, 
given the equally valid conception of art within the very same socio-economic 
period, urinals cannot and do not fall within the ambit of artworks. This is the 
reason why Duchamp could validly take a urinal as an artwork, even when it is 
not licensed by our conceptual scheme at that juncture and why this taking to be 
is not reducible to an issue of intention as such or social fiat.  Rather, it is the 
objective validity of Fountain, as an artwork, according to its modal and 
historical properties given a particular socio-historical moment.   
 
The historical moment [geschichtliche Moment] is constitutive 
[konstitutiv] of artworks; authentic works are those that surrender 
themselves to the historical substance of their age without reservation 
and without the presumption of being superior to it. They are the self-
unconscious historiography of their epoch; not least of which, this 
provides for knowledge. Precisely this makes them incommensurable 
with historicism, which, instead of following their own historical 
content [Gehalt], reduces them to their external history. Artworks may 
be all the more truly [wahrhaftiger] experienced [erfahren] the more 
their historical substance [Substanz] is that of the one who experiences 
it. (AT: 240)
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The world is developing in such a way that Duchamp could take a urinal, which 
is not an artwork, and assert it as an artwork.  It is not an artwork, however, 
because he chooses it to be an artwork or because he, as an artist, ‘made’ it or 
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 This is against the sort of historicism we find in Levinson: "an artwork is a thing (item, object, 
entity) that has been seriously intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art - i.e., regard in any way pre-
existing artworks are or were correctly regarded." (2011: 38 - 9).  Levinson's view was already 
anticipated and attacked by Adorno, AT: 240. 
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even because it was inserted, in some way, into the ‘artworld’.  Rather, inasmuch 
as it is an artwork, this is an objective state of affairs which obtains according to 
how the world is, how we are and how the object, qua form, etc, is.  The genius 
of the artist for Adorno is that they perceive in their materials a set of problems 
and their expressive solution to them is artistic as determined by the objective 
conditions of a particular socio-historical situation.   
 
Truth then, in this instance, is a question of objectivity as indexed to a socio-
historical moment: In artworks, objectivity [Sachlichkeit] and truth [Wahrheit] 
are inseparable (AT: 171).  As Adorno says above, it is the constitutive role that 
history plays in the being of an artwork that brings it into the arena of 
'knowledge' — insofar as we know the object as an artwork, and due to the 
historical constitution of the artwork, in terms of its materials and context, we can 
know something about the socio-historical world through the knowing of an 
object as an artwork.  That is, in terms of an object being an artwork it tells us 
something true about the world.  Adorno’s conception of truth lies in the notion 
that the particular form of an artwork expresses within its own particular aporias, 
form, material and content, a state of affairs which obtain external to its being 
(AT: 172).  The sense of truth being picked out here relies on the idea that the 
artwork ‘represents’, although indirectly and nondiscursively through its form 
and material, a non-aesthetic state of affairs which obtains external to the object.  
 
Given this relation, one could say that the artwork, insofar as it is an artwork, is 
'true of the world'.  In establishing the relationship of art, not only to a standard 
of objectivity, what it is for an object to be an artwork at a particular moment, but 
also to telling us, albeit indirectly, something about the world, Adorno argues 
that aesthetic questions resolve to a fundamental question about the object in 
terms of its socio-historical moment — is the artwork 'true'?    
 
The ceaselessly recurring question that every work dismisses in 
whoever traverses it—the "What is it all about?"— goes over into "Is it 
true [Wahr]?"—the question of the absolute, to which every artwork 
responds by wresting itself free from the discursive form of answer. 
(AT: 168, trans. modified) 
 
If an object is an artwork, it will be, in the sense being developed here, true of the 
world in virtue of being an artwork.  The point is that the artwork is a non-
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propositional, non-discursive 'representation' of the world which needs to be 
decoded through the sort of analysis I suggested above with Fountain.
178
   
 
Furthermore, because this representation is riddle-like, aesthetic analysis and any 
associated knowledge does not merely consist in reading off truths about the 
world from the material presentation of the artwork.  Rather, it is through 
understanding the dynamic relations between the elements of an artwork that we 
are able to develop notions about the true artwork and thereby learning 
something about the world.  One needs to work out what is true of it at different 
historical moments and consider the relations of those truths. Adorno is explicit 
that the key aesthetic question is, therefore, is it an artwork? — which is to say, is 
it true (and by extension, true of the world)? Here then, we see Hegel's complex 
theory of truth resurfacing in Adorno's thinking.  Truth is something about 
objects themselves, ourselves, and also about the relations to the world. 
 
Through the analysis of Fountain, we can come to know something about the 
world through the form of the artwork.  Yet it is the complex, dynamic, shifting 
character of artworks, which constitutes the relevant subject matter for analysis.  
The point is not to compare the artwork with the world; rather it is to analyse the 
validity of the integration — and fracture — of the form and content of an 
artwork.  That is, we consider the artwork on its own terms, according to its own 
form and content.  Through the analysis of the form and content, those objects 
which are objectively artworks, insofar as they are artworks, we can learn 
something true about the world: 
 
That by which truth content is more than what is posited by artworks is 
their methexis in history and the determinate critique that they exercise 
through their form.  History in artworks is not something made 
[gemacht], and history alone frees the work from being merely 
something posited or manufactured: Truth content [Wahrheitsgehalt] is 
not external to history but rather its crystallization in the works. Their 
unposited truth content is their name. (AT: 175) 
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 Another way in which Adorno discusses truth in this way is through the concept of 
authenticity: "That art enunciates the disaster by identifying with it anticipates its enervation; this, 
not any photograph of the disaster or false happiness, defines the attitude of authentic 
contemporary art to a radically darkened objectivity…" (AT: 25).  The truth content of an 
artwork, which is its index of authenticity, and which determines its objectivity, is distinguished 
from the falseness of a 'jargonistic' authenticity (JoA: 100 - 2). 
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One can think about this idea of truth, objectivity and analysis of form, in terms 
of Fountain.  In the same way as one could say, although it would be a rather 
uninteresting claim, that the urinal, inasmuch as it is a urinal, has certain formal, 
modal and historical properties which tell us something true about how and why 
we take objects to be urinals, genuine artworks tell us something true about our 
society which they do by simply being the way that they are.  What is interesting 
about artworks is that unlike urinals which are merely determined by fiat, as we 
have seen, artworks can contain within themselves, as it were, aporias and 
problems that are true of society through the objective formal features of the 
object as an artwork.  Identifying an artwork is not a case of 'taking as', but 
learning about what an object is and by extension, learning about the world.  
Artworks bring together, in one location, a vast amount of complex information 
which, through its socio-historical mediation, generates transformative 
interactions.   Analysis of the aesthetic validity of the integration of form and 
content tells us something true about the world which makes possible the 
aesthetic validity of the object qua art. 
 
Another way that Adorno considers the exceptional difficulties of this theory of 
truth is through the notion of questions and answers.  What makes an artwork an 
artwork, represents, albeit in the form of a riddle, a modal state of affairs about 
the socio-historical world which licenses the fact that the object may be validly 
taken as an artwork.  As we have seen in the case of Fountain, this is a dynamic 
and complex relationship.  The socio-historical moment, by being a particular 
way, poses a particular form of the fundamental aesthetic question: how to create 
a valid work of art at this moment?  Each work of art, if successful, where that 
success is settled by the aesthetic consideration of the form and content of the 
object in question, is therefore a particular answer to the aesthetic problem of art-
hood, posed through the context of a socio-historical moment.   
 
Artworks participate in enlightenment because they do not lie: They do 
not feign the literalness of what speaks out of them. They are real as 
answers to the puzzle [Fragegestalt] externally posed to them. Their 
own tension is binding in relation to the tension external to them. (AT: 
6) 
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That the object successfully answers the implicit problem of being an artwork at 
a particular socio-historical moment allows us to infer what the specific nature of 
the aesthetic problem is for that socio-historical moment – artworks help us to 
work out the puzzle or question of identity at a particular moment.  In 
discovering the question, we learn something about the questioner, the socio-
historical moment itself. 
 
During Modernism in particular, analysing a work's truthcontent is extremely 
challenging because they are true of a world which is fractured — aporetic 
propositions seem true of it depending on the point of view that the phenomena 
are considered.  In other words, an aspect of Fountain's truth content was to 
assert, through its disjunction of utilitarian, functional form and its idea as an 
artwork, a schism that was developing in the world about how it understood the 
production and consumption of artworks and how it separated this production 
and consumption from the functional object.   
 
Fountain, as a work of art, correctly 'asserted' that this distinction was no longer 
socio-historically tenable; Fountain is an answer to the problem of the identity of 
artworks within advanced western capitalism which it achieved simply through 
the meta-aesthetic move of articulating the question itself.    Note, that Fountain 
achieves this articulation apart from the social world it indicates.
179
  The relations 
between the two are developed through analysis, it is not stated within the 
artwork and it does not contain any content which is explicitly about the world.  
The content is mediated through the form.  The role of aesthetics is to unravel the 
content as it is mediated in the form.  As we have seen, in the case of the 
metaphysics of Fountain, this leads to radical transformations in entities and their 
properties at different moments.  It gives us a situation where the truth content of 
an artwork consists in a dynamic state of affairs. 
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they are nevertheless separate from it (AT: 237). 
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9.11 Conclusion 
 
The above analysis has emphasised nonidentity as a key issue when considering 
artworks.  Developing a metaphysics of co-locating objects, I have analyzed the 
complex and dynamic ways in which our propositions represent the world and 
how this representation, in the case of artworks at least, does not lend itself to the 
sort of identity we find in identity-thinking.  In order to show this, a basic 
analysis of certain aspects of an artwork, Fountain, was considered in a 
dialectical way.  This emphasized the shifting and aporetic quality of artworks.   
From there we were led to consider the relation of artworks to history.   
 
Through these movements we were brought to a consideration of key 
metaphysical and epistemological notions such as truth, validity and objectivity.  
We saw that in the case of artworks, Adorno understands the socio-historical 
index of propositions about objects to constitute the conditions for objectivity 
and truth-making.  This required us to consider, briefly, Adorno's notion of truth.  
That the internal form and integration of an artwork's content, modally, that is the 
way this integration occurred, would indicate something true of the world.  Yet in 
neither case is this truth merely something that can be read off the world, 
artworks or our concepts of them.  Determining the truth of an artwork requires 
analysis of the object in question.   
 
Yet in considering the relationship of nonidentity to truth, it was revealed that 
there was a form of identity at work here.  The artwork, insofar as it makes true a 
set of propositions at a particular moment and over a particular domain of 
discourse, is identical with a set of propositions, differently expressed, which are 
also true of society at the same moment and in that domain of discourse. 
However, the dialectical moment, as we have already seen, transpires because the 
relations between (co-locating) objects and phenomena are such that what is true 
of them is always changing and can come to make true contrary propositions.  
Therefore, an identity which obtains between an object and a social state of 
affairs at one time may, even in the next instant, not obtain precisely because of 
the dynamics involved in that identity relation.  I have argued that this is the case 
in terms of Fountain. 
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The expressive element, or 'content' of the artwork, which is true of the world, is 
not propositional; it is substantial, literally.  It expresses itself by being materially 
and formally instantiated in such a way that certain propositions are then true of 
it.  Inasmuch as we are interested in objectively identifying artworks and 
engaging with their truth content, critical analysis of the object is required.  
However, the complex, shifting, transformative ways that objects are, require that 
this analysis is understood not merely as the aggregation of true propositions as 
sufficient sets of descriptions for the identification of an entity.   
 
Analysis is therefore adequate to the work only if it grasps the relation 
of its moments [Momente] to each other processually rather than 
reducing them analytically to purported fundamental elements. (AT: 
232 - trans. modified) 
 
Rather, in the complex sets of propositions which are true of the object, which it 
brings together in the semblance of its own unity as a particular object, it 
provides a terrain through which far more complex dynamic relations can take 
place.  I have argued that the basis of this dialectics lies in at first realizing that 
the seeming identity that obtains between sortal terms and their referent and even 
across objects with different modal properties, is no such thing. Rather, this 
identity is complex; objects can enter into antagonistic, transformative relations 
with each other. 
 
Furthermore, from this analysis we have resources to counter Rosen's worry that 
without determinate negation Adorno's dialectics is left without motor force.  
Certainly it is true that the dialectical transformations of objects in relation to the 
world are not positive in some determinately progressive sense.  Nevertheless, 
given the metaphysics of objects and their socio-historical mediation, the 
tensions and fractures — a minimal requirement for the interplay of dialectics — 
are immanent to their constitution.  When Adorno speaks of the grinding away of 
the elements of an artwork, this grinding away is the forced interaction of 
aporetic qualities of artworks.  This grinding away cannot help but produce 
determinate change even if it is not the total sublation of tension. 
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We saw this in the example of Fountain.  I argued that the complexity of the 'art-
object' — which actually consists in a number of co-locating objects — generates 
a site of competing and contradictory dynamics.  The interaction of these 
dynamics then produces the sort of transitions where an artwork may be 
generated from material precisely because that material does not consist in being 
an artwork.  As we saw this dialectical transition required the socio-historical 
mediation of the object, i.e., that there were these contradictory dynamics was a 
result of the socio-historical situation within which the urinal was taken to be an 
artwork. 
 
It should be obvious, given the transformative character of dialectical aesthetics 
that what ought to count as identity, what relations, properties, propositions are 
aesthetically relevant, cannot be settled in advance by theory; they can only be 
captured by detailed and individual analysis.  To know what an object is requires 
following the transformations in the truth-values of propositions as they interact 
through their mediation in objects.  The problems of nonidentity are substantial 
and they require us to consider objects in their conceptlessness, i.e. not solely as 
they are rendered in concepts or according to a system or conceptual scheme, but 
as particular objects which pose particular problems for analysis.  In other words, 
the import of conceptlessness is that it directs our attention to the substantial, 
methodological demands the dialectics of nonidentity present to our 
epistemology.   
 
We have to follow what happens to Fountain — its history — tracking its 
existence as a lump of porcelain, as a urinal and finally as Fountain, considering 
what was true of these entities at what times and in what way.  And then consider 
why, particularly the modal and historical properties of the Fountain, were true 
qua art.  For that we would have to consider the socio-historical conditions for 
the production of Fountain.  What we find, according to Adorno, is that 
contained in Fountain were the very same problems and issues that we find in 
society but encoded in non-propositional, substantial form.  The idea that we 
have a theory, such as a scientific theory for example, which can generalise about 
artworks based on analysis of other artworks, radically misjudges the 
particularity of artworks.  Similarly, if we assume a rigid, representative relation 
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between language and the world such that analysis of language allows us to track 
general theoretical notions about any artwork, we assume far too much about the 
metaphysics of artworks.   
 
Adorno argues that artworks and their nonidentity confound these sorts of 
theoretical assumptions. As Heil even points out without aesthetic, dialectical 
analysis, not only would a 'total' explanation of an artwork's being be beyond our 
ken, their metaphysical constitution is fundamentally unruly from the point of 
view of physics, for example.   The metaphysics of artworks is such that their 
'identity' confounds generalisations, rules and predictions and requires us to 
engage with the object if we wish to understand it.  Again, as Heil says of statues: 
"We are in no position to move analytically from concepts to truth makers for 
applications of those concepts." (2003: 190).  That is not to suggest that artworks 
are beyond comprehension but it does suggest that an entirely different approach 
to their constitution is required.  I have argued that Adorno provides a compelling 
case for such an alternative approach, one which revolves around the 
complexities of nonidentity, mediation and conceptlessness as presented. 
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10. Negative Dialectics: Adorno's Immanent Critiques of Kant 
and Hegel Reconsidered 
 
 
We are now in a position to understand the core commitments of negative 
dialectics.  Negative dialectics is a theoretical orientation as opposed to a system, 
a set of principles or conditions or a process.  Adorno's immanent critiques of 
Kant and Hegel, which we will reconsider shortly, provided us with three critical 
notions: conceptlessness, nonidentity and mediation.  These have been discussed 
above.  Negative dialectics consists in a particular understanding of these notions 
and their mutual import for each other — they are a negative dialectical 
constellation. 
 
The theoretical orientation of 'negative dialectics' is negative in the sense that this 
constellation of concepts, or notions, entails limits to our epistemic and 
metaphysical ambitions and critically inflects our philosophical enquiries.  That 
is, it is critical in contrast to providing 'positive' systematic claims about the 
world.  The world cannot be known nor conceptually represented in its entirety; 
this is not merely a pragmatic issue but an immanent limit to the possibilities of 
knowledge.  Metaphysical enquiry also finds its limits in material particulars and 
cannot detach itself from those particulars.  We have seen, in the examination of 
the first three chapters, that Adorno understands critical enquiry to be motivated 
by the irreducible conceptlessness of the material world and its subsequent 
difference to the medium of our thinking and subjectivity, which, for Adorno, is 
irreducibly conceptual. 
 
I have arrived at this notion of negative dialectics through a close reading and 
reconstruction of Adorno's immanent critiques of Kant and Hegel.  In this final 
chapter, I develop an important nuance which is suppressed in the linear 
presentation of the thesis.  The first section developed criticisms of Kant through 
particular tensions in his philosophy.  In light of these tensions we moved to a 
critique of Hegel.  These criticisms may lead to the impression that even though 
Hegel was also critiqued by Adorno, Hegel is a progression from Kant.  That is, 
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Kant was useful insofar as he led Adorno to Hegel's thinking.  This 
interpretation, however, would be a mistake.  If we consider the content of 
Adorno's critique of Hegel, it has a distinctly Kantian inflection.  In this final 
section, I will re-present the material of the first two sections and show that rather 
than a linear progression from Kant to Hegel to Adorno, the latter's philosophy is 
the result of a mutual critique of the two thinkers, that Adorno has used Kant to 
counter critique Hegel.
180
  From a methodological point of view, it would appear 
that Adorno's negative dialectics can be fruitfully understood as a dialectical 
interplay between the two thinkers through which a new position is attained. 
 
10.1 Negative Dialectics: Commitments 
 
From the previous three chapters in this section, it becomes apparent that 
Adorno's negative dialectics entails a set of metaphysical commitments.  As 
Espen Hammer points out, whilst Adorno certainly had an antipathy towards a 
priori metaphysics and rationalism, it does not follow that he is insensitive to or 
unconcerned with metaphysics.
181
 Indeed, Adorno's metaphysical interests and 
commitments are often overlooked and this leads to problems of interpretation.  
In particular, the analyses above demonstrate that understanding his metaphysics 
enables us to negotiate the problems of begriffslose and Nichtidentität without 
needing to resort to some notion of non-conceptual content in experience or some 
element, portion or region of experience which is beyond conceptual experience. 
 
What, then, are the metaphysical commitments underpinning the above analyses?  
 
- Objects, qua material, are a particular way and that that way is self-
identical.   
 
- Objects, for us, as thinking, discursive agents, are many different ways.  
Objects and thinking agents are such that for the particular way an object 
is, there are many different ways in which we can attend to that object: we 
may say that it is an object; it is made of glass; it is hard; it is fragile.  
                                                 
180
 This idea occurred to Jarvis but he does not elaborate it in detail (1998: 152). 
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 See Adorno's analysis of Aristotle in particular. (MCP: 28 - 9). See Hammer, 2008: 65 - 72. 
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That does not commit us to the notion, that the way that we represent the 
object, whilst valid, is ontologically correct.  The difference between 
objects and their determining concepts is such that there is a nonidentity 
between the world and our articulations of it.  
 
- Inasmuch as we abstract and divide objects in our valid conceptual 
articulations and given that we are arguing that those divisions do not 
map onto real divisions in the world, the ways that we sort, determine and 
articulate the world conceptually do not represent how the world is — 
these demarcations are an unavoidable function of the way in which we 
can and do think about the world.   
 
- Contra Foster, this third notion does not entail that our linguistic 
articulations about the world are failures or that there seems to be some 
part or portion — perhaps even the whole depending on how strongly we 
take Foster's thesis — of the world which is 'beyond' conceptual 
articulation.  Any entity within the material world is amenable to 
conceptual articulation.  Despite being amenable to articulation, this does 
not preclude the complexity and perhaps contradictory character of 
phenomena.  As a result, valid articulations about the world will not 
simply aggregate as sets of facts. 
 
- Just because there are valid ways in which we can speak about the world 
we are not, therefore, committed to the idea that there is always a set of 
propositions which we could propose at a specific moment in history 
which would be sufficient to determination of an entity regardless of the 
historical moment.  Artworks, broadly speaking, appear to be a complex 
of non-identical objects which bear equally complex relations to the 
world and to each other.  Nonidentity does not simply obtain between 
mind and world, it obtains in the world.
182
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- Issues of nonidentity are underpinned by the modal notion of mediation: 
the way that objects are is at least in part as a result of their 'mediation' by 
heterogeneous dynamics, influences, material and history.  Mediation also 
refers to our cognition of objects by concepts and also, therefore, of the 
mediation of particular objects by general concepts and universals.  In 
short, for Adorno, everything is mediated: objects, our thoughts, our 
concepts and our social reality.  This does not mean that it is an 'ur-
concept' which is either the key to all theorizing or trivial in its super-
abundance.  Rather it is a notion with direct metaphysical and 
epistemological import that when we consider any phenomena, sensitivity 
to its mediations will help us to understand the phenomena.  Conversely, 
if we ignore the mediations we are likely to be led to systematically 
misunderstand the phenomena at hand. 
    
- In these cases the quantitative complexity of conditions involved in its 
consideration as an artwork at least push the limits of our comprehension; 
our methods for analysing such objects cannot be settled in advance of 
analysis, as a set of rules or as a system of analysis.  At the least, our 
methodological approach can be no more determinate than the following: 
when we consider an object, we must attend to the complex way that it is 
(see Chapter Nine) and, depending on this analysis, consider a potential 
host of heterogeneous socio-historical considerations.   
 
Negative dialectics is the philosophical attempt to maintain theoretical purchase 
on the world whilst being sensitive these metaphysical difficulties.  That Adorno 
sees these problems as constitutive of philosophical problems, results, on the one 
hand from his critical analysis of artworks found in his aesthetics, and on the 
other hand, from his immanent critique of Kant and Hegel. The point now is to 
show how these areas, namely his aesthetics and his critique of German Idealism, 
being grounded in his metaphysical and epistemological commitments given 
above, come together to provide the basis for understanding and 'performing' 
negative dialectical enquiry.   
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10.2 Critique of Kant Revisited 
 
I have sought to show how we can understand the philosophical foundations of 
negative dialectics as developing from an immanent critique of Kant and Hegel 
— the mutual mediation of Kant and Hegel results in negative dialectics.  
Aspects of Kant's thinking represent core commitments in Adorno's dialectics; 
but also his rejection of Kant is due to commitments that he has taken from 
Hegel.  Conversely, aspects of Hegel's thinking persist as core commitments in 
Adorno's dialectics but his rejection of Hegel is due to commitments that he has 
taken from Kant.  The account of negative dialectics presented above makes 
explicit the commitments which underpin this mediated critique and which help 
us to ground our philosophical understanding of negative dialectics. 
 
I have argued in Section One, that Adorno finds a number of problems with 
Kant's philosophy.  He breaks his own critical stipulation against speculative 
thinking in his rendering of transcendental subjectivity. Crucially, the fixing of 
subjectivity and its abstraction in transcendental subjectivity is concomitant with 
a particular view of both judgements and objects.  Adorno argues that Kant's 
thinking is at least divided in its commitments: on the one hand there is a critical 
sensitivity to the world — this suggests that we cannot simply propose a priori 
how the world is, we must develop our theories in response to the world itself 
and, specifically, how it appears to us.  It could be argued that Kant rationally 
fixes what objects, subjects and judgements are according to such appearances.   
 
These transcendental determinations of objects, subjects, etc., are not themselves 
validated by sensible experience.  For Adorno, they are the product of pre-critical 
commitments and a view of both the world and of experience which is wedded to 
a pre-critical belief in a particular world view: one that is essentially proto-
scientistic and empiricist.  Not only does Adorno worry about the consistency of 
this pre-critical element with the critical component of Kant's thought, he thinks 
that such a view of experience is false in its view of our epistemic activities and 
the view of the world it engenders. 
 
These problems, according to Adorno, result from Enlightenment commitments 
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that we can and should know the world, rationally in its entirety — in other 
words it results from pre-critical epistemic commitments which escaped Kant's 
own critical eye.
183
  Kant's solution was to pare down the objects of critical 
knowledge to that for which we could provide sufficient conditions of knowing.  
In other words, the reason why Kant makes this move is because he is 
epistemically committed to the idea that the world is the sort of thing, even if 
only in appearance, that is objectively knowable by us, in its entirety. 
 
Adorno argues that Kant's scientistic bent is much deeper than a commitment to 
geometrical and mathematical propositions as synthetic a priori.  Objects are 
entities amenable to empirical analysis and they are the only valid objects of 
knowledge.
184
   
 
To Kant we can add no theorems of knowledge that were not 
developed by him, because their exclusion is central to his 
epistemology; the systematic claim of the doctrine of pure reason 
makes this exclusion unmistakable enough. The Kantian system is a 
system of stop signals. The subjectively directed constitutional analysis 
does not alter the world as it is given to a naïve bourgeois 
consciousness; rather, it takes pride in its "empirical realism." But it 
sees the height of the validity it claims as one with the level of 
abstraction. Obsessed with the apriority of its synthetic judgments, it 
tends to expurgate any part of cognition that does not bow to their 
rules. The social division of labor is respected without reflection, along 
with the flaw that has become strikingly clear in the two hundred years 
since: that the sciences organized by a division of labor have usurped 
an illegitimate monopoly on truth. Put in bourgeois and very Kantian 
terms, the paralogisms of Kant’s epistemology are the bad checks that 
went to protest with the unfoldment of science into a mechanical 
activity. The authority of the Kantian concept of truth turned terroristic 
with the ban on thinking the absolute. Irresistibly, it drifts toward a ban 
on all thinking. What the Kantian block projects on truth is the self-
maiming of reason, the mutilation reason inflicted upon itself as a rite 
of initiation into its own scientific character. Hence the scantiness of 
what happens in Kant as cognition, compared with the experience of 
the living, by which the idealistic systems wished to do right, even 
though in the wrong fashion. (ND: 388) 
 
We can see that Kant would have blocked my analysis of Fountain.  The limiting 
of valid objects of knowledge, pointed to by Adorno in this quotation, to that 
which appears to us spatio-temporally and the consideration of objects only in the 
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scientifically minded philosopher' (1982: 253 - 5). 
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way that they appear spatio-temporally, is not only invalid for Adorno, it is 
indicative of a particular world-view.  Of course, Adorno's analysis may be 
incorrect.  However, the Kantian assumption that it is reasonable to develop all 
objectively valid knowledge from immediate spatio-temporal experience seems 
to have thoroughly ignored even the possibility and necessity of thinking in other 
ways.   
 
Kant's commitment to the transcendental limits of epistemology and the 
determination of modality according to those limits sets the scope of entities 
about which we can gain objectively valid knowledge.  Kant was then prepared 
to jettison thinking beyond appearances as such thinking jeopardizes the project 
of objectively and sufficiently valid knowledge of the world.  As Adorno argues, 
the result is eventually a truncation of thinking and knowing.  Conversely, 
Adorno's negative move is to give up our ambitions of an epistemology and 
metaphysics, tailor-made to objective knowing, and enter into open-ended critical 
relations with the world.  The truncation of experience and judgement in 
transcendental idealism could be seen as the crux of Adorno's rejection of Kant. 
 
Yet it is wrong to think that these criticisms amount to a complete rejection. Just 
as Adorno makes the point that there is truth in the untruth of Hegel's philosophy, 
there is similar truth in the untruth of Kant's thinking.  According to Adorno, 
Kant's philosophy is a 'force-field' which attempts to draw together and co-
ordinate key commitments of the Enlightenment psyche.  Even if Kant is wrong, 
he reveals deep truths, in philosophical form, about the environment within 
which he was working.
185
  It is also worth noting, that suggesting a philosopher, 
or their system of thought, is right or wrong and that this value is sufficient to the 
worth of the philosophy is deeply misguided for Adorno.
186
  If we imagine a 
philosophical system to be like an object, then just as objects have certain modal 
properties in virtue of how their socio-historical milieu is, so does a philosophical 
system.  Philosophy is not, for Adorno, a discrete body of thought that can or 
should be evaluated in abstraction from its socio-historical moment.  Nor does its 
value lie solely on the grounds of whether or not it is 'right'.  Adorno's criticisms 
of Kant are not simply a negative value judgement for Adorno. 
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Furthermore, Adorno considered Kant to be right about many issues.  Inasmuch 
as certain aspects of Kant's thinking can be used to help Adorno navigate the 
problems of dialectical philosophy highlighted in Chapter Six, some of Adorno's 
core philosophical commitments are genetically Kantian.  No doubt these 
Kantian commitments are transformed within their mediation in Adorno's 
negative dialectics and as such are no longer straightforwardly Kantian.  This 
transformation is effected through their mediation with Hegelian notions.  
Nevertheless, it is highly instructive to maintain a view of the Kantian moments 
of Adorno's thinking.   
 
The key notion that Adorno retains from Kant is that the appropriate way to 
determine what our metaphysics and epistemology consists in is through a 
critical reflection on our experience of objects.
187
  Reason errs when it speculates 
beyond the limits of experience.  Nevertheless, Adorno does not make the 
Kantian move that transcendental reason can provide the sufficient grounds for 
the co-ordination of this limitation (when this happens pre-critical commitments 
creep back in).  As has been said, he does not make the move that experience of 
objects only consists in empirical experience — a notion that will be returned to 
at the end of this section.  However, he does hold that a turn towards objects, 
those things which are conceptless, will help us come to realise particular limits 
of our conceptual and rational resources.  This move is unmistakably Kantian.  
 
In some sense, therefore, Adorno is attempting to be more Kantian than Kant.  
Kant wished to limn the limits of metaphysics and epistemology according to the 
transcendental conditions required for sensible cognition.  As Kant argues in his 
introduction to the first Critique, this is required because speculation has led 
metaphysics into confusion (CPR: Avii - viii).  The point of the limitation is, 
therefore, to eradicate the propositions of pure speculative reason where they 
masquerade as objective, valid knowledge, arrived at solely through a priori 
metaphysical enquiry.   
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Adorno is entirely in agreement with this project.  Indeed, as this stands, this 
move is constitutive of Adorno's thinking.  The problem, Adorno argues, is that 
whilst Kant made this move, he made far-reaching assumptions about what it was 
that we were investigating when we were analysing phenomenal experience and 
associated cognition.  Because Kant thought that experience consisted only in 
phenomena which can be spatio-temporally determined, he made pre-critical 
moves: he believed that experience consists only in entities which can be spatio-
temporally determined; and that if we are able to give conditions for that 
determination then those conditions can be considered the fixed conditions of all 
cognitive determination.  If we have good reason to reject the first assumption 
then we have good reason to reject the second assumption. If we reject these two 
assumptions, what you have is a persistent turn towards the object as opposed to 
the 'one-shot' consideration that we find in Kant.  The persistent turn to the 
objects of experience is isomorphic with the persistence of the critical turn in 
Adorno's thought; Adorno's negativity consists in the persistence of this critical 
turn. 
 
In considering nonidentity and modal properties in Chapter Nine, we saw that 
objects can change their properties, even come into existence and cease to exist, 
according to change in socio-historical conditions. If our grounds for the 
consideration of that change lie in critical consideration of the material object and 
the critical consideration of those socio-historical conditions, then we have good 
reason to doubt that the conditions of knowledge and what it is that we know 
about, can be settled at any one particular time.  Therefore, Kant's proposal that 
we consider what we are and what we can know according to our objective 
experience is irreducible in Adorno's philosophy.  For Adorno, propositions — 
transcendental or synthetic — cannot persist beyond their index to a particular 
state of affairs.  The consequence of this is an epistemic humility: whilst we can 
certainly know things about objects, what we know cannot be assumed to be 
sufficient and eternal; knowledge cannot be reified into an enduring, timeless, 
positive set of facts. 
 
As with artworks, which are objects about which our judgements change 
according to different socio-historical moments, attention to these objects present 
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immediate critiques of sets of propositions which we may take to be eternally 
true.  For example, let us say that some painting is an artwork.  Let us even say 
that we have made this judgement on the basis of an Adornian analysis — by 
considering not just the form and material of the object but also its socio-
historical milieu.  In light of these analyses, we assert that the proposition 'this 
painting is an artwork' is true.  Adorno's point would be that if we reify this 
proposition as a 'positive fact of the matter' we ignore the fact that the socio-
historical conditions upon which it is reliant for its status as an artwork, will 
change.  In turn, the status of the painting as an artwork may also change.  To 
know one way or another we must repeat our analysis.   
 
In terms of the judgement, we also ignore the nonidentity of the subject and 
predicate. In reifying the proposition as a fact we reify the relationship between 
the subject and predicate in their equation in the judgement; we suppress the 
nonidentity of the two terms and their referents and their dynamic, changeable 
relation. In particular instances, negativity is more literal in its meaning: socio-
historical states of affairs, more often than not, negate those propositions about 
the world which we have taken to be indicative of some truth; methodologically 
the negativity of Adorno's position is that even if socio-historical events do not 
negate such propositions, we cannot reify the method as a formula or rule of 
analysis prior to the examination of the object as the method would then contain 
systematic assumptions about what the object is.  Negativity is an orientation 
towards the persistence of change. 
 
The metaphysical commitments proposed above are in accord with this position.  
Not only is the material constitution of objects not faithfully represented in our 
conceptualisations of it, no matter how valid those conceptualisations, but also 
the material constitution of some objects is such that their being taken as a 
particular sort  of entity relies on heterogeneous factors to the object (see Chapter 
Nine).  If those heterogeneous factors, such as socio-historical circumstances 
change, which they most certainly do, then objects are such that they instantiate 
different modal properties at different times.  Insofar as they do this then it is 
more than possible, and is the case according to Adorno, that they will attest to 
the truth of very different, perhaps even contradictory, propositions at different 
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times.  Furthermore, some very complex objects will make true contradictory 
claims at the same time but in different respects; the analysis of co-locating 
objects helps us to make sense of the metaphysics of this notion.  Certain objects, 
artworks for example, are such that we cannot foreclose on a set of true 
propositions just because they may be true of that object at a particular time.  
Ignoring the indexing of propositions to a socio-historical moment actually 
creates the conditions whereby you can have inconsistency and contradictions — 
or where our metaphysics is gerrymandered to avoid such a possibility. 
 
This analysis does suggest why Adorno would be convinced by aspects of Kant's 
thinking — Kant's turn towards the particular as both the basis for metaphysics 
and epistemology, is a persistent, constitutive and irreducible feature of Adorno's 
philosophy.  He argues that character of cognition is responsive to the 
particularity of the object, which can only be taken as the invariant idealist, 
representation of the phenomena at the expense of that particularity.  If we 
jettison the pre-critical criterion that our knowledge of the world be objective, 
valid and complete (that epistemically the world is totally transparent and 
knowable for us) then we can reinstate the object as a substantial feature of 
cognition.   
 
The object, in its rich particularity, entails that it is more than what is captured by 
any one linguistic representation at any one time.  We can consider our encounter 
with objects as such rather than just phenomena because without our epistemic 
ambitions we are no longer as worried by the fact that what we experience cannot 
be sufficiently represented in sets of propositions.  This worry is allayed by the 
fact that we can still validly and objectively talk about the world — losing the 
former does not lead us into scepticism, it leads us into epistemic humility. 
 
The materialist longing to grasp the thing aims at the opposite: it is 
only in the absence of images that the full object could be conceived. 
Such absence concurs with the theological ban on images. Materialism 
brought that ban into secular form by not permitting Utopia to be 
positively pictured; this is the substance of its negativity. (ND: 207) 
 
Here Adorno is quite explicit that negativity just is the orientation towards the 
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fact that our representations of the world are not sufficient to it.  Materialism, 
which he argues replaces idealism through the immanent critique of the latter, is 
the turn towards analysis of the object as we saw in Chapter Nine.   
 
Our epistemic humility, as I put it, entails that we give up our claim and goal of 
total knowledge and a positive utopia associated with it — objects will always 
defy our articulations as representations.  Our valid conceptual engagements with 
the world will enter us into a dynamic, critical engagement with the world.  
Utopia, as Hammer rightly points out, is a philosopher's dream not an immanent 
reality (Hammer, 2008: 69).  In some circumstances this may be no real worry as 
we can still talk validly about the world, we can still pick out its features and 
attend to it in a logical, rational and consistent fashion.  In other circumstances, 
such as in the consideration of artworks, what this humility does is re-orientate us 
to the complexity of the world which is circumvented by our will to knowledge.  
Furthermore, it sets our epistemic practices back in motion.  The picture theory, 
identity-thinking, the will to transform the world into a conceptual picture of 
itself, is covertly the will to hold the world in place by making a static 
representation of it, sufficient to it.  If we let go, so to speak, of our epistemic 
ambitions, our intellectual experience of the world will become dynamic and 
responsive to the world again. 
 
10.3 Critique of Hegel Revisited: developing dialectics through the mutual 
Critique of Kant and Hegel 
 
Adorno's critique of Kant is primarily an immanent critique and is therefore 
conducted from within Kant's thinking. Nevertheless, Adorno uses Hegel's 
critique of Kant to rethink these problems or tensions such that they can be 
replaced by a more workable theory or so that what is right about Kant's theory 
can be developed.  If we consider certain key points in Hegel's critique of Kant, 
and considering these criticisms in light of the discussion in Section Two, we can 
see how Adorno is influenced by Hegel.   
 
However, as much as the first section proceeded from a critique of Kant, through 
to Hegel's thinking, we saw that Adorno was also critical of Hegel.  I now wish to 
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show that even in areas where Adorno appears to move in line with Hegelian 
thinking against Kant, there are Kantian elements which persist in Adorno's 
philosophy.  That is, Adorno does not accept Hegel's dialectics in its entirety 
because there are elements of Kant's thinking which Adorno is still committed to 
— or which he has used to mediate some of Hegel's thinking.  Therefore, I think 
it is better to understand Adorno as neither a Kantian nor an Hegelian, nor as 
amalgam of both theorists' work: rather, Adorno uses Hegel to develop and 
critique Kant, but he also uses Kant to counter-critique and develop Hegel.  
Negative dialectics, from which the constellation of philosophical commitments 
results, is most fruitfully understood as the dialectical interpenetration of Kantian 
and Hegelian philosophy. 
 
10.3i Key Hegelian Criticisms of Kant 
 
Through the discussion in section two, we have considered some of Hegel's key 
criticisms of Kant.  Adorno agrees, at least in part, with each of them: 
 
- Hegel argues that Kant was wrong to isolate only four antinomies (SoL: 
190).  As we have seen, an antinomy is some form of contradiction in 
thought, owing to the logical and rational viability of exclusive 
positions.
188
  Hegel argued that that there are antinomies in all our 
thoughts as a matter of dialectics (SoL: 191).  According to Hegel what 
Kant has done is isolate the two moments as a thesis and antithesis and, 
due to dogmatic commitments, opted for one side of the dialectic over 
another (SoL: 191 - 3).  What he ought to have done is considered how 
the limits of reason and understanding, which are the basis of antinomy 
provide the conditions for their own transformation.  In order to achieve 
this, Kant needed to think about limits itself, finitude and infinity, 
differently.
189
 
 
- For Kant, issues of modality are settled through the status of a judgement 
as it relates to the transcendental conditions of cognition.  Hegel warns 
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 See CPR: B433 - 5. 
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that this is irreducibly subjective and fails to properly account for the 
objective conditions within which particular individuals, and what can be 
said of them, obtain (SoL: 80).  Hegel resituates modality as an 
ontological category concerned with the determination of extant entities.  
In short, how and what objects are and the validity of the judgements we 
make about objects is not settled according to something about the subject 
but by an objectively real state of affairs.  At the pure ontological level, 
'measure' is arrived at through a priori argument into the dialectics of 
being; the modality of social phenomena is a similarly objective state of 
affairs.
190
 
  
- Objects are determined by the general conditions of cognition and 
rendered conceptually in the immediate subsumption of the appearance 
under a general conceptual representation. Hegel rejects the immediacy of 
the subsumption of objects in appearance to concepts.  Objects are 
different in kind to the concepts which we use to represent them, which 
are general and abstract.  If we ignore this difference, as we see in the 
Phenomenology, we find that our thought becomes suffused with 
confusions and susceptible to scepticism. (PoS: 204)  Obviously a central 
theme of the Phenomenology is the eradication of that difference through 
its sublation.  Nevertheless, the initial difference cannot be ignored or 
dogmatically suppressed; it must itself be sublimated through dialectical 
enquiry.  
 
- Hegel argues that Kant's placing of the real — qua self and world — 
beyond the rational is a deep mistake and is a consequence of ungrounded 
dogmatism concerning sensible appearances as the basis of valid, 
objective knowledge. (SoL: 779 - 80)  
 
- As implied in the last two points, Hegel argues against appearances as the 
basis of knowledge.  Whilst I think Stern has successfully argued that 
Hegel is sensitive to the critical turn against abstract, a priori 
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metaphysical speculation in Kant's philosophy, Hegel is quite explicit that 
rationalist metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the essence of 
objects and the world, is deeper, and more truthful, than the picture we 
find in Kant.  Hegel argues that, for genuine knowledge, we cannot base 
our epistemic enquiries on appearances; instead we ought to aim at 
knowledge of essence — a project entirely within the scope of our 
rational capabilities, even taking into consideration the Kantian turn. 
(SoL: 783 - 6) 
 
- Hegel argues that metaphysics and epistemology is dynamic in a way 
which cannot be accounted for by Kant.  Both the Logic and the 
Phenomenology, insofar as they are dialectical, follow the transformations 
of thought and of our categories.  They pursue a method and content of 
rational reflection which thoroughly rejects the transcendental move of 
the First Critique which fixes our cognitive framework according to the 
immediate content of perception.  According to Hegel, this Kantian move 
not only produces certain confusions in thought — concerning the 
immediate contents of our experience — it is also unable to account for 
the changes in our thinking and in our social structures which history 
attests to.  Kant's thinking is, rather, itself an expression in the historical 
movement of rationality. 
 
- Hegel objects to the Kantian critique of speculative metaphysics as it 
amounts to an attack on reason itself and entails limits on subjectivity 
itself.  Obviously Hegel appreciates why Kant made this move and sees 
Kant as progressive in certain respects; however, he balks at the limit 
placed on reason and therefore, on the autonomous, rational subject.  He 
argues that Kant's move against reason is dogmatic and imposes an 
heterogeneous limit, the source of which lies outside of reason itself — in 
the appearance of phenomena.  Conversely, for Hegel, it is the function of 
dialectical reason that it can develop itself, through its encounter with 
heterogeneous elements, to higher levels of clarity and insight.  
Importantly, these insights develop through the assimilation of what 
reason previously encountered as its limit.  The Kantian belief that the 
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limits of reason are fixed fails to understand reason and the dialectical 
character of limitation itself. 
 
These ideas have been discussed at length in Section Two.  What I will now 
explore is the extent to which Adorno accepts these criticisms, the way that he 
uses Kantian considerations to limit his acceptance and how his own particular 
position emerges as a result. The idea is that Adorno's position is a dialectical 
transformation of Kant and Hegel through their mutual mediation.   
 
10.3ii Critical Mediations 
 
Hegel's first criticism of Kant, concerning the antinomies, is taken up by Adorno: 
there are antinomies in all of our thoughts and, following Hegel, he rejects the 
idea that the resolution to the antinomies is to be found in transcendental 
idealism.  Kant helps Adorno to think negatively through the awareness of the 
problem of limitations of reason.  Where fixity and hypostasis persist in Kant's 
thinking, it persists to provide the transcendental conditions for an objective, 
valid, positive epistemology.  We have seen Adorno argue for antinomies as a 
real matter of nonidentity: the way in which we think as heterogeneous and 
contradictory to reality which produces judgements and modes of thinking ripe 
with tension. 
 
Yet dialectically, Adorno's counter criticism of dogmatic thinking in Hegel is 
implicitly a result of Kantian commitments concerning the limits of thought.  
Whilst he accepts that there are antinomies, he does not think that those 
antinomies can be sublated by thought alone.  Furthermore, he does not see 
antinomy as simply a moment of rationality.  Rather, antinomy becomes a broad 
category of intellectual experience resulting from the heterogeneity of thought to 
its content.  If we take Kant's critical move seriously, which Adorno takes 
exceptionally seriously, that critical enquiry always begins with consideration of 
the particular, we cannot, therefore, build systems and bodies of knowledge upon 
the reification of the dialectic.   
 
We must, like Kant did at first, begin with the object and what is before us and 
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constantly return to it.  Again the persistence of the critical turn speaks against 
O'Connor's interpretation of Adorno as a transcendental philosopher: we cannot 
fix the transcendental conditions of the critical turn prior to critical analysis.  
Rather, criticism is developed anew through each particular analysis.  Adorno 
holds this Kantian insight alongside Hegel's where antinomy is the dialectical 
tensions found between different terms in judgements and in our rational 
contemplation of the relation of judgements to the objects they determine — and 
then ultimately to our rational consideration of how particulars actually are.  We 
cannot reify the conditions of knowing to legislate against antinomy — we must 
think with the antinomy, as it were, through dialectics; but we must not sublate 
the irreducible particularity of the particular object in order to overstep the 
antinomy.  Adorno's dialectics is transformative rather than sublative. We can see 
how Adorno's thinking is a dialogue between Kant and Hegel to produce a 
position which neither thinker holds: a transformative mode of thinking which 
aims to reduce the dogmatic, 'positive' elements, of both thinkers if taken by 
themselves. 
 
The question then of Adorno's conception of antinomy is captured by those 
metaphysical commitments I have expounded above.  If it is the case that all our 
thoughts have aporetic moments — that there are antinomies in thought — and 
that these moments consist in a number of related tensions — the relationship 
between general and particular, abstract and concrete, representation and 
articulation — and that these antinomies cannot be sublated (Hegel) nor 
dissolved (Kant), we can make sense of this move if we understand key aspects 
of language and world and their relationship as expounded in the analysis of 
nonidentity and conceptlessness above.  I have argued that we are committed to 
attending to the world in its irreducible particularity — this captures the Kantian 
commitment to experience.   
 
However, taking up the Hegelian position, there is a dogmatic element in Kant's 
position over the antinomy.  Kant sees in the antinomies a justification of 
transcendental idealism because it is only idealism — as opposed to 
transcendental rationalism — which is able to explain the existence of the 
antinomy and dissolve it as an epistemological and metaphysical worry.  
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However, for Hegel, this is no solution: the antinomy still exists and its 'solution' 
is really only dissolved through a related truncation of experience and rationality.  
That Hegel thinks the antinomy can be overcome by considering it a fulcrum for 
the reconsideration of the notion of infinity shows that Kant's 'necessary' 
transcendental solution was premature and dogmatic.
191
 
 
Adorno sides with Hegel in holding that there are antinomies in all of our 
thoughts; he thinks that dialectics is required to negotiate these antinomies.  
However, he then dialectically shifts again to take Kant's side over Hegel when 
Hegel thinks that, through thought alone, the contradictory moments can be 
sublated by the dialectical understanding of the particular as universal and the 
universal as particular.  This is achieved by Hegel through the a priori 
reconsideration of limitation, finitude and infinity — the determinate movement 
of his dialectic from the negative to the speculative moment.  As we saw in 
Chapter Six, Hegel's idealist move that antinomies can be assimilated within 
systematic thinking mistakes our ability to identify the dialectic with the 
rationalist commitment that thought is sufficient to turn difference within the 
dialectic into identity.  The account of the conceptlessness grounds this limit to 
the Hegelian dialectic: 
 
To give a stark description we might say that the [Critique of Pure 
Reason] contains an identity philosophy — that is, a philosophy that 
attempts to ground being in the subject — and also a nonidentity 
philosophy — one that attempts to restrict that claim to identity by 
insisting on the obstacles, the block, encountered by the subject in its 
search for knowledge. (KCPR: 66)
192 
 
Adorno makes it quite clear that in many ways Kant has a deeper sensitivity to 
the limits of reason and the difference of material reality to pure subjectivity than 
Hegel.  As this limitation persists in Kant, there is a deeper and more Modern 
truth in Kant than in Hegel.  Insofar as Adorno is a thinker of nonidentity, and 
inasmuch as Kant has a constitutive role for the non-identical in his philosophy, 
Hegel's dialectics is strongly mediated by Kantian thinking for Adorno.  That is 
not to suggest that Adorno is a transcendental rather than a dialectical thinker.  
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Rather, it is to underline the fact that there are methodological limits — negativity 
— to dialectical thinking. 
 
Given that antinomy is eventually sublated within Hegelian thinking we can see 
that Hegel is the apotheosis of identity-thinking.  He takes the moment of 
difference, which makes itself apparent through antinomy, and argues that the 
conceptual identification of the dialectical character of difference can form a 
truly positive moment in thought — its negative moment (the difference itself) 
can be rationally negated and is preserved only insofar as it is the determinate 
moment for the transformation into a positive moment of the dialectic — 
identity.  Adorno makes precisely this point:  'The isolated moments [of the 
dialectic] go beyond themselves, in fact, only because the identity of subject and 
object is preconceived' (HTT: 93).
193
  As we saw in Chapter Six, it suppresses the 
initial moment which motivates the dialectic, that the object in its genuine 
difference to conceptual thought, produces antinomies in thought when we take 
account of that difference (HTT: 19).   
 
That we can recognize this difference does not entail that we can assimilate it 
within the dialectic.  Adorno's solution is precisely the opposite to that of Hegel: 
it is to say that our conceptual thoughts about the world, even as articulated 
within our recognition of nonidentity, whilst valid, do not represent how the 
world is ontologically: 
 
The linguistic expression "existence," which is necessarily conceptual, 
is confused with what it designates, which is conceptless, something 
that cannot be melted down into identity. (HTT: 19) 
 
Therefore, if we wish to know how the world is we cannot look to the conceptual 
rendering of difference as a moment in dialectical thinking; rather, we must look 
back to the world. Hegel's critique of Kant and then the critique of Hegel via 
Kant help to deepen what is meant by negativity in Adorno's thinking.  It also, of 
course helps us to ground what is meant by dialectics in Adorno's thinking. 
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Given this dialectical dialogue between Kant and Hegel and the metaphysical 
analysis of conceptlessness provided above, we gain a deep insight into negative 
dialectics.  Antinomies arise for both Kant and Hegel as a result of tensions 
between the generalising and abstracting capacities of thought and the particular 
and immediate determinations of the content of our thought.  Adorno's solution to 
the problem of antinomies arises largely as a result of the different ways in which 
identity-thinking manifests in both Kant and Hegel.  Using the one to critique the 
mode of identity-thinking in the other, we get a fuller grounding for the general 
problems of identity-thinking.   
 
This rejection of identity-thinking allowed us to present a metaphysical picture 
which revolves around the validity of conceptual articulations, qua world, but 
which points against the further, invalid move, that we should take these 
articulations as representations of the world.  Inasmuch as this metaphysical basis 
captures the sort of commitments that Adorno has in his mutual transformation of 
Kant and Hegel, we are beginning to validate his claim that negative dialectics is 
the 'consistent sense of nonidentity' (ND: 5).  I have shown that through Hegel 
and Kant we are consistently thrown back to consideration of the object in its 
particularity.  Our judgements and our understanding of judgements are 
consequently not able to be reified.  Given the way that certain objects are, 
artworks for example, their historical properties are such that they can never be 
thoroughly identified by a complete set of propositions.  Together these 
considerations unavoidably point us towards a deep, open-minded, theoretical 
consideration of the particular.  This is negative dialectics.  
 
Let us consider the second, third and fourth criticisms Hegel has of Kant 
together; we will see a similar pattern of analysis open up.  Kant's realism is 
attenuated by the epistemic problem that the noumenal is beyond the bounds of 
knowledge as we have seen.  Hegel's critique of Kant is that this is not genuine 
realism as the validity for the objective determination of an entity is, in the final 
analysis, irretrievably subjective and is concomitant with a lapse into dogmatism.  
Hegel, indebted far more to Aristotle here, wants a robust sense of the real as 
grounded in essences and universals.  Adorno agrees with this move to an extent.  
He complains that Kant makes the subject the grounds of objectivity through its 
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reification.  Given Kant's epistemic ambitions, Adorno argues that the result of 
Kant's position is a rationalistic and bureaucratic determination of a universal 
subject that could be capable of providing such objective grounds. 
 
Like Hegel, Adorno is deeply uncomfortable with this position in Kant.  Rather 
than proceeding transcendentally to shore-up the validity of what appears to be 
the case, we should consider what is the case.  One of Hegel's innovations is to 
think in a priori terms without grounding a priori thought on empirical 
experience.  Arguably then, he is able to avoid the position of transcendental 
realism without resorting to transcendental idealism. Reflection on the 
determination of the particular in thought provides the conditions through which 
we can progress in our thinking to a higher level of comprehension: an 
understanding which understands the competing moments of thought under a 
unity. 
 
But yet again, as we saw in Chapter Six, Adorno rejects Hegel's idealist 
dialectics which takes the sublation of difference for providing a new conceptual 
unity — one which overcomes or sublates the difference between mind and 
world.  Through the dialectical sublation of the antinomies in our thought, our 
thinking and conceptual rendering of the world advances to the point where it 
becomes sufficient to the thorough and total understanding of the world — we 
know the world as it really is.  Against this, Adorno still takes seriously Kant's 
insight that the mind and world are irreducibly different and we cannot cancel 
that difference, conceptually, through the recognition of this fact. 
 
The result is a form of materialist realism under enormous epistemological 
pressure.  Like Hegel, Adorno thinks that we should not resort to methodological 
antirealism so easily; like Kant, Adorno does not think that we can magic away 
the irreducible epistemic difficulties that the ontological difference of mind and 
world poses.  Interestingly, both the Kantian and the Hegelian positions result 
from Enlightenment epistemological ambitions: that whatever it is that we think 
we can know, we should be able to know it in its entirety.   
 
Negative dialectics is the rejection of both strategies as a route to a stable and 
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complete epistemology.  Metaphysically, it says that we can be realists about the 
world but that when we consider how certain objects are, and how they are 
different at the ontological level to how they are represented in our conceptual 
articulations, we find that some objects at least, modernist artworks for example, 
are vastly complex entities.  The combination of historical properties and their 
persistence conditions are such that our ability to know these objects is 
immediately put under extreme pressure.  Negative dialectics from this point of 
view, is the methodological acceptance of the fact that the entities which we 
enquire into are at least vastly more complicated than our conceptual schemas 
would suggest.
194
  If epistemology is the science of knowledge, then it is in this 
sense that Adorno is 'Against Epistemology'; it does not follow from this that 
Adorno was therefore against knowledge or an irrationalist.   
 
The fifth criticism that Hegel has of Kant is that he develops the foundations of 
metaphysics and epistemology on the determination of immediate appearances in 
experience.  As we have seen, Hegel argues at length against immediacy.  The 
influence of Hegel on Adorno over this issue is obviously profound and Adorno 
admits it on numerous occasions.  Appearances and what we even take to be an 
appearance is as a result of the conceptual mediation of our experience.  
 
Kant is aware of mediation, in one sense: the appearance mediates the mind and 
noumena.  Hegel's point was that the appearance is still taken as immediate in 
Kant and that this is a mistaken move — we see in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
the problems that any form of immediacy leads to for Hegel.  Appearance is, 
when we properly reflect on it, already engaged in the dialectic of general and 
particular, concrete and abstract — it contains antinomies.  Simple appearances 
require conceptual, dialectical reflection to realise that they are already a product 
of complex conceptual mediation.  Hegel's point is that the dialectical reflection 
on the 'immediacy' of appearance which yields a deeper understanding of how 
our experience is thoroughly mediated, even when it seems pure and simple, 
allows us, as we have seen repeatedly, to reach a higher level of unified 
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comprehension.  This is represented in the Phenomenology by the circle that 
consciousness travels through when considering the appearance.  That is, we can 
overcome the problem of immediacy on its own terms rather than circumventing 
it as we find in Kant. 
 
However, just as Adorno follows Hegel into a dialectical consideration of 
appearances, he maintains, against Hegel, the Kantian insight that cognition 
begins with, and must return to, particular experience.  And that experience of the 
particular is the condition of any intellectual activity and the condition for the 
form of intellectual activity.  In this instance, Adorno takes it that Hegel did not 
have enough sensitivity to the truth content of Kant's critical turn: that the 
difference between mind and world, or language and world, is irreducible and 
brings with it limits over what the mind and intellect can perform and know.   
 
Adorno argues this point within a dialectical critique of Hegel's dialectics.  
Analysis of objects, artworks for example, defy the unifying movement of 
idealist dialectics which argues for the rational certainty of total conceptual 
representation of objects — even in their difference to concepts.  As I have 
argued, Adorno's aesthetics of nonidentity demonstrates the disintegration of 
unity which immanently resists conceptual representation; in my discussion of 
conceptlessness, I showed how Adorno understands the problem of how to 
negotiate appearances.  The lack of unity in particular objects is a function of the 
lack of unity in society for Adorno.  That Hegel sees unity at the social level, 
grounded in the unifying logic of being, is the negative moment in Hegel's 
philosophy which sets the entire edifice back in motion for Adorno.  So, again, 
through the mutual critique of Kant and Hegel, Adorno is brought to a new 
position which is concerned with the dialectical reflection on appearances but 
where thought is never able to leave consideration of the object and move into 
pure dialectical analysis. 
 
The sixth of Hegel's criticisms of Kant follows from the previous considerations.  
That Kant's transcendental move prematurely checks rational reflection on the 
content of experience in favour of a fixed system of cognition.  That is, there is a 
stasis in Kant's thinking that Adorno critiques at length in his lectures on Kant.  
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As this criticism falls out of previous criticisms, I will not spend any time 
explaining it from the Hegelian perspective.  Nevertheless, as with the other 
criticisms, Adorno does not accept the Hegelian criticism in its totality and, 
again, uses Kantian insight to mediate the Hegelian criticism.   
 
Whilst Adorno agrees that the stasis we find in transcendental thinking is 
premature and blocks off the continued return to the object, he agrees with Kant 
that the object does impose, in its conceptlessness, a limit to the possibility of 
dialectical enquiry.  As such, Adorno's counter-critique of Hegel via Kant, is to 
ward off another type of stasis which results from idealist dialectics: the total 
understanding of the world within the system of dialectical reasoning.  The 
mutual mediation of Kant and Hegel opens up an irreducible dynamism where 
thought oscillates between dialectical conceptualisation back towards the 
conceptlessness, where dialectics meets its limit, and then back into dialectical 
thinking.  This oscillation cannot be foreclosed by either transcendental or 
dialectical thinking: as we saw in the analysis of nonidentity and conceptlessness, 
insofar as we are able to determine objects and make correct property 
predications of objects, some objects at least, modernist artworks for example, 
require us to continually return to them, to reanalyze them in accordance with the 
transformation of the socio-historical conditions which constitute the persistence 
conditions for their modal properties qua art. 
 
The final criticism concerned the status of reason.  One of the motivating forces 
of the first critique is to demonstrate that if we reason only in accordance with the 
possibilities afforded to us by pure thought, we will arrive at the sort of confusion 
that has mired philosophy, through metaphysics, until Kant's time.  The Critique 
of Pure Reason is an analysis of the limits of reason, the bounds of epistemology 
and a refiguring of metaphysics.  Equally well-known is the fact that Hegel 
rejected Kant's critique of dialectical thought — exemplified in the antinomies — 
as misunderstanding his own insight.  I have discussed the problems of the 
antinomies throughout the thesis and there is no need to revisit it here.   
 
Adorno agrees with Hegel that Kant's critique of pure reason is not only 
methodologically problematic insofar as reason is called upon to conduct a 
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critique upon itself but the stasis and limitation on the scope reason which Kant 
promotes is a dangerous attack on our ability to reason.  Adorno argues that the 
block, the limiting of epistemic and metaphysical enquiry to appearance, that 
Kant imposes on our powers of reason are a mutilation of reason by itself in order 
to guarantee a particular form of scientific cognition (ND: 388).  This is an 
exceptionally potent idea in Adorno and, as I have suggested, represents one of 
the deepest reasons for his rejection of Kant.  By extension, he does not want to 
reject or limit reason in this way. 
 
Like Hegel, Adorno argues that we must think through appearances as mediated; 
we must think through our predications and our conceptual determinations of 
objects; we must think through the socio-historical conditions which provide the 
persistence and truth conditions for many of the objects for which we are 
attempting to determine.  However, as with all of these criticisms, Adorno holds 
onto an aspect of Kant's insight which perpetually acts a limiting function on the 
totalising movements of Hegelian dialectics.  Rather than thinking that reason 
can think, dialectically, through to the total and sufficient representation of the 
objects of cognition, even sublating the difference of those objects within our 
rational reflection, Adorno agrees with Kant that there is a way the world is 
which cannot be totally captured in our conceptual articulations of it.   
 
The point of Adorno's negative dialectics is to say that in the face of this 
irreducible difference, we must not give up thinking in spite of this difference.  
Certain commentators take Adorno to opt for a hopelessly quixotic task where we 
must reason even though all reasoning is inherently a failure before the otherness 
of the object. I argue that we need not take this position.  Rather, reasoning is 
only a quixotic failure if we take stable, ahistorical knowledge of the world — 
which is total, systematic and unified — to be the goal.  Adorno's metaphysical 
insight, which underpins negative dialectics, is that we must let go of this goal 
and, even though this goal was the Enlightenment condition of us being able to 
proceed, only through the disintegration of this goal can we, as Beckett said, "go 
on".   
 
The price of negative dialectics is not knowledge as such: the price is our self-
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image of human reason as sufficient to the world we are attempting to 
understand.  But it does not follow from the fact that our conceptual engagements 
with the world are pointless or thorough failures, or necessarily invalid 
distortions; they can be valid and Adorno's immanent critiques of artworks testify 
to that fact.  What we must accept is that no matter how good our immanent 
critique of an artwork is at some time, at another time it  requires another, fresh 
critique — sufficient knowledge of certain objects, artworks for example, will 
always run away from us.  Progress is still possible for Adorno but only as the 
daily struggle of the intellect: only in the sense that one foot is placed ahead of 
the other. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In this section, I have considered how various analyses developed throughout this 
thesis come together in Adorno's negative dialectical method.  We have seen how 
Adorno both criticises Kant but also uses Kant's thought as a point of departure 
for the development of his own thought.  I have then outlined some of Hegel's 
criticisms of Kant, how Adorno is influenced by them, and also how Kant's 
thought persists in Adorno's dialectics.  In short, I have argued that Adorno 
mobilizes Kant and Hegel's thinking against each other and then uses that mutual 
critique to develop his own commitments.   
 
I have also indicated how this mutual critique, insofar as it helps us to understand 
Adorno's negative dialectics, points us towards the metaphysical commitments I 
have developed throughout this chapter.  As already quoted: "The idealists made 
a heaven of the mind, but woe betide the man who had a mind." (ND: 390).  This 
clever aphorism sums up Adorno's criticisms of Kant and Hegel.  Both in their 
different ways, they legislate against 'open-mindedness'.  Through the systematic 
determinations of their total systems of knowledge, their aim was to guarantee 
knowledge — not simply that we can have knowledge, but that the system can 
guarantee that our knowledge is valid, objective and complete.   
 
If we attend to Adorno's exact phrasing of particulars and general items in this 
phrase, it is telling. Firstly the idealists make 'a heaven' which implies it is one 
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amongst many.  This is an implicit rejection of the necessity of the theory of the 
subject that each proposes.  Furthermore, the heaven consists in a general mind as 
such.  He then inverts the first clause in the second clause to suggest that this 
structure stipulates against any particular man who has a particular mind.  As we 
have seen, Adorno believes that if we settle our metaphysics by our epistemic 
ambitions, the net result is an embargo on free thought — any thought which 
does not already fit the pattern of validated thought, is stipulated against. 
 
Despite his criticisms of Kant and Hegel, he holds both thinkers in great esteem.  
He develops his thinking through theirs and also links them, in their different 
ways, to the possibility of philosophy itself.  It is obvious in Adorno's discussion 
of Hegel that despite his rejection of Hegel, he perceives in Hegel the final 
(possible) attempt of philosophy to fulfill its promise — to provide a system of 
thinking which could guarantee, in virtue of reason itself, the validity and 
sufficiency of the knowledge it produces.  Indeed, so complete was Hegel's 
system that, in some sense at least, epistemology and metaphysics become one 
and the same thing in the Science of Logic.   
 
As with Beethoven in musical composition, inasmuch as content and form can be 
brought together in a thoroughly integrated unity, Hegel's idealism is the highest 
achievement of philosophy.
195
  However, just as musical form disintegrated, 
something which Adorno argues Beethoven anticipated in his Ninth Symphony, 
so did philosophy — its material, the conceptlessness, is an irreducible moment 
of resistance to a particular conception of identity (see Chapter Eight).  It is this 
resistance and disintegration that marks the modernism of Kantian thought.  
Whilst Hegel thought that he could recuperate the limits of experience through a 
dialectical metaphysics of experience, Kant's philosophy, in its material tensions, 
is already the realisation of this impossibility.  In the face of this impossibility, 
yet with the continuing belief in epistemology, Kantian thinking marks the retreat 
of philosophy from its grand visions.  In a deep sense, Adorno is committed to 
the idea that the dialectical sublation of Kant and Hegel accounts for the very 
possibility of the continuation of philosophy.  This does not entail that 
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philosophy must be carried out within the idealist idiom — quite the opposite as 
Adorno himself notes — but the sublation does proscribe the parameters and 
limits of epistemology and metaphysics. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
In this thesis I have attempted to provide an interpretation of particular 
philosophical commitments which underpin Adorno's negative dialectics as a 
critical mode of inquiry.  Given particular concerns Adorno has about systematic 
thinking, I have attempted to show that he has commitments which do constitute 
a substantial set of concerns for critical enquiry without having to render his 
thinking as a system. 
 
My strategy for developing these commitments was to follow the movements of 
Adorno's own critical analyses and show how his commitments emerge, as it 
were, out of these analyses.  As a dialectician, his concern is to show how 
contradictions, tensions and aprorias within thinking provide the resources for 
developing critical understanding.  It is this development of critical 
understanding which constitutes the advancement in thought and the 
transformation of consciousness. 
 
I began with his critique of Kant and isolated a key tension: that of the 
constituens and constitutum.  I offered an analysis of these concepts and showed 
that they were applicable to various aspects of Kant's philosophy, all related by 
the theme of constitution.  His argument is that due to Kant's epistemological 
ambitions there is a tendency to reify two related elements — such as mind and 
world — and prioritise one side of the dualism.  That fixity can be then be used 
as a secure basis from which its other may be determined.  The concern Adorno 
has is that this reification loses both the dynamic relationship of the two sides of 
the dialectic and also distorts them through the process of reification.  
 
I then showed how this concern was intimately related to identity-thinking.  
Kant's transcendental philosophy, amongst other aims, intends to produce a 
theory of judgement whereby the conceptual determinations we make of material 
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objects are objectively valid.  For Adorno this entails making the mind the fixed 
entity from which the objective validity of the world can be posited.  Adorno 
worried that this leads to the aporetic distinction between noumena and 
phenomena.  It also marks a slide, despite Kant's own beliefs about his system, 
into subjectivism: objective validity entitles us to consider the material object just 
as it is represented in our determinative, yet subjective, judgements.  Again, this 
fixing of the object in a determinative judgement simultaneously distorts the 
object and produces a distorted judgement.  To some extent Adorno accepts that 
this is unavoidable due to the ineliminable mediation of objects in perception by 
the subject.  However, it systematically suppresses what is both particular and 
historical about material objects.  Critical reflection on these distortions is what 
Adorno is commending. 
 
In short, Adorno sees in Kant's transcendental philosophy and his theory of 
determinative judgement a model of 'identity-thinking'.  I offered an analysis of 
identity-thinking which enabled us to understand the nature of the tension in 
Kant's account of judgement.  It also indicates why Adorno believes a transition 
towards dialectical philosophy is the appropriate way to revitalise the reified 
conceptual determinations of material objects and the relations of those 
determinations to the entities themselves. 
 
From here I moved to Hegel's philosophy as the clearest resource for developing 
a notion of dialectics for Adorno.  I analyzed a number of aspects of Hegel's 
philosophy which would be of direct importance to Adorno.  I considered Hegel's 
theory of propositions and judgements, also the relation of propositions and 
judgements to issues of essences and metaphysics.  From here we were able to 
develop an account of the intimate relationship between dialectics as a real, 
rational force which unfolds through the world and the way in which we judge 
the world.  The key idea being that our judgements, if they are to have claim to 
truth must be sensitive to the dialectics of reality itself. 
 
Having presented key facets of Hegel's philosophy, I considered the ways in 
which Adorno could be considered an Hegelian thinker.  It was not the primary 
intention to settle whether or not Adorno is an orthodox Hegelian; rather, it was 
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to continue to pursue his critical analyses as they reveal commitments in his own 
thought.  So, the evaluation of Adorno's relationship to Hegel is an important 
way in which we can come to understand Adorno himself — just as his critique 
of Kant was an important way to understand his philosophy. 
 
I argued that Hegel's dialectical critique of judgement and the emergence of the 
idea of nonidentity is of primary importance for Adorno.  Countering Kant's 
identity-thinking, Adorno finds in Hegel a way to think about objects which takes 
account of the distortions and reifications we make of particulars in judgement.  
Implicitly for Adorno, the ontological difference between material objects and 
our conceptual determinations of those objects is not a trivial fact.  Rather the 
conceptlessness of the material world is an immanent limitation on our ability to 
identify material objects with their concepts and something we must be sensitive 
to in our judgements about the world. The analysis I provided of Hegel's theory 
of judgement indicates that awareness of nonidentity and conceptlessness is an 
important commitment in Adorno's thinking. 
 
Adorno is also deeply impressed by Hegel's theory of mediation as it presents a 
way to circumvent the dualistic, reifying impulses of Kant's thinking.  The way 
objects exist, for Hegel, involves other objects and phenomena which are 
heterogeneous to it.  Hegel's theory of mediation gives Adorno the resources to 
overcome the bifurcations of transcendental idealism. 
 
Nevertheless, as much as Adorno takes on Hegelian ideas, they are greatly 
transformed in his thought.  This is because he rejects key systematic conclusions 
in Hegel's thinking.  I reconstructed Adorno's immanent critique of Hegel's 
idealist dialectics and showed that Adorno sees these dialectics as a social 
construction.  It is society which creates the material conditions for a particular 
understanding of dialectics not the other way around — hence Adorno inverts 
Hegel's thought in a significant way.  Furthermore, he argues that the total, 
unified positions of 'absolute knowing' and 'absolute idea' are in fact, for 
dialectical reasons, only themselves historical moments.  Analysis of these 
moments reveal further contradictions and the dialectic is set back in motion. 
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The fact that dialectics is never able to reach an end point — it is always only a 
moment in the transition to another moment — is a key aspect of Adorno's 
negativity.  His negative dialectics is a mode of thinking which is unable to 
conclude with positive, ahistorical claims.  Such claims will always be subject to 
further dialectical analysis.  Negativity is itself a commitment to change and the 
persistence of critique.  Furthermore, negativity is Adorno's attempt to fracture 
the dogmatic impulse, even within dialectics.  Arguably, it is the ethical potential 
of dialectics as a non-dogmatic mode of thinking which attracts him to Hegel's 
thought.  However, it is the concern with dogmatism which causes him to 
criticise and rethink Hegel when he thinks that Hegel's philosophy also reifies 
itself and becomes dogmatic.  The limits to dialectical thinking are not 
entrenched in dogmatic metaphysics; rather, they are a function of history and of 
the limits of epistemology. 
 
Having developed the notions of conceptlessness, nonidentity and mediation as 
they emerge out of Adorno's critiques of Kant and Hegel, I considered them in 
their own right.  I analyzed the concept of conceptlessness in an effort to 
disambiguate it from potential confusion with notions of non-conceptuality, i.e., 
that Adorno is referring to non-conceptual content in experience.  Whilst I 
acknowledge that this is a possible interpretation, through the work of Foster, I 
show that this interpretation strains intelligibility.  Taking Adorno to be referring 
strictly to the ontological difference between material objects and the concepts 
which determine them cognitively and discursively, is a fruitful way to 
understand his commitment and which concords with his other theoretical 
commitments. 
 
I then developed the concern with conceptlessness through the theoretical 
concern of nonidentity.  Nonidentity is a particularly challenging notion in 
Adorno's thinking which situated within the metaphysical debate of material 
constitution and the role of our conceptual determinations in this debate.  I 
argued that Adorno's theory of nonidentity is at least compatible with certain 
positions in contemporary metaphysics.  My intention is not to suggest, however, 
that Adorno is involved in ontological system building.  Adorno's commitments 
to nonidentity are developed through his analysis of material objects.  Following 
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Adorno, I demonstrated how an analysis of an artwork leads us to an appreciation 
of the complexities of nonidentity, founded upon the metaphysical distinctions 
made earlier.  Furthermore, when we see negative dialectics 'at work', we are able 
to allay Rosen's concern that without the systematic form of Hegel's dialectics, 
those of Adorno are fundamentally compromised. 
 
Whilst the primary purpose of the thesis was to offer an account of Adorno's 
philosophical commitments, the issue of whether or not he is a Kantian or an 
Hegelian inevitably arises.  I have shown that we can understand Adorno's 
philosophical commitments as they arise out of his engagement with Kant and 
Hegel.  However, I showed in this final section that rather than seeing Adorno's 
thought as the product of a linear progression from Kant to Hegel to himself, we 
should take the idea of emergence seriously.  Adorno's commitments emerge out 
of his critique of Kant and Hegel insofar as he in fact uses Hegelian ideas to 
critique Kant but he also uses Kantian notions to critique Hegel.  I suggest that 
negative dialectics is therefore the dialectical result of the interpenetration of 
Kantian and Hegelian thinking. 
 
***
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